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AF447 wreckage found

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AF447 wreckage found

Old 9th Jun 2011, 15:38
  #1541 (permalink)  
 
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So, let me guess. If the BEA faults the plane, you will judge that it remained impartial. But if it faults the pilot, it is clearly because it is biaised.
It is my strong suspicion(based on what we know) that a good air accident authority would fault both plane and pilot in this case.It is also my strong suspicion that only fault will be found with the pilots.They can quite legitimately use the old excuse "the pilot did not know/understand the aircraft".

Sekant,
Im never politcial when it comes to flying believe me.Frankly,I dont care where the plane's built.I write from one perspective only;that of a pilot.Did this aircraft through its design confuse/obstruct the pilot in any way,shape or form?
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 16:15
  #1542 (permalink)  
 
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Rananim:
It is my strong suspicion(based on what we know) that a good air accident authority would fault both plane and pilot in this case.

It is also my strong suspicion that only fault will be found with the pilots. They can quite legitimately use the old excuse "the pilot did not know/understand the aircraft".
In that last sentence lies a large body of investigation that either will or won't get answered: why?

You are I am sure aware of the following, but FWIW as this forum has lots of non pilot readers ...

A good accident authority ought to uncover systemic factors (training, culture, SOP, scheduling, maintenance, equipment, etcetera), and other contributing factors that help align the holes leading to the human factors you point to. Man-machine interface ain't out of the woods yet ...

The subtlety of some of those factors is lost on the public. In the rush to get to court and settle via money, when "blame fixing" trumps pursuit of detailed causes and remedies for accidents, the public noise may drown out the voices speaking of "problem(s) -> solutions(s)" ... with the risk that the right ears won't hear and decide upon which to implement.

If the root causes are not both identified and addressed, something like this will happen again. A question we learned to ask when I contributed to mishap investigations:
were they set up to fail?
If so, how?
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 16:24
  #1543 (permalink)  
 
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Cool

Hi,

As far we can see that accidents are not all treated the same way or with the same rigor ...
We have very recently the Falcon 7X after a malfunction (do not know why) is immediately banned from flying before any investigation start
Note that this incident did not cause any casualties
On the other hand we have AF447 ... which has claimed many victims.
After initial analysis of black boxes .. BEA announces that do not know what happened and the investigation continues ...
So long as the BEA does not know (and it is not even able to show that the plane is not faulty by design or management system) that aircraft presents a potential risk that must be assessed
Why grounded the Falcons .. and why let fly the A330
Both aircraft are not recently commissioned .. and both had so far proven reliability.
I see nothing about from EASA
Where is the logic?
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 16:26
  #1544 (permalink)  
 
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@ Lonewolf

I'd be very surprised indeed if the BEA's final report doesn't cover all the points you mention, as would the authorities in your country. It's a major, and respected, authority, fully conscious of its responsibilities (and incidental pressures that might be brought to bear).

PS @ jcjeant: Couild be, in the Falcon case, that a "whoopsie" came to light in the "first look" that people "in the loop" always make, without necessarily waiting for an official investigation to start. In my military flying days, I remember one or two cases where safety of crews demanded urgent and immediate action - not saying that this was the case with the Falcon, of course - I just wouldn't know.

Last edited by Jig Peter; 9th Jun 2011 at 16:32. Reason: add PS
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 16:31
  #1545 (permalink)  
 
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Jig Peter, I'd be surprised (and disappointed) as well if it turns out that way when the final report is released.

What is worrisome from the outside, (which is as true of mishaps in our country as anywhere, see the wake stirred up by Colgon Air accident) is my last concern: which cause factors will be actioned, and which paid lip service? (Ref: Sully's testimony in Congress ...)

That worry crosses all borders.
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 16:36
  #1546 (permalink)  
 
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Lonewolf - That's often the case, sadly. Depends, I suppose, on what seemed relevant at the time the report was drafted, though I agree that Colgon (and possibly AF447?) showed up some training (or understanding of training?) "loopholes". We shall see ...

Last edited by Jig Peter; 9th Jun 2011 at 16:37. Reason: splng
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 17:00
  #1547 (permalink)  
 
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Cool

Hi,

PS @ jcjeant: Couild be, in the Falcon case, that a "whoopsie" came to light in the "first look" that people "in the loop" always make, without necessarily waiting for an official investigation to start. In my military flying days, I remember one or two cases where safety of crews demanded urgent and immediate action - not saying that this was the case with the Falcon, of course - I just wouldn't know.
It's also a precedent:
The Concorde was forbidden to fly for sometime (after a first accident with casualties) and long before the investigation was finished ....
As I asked before .. where is the logic ?
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 17:21
  #1548 (permalink)  
 
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Straight and Level?

I have been following this thread on and off for a while. I see contributors range from non pilots to pilots with many years in the accident airplane type.

I am a pilot myself, although only SEL, but I did shoot a message to a friend of mine, a pilot for Virgin. He is not familiar with what happened to the pitot(s), what the autopilot commanded or what the pilots did, so no flaming please on his questions because he does not have all the facts that we now know. His question is more on a basic level of the loss of control and whether the pilot may have been able to regain control by 'conventional' techniques. He has 737 experience but no Airbus experience. I guess we are both wondering whether the the answers to his questions have something to do with the interaction between Airbus systems and the pilot.

So, hopefully someone with Airbus experience can respond. Here goes. Thx.

"Is it difficult to disengage the autopilot, disengage the autothrottle, level the wings and nose in an airbus? This technique used for unreliable airspeed indications and turbulent weather penetration. There is an attitude and a power setting for every phase of flight, airspeed and vertical speed being secondary indications in a way. The difficult thing for me to understand is why didn't they just disengage the autopilot as soon as the nose started pitching up? And a jet will descend at a safe speed with the thrust off at 2.5 to 3 degrees nose down. I guess we'll learn all about it in CRM next time."
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 17:44
  #1549 (permalink)  
 
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As far we can see that accidents are not all treated the same way or with the same rigor ...
We have very recently the Falcon 7X after a malfunction (do not know why) is immediately banned from flying before any investigation start
Note that this incident did not cause any casualties
On the other hand we have AF447 ... which has claimed many victims.
After initial analysis of black boxes .. BEA announces that do not know what happened and the investigation continues ...
So long as the BEA does not know (and it is not even able to show that the plane is not faulty by design or management system) that aircraft presents a potential risk that must be assessed
Why grounded the Falcons .. and why let fly the A330
Both aircraft are not recently commissioned .. and both had so far proven reliability.
I see nothing about from EASA
Where is the logic?
Dassault decided to ground the 7x, they then asked EASA and FAA to issue the AD

Last edited by flydive1; 9th Jun 2011 at 18:06.
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 17:55
  #1550 (permalink)  
 
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Good God mate, you are a test to one's patience.
Bear with me :

1/ pitot probes freeze. Speed doesn't make any sense to autopilot, consequently autopilot goes KABOOM !
Aircraft goes into alternate mode. No big deal. Just a few protections lost....like stall. Errrrrr ! Trim is still functionning though. You have basically your normal A300 only with fly by wire, but the logic is the same. Pull makes you climb and push.....well, you guessed.
2/ in any airline, trained pilot keeps pitch and thrust AS THEY WERE ! The damn thing was flying a second ago, why on earth shouldn't it fly a second later, speed or no speed indication !
3/ pilot for reasons the majority doesn't want to picture and will therefore hzve its nose rubbed in, pulls nose up. 7000 ft / min at FL 350 ! Some kind of pull ! 10 deg pitch ! Plane bleeds off all its speed and STALLS. by that time, still functionning trim has done its job.......it's trimed the aircraft since somebody was pulling !
4/ by that time, speed is back and shows an horrific 215 kt.....pilot pulls some more adding full thrust making things a lot worse than they already were.
5/ the rest is a long 3 minutes ending by a just horrifying death for 228 people if anyone cares.
Don't tell me they didn't feel anything ! 40 deg bank angle, 11 000 ft / min, some kind of smooth ride !
6/ according to rumours coming from Airbus, once stalled and the fuselage hiding the stab, it was too late.
I heard of some stunt which would have consisted of shutting the engines down, pitch down, relight......blablabla.
The trick was not to let it stall in the first place.
As to the skipper whose rest timing was well.......who could make a sense of the mess he had to face getting out of the bunk almost in his undies ?
Why isn't the french press full of this article when the rest of the world is ? Cuz the french press is a joke whose mission is to report what they're told to report exept maybe for Christophe Barbier. But then......who told him to leak this ?



Finally, this speed BUSS thing that was already in service in other airlines, like LH, is not reliable or very reliable above 25 000 ft, so says the rumour.

Last edited by Me Myself; 9th Jun 2011 at 18:55.
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 18:01
  #1551 (permalink)  
 
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3 questions regarding Air France 447

1. What were they doing flying through huge CBs when everyone else was going around them???
2. Was the Air Data Ice Protection switched on, and if not, why ???
3. So if you have unreliable airspeed indications, don't you revert to Attitude and Power?
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 18:18
  #1552 (permalink)  
 
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Quote:
3/ pilot for reasons the majority doesn't want to picture, pulls nose up. 7000 ft / min at FL 350 ! Some kind of pull ! 10 deg pitch ! Plane bleeds off all its speed and STALLS. by that time, still functionning trim has done its job.......it's trimed the aircraft since somebody was pulling !
4/ by that time, speed is back and shows an horrific 215 kt.....pilot pulls some more adding full thrust making things a lot worse than they already were.
I write this as a none pilot.
What makes me wonder is why a expirenced and well trained crew did these actions. I simply can not believe they ignored what seems to be SOP and standard pilot knowledge.
For some unknown reason they must have lost thier situation awareness and reacted the way they did with the known consequences.

After the auto pilot disengaged thier understanding of the situation seems to be very different from realtiy.
I hope the recovered data help us to understand why this happened.
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 20:14
  #1553 (permalink)  
 
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Stall warning inop

I don't know if someone said, but the Stall Warning was automatically cancel due to auto cancelation of angle of attack sensor because speed was showing bellow 60 kt.

Stall warning is the first and basic warning in aircrafts. Maybe a modern Airbus fell from 37000 ft because the crew didn't know they were stalling. I can imagine the workload, the storming and the IMC falling thinking they were in over speed or high speed stall.

That's my conclusion, it may be wrong but can somebody tell me why no stall warning during a stall?

In Airbus Manuals is said clearly that during a Unruialbe speed RELAY on Stal warning and Overspeed.
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 20:25
  #1554 (permalink)  
 
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747-400 Hi Alt Stall Recovery Training Video

Below link shows a sim 747-400 at FL400 cruising with A/P.
The thrust is reduced to approach stall. Note that the the plane pitches up automatically to try and maintain FL400 as power is reduced. Until finally it approaches stall with 5% pitch. In this case the Training Capt (Don Grange ) applies full thrust. This prevents a stall however the A/P is unable to correct its nose up attitude and is unable to increase its IAS. It can only be recovered by a gentle descent.

See link below and skip to about 5:15 min.


Last edited by xcitation; 9th Jun 2011 at 23:25.
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 20:38
  #1555 (permalink)  
 
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CP, #1558
1. ‘They were in a CB’’. There is no evidence that the aircraft was in a CB; the crew had seen and planned / turned to deviate around weather.
2. ‘Air data ice protection on’. A feature of pitot blocking due to ice crystals is that there has to be a heated surface on which some crystals can accumulate / melt. The water becomes the glue for other crystals to build up on, or the water ice mix can stabilize around freezing and block the pipes / vents.
3. ‘Fly attitude / power’. This depends on what the crew see and understand about the situation, and then depending on complex circumstances the ability to fly accurately, all in a very sudden, surprising, and complex situation.
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 21:04
  #1556 (permalink)  
 
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CP, #1558
1. ‘They were in a CB’’. There is no evidence that the aircraft was in a CB; the crew had seen and planned / turned to deviate around weather.
Yes, but is what they saw in front of them what was actually there?

PEI, wouldn't it be true to state that there is no evidence that they weren't in, or in the vicinity of, either a CB or a significant vertical development? I may be stretching the boundary of inference here, but there has been ample anecdotal evidence of possible "blind spots" with Wx radar, from people who operate and operated them. The possibility of locale specific weather/metro surprise remains open, and may remain an unknown forever. The metro conditions along the flight path route were sketched out by Mr. Vasquez. What was locally experienced remains unclear, beyond the BEA release of some conversation about turbulence before the event.
2. ‘Air data ice protection on’. A feature of pitot blocking due to ice crystals is that there has to be a heated surface on which some crystals can accumulate / melt. The water becomes the glue for other crystals to build up on, or the water ice mix can stabilize around freezing and block the pipes / vents.

Gonna save that one in a text file.
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 21:27
  #1557 (permalink)  
 
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Cool

Hi,

Open Part 5 and skip to about 5:15 min.

Boeing 747-400 Tutorial Video | Aviation Blogs
I skipped all .. ROFL cause videos no more available due to copyright claim

EDIT:
jcjeant and others

The training video link is fixed.
Thank's for edit !

Last edited by jcjeant; 10th Jun 2011 at 00:15.
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 21:59
  #1558 (permalink)  
 
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NigelOnDraft:
My comments Re 'classic 747s' was not meant to suggest that they were impervious to accidents, although the cases you referenced differ quite markedly to the Air France and QANTAS incidents. My point was, does a cascade of automated system failures distract / confuse a pilot from his most important job...flying the aircraft? Are these aircraft too complex? In the QANTAS incident the pilots became very task saturated trying to clear the multitude of system errors, and I wonder how they would have fared had they not had an additional two pilots on the flight-deck that day to assist.

I'm not Airbus bashing BTW, and as Iceman kindly responded to my query, both major manufacturers have their good and bad points. I'm merely posing a question for discussion.

Iceman, thanks for your reply. I'd love to hear your theory, but understand that it's probably not prudent to do so until more info comes to light. Will be interesting to hear how close you were when we do learn more...
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 22:17
  #1559 (permalink)  
 
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Cool

Hi,

Tireless I read and reread the BEA note .........

From 2 h 10 min 50, the PNF tried several times to call the Captain back.
At 2 h 10 min 51 , the stall warning was triggered again. The thrust levers were positioned
in the TO/GA detent and the PF maintained nose-up inputs. The recorded angle of attack, of
around 6 degrees at the triggering of the stall warning, continued to increase. The trimmable
horizontal stabilizer (THS) passed from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in about 1 minute and
remained in the latter position until the end of the flight.
Around fifteen seconds later, the speed displayed on the ISIS increased sharply towards 185 kt;
it was then consistent with the other recorded speed
. The PF continued to make nose-up
inputs. The airplane’s altitude reached its maximum of about 38,000 ft, its pitch attitude and
angle of attack being 16 degrees.
Note: The inconsistency between the speeds displayed on the left side and on the ISIS lasted a little less
than one minute.
15 seconds after 2H10Min51Sec the speed is coherent
So at 2H11Min06Sec the speed is coherent
It's also noted that the inconsistency between the speeds lasted a little less than ONE minute.
So for the sake of accuracy I will take the "less than ONE minute" as 59Sec.
So this indicate that the inconsistency between speeds appears (the earliest) at 2H10Min07Sec
So before 2H10Min07Sec the speeds are coherent
Or the BEA note that at 2H10Min05Sec the autopilot and auto-thrust disengage and the pilot tell he is in control..
From 2 h 10 min 05 , the autopilot then auto-thrust disengaged and the PF said "I have the
controls".
So .. the autopilot and auto-thrust disengage before the apparition of incoherent speeds
Where is the logic in the BEA chronology ?
Around fifteen seconds later
Why using the word around when they are accurate at the Sec for the other times in the note ...they have the accurate times or not ?
Can we take this BEA note as serious ?

Last edited by jcjeant; 9th Jun 2011 at 22:29.
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Old 9th Jun 2011, 22:31
  #1560 (permalink)  
 
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It's time to close this thread now, I'm totally overdosed on the same arguments, and newcomers asking the same questions, until more information is made available, which I frankly doubt will ever happen, IMHO the 'final' report will just be a padded out version of what has already been released. Hope I'm wrong, and it would be nice to have a complete voice transcript.

My thanks to those with Scairbus experience for some insight, but even they differ - recent sidestick 'feel' - or 'no feel' - opinions for instance.

Goodbye.
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