"Crew disregarded flight-procedures!

Airbus Test Pilot Fernando Alonso in the German WELT of today...

Air-France-Absturz: Crew von Todesflug AF 447 missachtete Flugregeln - Nachrichten Panorama - Weltgeschehen - WELT ONLINE

@airtren

An excellent statement, and @grity

an excellent ammendment to this statement.

Thank you both.


How was that old tale (at least how i was used to it):

Flying will be be hours of joy and boredom, interspersed with moments of sheer terror.

Be always prepared for the latter.

franzl

Fresh info has just been released

Vol AF 447

Best regards,
HP

The "report" is simply the SAME information as released in the previous "note", now labeled a "report"....? Seriously: WTF?

- GY

P.S. Admittedly I did NOT do a line by line comparison, but from what I see it is the same!

And for that statement they needed more than 2 month?

It΄s not clarifying anything at all.


Only one example:

It would be more interesting to know, wether the aircraft behaviour followed those inputs.

franzl

Try this link for the English version. Work to do at AF.

Safety recs summarised at http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....let2011.en.pdf

Actually, it looks like the safety recommendations are pretty specific, and there are clear references to AoA in both the new note and the recommendations. AF come in for implied criticism due to there being no established procedure for a flightdeck when the captain is not present as well as training in general (it appears that neither PF nor PNF called the "Unreliable IAS" procedure), and there is a recommendation for an AoA display, which will be down to Airbus and Boeing to implement - if the regulators take the recommendations up, as well as for flight recorders to record extra parameters (including all visible instruments).

So no, it's not anything like a final report, but steps forward have been made and it appears that any fears that AF or Airbus would be "protected" from criticism or requests for change were unfounded.

Air France - Corporate : Air France?s reaction to the publication of the BEA?s third intermediate report

and? at which place was sitting the so called PF? left the new one with the reportet instruments ahead his nose, or right as in the hours before mayby?

It looks as if two of the three pilots had been napping up until about 0200, and the alert pilot, the captain, leaves the cockpit.

From both the English and French versions.

A 1 h 55 min 57, le commandant de bord rιveille le second copilote et annonce « […] il va prendre ma place ».

A 1 h 55, the Captain woke the second copilot and announced "[…] he’s going to take my place".

It would seem there was no playing with the radar with respect to tilt or gain, and they flew on expecting little more than some light to moderate chop.
_____________________

Is the second co-pilot the junior co-pilot, and is he the PF?
Both versions omit what appears to be a name reference in the captain's announcement.

Hi,
This is a "Synthetis Note", not the 3rd Interim Report which would be posted later (likely, following the Press Conf .)

takata, that would be the press conference at 14:30. Do you know, is it being televised?

Well you can be a generous as you like, but if it took me 2 months to produce this level of work output where I work... I wouldn't be working there any more.

If there is one tiny shred of additional information it is this:

The rest we had before.

All this confirms is:

- The crew never mentioned UAS
- The crew never mentioned Stall

Again I may be missing something the more rigorous reader may spot.

- GY

Hi,

I would appear that neither pilot "heard" the stall warning "Stall Stall".
Does it only come from the speakers in the cockpit or does it come through their headsets. Do AF use ANR?

It is not uncommon to observe crews (with a high work load) shut down their audio senses - like this crew did:

rudderrudderrat asked:

The FWC generates the Stall warning and it is sent to the speaker outputs irrespective of pilot ACP control setting or speaker volume (i.e. it cannot be defeated).

Warnings are ALSO sent to the crew headsets directly.

- GY

- CAS1 (ADR1, Captain probes) was erroneous during 29 seconds, starting @ 0210:05.
- CAS3 (ADR3, ISIS) was erroneous during 54 seconds, starting "after" 0210:05 but "before" 0210:16.
So (at least) during 19-29 seconds, two (or three) airspeeds were wrong, meaning that all speeds were rejected by the EFCS and AFS.

I'm not sure, but IIRC the ADI section of the PFD flashes "STALL" in large capital letters as the audible warning sounds.

What can one say but "D'oh!"?

BEA website seems to be struggling, but links direct to the pdf documents are still working (although takes a couple of tries for me):

The "note":

English: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....let2011.en.pdf
French: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....let2011.fr.pdf

The recommendations (actually more a note about them):

English: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....let2011.en.pdf
French: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/reco29juillet2011.fr.pdf


Looking at these, I think (hope) they are more press summaries / extracts released in advance of the complete interim report.


A few things do grab attention:

• Recommendation for video recording of cockpit displays - perhaps implying there is still significant uncertainty about what the pilots actually saw ?
• No training (not just "not a lot" - none!!!) for manual flight or UAS at altitude (let alone alt or direct law)
• No CRM training for capt. off duty [edit: intended meaning no CRM training for the situation of capt. off duty, not that capt. was not trained - too few words used first time!]
• no UAS procedure called, and no mention of stall despite continuous warning for almost a minute at one point

And what might turn out to be a biggie (or two):

• Control surfaces moved according to pilot inputs (BUT: only pitch axis mentioned, what happened in roll ?)
• Plane moved according to contol inputs "Until the airplane was outside its flight envelope". Why qualify with that ? Maybe there is a nasty deep stall behaviour in there ?

Waiting for the real report now...

@RetiredF4

You might care to read the orange bits in the report a little less selectively:

" Until the airplane was outside its flight envelope, the airplane's longitudinal movements were consistent with the position of the flight control surfaces"

Almost certainly by implication, once the airplane was "outside its flight envelope" this was no longer the case.

From the recommendations re image recording of the instrument displays:-

Are they suggesting a possible explanation is that the displays were not showing the same information as that recorded?