Hello Bear,
In summary, as nothing will change your point anyway, I'll consider that you are either a so damn good expert capable of dismissing field investigation work by looking at a couple of pictures and telling us they are totally incompetent about this matter, either that you are stretching all evidences in order to fit your pre-conceived theory already made before a single piece of this aircraft was actually recovered.
Originally Posted by Bearfoil
ACARS is a maintenance option, .. Just because a message wasn't received certainly does not mean it was not sent.
So, the BEA is obviously bullying us...
Originally Posted by BEA 2nd interim report
1.16.2.4.3. Interruption of the messages
The last ACARS message was received at 2 h 14 min 26. The traces of
the communications at the level of the satellite show that the ACARS
acknowledgement from the ground was effectively received by the aircraft.
No trace of any attempted communication by the aircraft with the ground was then recorded, although there was still at least one message to be transmitted
(see above). In absolute terms, there are several reasons that could explain
why communications stopped.
¤ no message to be transmitted: as explained above, the “MAINTENANCE
STATUS ADR2” message should have been followed, one minute later, by
the transmission of a class 2 fault message. The aircraft therefore had, at
2 h 15 min 14 at the latest, one message to be transmitted.
¤ loss of one or more system(s) essential for the generation and routing of
messages in the aircraft:
• ATSU / SDU / antenna: none of the maintenance messages sent is
related in any way whatsoever with the functioning of these systems. A
malfunction of this type should have occurred after the transmission of
the last message and without forewarning.
• loss of electrical power supply: this would imply the simultaneous loss of
the two main sources of electrical power generation.
¤ loss of satellite communication:
• loss of data during transmission: the satellite’s quality follow-up does
not show any malfunction in the time slot concerned.
• loss of contact between the aircraft and the satellite:
• • unusual attitudes: given the relative position of the satellite with respect to the aircraft and the aircraft’s tracking capability, the antenna would
have to be masked by the aircraft’s fuselage or wings. Examination of
the debris showed that the aircraft hit the water with a bank angle close
to zero and a positive pitch angle. The aircraft would therefore have
been able, in the last seconds at least, to transmit an ACARS message.
• • end of the flight between 2 h 14 min 26 and 2 h 15 min 14.
Investigation worked out aircraft-sattelite-ground communications. Its conclusion was not only based on what was received on the ground but on the whole protocole, including the fact that the last message received at 02.14.26 was duely aknowledged by the ground to the aircraft as being transmitted. ACARS can not transmit if the aircraft is not loged on the sattelite meaning that ACARS are not sent into thin air with hopes it will be picked up by chance (or not) by the communication system.
Originally Posted by Bearfoil
I think the VS failed laterally while in flight, as a result of the fractures seen in the mountings in BEA's photography. This does NOT mean a failure of hydraulics, necessarily.
Of course it doesn't!
Airbus is so dumb as it does not want to bother pilots/maintenance when some control surface is falling from the sky, like if they needed it for something...
And so, the BEA is still bullying us... Where are the evidences (so obvious) of lateral failures here:
Originally Posted by BEA 2nd interim report
1.12.3.5.2 General examination of the vertical stabilizer
The vertical stabilizer was in generally good condition. The damage observed
on the side panels and on the rudder was largely due to the recovery and
transport operations. The damage due to separation from the fuselage was
essentially located at the root of the vertical stabiliser.
The vertical stabilizer separated from the fuselage at the level of the three
attachments:
• the forward attachment (male and female lugs) and part of the leading
edge are missing;
• the centre and aft attachments are present: male and female lugs and parts
of the fuselage frames (frames 84, 85, 86 and 87).
1.12.3.5.3 Examination of the fin structure
Rib 1 had almost completely disappeared.
Rib 2 was bent upwards with a right-left symmetry.
The front of the fin showed signs of symmetrical compression damage:
• failure of the leading edge right- and left-hand panels
• longitudinal cracking of the leading edge stiffener
• HF antenna support (attached to the forward spar): failure of the lower
part, crumpling indicating bottom-upwards compression loads
1.12.3.5.4 Examination of the vertical stabiliser – rudder attachments
The vertical load pick-up arm in the rudder’s hinge axis (arm 36 g) broke at the
level of the attachment lug on the rudder side.
The size of this arm is calculated to withstand a maximum load of 120,000 N,
corresponding to a relative acceleration of 36 g of the rudder in relation to the
vertical stabilizer.
Shear cracks, along a top-down axis, can also be seen on the rudder hinge arm
attachment fittings close to arm 36 g.
These observations indicate that the vertical stabiliser was subjected to a load
greater than 120,000 N in the rudder’s hinge axis.
1.12.3.5.5 Examination of the Rudder Travel Limiter Unit (RTLU)
The RTLU was found in its place in the fin and disassembled. An examination
was performed at the manufacturer’s and showed that it would allow travel
of the rudder measured as 7.9° +/- 0.1°. As an example, at FL350, this travel is
obtained for Mach 0.8 +/- 0.004, corresponding to a CAS of 272 +/- 2 kt.
Note: the maximum travel of the rudder is calculated in relation to the airplane
confi guration, its speed and its Mach number. This travel can be commanded between 4 degrees and 35 degrees.
1.12.3.5.6 Examination of the fuselage parts (remains of the skin, frames and
web frames)
The fuselage was sheared along the frames and centre and aft attachment
lugs by loads applied bottom-upwards.
The part of frame 87 that can be seen had undergone S-shaped deformation:
the left-hand side forwards, and the right-hand side backwards. The horizontal
stabiliser actuator supports were deformed and broke in a backwards
movement from the front. These observations indicate a backwards movement
of the trimmable horizontal stabiliser.
Frames 84 and 85 were pushed in backwards in the middle. The deformations
observed on the rudder control rod are consistent with this indentation.
The deformations of the frames were probably the consequence of the water
braking the aircraft’s forward movement.
1.12.3.5.7 Examination of the fin-to-fuselage attachments
The centre attachment had pivoted backwards with the parts of the frames
and web frames that were attached to it. The aft attachment had pivoted
forwards with the parts of the frames and web frames that were attached to it.
The aft attachment lugs (male on the fin and female on the airframe) had
marks indicating a backwards movement of frames 86 and 87 as a whole.
The centre and aft lateral load pick-up rods showed damage that was consistent
with this backwards pivoting of frames 84 to 87:
• tensile failure of the centre spar at the level of the centre rod attachments;
• compression failure of the aft spar at the level of the aft rod attachments
and failure of the left-hand rod by buckling.