AF447
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On why this occurred: Coffin corner, mixed with severe weather.
On fuel: 3 hours into the flight, more than enough contingency to deviate.
On Cb penetration: Unknown. Worrying.
On this thread: Valuable.
On fuel: 3 hours into the flight, more than enough contingency to deviate.
On Cb penetration: Unknown. Worrying.
On this thread: Valuable.
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At any altitude, if you go too slow, you stall - loss of control.
At any altitude, if you go too fast either you run into flutter (very bad) or hit high Mach effects such as buffet.
So the operational range must lie between the two limiting speeds.
The two speeds get closer together, the higher you go, until eventually they meet.
At that point (called "coffin corner"), if you slow down, you stall, and if you speed up you get nasty Mach effects. Proverbial rock and hard place situation.
At any altitude, if you go too fast either you run into flutter (very bad) or hit high Mach effects such as buffet.
So the operational range must lie between the two limiting speeds.
The two speeds get closer together, the higher you go, until eventually they meet.
At that point (called "coffin corner"), if you slow down, you stall, and if you speed up you get nasty Mach effects. Proverbial rock and hard place situation.
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TCAS is fed air data information from the ADIRU's. If you already have faults or issues with the ADR part the data bus going to TCAS will log a fault.
Once again 23 of the 24 messages can be traced back to air data.
Once again 23 of the 24 messages can be traced back to air data.
Regarding the timely sequence of the error messages, what puzzles me is that both the pitot probe and TCAS-related events have a 02:10 timestamp, whereas the ADR disagree event is 02:12, roughly one minute after the IR2 failure.
That is why I was wondering before how specific the TCAS error code in the ACARS message actually was, and whether other sources of TCAS error can safely be excluded.
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As Mad Scientist said; if you slow down you stall and if you speed up you overspeed (running into buffet etc). The heavier you are and the higher you are the closer the two limits. So if you have just taken off with a large amount of fuel and you climb to your max operating altitude, "coffin corner" could be quite small. I have been in a situation where if I slowed down by 7/8 knots we would be in essence about to enter a stall - and if we sped up by 7/8 knots we would overspeed. I kept a VERY close eye on the speed! After an hour or two we had used a fair amount of fuel and so our weight was lower - now we had (I forget exactly) 14 knots from the stall and 14 knots from overspeed...
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Some have speculated that something must have been wrong before the weather penatration for the crew to continue through the area. As said before it may not have been a bad course to take with the information available. With a loss or discrepency in airspeed indications, manual flight, the situation could go pear-shaped in a matter of minutes or less. If the ISIS was also affected this is a grave scenario especially in poor weather and nighttime. It would be beyond the capability of most of us I belive.
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Coffin Corner
As altitude is gained, the air thins. Try breathing on top of Mt Everest.
As the air thins, the speed at which an airplane will stall INCREASES. At the same time, the speed at which an airplane enters the supersonic realm DECREASES.
Imagine a vertical bar chart. Up, down, right? Go ahead and draw one on a piece of paper right now. It will be a lot easier if you have a picture. The drawing does not need to be pretty.
Now graduate the vertical bar you've drawn with horizontal marks. These marks, or ticks, are the airspeed. The unit of measurement is the knot.
At the top of the bar chart, color the ticks in red. Make these ticks, or graduations if you like, thicker than the others. The red ticks represent a high speed "no-go" zone for the airplane. Flying in the high speed red bits at the top of the bar chart reduces overspeed protection. The airplane is now approaching the supersonic realm.
At the bottom of the bar chart, color the ticks in red. Make them thick, just like the red ticks at the top of the bar chart. The red stuff down here is the low speed stall area. Fly in it, that is, reduce your airspeed enough, and your airplane will fall out of the sky.
Now, as your airplane climbs ever higher into thinner air, the red at the top of the bar chart comes down. You don't have to draw this. The flight instruments in a real airplane show the red ticks coming down. At the same time, the red at the bottom of the bar chart rises.
At some point the red bits will be so close that the airplane cannot slow down by a knot, nor can it increase by a knot. Doing so would see the airplane stall on the one hand, or overspeed on the other. The airplane now has no 'manoeuvre margin'. None at all. This is what we refer to as 'coffin corner'.
No pilot will knowingly fly his airplane (masculine encompassing the feminine) in 'coffin corner'.
In another type of graph used to depict reducing manoeuvre margins for flight due to increasing altitude, the presentation is of an upside down V-shape. Each side of the upside down V-shape represents airspeed. On the left is the low airspeed stall. On the right is the overspeed 'speed'.
At low altitudes, the upside down V-shape is wide. There is a wide manoeuvre margin. At high altitudes, the upside down V-shape is thin. Here, there is a thin manouevre margin. Coffin corner is at the top of the upside down V-shape.
I hope that helps.
As the air thins, the speed at which an airplane will stall INCREASES. At the same time, the speed at which an airplane enters the supersonic realm DECREASES.
Imagine a vertical bar chart. Up, down, right? Go ahead and draw one on a piece of paper right now. It will be a lot easier if you have a picture. The drawing does not need to be pretty.
Now graduate the vertical bar you've drawn with horizontal marks. These marks, or ticks, are the airspeed. The unit of measurement is the knot.
At the top of the bar chart, color the ticks in red. Make these ticks, or graduations if you like, thicker than the others. The red ticks represent a high speed "no-go" zone for the airplane. Flying in the high speed red bits at the top of the bar chart reduces overspeed protection. The airplane is now approaching the supersonic realm.
At the bottom of the bar chart, color the ticks in red. Make them thick, just like the red ticks at the top of the bar chart. The red stuff down here is the low speed stall area. Fly in it, that is, reduce your airspeed enough, and your airplane will fall out of the sky.
Now, as your airplane climbs ever higher into thinner air, the red at the top of the bar chart comes down. You don't have to draw this. The flight instruments in a real airplane show the red ticks coming down. At the same time, the red at the bottom of the bar chart rises.
At some point the red bits will be so close that the airplane cannot slow down by a knot, nor can it increase by a knot. Doing so would see the airplane stall on the one hand, or overspeed on the other. The airplane now has no 'manoeuvre margin'. None at all. This is what we refer to as 'coffin corner'.
No pilot will knowingly fly his airplane (masculine encompassing the feminine) in 'coffin corner'.
In another type of graph used to depict reducing manoeuvre margins for flight due to increasing altitude, the presentation is of an upside down V-shape. Each side of the upside down V-shape represents airspeed. On the left is the low airspeed stall. On the right is the overspeed 'speed'.
At low altitudes, the upside down V-shape is wide. There is a wide manoeuvre margin. At high altitudes, the upside down V-shape is thin. Here, there is a thin manouevre margin. Coffin corner is at the top of the upside down V-shape.
I hope that helps.
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If the theory of a strong thermal updraft pushing the aircraft out of its operating envelope does turn out to be the case, and with all the flights that routinely travel this route, does this mean the cause is just bad luck, being in the wrong place at the wrong time at the wrong altitude at the wrong weight?
That's not a very comforting thought. Why would a flight be on the knife edge knowing it was heading into a situation where greater margins could potentially be called for?
One answer that has occurred to me, and I think deserves knocking down quickly, is that the possibility of overflying the worst might have seemed a 'least worst option'
Another, that whilst potentially safer lower down as far as maneouvre margins are concerned (& thus actual 'upset'), roughness of ride and high airframe loads can likely be more guaranteed and last longer (transit time)
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One answer that has occurred to me, and I think deserves knocking down quickly, is that the possibility of overflying the worst might have seemed a 'least worst option'
Another, that whilst potentially safer lower down as far as maneouvre margins are concerned (& thus actual 'upset'), roughness of ride and high airframe loads can likely be more guaranteed and last longer (transit time)
Another, that whilst potentially safer lower down as far as maneouvre margins are concerned (& thus actual 'upset'), roughness of ride and high airframe loads can likely be more guaranteed and last longer (transit time)
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Well, I do not think that they were speculating on anything like 'overflying' given the fact, that the tropopause was marked at FL450 in that area and tops of embd CBs at FL480.
Seeing that WX Chart me too I would not have been especially alerted.
By the way, LH507 and LH-Cargo were passing the area without any problems. LH503 30 min bef AF on the same AWY without reporting anything about turbulence or icing.
Seeing that WX Chart me too I would not have been especially alerted.
By the way, LH507 and LH-Cargo were passing the area without any problems. LH503 30 min bef AF on the same AWY without reporting anything about turbulence or icing.
Last edited by Flyinheavy; 7th Jun 2009 at 22:12.
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@DC-ATE:
All I wanted to say with this is, that I do not speculate that they would be thinking of overflying the weather. I personally do have a very good impression of french aviators, I know about their trainingstandarts ab inicio. I have problems to imagine that they got caught in that situation by their own fault.
The rest has to be shown by the investigation.
All I wanted to say with this is, that I do not speculate that they would be thinking of overflying the weather. I personally do have a very good impression of french aviators, I know about their trainingstandarts ab inicio. I have problems to imagine that they got caught in that situation by their own fault.
The rest has to be shown by the investigation.
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@HarryMann:
I have been reading it, by the way both editions. All I can say is, that I crossed the ITCZ to/from Brazil, I do have to look in my logs how many times. Did so in Africa as well. I do not want to downplay nothing that had been analysed by Tim, excellent analysis. But still, how many planes were lost in the last decades on the South Atlantic?
There must have been various things coming together for this unlucky flight.
I have been reading it, by the way both editions. All I can say is, that I crossed the ITCZ to/from Brazil, I do have to look in my logs how many times. Did so in Africa as well. I do not want to downplay nothing that had been analysed by Tim, excellent analysis. But still, how many planes were lost in the last decades on the South Atlantic?
There must have been various things coming together for this unlucky flight.
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Speculating
Speculating on PPRuNe -
I would like to insert this here before we see another:
"This thread is now closed. The main reason being one of too many uninformed speculators relying on unattributed media quotes..."
All over the World since AF 447 was reported overdue/lost, professional pilots in their cockpits have been 'speculating' on what happened that fateful night over the South Atlantic. To suggest that they are only relying on 'facts' is absurd. That's what pilots do: speculate on what happened on every incident/accident. When the final reports come out, they will even speculate on the validity of some of them.
As the title "PPRuNe" suggests: RUMOUR. The only thing different is this Forum contains posting by other than Professional Pilots. But I don't think it's possible to prevent that. Besides, there ARE many good posts by other than pilots that do contribute to not only the RUMOURS, but speculation as well. All of this information is needed by those who attend these forums to try and make some sense of what might have happened, not only in this case, but others as well. All of us are "uninformed" at this state.
I would like to insert this here before we see another:
"This thread is now closed. The main reason being one of too many uninformed speculators relying on unattributed media quotes..."
All over the World since AF 447 was reported overdue/lost, professional pilots in their cockpits have been 'speculating' on what happened that fateful night over the South Atlantic. To suggest that they are only relying on 'facts' is absurd. That's what pilots do: speculate on what happened on every incident/accident. When the final reports come out, they will even speculate on the validity of some of them.
As the title "PPRuNe" suggests: RUMOUR. The only thing different is this Forum contains posting by other than Professional Pilots. But I don't think it's possible to prevent that. Besides, there ARE many good posts by other than pilots that do contribute to not only the RUMOURS, but speculation as well. All of this information is needed by those who attend these forums to try and make some sense of what might have happened, not only in this case, but others as well. All of us are "uninformed" at this state.
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Blame is starting to creep into the thread. It didn't take long. Someone started writing how pilots don't know how to use the weather radar. Now we're getting accusations of trying to fly over the weather, and that there are so many pilots nowadays who "don't know anything about high altitude flying". I'm not so sure about that.
My wife is not a pilot. Nor are her family pilots. None of her in-laws, their children or our children are pilots. Some of the relo's are heading off tomorrow for 'wherever'. They are suddenly unsure of what it is I do, as if they ever knew. AF447 is the conversation no-one is having. They're too damn scared to even think about it. So I think I can see this from the perspective of non-pilots reading this thread.
Most are uncomfortable with flying, period, and often ask "what carrier should I avoid" in the hope of not falling out of the sky at night over a foreign shore or sea. And when tragedies occur such as with AF447, the easiest answer to fill the dreaded hole of naivete about how pilots fly airplanes is that pilots don't know how their airplanes fly; don't know what they are doing; don't know how to use a weather radar; don't know about high altitude flight; don't appreciate that contingency fuel ("er, what's that?") is for contingencies, oddly enough; don't know that if you ... and so on and so on.
Often times, events occur that are above the experience level of the men and women on the job at the time. It would appear this is what happened, else the airplane would not be lost. Flying is inherently dangerous. The environment in which flight occurs demands respect, as anyone who has ever been near a giant Cb well knows. Aviation demands attention to detail. There is nothing, not a shred of evidence, to show our fallen colleagues operating AF447 were not aware of these intrinsic facts of flight.
My wife is not a pilot. Nor are her family pilots. None of her in-laws, their children or our children are pilots. Some of the relo's are heading off tomorrow for 'wherever'. They are suddenly unsure of what it is I do, as if they ever knew. AF447 is the conversation no-one is having. They're too damn scared to even think about it. So I think I can see this from the perspective of non-pilots reading this thread.
Most are uncomfortable with flying, period, and often ask "what carrier should I avoid" in the hope of not falling out of the sky at night over a foreign shore or sea. And when tragedies occur such as with AF447, the easiest answer to fill the dreaded hole of naivete about how pilots fly airplanes is that pilots don't know how their airplanes fly; don't know what they are doing; don't know how to use a weather radar; don't know about high altitude flight; don't appreciate that contingency fuel ("er, what's that?") is for contingencies, oddly enough; don't know that if you ... and so on and so on.
Often times, events occur that are above the experience level of the men and women on the job at the time. It would appear this is what happened, else the airplane would not be lost. Flying is inherently dangerous. The environment in which flight occurs demands respect, as anyone who has ever been near a giant Cb well knows. Aviation demands attention to detail. There is nothing, not a shred of evidence, to show our fallen colleagues operating AF447 were not aware of these intrinsic facts of flight.
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What I am left with after reading the entire thread is just a bit more about the Airbus and also it's mfg. and it's owners.
The idea is to build and fly an a/c that "protects" itself from stall, excessive amounts of roll, pitch and a/s, programmed uniformly into a computer that virtually 'covers all the bases', prevents ham fisted pilots from over eager input, until..... it can't. Then the potentially abusive pilot gets the whole enchilada in his lap, with some stab trim and a restricted rudder. A hemmorrhage of electric data is broadcast after the fact, but can't be relied on because it results from, doesn't cause, the faults that the airline hope are never discovered. That about it?
The idea is to build and fly an a/c that "protects" itself from stall, excessive amounts of roll, pitch and a/s, programmed uniformly into a computer that virtually 'covers all the bases', prevents ham fisted pilots from over eager input, until..... it can't. Then the potentially abusive pilot gets the whole enchilada in his lap, with some stab trim and a restricted rudder. A hemmorrhage of electric data is broadcast after the fact, but can't be relied on because it results from, doesn't cause, the faults that the airline hope are never discovered. That about it?
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It's not about blame. It's about exploring all possible contributing factors and eliminating them in the future, whether those factors were present in this particular accident or not.
For example, if some pilots believe that a modern aircraft can transit any CB, and if that's not the case, then this discussion would be valuable just to highlight that problem. Again, regardless of whether that problem turns out to relate to AF447.
For example, if some pilots believe that a modern aircraft can transit any CB, and if that's not the case, then this discussion would be valuable just to highlight that problem. Again, regardless of whether that problem turns out to relate to AF447.
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Wiki section: expert refinements needed
A detailed description of the ACARS warnings and fault reports can now be found on the AF 447 wikipedia page. It captures the information shared in this forum and additional information from the A 330 systems and operating handbook. Maybe people with direct access to all ACARS codes can refine the posting. More detailed observations from operators concerning the pressure system and on disengagement of auto-thrust could also add to the accuracy of the section.
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RE: Contingency Fuel
A question for long haul Airbus pilots:
While I make no claims to be an expert on ETOPS fuel reserves, I do know that there is an ETOPS fuel requirement to carry sufficient fuel for high fuel burn situations, such as an enroute pressurization failure necessitating a descent to a breathable altitude. Given this, and the availability of alternate airports (the flight would have passed close to or over the Cape Verde Islands and Tenerife) along the planned route for a tech stop, my question is whether these factors more or less ensure that there was sufficient fuel for a weather deviation. In other words, it seems to me that the failure to make a course deviation was not likely caused by fuel issues. It seems to me there would have been enough fuel to deviate and still cope with a subsequent problem since Cape Verde was approximately 750 nm away. I don't have the tech data to work through the math myself.
Or, am I missing something here?
While I make no claims to be an expert on ETOPS fuel reserves, I do know that there is an ETOPS fuel requirement to carry sufficient fuel for high fuel burn situations, such as an enroute pressurization failure necessitating a descent to a breathable altitude. Given this, and the availability of alternate airports (the flight would have passed close to or over the Cape Verde Islands and Tenerife) along the planned route for a tech stop, my question is whether these factors more or less ensure that there was sufficient fuel for a weather deviation. In other words, it seems to me that the failure to make a course deviation was not likely caused by fuel issues. It seems to me there would have been enough fuel to deviate and still cope with a subsequent problem since Cape Verde was approximately 750 nm away. I don't have the tech data to work through the math myself.
Or, am I missing something here?
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The Air France Press Release #12 cited by Mercenary Pilot in currently post #397 and available directly has some interesting points, most notably number 2:
This means:
A. Air France has had a significant number of A330/340 pitot probe icing events in the past year, and presumably has a very good idea of the sequence of ACARS messages that they generate. Do the ACARS messages generated by AF447 look anything like the ones in AF's possession from prior cases of pitot probe icing? What about other carriers?
B. Air France's solution to this problem was to adopt fleetwide the probes developed to solve water ingress problems on the A320 before they could be evaluated outside the laboratory, and in spite of the manufacturer's claim that the design was not made to address this problem. So, even if the 'A320 probe' was fitted to AF447, there's no guarantee it would have done something.
C. The OEM's proposed 'solution' to pitot icing, reiterated by the operator, was/is to follow the procedures outlined for unreliable airspeed.
---
I'll let you folks do the speculation.
2) Starting in May 2008 Air France experienced incidents involving a loss of airspeed data in flight, in cruise phase on A340s and A330s. These incidents were analysed with Airbus as resulting from pitot probe icing for a few minutes, after which the phenomenon disappeared. Discussions subsequently took place with the manufacturer. Air France asked for a solution which would reduce or eliminate the occurrence of these incidents. In response to these requests, the manufacturer indicated that the probe model recommended for the A320 was not designed to prevent such incidents which took place at cruise levels, and reiterated the operational procedures well-known to the crews.
In the first quarter of 2009 laboratory tests suggested, however, that the new probe could represent a valuable improvement to reduce the incidence of high altitude airspeed discrepancy resulting from pitot probe icing, and an in service evaluation in real flight conditions was proposed by Airbus. Without waiting for the in service evaluation, Air France decided to replace all its probes and the programme was launched on 27 April 2009.
In the first quarter of 2009 laboratory tests suggested, however, that the new probe could represent a valuable improvement to reduce the incidence of high altitude airspeed discrepancy resulting from pitot probe icing, and an in service evaluation in real flight conditions was proposed by Airbus. Without waiting for the in service evaluation, Air France decided to replace all its probes and the programme was launched on 27 April 2009.
A. Air France has had a significant number of A330/340 pitot probe icing events in the past year, and presumably has a very good idea of the sequence of ACARS messages that they generate. Do the ACARS messages generated by AF447 look anything like the ones in AF's possession from prior cases of pitot probe icing? What about other carriers?
B. Air France's solution to this problem was to adopt fleetwide the probes developed to solve water ingress problems on the A320 before they could be evaluated outside the laboratory, and in spite of the manufacturer's claim that the design was not made to address this problem. So, even if the 'A320 probe' was fitted to AF447, there's no guarantee it would have done something.
C. The OEM's proposed 'solution' to pitot icing, reiterated by the operator, was/is to follow the procedures outlined for unreliable airspeed.
---
I'll let you folks do the speculation.
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Succinct Summary by Mr Fraser
Will Fraser said:
Mr Fraser,
Yours is the best post of the entire thread. Although you were probably trying to highlight the irony, you have deftly hit the nail of the problem on the head. I now promote you to Chief Pilot of Airbus Industries, since it is clear from your honesty, that you not only fathom more about the problem than anyone else in the world, but that you have no vested interest in denying the unenviable situation that all great "Pushbutton-Pilots of Tomorrow" now face.
Which is the dilemma:
Concur with the Airbus Religion of Total Obedience and preference to Automation approved by government and business, or be burned at the airline stake as a heretic. (Translation: Never Hand-Fly, or else!)
The tyranny of SOP's assumes that everybody has the same currency retention skills and will never need line hand flying skills anyway since the Airbus was marketed to the third world as "an airplane that virtually flys itself" (that doen't really need pilots or a PIC, wink, wink)
But the real world truth is: that as the automated world fleet gets older, this sort of accident is going to happen more and more. You can't have the PIC (pilot in command) be behind a desk in France issuing edicts in a Ivory Tower. The PIC must be empowered in the airplane to conduct line training as he sees fit. "The PIC must be the FINAL authority as to the operation of that aircraft." - FAR, and axiom held sacred for every ship commander throughout history. This includes a duty to train new co-pilots in the art of hand flying on legs where you don't need to be a slave to the FMS.
Crunch - Out
"You can only have one Captain of the Ship" -author unknown
What I am left with after reading the entire thread is just a bit more about the Airbus and also it's mfg. and it's owners.
The idea is to build and fly an a/c that "protects" itself from stall, excessive amounts of roll, pitch and a/s, programmed uniformly into a computer that virtually 'covers all the bases', prevents ham fisted pilots from over eager input, until..... it can't. Then the potentially abusive pilot gets the whole enchilada in his lap, with some stab trim and a restricted rudder. A hemmorrhage of electric data is broadcast after the fact, but can't be relied on because it results from, doesn't cause, the faults that the airline hope are never discovered. That about it?
The idea is to build and fly an a/c that "protects" itself from stall, excessive amounts of roll, pitch and a/s, programmed uniformly into a computer that virtually 'covers all the bases', prevents ham fisted pilots from over eager input, until..... it can't. Then the potentially abusive pilot gets the whole enchilada in his lap, with some stab trim and a restricted rudder. A hemmorrhage of electric data is broadcast after the fact, but can't be relied on because it results from, doesn't cause, the faults that the airline hope are never discovered. That about it?
Mr Fraser,
Yours is the best post of the entire thread. Although you were probably trying to highlight the irony, you have deftly hit the nail of the problem on the head. I now promote you to Chief Pilot of Airbus Industries, since it is clear from your honesty, that you not only fathom more about the problem than anyone else in the world, but that you have no vested interest in denying the unenviable situation that all great "Pushbutton-Pilots of Tomorrow" now face.
Which is the dilemma:
Concur with the Airbus Religion of Total Obedience and preference to Automation approved by government and business, or be burned at the airline stake as a heretic. (Translation: Never Hand-Fly, or else!)
The tyranny of SOP's assumes that everybody has the same currency retention skills and will never need line hand flying skills anyway since the Airbus was marketed to the third world as "an airplane that virtually flys itself" (that doen't really need pilots or a PIC, wink, wink)
But the real world truth is: that as the automated world fleet gets older, this sort of accident is going to happen more and more. You can't have the PIC (pilot in command) be behind a desk in France issuing edicts in a Ivory Tower. The PIC must be empowered in the airplane to conduct line training as he sees fit. "The PIC must be the FINAL authority as to the operation of that aircraft." - FAR, and axiom held sacred for every ship commander throughout history. This includes a duty to train new co-pilots in the art of hand flying on legs where you don't need to be a slave to the FMS.
Crunch - Out
"You can only have one Captain of the Ship" -author unknown
Last edited by Captain-Crunch; 7th Jun 2009 at 05:07.
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@Avspook
Thank you for the ISIS info.
I am aware of the previous iterations of the A330's standby instruments, shared by my own aircraft (737, MD-80) but the ISIS arrangement is revelatory to a comparatively moldy-oldie driver like me.
Thank you for the ISIS info.
I am aware of the previous iterations of the A330's standby instruments, shared by my own aircraft (737, MD-80) but the ISIS arrangement is revelatory to a comparatively moldy-oldie driver like me.
