Gretchenfage
Well, there’s no intent to denigrate anyone and I never implied “not up to the job”. Even a genius can provide an inept design. As Dozy pointed out, there might have been a broad selection of pilots involved in the design, just as your friend.
OK, I accept you did not intend any denigration, and that "not up to the job" was my interpretation of the gist of your remarks. But you did seem to be implying that the pilots on the development team were incapable of understanding how line pilots actually fly their aircraft -and yes, I can confirm that there was discussion with a range of pilots.
With all the information about how and when and why a design was created, we tend to forget to look at the outcome. This is the essence of it. Unfortunately this design seems not to convene to a lot of pilots, just read on these pages. That is the troubling fact.
I am not a pilot, so I cannot speak from personal experience, but I have to say that just from reading these pages I see the world divided into two camps on this question of tactile feedback and throttle movement under A/T command. Those who have flown the AB design seem to be generally (but not exclusively) happy with it, those who have not seem generally anti.
Now what does that tell you of a design? At the least I would expect that the manufacturer and regulator would also listen to them. Not only lecture them to understand the system better or get more training, although this can never be wrong.
I am sure that AI are well aware of the preferences of about half the pilot population, but in practice there is no way they are going to throw away the results of twenty years development.
Confusion with the absence of tactile feeback started with Habsheim, as the PF was not sure if the AT really was giving TOGA because nothing moved and then clicked back to idle and TOGA again losing precious seconds, and still lingers with AF447, seeing the clicking through detents and swinging the stick.
Habsheim has been done to death, but I just went back to the accident report to refresh my memory, and I was right - the pilot planned to and did, disconnect the alpha floor function, so there was never any chance of the A/T giving him TO GA thrust - he was in charge of that himself, and he left it until he was at 30 ft and 112 kts before moving the levers. 5 seconds later he hit the trees. Those high bypass engines take about 8 seconds to spool up? I am surprised that an experienced pilot would not have been aware of this.
I don't see any absence of
tactile feedback here - was there ever '
tactile feedback' on manual throttle movement?
We need to accept that not all pilots are of the stuff of the forementioned designer. An airliner needs to be designed for the average pilot.
Well actually they are designed for an average pilot having a bad day, but as PJ2 has said from time to time it is difficult to set a limit on exactly how bad a day and how many poor decisions you have to take into account.
Some may be able to work with the single channel input, some may not. My point is that probably more are of the second breed, at least that is what I experienced and I am of that club myself.
Which is fair enough, but whether you are in the majority is unproven surely?
Quote:
This wasn't just pilot error, this is a systemic problem affecting the airlines and the industry as a whole
So go ahead and change all the flaws, not only the pilot's.[/quote]
I agree with Dozy, this wasn't just pilot error, although we might differ on what the other factors were.
Just a few remarks on Dozy’s other reflections (I like your factual way of discussing)
Quote: they've convinced the certification authorities and the regulators that they won't automatically control you into an unstable attitude and then hand you back the controls, yet you seem to be fully convinced that they will.
Now I'm not saying they won't or can't, but I believe the chances of it happening are suitably remote
Even remote chances need to be correctly addressed. Otherwise no need for V1 or ETOPS ‘cos the chances are statistically very remote.
OK again, but the problem is to identify the remote chances well before they matter. For example, only a few short weeks ago these discussions were full of remarks along the lines of "Don't be silly, no pilot would fly like that" It seems to me to be harsh when people criticise AI for failing to predict that they would have to design for pilots taking the aircraft so deeply into stalled conditions.
Don't get me wrong - I am not saying that with hindsight the aeroplane could not be improved - clearly it can be, and IMO will be, modified in certain respects, but I am also saying that reasonable people would perhaps agree that the need for these changes depends on the new knowledge of what the spectrum of possible pilot actions might be.
That is my point.
This particular problem with automation gets too little attention.
It will for sure get more now.