AF447 wreckage found
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Hi,
Actually .. the BEA have the full CVR (voices and background noises) and so also the full CVR transcript
They have also the full FDR data
They just decided to release fragments (transcripts) of those in the interim report N°3
These are selected pieces of BEA
Ce sont les morceaux choisis du BEA
Ive read the CVR transcript from the 3rd interim report and it opens up a lot of questions that I know you have been debating. I have one immediate question:
Is that the complete transcript as it says its an "Extract" so do we take that to mean that the transcripting of the CVR has not been completed?
As there seem to be many communication gaps and obvious things you would expect the crew to be discussing given stall warnings etc.
Is that the complete transcript as it says its an "Extract" so do we take that to mean that the transcripting of the CVR has not been completed?
As there seem to be many communication gaps and obvious things you would expect the crew to be discussing given stall warnings etc.
They have also the full FDR data
They just decided to release fragments (transcripts) of those in the interim report N°3
These are selected pieces of BEA
Ce sont les morceaux choisis du BEA
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Besides the system failure, due to suspected malfunction of the pitot head, BEA's third interim report points towards likely lacuna in training in recovery from stall at high altitude. This brings us back to the need for relook at the training in human factors and performance, including maintaining Situational Awareness through all phases of flight.
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Rananim
On the traces for the Elevators and the THS, shown is the THS remaining in position at -3 degrees during the fatal climb. At the Top of the climb, the airframe STALLED, and it was at this point the THS started to lumber full NU. This migration was caused by the demand of the Pilot and the a/c's low airspeed.
At this point, well into the LOC, the Pilot would probably have selected more elevator and more THS TRIM, if available. He had applied TOGA, and was holding the stick back full. This isn't consistent with a Pilot who would be looking for ND TRIM. It may have everything to do with why no one found NOSE DOWN.
A belabored point, but the fatal accident happened well in advance of the STALL. That is the issue. The answer to the crash is in the a/c layout, the controls management, automatique, and the Pilot's responsibilities at the loss of NORMAL LAW. IMHO.
Taking sides is madness. That way lies BAU.
On the traces for the Elevators and the THS, shown is the THS remaining in position at -3 degrees during the fatal climb. At the Top of the climb, the airframe STALLED, and it was at this point the THS started to lumber full NU. This migration was caused by the demand of the Pilot and the a/c's low airspeed.
At this point, well into the LOC, the Pilot would probably have selected more elevator and more THS TRIM, if available. He had applied TOGA, and was holding the stick back full. This isn't consistent with a Pilot who would be looking for ND TRIM. It may have everything to do with why no one found NOSE DOWN.
A belabored point, but the fatal accident happened well in advance of the STALL. That is the issue. The answer to the crash is in the a/c layout, the controls management, automatique, and the Pilot's responsibilities at the loss of NORMAL LAW. IMHO.
Taking sides is madness. That way lies BAU.
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Rananim
Sorry but you are incorrect, there are forces on the sidestick, it does not just flop about! As the trim had moved to nose up "significant" effort would be required to hold the stick forward to get the nose down. It would be much "easier" to hold back stick as the "pilot flying" did.
Sorry but you are incorrect, there are forces on the sidestick, it does not just flop about! As the trim had moved to nose up "significant" effort would be required to hold the stick forward to get the nose down. It would be much "easier" to hold back stick as the "pilot flying" did.
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Bubbers44
I generally agree that AF447's crew's training was deficient. Initially I thought that issues in roll control overrode the pilot's ability to keep the nose where he wanted it, but now I am inclined to believe that the PF could have been in Normal law and would still have caused a climb because his scan was completely broken and disfunctional.
He palmed the stick from the start. The amplitude and frequency of control movement is the indicator. That is no way to fly smoothly!
The PNF must have been so concerned with the PF's technique, he didn't start the UAS drill, but instead nagged him to control the aircraft. (The PF's control technique was a greater emergency than UAS.)
He should have given him an ultimatum to get the aircraft back on altitude or he would take control-and then acted. PNF's efforts to get the Captain back on the flight deck delayed proper corrective action tremendously. Sometimes you just have to take charge, whether you are mentally ready or not.
If you were to ask the average Airbus pilot to fly an S-1 or S-3 pattern manually in alternate 2 law (with a little turbulence to make things interesting) up at cruise altitude, I think a lot would be very embarassed.
I don't think the average B pilot is likely to do much better in his favorite machine either. (Note: S-1 and S-3 Patterns are USN basic instrument instruction maneuvers). Maybe we need to emphasize instrument fundamentals again.
S-1 pattern
S-3 Pattern
Yes, I guess occasionally AOA would be helpful with plugged pitot tubes but these guys couldn't have figured it out no matter what they had, they both panicked so couldn't fly the airplane. They needed the captain to sort it out for them because they couldn't. Kind of a sorry state for our new pilots who need someone to watch over them.
He palmed the stick from the start. The amplitude and frequency of control movement is the indicator. That is no way to fly smoothly!
The PNF must have been so concerned with the PF's technique, he didn't start the UAS drill, but instead nagged him to control the aircraft. (The PF's control technique was a greater emergency than UAS.)
He should have given him an ultimatum to get the aircraft back on altitude or he would take control-and then acted. PNF's efforts to get the Captain back on the flight deck delayed proper corrective action tremendously. Sometimes you just have to take charge, whether you are mentally ready or not.
If you were to ask the average Airbus pilot to fly an S-1 or S-3 pattern manually in alternate 2 law (with a little turbulence to make things interesting) up at cruise altitude, I think a lot would be very embarassed.
I don't think the average B pilot is likely to do much better in his favorite machine either. (Note: S-1 and S-3 Patterns are USN basic instrument instruction maneuvers). Maybe we need to emphasize instrument fundamentals again.
S-1 pattern
S-3 Pattern
Last edited by Machinbird; 14th Aug 2011 at 04:33. Reason: Add pictures of S-1 and S-3 maneuvers
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Owain
Well, there’s no intent to denigrate anyone and I never implied “not up to the job”. Even a genius can provide an inept design. As Dozy pointed out, there might have been a broad selection of pilots involved in the design, just as your friend. By the way I truly honor his credentials.
With all the information about how and when and why a design was created, we tend to forget to look at the outcome. This is the essence of it. Unfortunately this design seems not to convene to a lot of pilots, just read on these pages. That is the troubling fact.
Now what does that tell you of a design? At the least I would expect that the manufacturer and regulator would also listen to them. Not only lecture them to understand the system better or get more training, although this can never be wrong.
It is like wanting to change the human (good luck) instead of going the way we all thought was intended, namely to adapt the helpful automation to the humans capacities.
Confusion with the absence of tactile feeback started with Habsheim, as the PF was not sure if the AT really was giving TOGA because nothing moved and then clicked back to idle and TOGA again losing precious seconds, and still lingers with AF447, seeing the clicking through detents and swinging the stick.
We need to accept that not all pilots are of the stuff of the forementioned designer. An airliner needs to be designed for the average pilot. Some may be able to work with the single channel input, some may not. My point is that probably more are of the second breed, at least that is what I experienced and I am of that club myself.
This leads me to the question as to why not adapt the system to the prevalent talent that operates it? As Dozy rightly points out
So go ahead and change all the flaws, not only the pilot's.
Just a few remarks on Dozy’s other reflections (I like your factual way of discussing)
I was always told to expect the unexpected and always stay on top of the things. This involves a healthy amount of initial distrust.
Even remote chances need to be correctly addressed. Otherwise no need for V1 or ETOPS ‘cos the chances are statistically very remote.
That is my point.
This particular problem with automation gets too little attention.
Contrary to the somewhat snide slur implied by "not bad guys, but not really up to the job" Gordon was an ex ARB, ex CAA, test pilot who had flown many more types than, I suspect, anyone else writing in this forum. This for passing them off in certification, not joy riding. He probably knew more of the good and bad points of As and Bs and quite a few other manufacturer's designs than any line pilot.
So please - check on facts before denigrating the manufacturers pilots!
So please - check on facts before denigrating the manufacturers pilots!
With all the information about how and when and why a design was created, we tend to forget to look at the outcome. This is the essence of it. Unfortunately this design seems not to convene to a lot of pilots, just read on these pages. That is the troubling fact.
Now what does that tell you of a design? At the least I would expect that the manufacturer and regulator would also listen to them. Not only lecture them to understand the system better or get more training, although this can never be wrong.
It is like wanting to change the human (good luck) instead of going the way we all thought was intended, namely to adapt the helpful automation to the humans capacities.
Confusion with the absence of tactile feeback started with Habsheim, as the PF was not sure if the AT really was giving TOGA because nothing moved and then clicked back to idle and TOGA again losing precious seconds, and still lingers with AF447, seeing the clicking through detents and swinging the stick.
We need to accept that not all pilots are of the stuff of the forementioned designer. An airliner needs to be designed for the average pilot. Some may be able to work with the single channel input, some may not. My point is that probably more are of the second breed, at least that is what I experienced and I am of that club myself.
This leads me to the question as to why not adapt the system to the prevalent talent that operates it? As Dozy rightly points out
This wasn't just pilot error, this is a systemic problem affecting the airlines and the industry as a whole
Just a few remarks on Dozy’s other reflections (I like your factual way of discussing)
What this tells me is that you have an innate distrust of technology, and that colours your perception of the systems
they've convinced the certification authorities and the regulators that they won't automatically control you into an unstable attitude and then hand you back the controls, yet you seem to be fully convinced that they will.
Now I'm not saying they won't or can't, but I believe the chances of it happening are suitably remote
Now I'm not saying they won't or can't, but I believe the chances of it happening are suitably remote
That is my point.
This particular problem with automation gets too little attention.
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The neat thing about Boeing is when you flop around you display to your fellow pilot you don't have a 
clue what you are doing so the other pilot will take over before you kill everybody. Airbus makes it so you are not sure what is going on.
clue what you are doing so the other pilot will take over before you kill everybody. Airbus makes it so you are not sure what is going on.
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Gretchenfage
OK, I accept you did not intend any denigration, and that "not up to the job" was my interpretation of the gist of your remarks. But you did seem to be implying that the pilots on the development team were incapable of understanding how line pilots actually fly their aircraft -and yes, I can confirm that there was discussion with a range of pilots.
I am not a pilot, so I cannot speak from personal experience, but I have to say that just from reading these pages I see the world divided into two camps on this question of tactile feedback and throttle movement under A/T command. Those who have flown the AB design seem to be generally (but not exclusively) happy with it, those who have not seem generally anti.
I am sure that AI are well aware of the preferences of about half the pilot population, but in practice there is no way they are going to throw away the results of twenty years development.
Habsheim has been done to death, but I just went back to the accident report to refresh my memory, and I was right - the pilot planned to and did, disconnect the alpha floor function, so there was never any chance of the A/T giving him TO GA thrust - he was in charge of that himself, and he left it until he was at 30 ft and 112 kts before moving the levers. 5 seconds later he hit the trees. Those high bypass engines take about 8 seconds to spool up? I am surprised that an experienced pilot would not have been aware of this.
I don't see any absence of tactile feedback here - was there ever 'tactile feedback' on manual throttle movement?
Well actually they are designed for an average pilot having a bad day, but as PJ2 has said from time to time it is difficult to set a limit on exactly how bad a day and how many poor decisions you have to take into account.
Which is fair enough, but whether you are in the majority is unproven surely?
Quote:
This wasn't just pilot error, this is a systemic problem affecting the airlines and the industry as a whole
So go ahead and change all the flaws, not only the pilot's.[/quote]
I agree with Dozy, this wasn't just pilot error, although we might differ on what the other factors were.
OK again, but the problem is to identify the remote chances well before they matter. For example, only a few short weeks ago these discussions were full of remarks along the lines of "Don't be silly, no pilot would fly like that" It seems to me to be harsh when people criticise AI for failing to predict that they would have to design for pilots taking the aircraft so deeply into stalled conditions.
Don't get me wrong - I am not saying that with hindsight the aeroplane could not be improved - clearly it can be, and IMO will be, modified in certain respects, but I am also saying that reasonable people would perhaps agree that the need for these changes depends on the new knowledge of what the spectrum of possible pilot actions might be.
It will for sure get more now.
Well, there’s no intent to denigrate anyone and I never implied “not up to the job”. Even a genius can provide an inept design. As Dozy pointed out, there might have been a broad selection of pilots involved in the design, just as your friend.
With all the information about how and when and why a design was created, we tend to forget to look at the outcome. This is the essence of it. Unfortunately this design seems not to convene to a lot of pilots, just read on these pages. That is the troubling fact.
Now what does that tell you of a design? At the least I would expect that the manufacturer and regulator would also listen to them. Not only lecture them to understand the system better or get more training, although this can never be wrong.
Confusion with the absence of tactile feeback started with Habsheim, as the PF was not sure if the AT really was giving TOGA because nothing moved and then clicked back to idle and TOGA again losing precious seconds, and still lingers with AF447, seeing the clicking through detents and swinging the stick.
I don't see any absence of tactile feedback here - was there ever 'tactile feedback' on manual throttle movement?
We need to accept that not all pilots are of the stuff of the forementioned designer. An airliner needs to be designed for the average pilot.
Some may be able to work with the single channel input, some may not. My point is that probably more are of the second breed, at least that is what I experienced and I am of that club myself.
Quote:
This wasn't just pilot error, this is a systemic problem affecting the airlines and the industry as a whole
So go ahead and change all the flaws, not only the pilot's.[/quote]
I agree with Dozy, this wasn't just pilot error, although we might differ on what the other factors were.
Just a few remarks on Dozy’s other reflections (I like your factual way of discussing)
Quote: they've convinced the certification authorities and the regulators that they won't automatically control you into an unstable attitude and then hand you back the controls, yet you seem to be fully convinced that they will.
Now I'm not saying they won't or can't, but I believe the chances of it happening are suitably remote
Even remote chances need to be correctly addressed. Otherwise no need for V1 or ETOPS ‘cos the chances are statistically very remote.
Quote: they've convinced the certification authorities and the regulators that they won't automatically control you into an unstable attitude and then hand you back the controls, yet you seem to be fully convinced that they will.
Now I'm not saying they won't or can't, but I believe the chances of it happening are suitably remote
Even remote chances need to be correctly addressed. Otherwise no need for V1 or ETOPS ‘cos the chances are statistically very remote.
Don't get me wrong - I am not saying that with hindsight the aeroplane could not be improved - clearly it can be, and IMO will be, modified in certain respects, but I am also saying that reasonable people would perhaps agree that the need for these changes depends on the new knowledge of what the spectrum of possible pilot actions might be.
That is my point.
This particular problem with automation gets too little attention.
This particular problem with automation gets too little attention.
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For decades we have hired pilots that had thousands of hours to fly our airliners. Now some airlines are hiring kids who just got out of basic flying school. The two left in this AF airplane needed a supervisor. They had no clue what they were doing on their own if things got out of the norm.
For decades we have hired pilots that had thousands of hours to fly our airliners. Now some airlines are hiring kids who just got out of basic flying school. The two left in this AF airplane needed a supervisor. They had no clue what they were doing on their own if things got out of the norm.
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For decades we have hired pilots that had thousands of hours to fly our airliners.
1) General aviation. GA could be a reasonable source of pilots in the US in the past, but not so much in other countries and certainly not in the future. Considering the latest trends in the economy, GA is a luxury that will soon become totally unaffordable to everyone except the rich. Obviously, you can't hope to recruit all the pilots from just the richest 1% of the population.
2) Military background. Maybe, but the number of military pilots is not so high and will probably decrease in future, due to a general shift to unmanned planes.
3) Small regional airliners. Maybe, but with rising fuel prices and falling real incomes, more people will prefer other travel alternatives like trains and such. Also, the regional airliners tend to become bigger to save costs. E.g. Dash-8 used to be a small Dash8-100, but now we have Q400 that is like 2 times longer...
4) Bush flying in Africa and similar remote places. But would you expect every pilot to start their career in Africa?
To sum it up - the future is grim, and with the way things are going, soon there will be no way for pilots to acquire thousands of hours before they are allowed to fly an airliner. Obviously they won't be going to a widebody right after flight school, but I see no way to avoid 200hr co-pilots on 737's and the like.
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Flop about means.....do something....quick...
Machine..... I've always had great respect for USN training.
Their safety culture and accident rates were always regarded as superior by aviation safety researchers.
Machine..... I've always had great respect for USN training.
Their safety culture and accident rates were always regarded as superior by aviation safety researchers.
Just my experience, there maybe some worries about 200-hour pilots, but it depends a lot on their training. Puppy mill schools without standards beyond the decency of payment--very frightening. Put into place structured training with high standards, lots of training in the outer reaches of handling--no problem. Pilots should have exposure to and evaluated on stalls, spins, some acro and even formation, which does teach some skills in handling. Lots od actual instrument time. All in jet aircraft, too.
Will it been done, I doubt it, too expensive.
Will it been done, I doubt it, too expensive.
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I don't think any 200 hr pilot should be flying an airliner. It never happened in the past. When we had FE's united hired 300 hr guys in the 60's but they never touched the controls for years. I don't want to fly on a foreign airliner if they allow this. American pilots are all in their 40's plus with tons of experience, why take your chances with an airline with low hiring standards?
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Originally Posted by Owain Glyndwr
Habsheim has been done to death, but I just went back to the accident report to refresh my memory, and I was right - the pilot planned to and did, disconnect the alpha floor function, ...
- planned - yes
- did - no
Habsheim has never been done to death, actually I cannot find a single thread dedicated to Habsheim ...
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For decades we have hired pilots that had thousands of hours to fly our airliners.