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ANA Japan roll incident.

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ANA Japan roll incident.

Old 9th Sep 2011, 20:46
  #21 (permalink)  
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so only 10 cm apart !!!

then we all should be very carefull next time when eating,
and using our fingers, forks or chopsticks...especially in dark cockpit

NOT to mix up the mouth for an eye
 
Old 10th Sep 2011, 02:37
  #22 (permalink)  
 
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OK, poor switch position is fine, but why on earth was there not a F/A on the flightdeck during the restroom break? With the threat of the badguys entering the flightdeck just flipping the door unlock switch on does not sound like the brightest thing in the world to do. one of the inflight crew should have been on the flightdeck ready to open the door after verification.
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Old 10th Sep 2011, 02:55
  #23 (permalink)  
 
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by CDRW:
...the captain decided to turn off some fuel pumps, but turned off some hydraulic pumps.
that's what I call "an effort".

Last time I looked at, the trim switches are not on the overhead panels. So no, you cannot confuse secondary flight control systems with a door lock mechanism in an Airbus (unless you make an effort...).

Of course you could confuse your captains seat with the one of the toilet - the possibilities are endless. What did you want to tell me?
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Old 10th Sep 2011, 03:26
  #24 (permalink)  
 
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Years ago a Deltoid captain climbing out of LAX thought he was turning off the EEC switches on a 767 and somehow turned off the nearby fuel control switches instead. They got the motors restarted 600 feet off the water, got salt spray on the plane and continued on to CVG, RAT extended, with the blessing of ATL flight ops:

ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 767-232 N103DA Los Angeles International Airport, CA (LAX)

The FAA did an emergency license revocation and actually went to his house to pick up his ticket in person. I'm told he took early retirement.

The EEC switches were later relocated to the overhead well away from the fuel cutoffs.
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Old 10th Sep 2011, 09:37
  #25 (permalink)  
 
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The 737 is redesigned from 727 (I am experienced on both).
That's why 737 ergonomics is just poor.
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Old 10th Sep 2011, 10:02
  #26 (permalink)  
 
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With reference to the first post, it could not happen on the airbus as the rudder trim switch is inoperative when the autopilot is engaged.
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Old 10th Sep 2011, 10:42
  #27 (permalink)  
 
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Airmanship...

All of us can do mistakes.

But some of our new copilots are more chicken than eagle....
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Old 11th Sep 2011, 01:59
  #28 (permalink)  
 
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Dani, read the post before you comment on it. The post was about confusing the fuel pumps for the hydraulic pumps, which is very easy to do on an Airbus as they are above each other on the overhead. HYD, FUEL, ELEC, AIR, in descending order.
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Old 11th Sep 2011, 07:19
  #29 (permalink)  
 
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, but why on earth was there not a F/A on the flightdeck during the restroom break? With the threat of the badguys entering the flightdeck just flipping the door unlock switch on does not sound like the brightest thing in the world to do. one of the inflight crew should have been on the flightdeck ready to open the door after verification.
So airlines the world over should re-write their SOP's to match your door opening procedures?

We have never required an F/A to come in during a comfort break, nor do most airlines who's procedures I know.

Should we remove our video camera's from our cockpit door?

There's more than 1 way to crack an egg.
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Old 11th Sep 2011, 09:05
  #30 (permalink)  
 
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US carriers require a FA in the cockpit to verify our security procedures are followed. It seems your procedures use a security camera which would accomplish the same thing. Keep doing what you are doing. We will catch up.
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Old 11th Sep 2011, 09:13
  #31 (permalink)  
 
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Ten years ago today is when we had to implement these procedures so we probably do a bit of overkill to make sure it can't happen again. I am sure today the bastards will test us again on the anniversary.
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Old 11th Sep 2011, 09:39
  #32 (permalink)  
 
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Said with a heavy sigh: "IN Japan.........!"

It is JCAB reg for all airlines that if one crew leaves then a CA (in some companies at least it MUST be the CManager only) comes in to open the door for the return of the crew; I believe this was done although not clearly stated, IF for some reason it was NOT done then one can expect blood!

Also from JCAB a continuous outside watch is paramount to safety - so if the F/O was maybe low experienced and impressionable he could not spare a glance inside the cockpit, far better to fumble around and get it....wrong.

If procedures were followed and there was a CA in the cockpit the question of why the F/O was stuffing around with the door lock rather than allowing the CA to ID the returning crew after a pre-arranged signal and open the door will be a point of interest.

As a final - don't know procedures around the world but do know Australia changed 10-15 years ago so that oxygen only had to be worn above 41,000ft
(or something like that) when single crewmember in the cockpit.
I believe Boeing have stated that unnecessary use of the quick donning masks reduces their life - one wonders if that could cause them to fail when really, really required??

In Japan use above 25,000ft remains - no doubt the rationale "...the B727 oxy mask was very difficult to use therefore..." or similar would be the justification, the fact it is a totally different mask to the 727 (the term "quick donning" a bit of a giveaway to the vast majority ) will probably need pondering and consideration for at least the next 10 years (being generous!)
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Old 11th Sep 2011, 09:46
  #33 (permalink)  
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9/11 caused the demise of my 'retirement job' - when the bank pulled the plug on us. Generally I read of huge advances in technology and safety, but when I read that one crew-member is left on the flightdeck as the door is locked behind them, I'm left bewildered.

I realize there can't be a public answer to part of this issue, but just leaving one crew-member behind something that would even delay assistance has to be just plain wrong. There are several forms of incapacitation that leave the patient not just incapacitated, but literally flailing about. One outfit I worked for trained the cabin crew in containing such an occurrence.
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Old 11th Sep 2011, 09:57
  #34 (permalink)  
 
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LR, some of those huge advances in technology allow, erm, "alternative means" of getting back into the flight deck without being let back in, should it be necessary. I'm not telling you how though!

It's never been a requirement at the airlines I've worked for to have an extra crew member in the flight deck if one of us is having a quick widdle.

A number two or longer absence, for whatever reason, does require the extra crew member though.
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Old 11th Sep 2011, 14:19
  #35 (permalink)  
 
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It is JCAB reg for all airlines that if one crew leaves then a CA (in some companies at least it MUST be the CManager only) comes in to open the door for the return of the crew
Not true, mate. With the advent of the CCTV that requirement was removed. Not going to go into minute detail for the obvious security reasons, although I do appreciate how over-the-top that sounds .
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Old 11th Sep 2011, 15:19
  #36 (permalink)  
 
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There's at least one major European airline that requires cabin crew to be on the flight deck when a pilot goes to the toilet. Coincidentally that same airline had an almost identical incident as the one mentioned here. Lost control at FL390 I think, after the autopilot gave up on the full deflection rudder trim whilst trying to open the door.
If it can happen - it will happen.
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Old 11th Sep 2011, 20:27
  #37 (permalink)  
 
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Fratemate

Thanks for that, wasn't aware the local regs allowed that option - was just speaking from general knowledge/undertnanding.
Questions: is it just an option under the regs or do some Japanese operators actually use CCTV as standard ops ?? Pax or freight or both??

Ta!
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Old 11th Sep 2011, 23:19
  #38 (permalink)  
 
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Our airline requires an F/A in the cockpit at night time if one of the pilots goes out of the cockpit but they put that requirement in the CC manual so no-one bothers. The other problem is that they have reduced the CC numbers and put cadets inthe RHS so I will reduce my caffiene intake and stay put.
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Old 12th Sep 2011, 01:01
  #39 (permalink)  
 
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Galdian,

Standard ops i.e. we use the CCTV all the time on the pax flights. It is, of course, on pax flights only, as there's no nasty people in the aircraft on the freighter (apart from the pilots) so there's no need for TVs (and the toilet is on the flight deck )
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Old 12th Sep 2011, 09:32
  #40 (permalink)  
 
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The NG is poorly designed when it comes to switches and where they are placed. You ask for the wipers, and you get engine ignition. You ask for eng a-ice, and you get hyd pumps. Try to operate the MCP in darkness/smoke, and you will have a hard time (as another poster already pointed out) to differenciate between heading, alt, etc.

In this tread we have the super pilots who never make mistakes, and think selecting a wrong switch is impossible and due to poor operating procedures. They are in for a big surprise sooner or later.

The rest of us have already been there and done that, and we are better prepared for these events. Including Pilots trying to retract flaps when gear up is called.

You are missing the important bit. Had the 64 year old captain had some
bladder control, this would never have happened.
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