Repeated for emphasis.
I will grant that a variety of certification decisions of similar weight (and posible lethal side effects) have been made over the years, but when you consider how pervasive shakers are, throughout the airline industry world wide, deliberately omitting them is a signal regulatory decision in a certification process. Not saying this is any sort of golden bullet, see Colgan, but another hole in the cheese? Likely. (But if it cuts out as the SW does, rendered useless in this case??? Not sure).
Originally Posted by ECAMS
Q:
How did AIRBUS avoid the installation of a Shaker/Pusher?
A: This is why I made the comment I did regarding the aircraft being considered "un-stallable."
It was considered that the aircraft would prevent itself from stalling.
The small detail omitted is that it only does this in Normal Law.
Combined with the STALL audio warning (problem: it is silenced when the airspeed drops below 60 kts), this was considered sufficient protection.
Of note in the causation chain analysis: regulating authority and manufacturer (and who else?) are the parties to this compromise, which saves cost (and possibly weight?) and reduces by a small amount system complexity.
Question: does anyone know what the test pilots involved in the A330 program thought of this decision, to omit the stick shakers?
There are a few lapels upon which I'd like to have been a fly, eh?
Originally Posted by Dozy
Speaking for myself, whatever I may feel about the causes - I don't care about blame. I don't care about the politics that will follow in the legal battle, where lawyers for all concerned parties will try to blame the other parties in an effort to minimise liability. I care about the system as a whole being made safer.
Nicely put.