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AF447 final crew conversation - Thread No. 1

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AF447 final crew conversation - Thread No. 1

Old 16th Oct 2011, 01:50
  #101 (permalink)  
 
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Aileron Drag @ #88

He held back stick...... What could go wrong, he flies an Airbus?

He's in ALTERNATE LAW, what could go wrong, he is Alpha protected?

Wicked speed, insane descent, He'll wait for the a/c to "raise" the nose.

What else could be wrong, it can't be STALLED.

He had it figured, wrong, but figured. His idea of recovery was to allow the a/c to recover, as it always does.

Ultimately, all three figured to PULL was the call. ALL THREE.

It happened another way? Funny thing, Airbus pilots aren't quite as harsh on these three, wonder why? They know something we don't?
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 03:52
  #102 (permalink)  
 
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Blubbers44m Spot on. I have been following this(s) threads for a long while. Clearly a combination of lack of basic flying skills by at least one, lack of ability to take command of the situation (other FO, he knew something was wrong but did not act) and the poor captain who opened the door and saw a freakin mess.
I still say we need basics in the cockpit, some glider and acro time (just an intro course will do) and at least two pilots on board who know more then FMS operation. Not harsh at all. However that being said it is easy to point fingers from the comfort of your living room.
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 04:57
  #103 (permalink)  
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Disgressing a bit : A joke in France for long is that Air France FI/FE thought they were so good they would teach birds how to fly .

Take a cup of coffee and watch this 1 min APP video, (full screen mode )
Amazing nature - The Eagle Owl

Particular attention to the winglets, the course correction when on the localizer, the full flaps extensiom, the slats, and if you can, (but you have to be very good ) the stall warning device.

Now back to PPRuNe and explaining the world how it should have been done...
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 07:57
  #104 (permalink)  
 
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Cool

Hi,

The latest movie about AF447 (in french)
http://www.stream-tv.fr/reportage-tv...e-de-securite/
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 08:32
  #105 (permalink)  
 
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Is post #63 to be interpreted as a test conducted to duplicate AF447 ? Presume they used manual trim.

Anyway, what did this snippet from the conversation add, other than that they believed the altimeter ?

Last edited by Mr Optimistic; 16th Oct 2011 at 10:04.
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 10:14
  #106 (permalink)  
 
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The crew were lacking in flight management knowledge...Isn't that obvious?
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 10:17
  #107 (permalink)  
 
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Obvious, yes but wasn't it already from the previous extracts? Can't see anything new here. The FULL extract from the start of the incident up until stall would help as it would clear up what was going through their minds and, maybe, what they thought the instruments were telling them.
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 10:46
  #108 (permalink)  
 
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quote- bubbers44 (i can't seem to quote directly, but that's another issue)
And sorry to digress a little.

Originally Posted by bubbers44
'These guys were poorly trained and were not qualified to be flying that airplane. The only qualified pilot was taking his rest break so when he got up there he had little time to figure out how they had gotten into their situation. How can airlines keep hiring pilots of this low capability to fly these wide body aircraft when they know the junior guys will be flying together with little experience? '
There is little doubt that the situation was not handled correctly, but that is not quite the same as poorly trained.

In your statement above, you say the 'only qualified pilot', implying that the 2 F/Os were not qualified?
Would you elaborate, as I feel there is a misconception here? The 2 F/Os were of less experience than the captain, maybe. But surely all were qualified to be there.
In my time, I have flown as F/O, with another F/O as relief, for the captain and myself, on very long trips. All are qualified.

Experience does not automatically produce great ability, nor does great ability infer lots of experience. No matter what the insurance companies and bean counters think.
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 12:04
  #109 (permalink)  
 
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Lyman said

He held back stick...... What could go wrong, he flies an Airbus?

He's in ALTERNATE LAW, what could go wrong, he is Alpha protected?

Wicked speed, insane descent, He'll wait for the a/c to "raise" the nose.

What else could be wrong, it can't be STALLED.

He had it figured, wrong, but figured. His idea of recovery was to allow the a/c to recover, as it always does.

Ultimately, all three figured to PULL was the call. ALL THREE.

It happened another way? Funny thing, Airbus pilots aren't quite as harsh on these three, wonder why? They know something we don't?
I think you hit the nail right on it's head.

You can't expect a crew to handle an emergency situation in which they have not been trained.
An Airbus can't stall (well, actually they can, but you know what I'm talking about). Airbus crew do not train stall recovery. It's possible these guys more or less grew up on Airbus aircraft, and the last stall training they had was many years ago?
I've never flown Airbus aircraft, but I've seen many demonstrations where the pilots fly the aircraft with the stick max aft to show what it's capable of.
So why are we surprised the pilots tried to recover with this procedure?

Last time I trained high level deep stall (in the sim) on the 737, it took some 10000+ ft to recover. It's not just "close the thrust levers and pitch forward--> recover". You need to push hard and use trim, then wait, wait, wait (and prey you have enough altitude), then hopefully you start to fly before you hit the ground.

These guys had a multitude of other problems as well. I just hope I never have to face a similar situation myself.
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 12:07
  #110 (permalink)  
 
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Lance

the figures still show that the lowest incident/accident rates in commercial flight are in the 50-55 years old pilot group, so experience must mean something, even if its just that the guys not wanting to be there have all left!

.....and interestingly, the 55-65 year olds are safer than the 40-50 year olds, but not by much.
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 12:13
  #111 (permalink)  
 
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Interesting!
Are you talking about 50-55 year old captains, or average age of the crew?
Can I have your source, please?
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 12:40
  #112 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Organfreak View Post
If I may beg to differ.... The captain of CG3407 had failed several checks.
But they kept checking until they passed him, which means he was technically a qualified Captain in spite of his questionable competence. This was why I made the distinction between competence and rank.

@ManaAdaSystem - You know as well as I do that there are no hard protections in Alternate Law - Lyman's trying to muddy the waters again. If he had been properly trained he would have known that Alternate Law = no hard protections. They only followed the suggestion to pull up after it was way too late (about 4000 ft I think?).
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 12:50
  #113 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by mimpe
the figures still show that the lowest incident/accident rates in commercial flight are in the 50-55 years old pilot group, so experience must mean something, even if its just that the guys not wanting to be there have all left!

.....and interestingly, the 55-65 year olds are safer than the 40-50 year olds, but not by much
I don't doubt that.
The point I was (obviously badly) aiming at, is that the 2 F/Os were not just very low time newbies, with no type rating. Unless my understanding of the AF accident is wrong.

Of course experience does count for a great deal, but only when coupled with actual ability, and not just luck.

The assumption seemingly being made in Bubbers44 post was that only the captain was qualified, the 2 F/Os being what?
This is adding an aspect to the discussion which is not supported by the facts so far, nor by the JAA regs. Surely?

If this accident is being discussed with a view to extracting as much information for the rest of us to learn from, then there is a responsibility for the facts to be presented or determined, without adding ambiguity. Hence my question.
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 14:05
  #114 (permalink)  
 
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I think the point being made is that the two F/Os may (possibly) have been the product of the 'new' training regime. That is, no exposure to stalling, spinning, and aeros, then after the CPL has been obtained straight onto a fly-by-wire computer-with-wings.

I met so many people like this. Fail the FMC and GPS and they're hopelessly lost. I guess it's inevitable in a high-tech environment.

I often got back from a trip thinking 'I wouldn't want to be with that F/O on a dark night with multiple failures'.

Of course these guys were qualified. It's just that it's a lot easier, these days, to 'qualify'!
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 14:22
  #115 (permalink)  
 
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Whomever caused the last minutes to be released of the CVR aside, fairness and fairplay demand a release of the CVR contents of the period prior, thorugh, and beyond a/p loss to STALL.

It is virtually certain there will be no hysterics, overt drama, or strictly personal proprietaries.

Was there other discussion at disconnect a/p a/t? Does PF KNOW and immediately respond to UAS? Misunderstood or unavailable, the data at manual flight start informs of his thought process.

"He pulled into a STALL". Is not a lie, but it doesn't contain much truth, looking at the whole of the currently unsupported HF data made available.

Instead of focusing attention on the unfortunate exposure of some extremely stressed pilots in a seeming hopeless situ, BEA should release the data that would inform a better understanding of why and how this crew acted as it did. To allow shrill and amateur slanders to continue without protecting the performance of this crew with the truth, is to me inexcusable.
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 14:27
  #116 (permalink)  
 
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FAA stopped requiring SPIN training long ago, they did not make it illegal.
And that for the Private certificate. So what is preventing commercial requirements for spin/acro for the ATPL?

NOTHING.

FAA sets MINIMUMS, it does not prevent further progress, and skill training. Gliding, spins, and enhance UA recovery should be requirements. They're not, more's the pity, but professional advanced training is available.

DOZY. Relative to the PF's training, and Protections. His handling in Pitch is protected. It isn't closeout, but it is not DIRECT, as ROLL. I am not trying to muddy the waters. The PF found the waters muddy enough, I am suggesting to us that he was less than clear (possibly) of the LAWS in 2 that made Roll a challenge, and PITCH, gentle, though definitely deadly.

It isn't what you think that is important, or what I think, it is what was going through the PIlot's mind that matters.

I think PITCH DIRECT in A/LAW 2 may have prevented this accident. And please eliminate autoTRIM also.

WHY? Because with ROLL so demanding, PITCH was relegated to second tier priority, due its computer filtered inputs. I say this figuratively, for of course it was crucial, but DIFFERENT.

It is this one Failure in programming that caused the crash, I believe.

In slipping from NORMAL to ALTERNATE, a consistent degrade should be the rule, not ROLL this way, PITCH that way, etc.

Had the Pilot pulled hard enough, the a/c would have STALLED with gusto, a la vanilla, cues and all. Do they recover from this early STALL?

Did they recover from the "Weird" STALL that happened when the airframe was paid off in energy? When at the top of a "leisurely" climb, non-DIRECT in PITCH?

Last edited by Lyman; 16th Oct 2011 at 14:40.
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 16:55
  #117 (permalink)  
 
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"I realise that is a gross simplification, but few pilots (I suspect) were ever demonstrated the pilot-maintained stall."

I go back a long way, but we used to do just that in the RAF's Varsities. I don't think "normal" students did that exercise, but it was certainly part of the training for instructors. I was a "Waterfront" instructor's instructor (why was it called "The Waterfront"?) at Central Flying School. You could hold the Varsity in a full stall, stick (yoke) hard back and it would just float downwards nose in the air. It was a long time ago that I used to do this exercise (best part of 40 years) so my memory is perhaps incomplete. But I seem to recall that even in a steady full stall, there was still some degree of aileron control.

Our exercise all those years ago bears a remarkable resemblance to AF447. Our recovery technique - giving an instantaneous result - was simply "stick forward"
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 17:19
  #118 (permalink)  
 
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In reply to post #109


You can't expect a crew to handle an emergency situation in which they have not been trained.
Why not? Flight crew don't get qualified by opening the right cereal boxes, although this crew's handling of the situation is questionable, other aircraft/crew have had situations which were unforeseen and have dealt with them.
So in effect they were trained, albeit not for this specific instance. However, if flying the Bus makes you dependent on the inbuilt protection to the extent that you can't recognize a deep stall regardless of instrumentation then the training wasn't sufficient.
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 17:21
  #119 (permalink)  
 
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jack. It is a well known tool in emer. descent, provided the a/c is up to it, and in a sufficient emergency, it doesn't really matter, does it?

Stick back, held, and descend with roll control, and recover as you say when a spot is found to plant. If the ground is not visible, and depending on the a/c, impact is to some extent "survivable" (see Schiphol).

Fast jets do this, though not the "impact" part, hopefully.

Also in the quiver is Flat Plate, a 90 degree AoA fast brake.

As we see in 447, much of the a/c was isolated from the more destructive impact in the tail and belly. Witness the pristine galley, tray shelving, and other bits.

Though not fully addressed, the survivability of the impact is not discussed. For good reason. God Forbid some survived, only to drown, or die of exposure. Imagine the PR disaster that would be. Only the most gruesome autopsies are released, as they herd the conclusion to "No Survivors of Impact". For those with some patience, and a sceptic's eye, this investigation is.....fishy.

Momoe: They did handle it, and your expectation is of success. Analyze the "handling"? Listen to them, completely, there was no abdication of handling. You make it sound as though the pilots were quitters at the outset. Of course the expectation is of success. Failing that, the baby goes out with the bathwater?

From the CVR, at the outset with Captain's arrival, the pilots state they are out of ideas, and that they do not know what is wrong. That leaves us to figure out what they missed, not difficult, as the data is found, reasonably complete, we think.

That leaves the Captain's training. I will admit I am not fond of this Captain's apparent leadership skill. For what we think from the other pilots comments, he is expected to sort the mess out, and ostensibly becomes instead merely an audience of one.

At this point, I believe the pilots messed up, with "help" from Airbus. I cannot excuse the apparent lack of good planning in programming the aircraft to degrade into touchy ROLL, yet remain same in PITCH feel, and with the loss of Alpha Protection. It is a trap.

Who wants to handle an airplane that changes the way it flies in one axis, but retains the response in another, and there is loss of STALL protect on top of that?

One should not have two commanders at the controls. The BUS, and the PF.

Last edited by Lyman; 16th Oct 2011 at 17:46.
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Old 16th Oct 2011, 19:15
  #120 (permalink)  
 
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"You can't expect a crew to handle an emergency situation in which they have not been trained"


Erm..
I believe that the one thing that a human can do better than any computer is react well to an unforseen/unplanned/untrained for event.

That expectation is pretty much the whole reason for having us nowadays.
The vanilla stuff is computer food all the way.
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