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AF447 wreckage found

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AF447 wreckage found

Old 1st Jun 2011, 00:16
  #1201 (permalink)  
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I presume all data from all sensors gets recorded on the Flight Data Recorder, so there will be information saying they were in a stall and AoA when in fact due to frozen probes they, at the start at least, were not in a stall and the AoA is incorrect. The only correct information being pitch and power the same as what the pilots would have?
Why this has been released to the media in the way it has seems very poor management.
I have sat here reading as many posts as possible, it is a shame the pilot concerned has been referred to as a Baby and its been jumped on by all and sundry. I wonder how you would cope given the situation of long haul and in the frame of being in a routine. Unreliable airspeed is hard enough to cope with, but in a storm cell, never mind later on when your tail rips off -which the latter I haven't seen anyone make reference to yet.

Re 2 previous post, I seem to recall something about this specific route being tight on fuel in order to be achieved, and this is the reason they did not deviate around the storm, they simply couldn't spare the gas??
Or much simpler, they missed it in the departure brief and missed the trick of turning up the brightness on the weather radar so saw nothing! (latter been done before)
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 00:36
  #1202 (permalink)  
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never mind later on when your tail rips off -which the latter I haven't seen anyone make reference to yet.
The tail didn't rip off while in flight but upon impact. That was one of the first findings 2 years ago.
Short of fuel ? Pressure ?
All I can say is this : in all the years I have been flying for AF, not once have I been given the " frown " for taking whatever quantity of fuel I deemed necessary.
We have figures as to the cost, that's all. The rest is entirely left up to you, your experience and judgement.
If I ever felt pressure......it was the one I was puting myself under.

AF chose to not update pitots aggresively as some other airlines.
Prior to departure the Captain chose a flight path directly through the storm whereas the subsequent flights (Iberia and Lufthansa) took on extra fuel and significantly deviated.
Captain chose to take bunk rest during the more challenging part of the flight.
Airbus training in excursions outside the normal flight envelope and outside normal law are under represented.
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 00:46
  #1203 (permalink)  
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Once enroute you can always get deviations for weather so I am sure all the other airliners on the same route did that. It still looks like the final report will be the repeated Airbus pitot/static problems that were slow in being corrected. The copilots should have been able to handle unreliable airspeed with no problem. Everybody wonders why the PF pulled back and zoomed to FL380 and entered a deep stall.

No airliner I have flown says to pull back, it says to hold appropriate pitch and power for weight and altitude. I know the Airbus has no feedback of what the other pilot is doing so complicates things.
Also the interim report leaves out so much information they have for some reason so even though I am sure they know what happened, we don't with the lack of information. The CVR will tell a lot of the story and the FDR will tell the rest when they release it.
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 02:39
  #1204 (permalink)  
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Undercarriage Microswitch

Late but hopefully useful
This thread is galloping forwards so fast that I'm replying to something three pages ago, but it was only a few hours ago, and it needs answered because it is another daft blind alley.

Someone said:
I can't believe anybody would certify an airliner that is stalled but the stall warning mutes because the pitot static system senses less than 60 knots. That is nuts.
I think you will find that is completely normal, and even a microsecond of thought will tell you why. Think "parked on the taxiway". There's a strong chance the wing is fully stalled, but we'll supress the stall warning until we've got some speed up, thank-you.
I think that you will find it is normal to use an undercarriage microswitch so that when the aircraft is 'sat on the runway' the weight compresses the oleo and the microswitch says 'ON' when the weight is off the undercarriage the microswitch says 'OFF'. This is used for OOOI by ACARS but apparently is too simple for the Airbus design team who instead put in a system that was based on their assumption that at less than 60 kts the aircraft will be on the ground.
That was an incorrect assumption which in this case may have been one of the series of errors that ended with a destroyed aircraft.
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 02:45
  #1205 (permalink)  
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75 additional bodies recovered from Air France crash after 2 years

Unless I skipped a page somewhere, I've not seen this posted. Apologies if it has been.

75 additional bodies recovered from Air France crash after 2 years - CNN.com

This is contrary to decisions I thought were made weeks ago.
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 03:10
  #1206 (permalink)  
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Stall Whining

I wish somebody intimate with AOA vanes would come on here and explain authoritatively why stall warning shuts off below 60. It's a physical limitation. Maybe one of you whiners could come up with a design that's better than the present one, which is nearly as universal as the pitot tube. How often has the present design even been criticized in an accident investigation, let alone blamed?
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 03:39
  #1207 (permalink)  
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A question for all the experts....

There has been no discussion of the lack of a distress call from AF447. Does this indicate the lack of situational awareness on the flight deck as they where struggling with the jet? Is it SOP to put out a distress signal when the is hitting the fan, regardless of where you are? Where the pilots to busy to put out a call, or too confused?
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 03:40
  #1208 (permalink)  
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Extra Fuel

Delta T,
if you have to deviate around a large storm system and by doing so you run short of fuel, then you make an en route stop for fuel. It's that simple. They could have stopped in the Canaries or Lisbon for fuel, but now they will never have the chance of taking fuel ever again. Please pay attention to the fact that other flights took extra fuel, deviated and arrived safely. Flying is serious business.
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 03:56
  #1209 (permalink)  
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Who designed this (to create a page nobody can read and wonders why) ?
I think most of us figured it out a long time ago.
Yep, but it took me longer than 3.5 minutes ...
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 04:03
  #1210 (permalink)  
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There has been no discussion of the lack of a distress call from AF447.

Aviate, navigate, communicate. They hadn't got past the first which is why you see no discussion of the third.
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 04:38
  #1211 (permalink)  
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Fuel ?

Prior to departure the Captain chose a flight path directly through the storm whereas the subsequent flights (Iberia and Lufthansa) took on extra fuel and significantly deviated.
Delta T,
if you have to deviate around a large storm system and by doing so you run short of fuel, then you make an en route stop for fuel. It's that simple. They could have stopped in the Canaries or Lisbon for fuel, but now they will never have the chance of taking fuel ever again. Please pay attention to the fact that other flights took extra fuel, deviated and arrived safely. Flying is serious business.
The BEA report:
The take-off weight was 232.8 t (for a MTOW of 233t), including 70.4 t of fuel.
Do you know the extra fuel quantity take on board by Iberia and Lufthansa ?

The AF447 flight had enough fuel for change his route.
Read also the two BEA preliminary reports.

Bodies recovered
This is contrary to decisions I thought were made weeks ago.
Those decisions were nullified by another .. one week ago when the results of ADN research on the two firsts bodies recovered were positive

Distress call

Where the pilots to busy to put out a call, or too confused?
You answered yourself ....

Last edited by jcjeant; 1st Jun 2011 at 04:51.
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 06:07
  #1212 (permalink)  
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Zoom climb

"Everybody wonders why the PF pulled back and zoomed to FL380 and entered a deep stall."

I never read it that way. My read is that they were unable to climb because the temperature did not fall. Never any indication that they "planned" a climb.

I read NOT that they climbed, but they ascended, or, they were pushed, or, caught a severe updraft, and then wound up at 38,000 in a nose up condition, at below 60kts and thus literally out of control because at that time the controls would be inneffective.

Which is consistant with being in a thunderstorm.
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 06:10
  #1213 (permalink)  
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Right on!! bbg (Page 51)

Didn't we go through this with the Dominica 757 crash?? Problem is the warnings don't shut up--goes back to a CV-580 crash in the midwest-they ingested a bird right at rotation and the engine autofeathered-the pilot was a veteran but the speaker was shouting "Pull Up, Pull Up................." he never got back the speed he need to recover - because?? Yea - He pulled up. I memorized the locations of the Aural and Speaker CB's on the 757 so I could shut them up and keep my head straight during what was obviously a warning malfunction. What's happening here is the Automation is not assisting pilots anymore -- pilots are trained to assist automation = Bad Formula! Standby for more of the same in the future until they get the formula changed-if ever!
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 06:30
  #1214 (permalink)  
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@ wallybird7

At the moment the incident began.....(from the May 28, 2011 update report)

"From 2 h 10 min 05, the autopilot then auto-thrust disengaged and the PF said "I have the controls". The airplane began to roll to the right and the PF made a left nose-up input....The airplane’s pitch attitude increased progressively beyond 10 degrees and the plane started to climb."

As you say, no climb was planned - but that doesn't rule out an inadvertent climb induced by pulling the stick while correcting the right roll.

The report mentions the pilot raising the nose in the first seconds after taking the controls. It notes turbulence events. It doesn't mention evidence of an updraft.

Last edited by pattern_is_full; 1st Jun 2011 at 06:51.
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 06:47
  #1215 (permalink)  
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Alan Levin's USAToday Article on AF447

I sorta took exception to the presumptive tone of the article and some private correspondence between journos in the same ilk....that I was copied in on. I decided to re-orient them (late at night after a half-bottle of brandy) - so it may not be comprehensive. If you know of any points that were missed, pls post. Apologies for length but need to be comprehensive. I'm sick of defenceless dead pilots having to carry the can.
You oversimplify their predicament. You (and so do we all) need more data. However it's also obvious that useful data was exactly what the AF447 pilots lacked during their deep-stall descent - because of the peculiar aspects of the pitot freeze-up during high altitude cruise..... and its effect upon the subsequent post-zoom stall.
One of the characteristics of an approaching or incipient stall that pilots are trained to respond and react to is "low and decreasing" airspeed (even if they have no stall warning hooter or "cricket"). However they wouldn't have had any airspeed indication during their deep-stall descent with an iced pitot x 3. Nor did they have an angle-of-attack indication..... i.e. even though the A330 is equipped with an AoA vane to feed the automation (including the stall warning system), the pilots don't warrant a gauge of any sort. So what did they have for identification of (and recovery from) a stall? The real answer is precious little - by way of overt display or training fallback.
They had a source of pitch attitude. However consider that most approaches to the training one-g stall is made in level flight at a speed reduction rate of circa one knot per second. Thus, at the point of the incipient stall, where pilots are taught to initiate recovery (i.e. at the stall buffet), the additional cue on an ADI or visual horizon*is a high nose attitude (typically around +15 degrees).*But in a deep stall entered ballistically at high altitude post-zoom, the attitude in pitch during descent with max power (due pitch-up effect of underslung engines) would approximate the straight and level attitude of around 3 to 5 degrees nose-up. Thus they were robbed of most all cues that could clue them that they were in fact in a stall. They wouldn't have been aware that their auto-trimmed horizontal stabilizer trim was NOW unavailable - and stuck at its maximum of 13 degrees nose-up. If nothing else, it was that THS (trimmable hoz stabilizer) that would've held them in a stalled pitch attitude..... regardless of any subsequent side-stick pitch inputs. The THS has the REAL pitch-trim authority at low speed, the elevators are virtually trim-tabs for higher speed refinements.
But wouldn't the stall warning be blaring you say? Not necessarily so. It's designed to be discontinuous (a rare concession to the cacophony effect of blaring aural alerts in an emergency). In the factually sparse BEA report, that aspect isn't addressed in depth. The only trigger for the aural stall warning is the AoA and that has a set threshold both to start and to cease. Once they were at around 40 degrees AoA I'd be surprised if it was to be heard on the CVR (see later shock statement of cause of non-recovery below). What about the stick-shaker? It too has cautionary thresholds and they were soon well beneath that triggering band. The A330 wasn't tested for its high altitude ballistic stall entry characteristics - so the instrumentation wasn't available or calibrated to cope. What about the VSI or IVSI/RCDI (rate of descent indicator). It's not very attention-getting and it's probably linear (i.e.in a non-circular) presentation anyway in the A330 (I prefer the round dials for visual attention-getting). It's hard to say what it would have read in a compromised pitot-static system anyway. You must also consider what effect upon the airspeed indicators a 10,000 fpm rate of descent would have on their airspeed read-outs (think rate-of-change of static pressure). The ASI's are reliant upon both a pitot and a static pressure input feed.
*Would there have been any tell-tale buffeting? In a word "NO". The buffet in a one-g stall is provided courtesy of the disturbed airflow over the wing hitting the tailplane. At the BEA's stated 40 degrees angle-of-attack, the disturbed airflow would not impinge upon the tailplane. They were going down in an express elevator at around that self-same 40 degrees angle (that they were presenting to the relative airflow). I was surprised to find myself agreeing with one animated depiction on TV of the stalled steep descent event. That's how it would've been in my view - and thus the airflow and airframe buffet wouldn't have been a player in alerting the pilots to their stalled status. It was probably/relatively much quieter than the ambient noise in cruise, even with the engines at TO/GA. By design, in alternate, direct or ABNORMAL Law there is no auto-trim (it discontinued after reaching 13 degs nose-up), no ALPHA FLOOR PROT or ALPHA max (i.e. no max selectable AoA), so the aircraft can be stalled once in extremis - an aspect and consideration that's alien to Airbus pilots. AF447's stall occurred beyond the imagination (also) of the A330 designers or test pilots, at the ballistic apex of a zoom climb with lotsa power set - and at or above its ceiling for its weight.
But there were also other complications which I'll briefly mention:
a. What actually happened to initiate the sequence of failure advisories and the ACARS spew? Did the auto-pilot self-disconnect after running out of its ability to hold the nose-down force gradient of a horizontal stabilizer being trimmed by the system to compensate for the aircraft being driven ever faster in real speed terms (i.e. accelerated by the auto-thrust, to offset the perceived gradual loss of airspeed from the slowly icing pitots?). If so, then when the autopilot disconnected, the pitch-up would have been involuntary. Any evidence for that? The BEA says "the airplane's pitch attitude increased progressively and the plane started to climb. The PF made nose-down control inputs and alternately, left and right roll inputs." Reflect upon the fact that the one thing the pilot has left once he's apparently lost elevator authority in a pitch-up, is to roll the airplane in order to induce a nose-drop. It's evident IMHO that the post-disconnect pitch-up was therefore involuntary and opposed by the PF. Entry to the post-zoom stall is likely to have been automated.
b. A few seconds after the aircraft levelled at 37,500ft at a 4 deg AoA the BEA says: "the stall warning triggered again. The thrust levers were positioned at TO/GA and the pilot maintained nose-up inputs." No real surprise there. They'd zoomed to above their ceiling and the pilot was stick-back to oppose the tendency of the nose to drop at the unknown (to him) low speed. Unfortunately, as a result, the THS continued to trim to max nose-up and the distracted pilots then allowed the aircraft to stall. There's an indication that the lower speeds may have allowed the pitot heat to clear some of the pitot ice....i.e. the ISIS speeds becoming consonant with the recorded PF speed. Report: "As the captain re-entered the cockpit the recorded speeds became invalid and the stall warning stopped" At this point these are evident indications of now having entered into the very low IAS/high AoA deep-stall condition. Distractions of trouble-shooting are the likely cause of the PF allowing the 13 degs nose-up THS (of which he was unaware) to silently promote a stall.
c. If the autopilot had disconnected because of ADR disagree parameters being exceeded, then the zoom may have resulted from a post-disconnect overspeed warning and a natural pilot pitch-up response. Whatever the cause of that pitch-up, the auto-trim would've been available and so it was (BEA) - and so it did auto-trim the THS into a fateful 13 degs nose-up (whence it remained).
d. How did the captain's arrival upon the flight-deck affect the outcome? Firstly, in a quick urgent scan he'd not have seen the PF pilot's grip upon his sidestick (think about it and compare with what the MS990 Captain saw upon re-entering his Egyptair cockpit). He would've seen no (or low?) IAS displayed and the altimeter unwinding - yet loads of power. 20 seconds after he entered the flightdeck the throttles were placed at idle. At his command? Probably. Did he misinterpret the situation as the aftermath of a high-speed loss of control and thus did he complicate the recovery issue? Probably. Are Airbus pilots generally unfamiliar with the possibility of entering a deep-stall condition at altitude? Probably. Is it never sim practised or preached or does it not rate a mention in the Pilot's Handling Notes? Probably not.
e. The BEA mentions that, at A/P disconnect, a sharp fall from about 275 kts to 60kts in the left primary PFD was recorded, then a few moments later on the ISIS STBY insts. Using the analogy of how hail size-growth increases exponentially in the latter part of its fall (due to an ever increasing surface area upon which moisture can coalesce), we can divine that a similar thing was happening to each of the three pitots. Thus, as soon as the pilot made his sharp nose-up side-stick input, the smooth laminar flow into the LH pitot inlet (the only one recorded) would've been disrupted by the pitot's projecting icy excrescences.... causing the 275/60 transitory hiccup. I'd further interpret this as being partial proof that the auto-pilot disconnected primarily because of the elevator (nose-) download it was carrying due to the discrepancy between the aircraft's actual speed and the system speed (for which it was being THS-trimmed). i.e. It was unlikely that they actually hit Mach Crit and pitched up because of Mach Tuck. Thus the pitch-up may have been trim-induced and not pilot-initiated. Who's to know at this stage? But what happened next (the ballistic stall entry with 13 degrees nose-up THS) surely sealed their fate. The PF was never aware of that 13 degs nose-up THS (or he may have manually trimmed it out - yet another*completely*unnatural input action for a FBW Airbus pilot).
f. Ultimately, what killed their chances of recovery? It's very ironic that it was likely one of the systems meant to have saved them.
i.e. The BEA Report says: "At 2 h 12 min 02, the PF said "I don’t have any more indications", and the PNF said "we have no valid indications". At that moment, the thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the engines’ N1’s were at 55%. Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall warning sounded again."

At the sound of the stall warning, the pilot was likely deterred from any further initiatives (even though he was on the right track with his pitch-down inputs) - and he promptly then handed over the controls to his more senior PNF. A stall warning that sounds off as you exit a deep-stall condition? Not a great idea at all....... it is likely to have the opposite of the desired effect. The overwrought pilot might easily assume that his action is initiating a stall. A Doppler-based stall warning whose pitch and volume varies (dependent upon how embedded in the stall you are) would be a much safer (and saner) proposition.

It gets back to that old saw: "For the want of a nail...." Unfortunately for AF447 it was more than just a nail. It was a whole row of rivets that allowed the operation to become unglued.

So if you place a pilot in harm's way beyond his training and experience, fail a vital sub-system that then causes a failure cascade, can you really blame him for the outcome? Perhaps you should be blaming a system that's too lazy or incompetent to extrapolate failure modes into real world scenarios and identify real threats. The hazard was all too evident from all the prior Air France, Air Caribbes, NWA and other incidents (including QANTAS). Nobody acted with sufficient urgency to address the hazards. Hubris? In large measure I'd say.
PS Also see the attached file - revelations from a*DER Spiegel article
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 06:49
  #1216 (permalink)  
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Somebody reaasure me please that there wasnt some automated voice screaming in the PF's ear saying " pull - up, pull - up" when his AoA was 40 degrees or whatever it was....with a 10,000 fpm ROD.

I shudder at the bit where the poor sods finally decide to push the nose down, only to have the stall warning reactivate........
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 06:50
  #1217 (permalink)  
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I read NOT that they climbed, but they ascended, or, they were pushed, or, caught a severe updraft, and then wound up at 38,000 in a nose up condition, at below 60kts and thus literally out of control because at that time the controls would be inneffective.
As a previous post notes, the BEA report says that the PF pulled the stick back, resulting in the climb. It was not an updraft. Given the time the nose up command was applied, it was likely deliberate, meaning the PF wanted to pull the nose up. That does not necessarily mean he wanted to climb, but perhaps that he wanted to bleed off speed, or perhaps for some reason thought they were in a dive, and needed to pull the nose up.

The report is not that clear about how much time the pull-up lasted, nor how much time the PF later spent trying to push the nose back down again, so it is also possible that when the AP dropped out, the nose rose on its own, and the PF was trying to counteract that tendency, and was pushing down. I would have thought that the report would have mentioned that sequence of events if it happened that way, since it would have been readily seen on the DFDR. However, the report is very thin, so much could have been left out.

Will have to see the final report to see what might have given the pilot the impression he needed to pull the nose up, or if he was reacting to the effects of the AP dropout. That would also explain his mindset, and perhaps help explain why he didn't later put the nose down to recover, other than for a few short attempts.

The fact that the aircraft lost as much speed as they did also supports the fact that the the climb was due to a nose-up command, since it takes energy to climb, and if an updraft provided the energy, they wouldn't have lost as much speed as they did in the process.

Note that the aircraft didn't drop as low as 60 kts in the climb. That was an erroneous speed displayed in front of the pilot, and recorded on the DFDR, presumably as a result of the blocked pitot tubes. The report suggests that the aircraft's actual speed only dropped to about 185 kts, which is what two separate speed indicators said when they came back into correspondence, meaning the blockage in the pitots had likely cleared again at that point.

Last edited by ST27; 1st Jun 2011 at 07:32.
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 06:53
  #1218 (permalink)  
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Effect of the position of the THS

From 38 000 ft down to 0, the trim/THS was at 13° nose up.
Starting around 2 h 12 min 17, still well above 10000 ft, there was an apparent attempt to get out of stall: nose down stick with engines around 55% N1. It did not work out. I'm trying to understand how the position of the THS is related to that failure.

- Can it be determined what the flight law was during that nose down input?
- Is this mode consistent with the THS remaining static?
- Does this mode allow full deflection of the elevator?
- Was getting out of stall feasible despite the position of the THS?
- Do procedures to get out of stall, as (I guess) practiced in simulator, include manual action on the trim to get the THS back to neutral or nose down (or on the contrary is it customary to assume autotrim will take care of the THS)?
- Do these standard procedures include extending flaps to some degree, which is not mentioned in the BEA report?

Full disclosure: I'm not a pilot; I'm an engineer working on systems where security (not safety) is critical, and I like to understand by myself how failures happen.
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 06:56
  #1219 (permalink)  
Join Date: Nov 2007
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Could it be that the pull up by the PF was purely to follow his flight director cues that were demanding a pitch up due to an overspeed condition as well?

Could the FD have been commanding a pull up caused by the aircraft sensing an overspeed condition that arose either by the rapid increase of mach no. from hitting the relatively hot air in the top of or leading the top of a very active itcz night time thunderstorm, and/or positive local thunderstorm wind vectors?

I know of two jet aircraft that have lost control in the tops of tropical TS due to being put outside the envelope suddenly in warm TS air at altitude.

And by the way - great post Hundredpercentplease at #1179 - hats off!!
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Old 1st Jun 2011, 07:29
  #1220 (permalink)  
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'"The Shadow" - thanks. Thats a good effort and summary of the sad event.
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