AF447
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Imarsat
Since I haven't read through all 85 pages of posts; I was wondering if any airbus gurus know if the A-330 has an AoA indication on the PFD, and if so, where it gets it's information.
My company use to train flying an air transport category aircraft with just the AoA.
My apologizes if this has already been discussed.
My company use to train flying an air transport category aircraft with just the AoA.
My apologizes if this has already been discussed.
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advisory, recommendations
Sorry. Too many posts... I have found it at last:
- SB A330-34-3071 (first published in September 2007) proposes to change Thales Avionics pitot probes P/N C16195AA by pitot probes P/N C16195BA.
QUOTE
- REASON/DESCRIPTION/OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES A320 aircraft family operators have reported airspeed discrepancies while flying under heavy precipitations. A new Pitot probe has been designed to improve A320 aircraft airspeed behavior with these specific weather conditions. A few similar discrepancies had also been reported by A330/A340 aircraft operators and AIRBUS now proposes this Pitot probes improvement for Long Range (LR) aircraft. This Service Bulletin proposes the replacement of the three Pitot probes PN C16195AA (FINs 9DA1, 9DA2 and 9DA3) by new probes PN C16195BA. Accomplishment of this Service Bulletin will improve the resistance against water ingress under severe conditions resulting in improved airspeed behavior. In addition, this new Pitot probe introduces a new external protection layer to prevent corrosion.
Please note that both of these SBs are RECOMMENDED only, meaning that it's up to the operators to decide upon the embodiement on their fleets.
To conclude, P/N C16195 has been improved by Thales Avionics to cope with some minor (because no AD was raised to cover those two SBs) in-service issues.
Therefore, the various retrofit campains that have been mentioned in the previous pages are led on a volontary basis by the operators.
No TFU on A330 airspeed discrepancies has been published by Airbus meaning that, even if some incidents have occured (see Air Caraïbes above), it was not on a widespread basis and/or no major safety issue was identified.
To conclude, P/N C16195 has been improved by Thales Avionics to cope with some minor (because no AD was raised to cover those two SBs) in-service issues.
Therefore, the various retrofit campains that have been mentioned in the previous pages are led on a volontary basis by the operators.
HAD this protection: it's called Design Maneuvering Speed; the speed at which application of FULL available aileron, rudder or elevator will NOT overstress the airplane. It approximates Rough Air Speed.
GF
DC-ATE;
Reading limited commentary here and being "glad I never had to. [fly the Airbus]" are personal statement of opinion which do not relate to the accident and do not testify to anything regarding an Airbus aircraft.
Well DC-ATE that's the very same as what the king said to Mozart regarding his latest opera, "There's just too many notes!". In DC8 terms, it's like say, "there's far too much piping and too many pumps for my liking".
But in the larger issue, citing disagreements over discussions between pilots here on fbw systems as "cases in point" is simply a personal opinion which advances nothing, proves nothing and teaches nothing. Rather, the views express a prejudged opinion solidified without the benefit of knowledge or experience.
Anyone who says "the computer" is flying the airplane against the pilot's wishes/demands/requirements has never flown the aircraft. I've seen a lot of screw-ups on the 'bus and they are generally the result of a lack in some of the basic requirements like good training, experience and attitude - not always, but almost always.
States the obvious. I'm sure you've seen more than one toppled gyro, iced-over windshield, unreliable speed indicator, difficult-to-read altimeter and a cockpit tossing so badly you can't read a thing in your day and I'm sure you know colleagues who had superb hands who flew a perfectly serviceable aircraft and it's passengers into a mountain or the ground. Did they have any more of a chance? If these guys lost everything for whatever reason (and we do NOT know those reasons or that they lost everything), and were being tossed like a cork in white water, what chance do any "hands" have?
Well, I don't mean to be unkind, but it really says nothing. The Fleet 80 I learned on is in principle no different than the A340. If one understands one's airplane and practises to learn more, one can fly the 340 like any aircraft including Boeing's 787.
My overriding point is, as always, one respected the limits of the machine one was in no matter when one flew, then or now. Respect means one learns about one's craft and one's airplane.
From your writing I know you knew your machine and cared. The 320/340 series is no different, nor is the 777 nor will be the 787 nor are those who fly present fbw aircraft.
An accident such as we now have does not negate over two decades of experience with the type, no more than the Amsterdam accident negates the brilliant 3 (almost 4)-decade experience with the 737.
Changing your mind isn't the goal. One goal is challenging ignorant comments about automatic flight. We are all free to have a say of course but that doesn't make what is said, right. Nor does that mean that autoflight is "innocent" by any means, but it takes some time to know the traps and corners and experience to discuss them legitimately.
The deeper goal is to recapture what has been lost and is becoming more elusive as "internet knowledge" makes "laptop experts" of more and more people, who cruise, scan, quote and freely shove an oar into a complex, specialist discussion without understanding; I am looking to recapture an abiding respect for those who actually have done, or still do the work on a professional, daily basis and who offer their time and expertise freely to help others who are genuinely keen to learn about these aircraft and what it really means to investigate such a tragic fatal accident.
best,
PJ2
But, I have read enough from those that HAVE flown these types to know that I'm glad I never had to.
It is utterly amazing to read the differences expressed by those that fly these things as to how various systems operate. There are disagreements everywhere. The manuals are simply too full of information that not even a computer scientist could possibly remember/recall in the time of need. Who ever heard of an aircraft having THREE different flight control laws?!
But in the larger issue, citing disagreements over discussions between pilots here on fbw systems as "cases in point" is simply a personal opinion which advances nothing, proves nothing and teaches nothing. Rather, the views express a prejudged opinion solidified without the benefit of knowledge or experience.
Anyone who says "the computer" is flying the airplane against the pilot's wishes/demands/requirements has never flown the aircraft. I've seen a lot of screw-ups on the 'bus and they are generally the result of a lack in some of the basic requirements like good training, experience and attitude - not always, but almost always.
Whatever happend to AF447, apparently happend so fast, the crew had no chance to sort out all the warnings being displayed on their panel. They probably had no chance to simply FLY their aircraft.
Like it or not, his (Desertia) reference to having a "...piece of wire or hydraulics controlling..." says alot, along with those of us, yourself included, who learned how to "fly" airplanes and not manipulate a computer to do it for us.
My overriding point is, as always, one respected the limits of the machine one was in no matter when one flew, then or now. Respect means one learns about one's craft and one's airplane.
From your writing I know you knew your machine and cared. The 320/340 series is no different, nor is the 777 nor will be the 787 nor are those who fly present fbw aircraft.
An accident such as we now have does not negate over two decades of experience with the type, no more than the Amsterdam accident negates the brilliant 3 (almost 4)-decade experience with the 737.
Changing your mind isn't the goal. One goal is challenging ignorant comments about automatic flight. We are all free to have a say of course but that doesn't make what is said, right. Nor does that mean that autoflight is "innocent" by any means, but it takes some time to know the traps and corners and experience to discuss them legitimately.
The deeper goal is to recapture what has been lost and is becoming more elusive as "internet knowledge" makes "laptop experts" of more and more people, who cruise, scan, quote and freely shove an oar into a complex, specialist discussion without understanding; I am looking to recapture an abiding respect for those who actually have done, or still do the work on a professional, daily basis and who offer their time and expertise freely to help others who are genuinely keen to learn about these aircraft and what it really means to investigate such a tragic fatal accident.
best,
PJ2
Will;
You are asking a fundamental design-philosophy which took if I recall ET's story-telling took many years for Airbus to develop. It's available in a paper he wrote (if I recall), entitled "Why we designed them like we did".
What you are essentially asking is, "why isn't there an autopilot system which can fly an airliner in every possibly-conceivable flight regime?"
The A330 autopilot disconnects at 45deg bank angle, 25deg pitch up, 13deg pitch down. The autoflight system reverts to alternate law (and cannot be recovered to normal law) in bank angles greater than 125deg.
In any airplane, it is unreasonable for a designer to not expect that a trained flight crew can take over the aircraft with sufficient competency to fly/land safely. If that is not the case, we are clearly into a very different zone of autoflight development which has yet to be fleshed out.
I don't think you understand fbw very well.
You are asking a fundamental design-philosophy which took if I recall ET's story-telling took many years for Airbus to develop. It's available in a paper he wrote (if I recall), entitled "Why we designed them like we did".
What you are essentially asking is, "why isn't there an autopilot system which can fly an airliner in every possibly-conceivable flight regime?"
The A330 autopilot disconnects at 45deg bank angle, 25deg pitch up, 13deg pitch down. The autoflight system reverts to alternate law (and cannot be recovered to normal law) in bank angles greater than 125deg.
In any airplane, it is unreasonable for a designer to not expect that a trained flight crew can take over the aircraft with sufficient competency to fly/land safely. If that is not the case, we are clearly into a very different zone of autoflight development which has yet to be fleshed out.
I don't think you understand fbw very well.
Last edited by PJ2; 16th Jun 2009 at 16:37.
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From article
Probably meant 35k feet which is normally above icing altitudes. So they're saying the problem is with water ingestion into the pitot, or the water forming ice. Does ingesting ice crystals, turned into water from the heat, count as water ingestion.
but the problem was with water on takeoff and landing, not a problem faced by aircraft flying at 25,000 feet.
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An AoA indicator is an available option for all Airbus FBW aircraft. I'm not aware of an airline that was willing to pay for it.
ELAC
ELAC
Part of the Air France A320 fleet is equiped with it. These aircrafts were part of the Air Inter fleet that was merged to AF 10 years ago.
They also had head up displays which were removed after a while although they were very handy on CAT3 approaches.
This story is taking a nasty turn for AF in France.
Here's a link to Radio France national radio where a comedian name Stéphane Guillon, has a daily editorial and this what he had to say today.
France Inter - Vidéo
No very good considering the large morning audience this guy has.
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ClippedCub, in the SB for the A320s, the problem was said to be 'water ingress.' Apparently the problem was that the drainholes on that particular design of tube were getting clogged up and failing to let the water drain out. Whether the water then froze, I don't know; but presumably standing water would have a similar effect anyway.
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ClippedCub,
When you increase "software intelligence", you exponentially increase incorrect specification risks, code complexity, testing costs... If you want a cheap, testable, reliable software, better make it as simple as feasible. You can go for more complex softwares only if you have the extra-money... and are willing to take the extra-risks that come with them...
From a quick glance at the RISK database, there may be rather more fighter software bugs that pass undetetected. I guess the most famous example was the F-22A software bug:
I doubt that such an error could have made it undetected up to real-life flights on a civil plane...
In modern fighters, the weapons systems are very complex. The flight control/management computers are trained to only bug the pilot with sequenced, pilot action only, messages during combat engagement, since he's busy targeting, etc.. [SNIP] Would have thought some of that logic structure would be present in civilian airliners.
From a quick glance at the RISK database, there may be rather more fighter software bugs that pass undetetected. I guess the most famous example was the F-22A software bug:
At the international date line, whoops, all systems dumped and when I say all systems, I mean all systems, their navigation, part of their communications, their fuel systems.
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They are there to allow you to eat your breakfast or read the paper or look out the window (!).
They are NOT a substitute for that stuff you learned at your flight school!
I see young FOs these days that can barely fly the a/c.
The real worry tho' is that they think they are completely 'bulletproof'.
They are NOT a substitute for that stuff you learned at your flight school!
I see young FOs these days that can barely fly the a/c.
The real worry tho' is that they think they are completely 'bulletproof'.
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Deep breath time again. Can I request a summary from 'the knowledgeable'?
1) Do we have ANY evidence to rule out some sort of mechanical disruptive event or fire around the cockpit/electronics bays?
2) Is it established that we have no ACARS message recording LOSS of cabin pressure AND is it confirmed that the ACARS message we have refers to excessive cabin DESCENT rate?
3) There have been several (I think unanswered) requests here for positions of the groups of bodies found. Do we have any, and has anyone back-plotted the position of the second recovery vis a vis ocean currents to see where they would have been in relation to the first, and likewise for the first to the POSSIBLE crash site?
4) All the ACARS messages COULD have related to software interpretations of events. Amongst them, is there any hard evidence of ACTUAL failures?
Apologies if I have missed a post or two - usual excuses.
1) Do we have ANY evidence to rule out some sort of mechanical disruptive event or fire around the cockpit/electronics bays?
2) Is it established that we have no ACARS message recording LOSS of cabin pressure AND is it confirmed that the ACARS message we have refers to excessive cabin DESCENT rate?
3) There have been several (I think unanswered) requests here for positions of the groups of bodies found. Do we have any, and has anyone back-plotted the position of the second recovery vis a vis ocean currents to see where they would have been in relation to the first, and likewise for the first to the POSSIBLE crash site?
4) All the ACARS messages COULD have related to software interpretations of events. Amongst them, is there any hard evidence of ACTUAL failures?
Apologies if I have missed a post or two - usual excuses.
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Originally Posted by JuggleDan
When you increase "software intelligence", you exponentially increase incorrect specification risks, code complexity, testing costs...
The '10's cargo doors certainly didn't fail non catastrophically (leading to - I think - 2 hull losses (1 near Paris)) when they completely departed the aeroplane but the issue was due mainly to the failures of the over centre latching mechanism and no positive indication when the latches were secure / insecure not the power of the actuator. What they did reveal was some serious weakness in the cabin floor when, following an explosive decompression of the cargo hold, air couldn't vent fast enough from the passenger cabin and the cabin floor couldn't stand the pressure differential. The elevator and engine control runs in the floor were suddenly yanked which led to loss of control and severe unrecoverable pitch up (who says cables are better than wires ?).
Something of the swiss cheese effect that took a lot to sort out - accept that there was a problem - and subsequently fix. If such a compehensive fault is found with AF447, I hope the industry accepts what it is and resolves it quicker than 34 years ago.
Personally I doubt very much it will be the case and these swiss cheese holes will be far more obscure and harder to find.
Something of the swiss cheese effect that took a lot to sort out - accept that there was a problem - and subsequently fix. If such a compehensive fault is found with AF447, I hope the industry accepts what it is and resolves it quicker than 34 years ago.
Personally I doubt very much it will be the case and these swiss cheese holes will be far more obscure and harder to find.
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Re several posts concerning the pilot making inadvertent inputs on the sidestick in turbulence:
My instructor in Toulouse urged us to treat the sidestick as you would a dog s***, ie, only touch it if you have to, as theoretically the fbw will hold its current trajectory. But easier said than done, most especially in AF's predicament....
My instructor in Toulouse urged us to treat the sidestick as you would a dog s***, ie, only touch it if you have to, as theoretically the fbw will hold its current trajectory. But easier said than done, most especially in AF's predicament....
Or this particular pilot LOVES dog s***,
Or in theory the instructor is right, but...
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BOAC, with respect to your paragraph #3, the better indicator would be to learn the coordinates for the search grid for the pingers. One would expect that the French Navy would first target the most likely area, based on the extrapolated flight path, and the plot of the recovered wreckage and remains as matched against currents and surface winds over time. If repeated sweeps over an area produce nothing, the grid would be expanded.
I have not read if they have deployed side scan sonar to search for wreckage on the sea floor. Knowing the grids for that would also be a clue into where the French Navy thinks major portions of the wreckage are located.
As the pingers are about half way through their battery life, time is becoming of the essence.
In the instance of Air India 182, the recorders were recovered from 2,000 meters and read within about three weeks of the crash. Air India's wreckage was scattered for about five NM along the route of flight axis.
I have not read if they have deployed side scan sonar to search for wreckage on the sea floor. Knowing the grids for that would also be a clue into where the French Navy thinks major portions of the wreckage are located.
As the pingers are about half way through their battery life, time is becoming of the essence.
In the instance of Air India 182, the recorders were recovered from 2,000 meters and read within about three weeks of the crash. Air India's wreckage was scattered for about five NM along the route of flight axis.
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Originally Posted by SaturnV
based on the extrapolated flight path,
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I think the thread may be doomed unless someone like bsieker can re-focus the discussion with analysis of ACARS messages.Its all we've got to go on.What do the messages mean individually?Do they collectively indicate strictly an air data event and not an IR event?Air Caraibe/Qantas valid parallels or not?Presumably the ACARS messages indicate what ECAM messages the crew faced?Which ECAM messages were seen in Air Caraibe and Qantas?Commonality to AF447?ISIS fault interpretation?Air data only or possibly gyro-related,ie did that crew have attitude data?Robustness of RLG in severe turbulence?Power supply of ISIS?ESS bus or HOT BAT?Rudder travel limit controlled by airspeed but what if CAS was erroneous.Could RTL theoretically give FULL deflection at cruise altitude?Sensitivity of A330 rudder control system?Side-stick issues in severe turbulence..inadvertent input,conflicting dual pilot input.
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But with the ACARS messages themselves being subject to scrutiny and the picture they paint being incomplete, maybe it's best we keep our powder dry until we have more evidence - otherwise we'll keep going round in circles.
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For the purposes of his comments, depends whether those melted ice crystals then re-freeze in a non-heated area of the pitot system and cause a blockage further in.