AF 447 Thread No. 5
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1. control surfaces followed pilot control input. Always (as RetiredF4 said)
- control systems not at fault
2. plane follows control surface input. until flight envelope exceeded.
- plane behaved aerodynamically (and ergo probably didn't lose any bits)
... until outside envelope, where you are into test-pilot territory or even beyond.
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Originally Posted by Infrequentflyer789
Plane moved according to contol inputs "Until the airplane was outside its flight envelope". Why qualify with that ? Maybe there is a nasty deep stall behaviour in there ?
Hence, this part could only be verified by test flight (if one want to risk an A330 to verify that) which the BEA did not do up to this point (understandable).
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infrequentflyer78 No CRM training for capt. off duty
• There is no CRM tr aining for a crew made up of two copilots in a situation with a relief Captain
p.s. is it coincidence that JAA four weaks after the AF447 chrash became dissolved.....
airtren;
If I may, I've clarified the meaning of "do nothing" and I think you're turning it into something I never meant and that no airman would mis-interpret.
I would have thought that all pilots who fly transports would have understood what I meant and wouldn't think of it as "advice", or take it literally - no pilot would actually "do nothing" and just sit there waiting for the automatics.
As for the BEA effort, it's disappointing, but there it is. Some interesting points regarding SOPs and some obvious safety recommendations. I guess we'll have to wait til October.
PJ2
If I may, I've clarified the meaning of "do nothing" and I think you're turning it into something I never meant and that no airman would mis-interpret.
I would have thought that all pilots who fly transports would have understood what I meant and wouldn't think of it as "advice", or take it literally - no pilot would actually "do nothing" and just sit there waiting for the automatics.
As for the BEA effort, it's disappointing, but there it is. Some interesting points regarding SOPs and some obvious safety recommendations. I guess we'll have to wait til October.
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 29th Jul 2011 at 12:30.
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Not really, but "sort of". I read this as a criticism of the fact that only the LHS instrument displays were recorded, which means that the PF's side (RHS) was not. I think this is the BEA saying that it's impossible to know what the PF was actually seeing, and they don't like having to take it as read that he was seeing the same as the PNF, whose instrument displays were recorded. This doesn't alter the fact that the PNF was supposed to be monitoring his instruments, and both pilots should have been checking for discrepancies the moment the ASI data became unreliable.
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That meant that, outside the flight envelope, simulators can't tell the BEA (for sure) that an imput is actually valid in relation with aircraft control surfaces position: as simulators are not supposed to derive anything accurately out of envelope's flight domain.
Hence, this part could only be verified by test flight (if one want to risk an A330 to verify that) which the BEA did not do up to this point (understandable).
Hence, this part could only be verified by test flight (if one want to risk an A330 to verify that) which the BEA did not do up to this point (understandable).
BEA qualification could indicate either case I suppose, or nothing at all.
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Originally Posted by Dozy
I think this is the BEA saying that it's impossible to know what the PF was actually seeing, and they don't like having to take it as read that he was seeing the same as the PNF, whose instrument displays were recorded.
A lot of things needed to understand their actions are lying in cockpit ergonomics and pilot's way to deal with the interface. Most of what would be very helpful to investigation, in this case, is lost without a camera record. About the flight data missing, it seems that it would be better/easier to have them directly recorded rather than filmed.
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Seeing as captain off duty happens rather frequently on long haul, it's slightly suprising (well, to me...) that there is no CRM training for the rest of the crew in that situation. Poor CRM is then unsuprising.
Agree with takata: Interim report 3 is still the meat that is due today. Still scanning the BEA website. The PR issued on July 25th clearly states the 3rd interim report is due today - the 'synthesis note' does not seem to meet that criteria.
- GY
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Pilots against Cockpit Video Recording
Takata
I could not agree more. Many investigations comprise a group of 'subject matter experts' listening to noises on the CVR and trying to work out what it was - who was in the cockpit, what was the FO doing etc etc. Or trying to infer from the FDR what was on displays. But every time cockpit video recordings are proposed the 'professional pilots' rise up against the idea. They would rather have investigations fail and others of their number die due to repeating the same error, than have their actions recorded in the way the cashier at a 7/11 gas station is recorded. 
I doubt if recommendations from this accident will change their minds.
Having a camera showing all the displays and crew actions (postions/attitudes) would be very helpful rather than having to derive something from recorded data which doesn't give any hint about what can NOT be derived. (e.g. was the PNF reading silently the documentation? was he scanning the displays? looking at the PF actions? did they exchange meaningful regards?)
A lot of things needed to understand their actions are lying in cockpit ergonomics and pilot's way to deal with the interface. Most of what would be very helpful to investigation, in this case, is lost without a camera record. About the flight data missing, it seems that it would be better/easier to have them directly recorded rather than filmed.
A lot of things needed to understand their actions are lying in cockpit ergonomics and pilot's way to deal with the interface. Most of what would be very helpful to investigation, in this case, is lost without a camera record. About the flight data missing, it seems that it would be better/easier to have them directly recorded rather than filmed.
I doubt if recommendations from this accident will change their minds.
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... until outside envelope, where you are into test-pilot territory or even beyond.
, many were stalling and recovering gliders and even powered aircraft before they had a full driving licence. I'm sure some were recovering from spins even).====
I find it quite incredible that so many are suggesting (albeit frequently doing it between the lines), that the aircraft may have been irrecoverable once fully stalled soon after reaching the apogee.
It's a fairly conventional aerod. design, and I see no reason we should start comparing it to a 'T' tailed a/c operating with an aft c.g.
The fact it stayed at a stable AoA (probably determined by the THS setting) and just rocked its wings (+/- 20° max), maintained a reasonable airflow and forward speed component, make me think all was definitely not lost until say, at a guess, 25 > 20,000 ft.
It's for this reason that I banged on loudly earlier about an well positioned AoA instrument, with green and red areas a bit like the revcounter in many cars, and about insistance on above average manual flying skills, for any aircrew going for a commercial license.
One other thing, and I know this will not be accepted immediately by all Airbus cockpit crew .. I am not convinced that the airbus sidestick design is optimum for all situations (I'll leave it at that for now!).
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Originally Posted by HarryMann
an well positioned AoA instrument, with green and red areas
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Originally Posted by HM
I find it quite incredible that so many are suggesting (albeit frequently doing it between the lines), that the aircraft may have been irrecoverable once fully stalled soon after reaching the apogee.
'irrecoverable'?
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Originally Posted by BOAC
- where do you get this impression? We were told (in May, certainly) that it was recovering at one point. Who says 'irrecoverable'?
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Air France’s reaction to the publication of the BEA’s third intermediate report
Friday 29 July 2011
In its third intermediate report, the French Accident Investigation Bureau (BEA) has just presented the exact circumstances of the AF 447 Rio/Paris accident on 1 June 2009.
It sheds further light on this tragedy that has deeply affected Air France and the entire air transport community. Air France wishes to pay tribute to the memory of the passengers and crew who lost their lives and extends its most sincere thoughts to their families.
From the flight recorder data, it has been established that the combination of multiple improbable factors led to the disaster in less than four minutes: the icing of the Pitot probes was the initial event that led to the disconnection of the autopilot, the loss of associated piloting control protections and considerable roll movements. After the manoeuvres carried out by the crew in deteriorated and destabilizing piloting conditions, the aircraft stalled at high altitude, could not be recovered and struck the surface of the Atlantic Ocean at high speed. It should be noted that the misleading stopping and starting of the stall warning alarm, contradicting the actual state of the aircraft, greatly contributed to the crew’s difficulty in analyzing the situation.
During this time, the crew, comprising both First Officers and the Captain, showed an unfailing professional attitude, remaining committed to their task to the very end. Air France pays tribute to the courage and determination they showed in such extreme conditions.
At this stage, there is no reason to question the crew’s technical skills.
Work will now continue to understand the causes and the various technical and human factors that contributed to the events leading to this disaster. It is important to understand whether the technical environment, systems and alarms hindered the crew’s understanding of the situation.
The BEA has also issued various recommendations for the European authorities in charge of air safety that Air France has already implemented or will implement as soon as possible. In addition to the elements that will be brought to light by the BEA’s final report and the work of the legal inquiry, we know that the measures already taken have considerably improved the safety of air transport, which is the most important aspect for the air transport industry. These measures prevent such an accident happening again.
Friday 29 July 2011
In its third intermediate report, the French Accident Investigation Bureau (BEA) has just presented the exact circumstances of the AF 447 Rio/Paris accident on 1 June 2009.
It sheds further light on this tragedy that has deeply affected Air France and the entire air transport community. Air France wishes to pay tribute to the memory of the passengers and crew who lost their lives and extends its most sincere thoughts to their families.
From the flight recorder data, it has been established that the combination of multiple improbable factors led to the disaster in less than four minutes: the icing of the Pitot probes was the initial event that led to the disconnection of the autopilot, the loss of associated piloting control protections and considerable roll movements. After the manoeuvres carried out by the crew in deteriorated and destabilizing piloting conditions, the aircraft stalled at high altitude, could not be recovered and struck the surface of the Atlantic Ocean at high speed. It should be noted that the misleading stopping and starting of the stall warning alarm, contradicting the actual state of the aircraft, greatly contributed to the crew’s difficulty in analyzing the situation.
During this time, the crew, comprising both First Officers and the Captain, showed an unfailing professional attitude, remaining committed to their task to the very end. Air France pays tribute to the courage and determination they showed in such extreme conditions.
At this stage, there is no reason to question the crew’s technical skills.
Work will now continue to understand the causes and the various technical and human factors that contributed to the events leading to this disaster. It is important to understand whether the technical environment, systems and alarms hindered the crew’s understanding of the situation.
The BEA has also issued various recommendations for the European authorities in charge of air safety that Air France has already implemented or will implement as soon as possible. In addition to the elements that will be brought to light by the BEA’s final report and the work of the legal inquiry, we know that the measures already taken have considerably improved the safety of air transport, which is the most important aspect for the air transport industry. These measures prevent such an accident happening again.
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Well neither is the yoke, to be honest - it gets in the way, seriously limits freedom of movement, accumulates crud around the base (when floor-mounted) and it's easy to bump when you turn around, which can have unintended consequences (ref: EAL401). As many others have said, there are positives and negatives to both major civil airliner control philosophies applied to the airframes currently in manufacture.