Warning horns
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Warning horns
Well folks, it's starting to get a bit looney at some airlines.
Why, you ask?
Apparently, from info just received, some airlines operating B737 equipment now require their crews to brief the following, prior to takeoff...
'If we hear an intermittant horn on the ground, it is the Takeoff Configuration Warning, whereas, if we hear the same horn in the air it is the Cabin Altitude Alert.'
Now, it seems to me that anyone whom has actually RTFB would know this, so I would ask....is training at some airlines now so substandard, that aircraft ground school needs to be reviewed prior to each takeoff?
Why, you ask?
Apparently, from info just received, some airlines operating B737 equipment now require their crews to brief the following, prior to takeoff...
'If we hear an intermittant horn on the ground, it is the Takeoff Configuration Warning, whereas, if we hear the same horn in the air it is the Cabin Altitude Alert.'
Now, it seems to me that anyone whom has actually RTFB would know this, so I would ask....is training at some airlines now so substandard, that aircraft ground school needs to be reviewed prior to each takeoff?
s training at some airlines now so substandard, that aircraft ground school needs to be reviewed prior to each takeoff?
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I know we got a new checklist with memory items for it (WARNING HORN - CABIN ALTITUDE OR CONFIGURATION) and on the new aircraft two new lights (CABIN ALTITUDE and TAKEOFF CONFIG), but i wasn't aware its now a mandatory briefing item. Being out of it for 6 months might be the reason. I wonder if that really would have prevented the Helios crash but one never knows.
'If we hear an intermittant horn on the ground, it is the Takeoff Configuration Warning, whereas, if we hear the same horn in the air it is the Cabin Altitude Alert.'
I agree it seems excessive.
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We are not among those that recite this little bit of Helios fallout.
Before each takeoff I do quietly tell myself levers forward go, levers back slow.
Before each takeoff I do quietly tell myself levers forward go, levers back slow.
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IT IS SCARY....i had a fellow who had flared high and excessively, sets the thrust lever to idle even with the airspeed decaying
after taking over and managing to set the aircraft on the runway again(barely)..and asking him why did he do such a thing...his answer was that he heard the RETARD call
The point is of course not enough training at basic flying techniques.
I was fortunate enough to have gone through the what used to be the normal way..i.e the basic navigation ..well basic everything actually and then progressed to 320s and i consider myself to be fortunate,in my airlines which is considered a 3rd world airlines we used to have the basic jet transition course on the SE super caravel then th B727 where you have air work,steep turns,stalls( departure,approach,landing,high altitude),engine failures t/o and ldg,actual emergency descend vor,ndb,raw data ils approaches,
I mean the works and those who made it through had a long spell at 2nd officer then 1st officer then maybe captain after a loooong way
now we have the zft,mcc,...etc and the outcome is a lot of poorly trained f/os later to be captains handling ever increasing complex aircrafts
It's not their fault actually..they were not trained properly..and if this issue...TRAINING...meaningful training is not addressed by institutions and regulators ASAP...then we all know what the outcome is going to be
after taking over and managing to set the aircraft on the runway again(barely)..and asking him why did he do such a thing...his answer was that he heard the RETARD call
The point is of course not enough training at basic flying techniques.
I was fortunate enough to have gone through the what used to be the normal way..i.e the basic navigation ..well basic everything actually and then progressed to 320s and i consider myself to be fortunate,in my airlines which is considered a 3rd world airlines we used to have the basic jet transition course on the SE super caravel then th B727 where you have air work,steep turns,stalls( departure,approach,landing,high altitude),engine failures t/o and ldg,actual emergency descend vor,ndb,raw data ils approaches,
I mean the works and those who made it through had a long spell at 2nd officer then 1st officer then maybe captain after a loooong way
now we have the zft,mcc,...etc and the outcome is a lot of poorly trained f/os later to be captains handling ever increasing complex aircrafts
It's not their fault actually..they were not trained properly..and if this issue...TRAINING...meaningful training is not addressed by institutions and regulators ASAP...then we all know what the outcome is going to be
Flight Detent I believe that you are correct.
Now I typically have one of the cheapest mobile 'phones on the market, and even that gives me a gazillion different ring tones which I can allocate to various incoming calls. Is it beyond the whole of the R&D department of the Boeing Company (Commercial Airplane Division) to come up with a horn that makes one sound on the ground, and another one in the air?
Now I typically have one of the cheapest mobile 'phones on the market, and even that gives me a gazillion different ring tones which I can allocate to various incoming calls. Is it beyond the whole of the R&D department of the Boeing Company (Commercial Airplane Division) to come up with a horn that makes one sound on the ground, and another one in the air?
The design for the 737 cockpit is about 50 years old now, and it shows in that (as standard) is has no warning light for "cabin above 10,000 feet".
Now personally, I find it amazing that it was certified that way - but it was, and all the marks after are the same, due to grandfather rights, I guess. SO, just at a time when the pilots are hypoxic, they hear a horn which is only ever heard on the ground. Nothing lights up. That's one of the errors in the Helios accident.
Boeing (and the FAA) were faced with requiring the fitment of a "cabin above 10,000" light to the most popular airliner ever built, or adding a few lines to the latest manual revision. No surprise which action they took.
Now personally, I find it amazing that it was certified that way - but it was, and all the marks after are the same, due to grandfather rights, I guess. SO, just at a time when the pilots are hypoxic, they hear a horn which is only ever heard on the ground. Nothing lights up. That's one of the errors in the Helios accident.
Boeing (and the FAA) were faced with requiring the fitment of a "cabin above 10,000" light to the most popular airliner ever built, or adding a few lines to the latest manual revision. No surprise which action they took.
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Boeing (and the FAA) were faced with requiring the fitment of a "cabin above 10,000" light to the most popular airliner ever built, or adding a few lines to the latest manual revision. No surprise which action they took.
But I guess that is not what you meant......
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Isn't it called Modality? Isn't that what snagged the pilot of Air Inter A320 into Strasburg? Didn't he confuse 3.3 degrees glideslope for 3.3K ft. rate of descent? Did that ever get changed?
GB
GB
During a reduced thrust take-off, as we accelerated through about 70 KIAS, the TOCW horn sounded. So the take-off was aborted.
It later transpired that there was nothing wrong with the configuration, but the interrupter system which sounded the horn was faulty and it would sound for no apparent reason when it felt like it. So it was replaced and the fault cleared.
But what really irritated me was that I later discovered that several other crews had also had the warning, but had just ignored it and then hadn't bothered to snag it after flight......
In that jet, the TOCW system was inhibited above a certain throttle angle. But someone had later decided to save more money / engine life by accepting take-offs at even lower thrust values - corresponding to a throttle angle which ws still 'inside' the TOCW range. Normally the TOCW was checked just prior to take-off; if it continued to sound then checklist action to resolve the cause was taken. However, with the TOCW still 'live' at the reduced thrust take-off setting, a configuration failure (TPI runaway, perhaps - or uncommanded speedbrake lever movement due to vibration) could still be signalled during the take-off roll. As we practised aborts in the simulator several times per month, a low speed abort was hardly hazardous - but continuing with an unknown configuration error might well have been.
If the interrupter unti is faulty, either a spurious TOCW or a spurious cabin alt warning might result - the crew must then check the actual cause.
It later transpired that there was nothing wrong with the configuration, but the interrupter system which sounded the horn was faulty and it would sound for no apparent reason when it felt like it. So it was replaced and the fault cleared.
But what really irritated me was that I later discovered that several other crews had also had the warning, but had just ignored it and then hadn't bothered to snag it after flight......
In that jet, the TOCW system was inhibited above a certain throttle angle. But someone had later decided to save more money / engine life by accepting take-offs at even lower thrust values - corresponding to a throttle angle which ws still 'inside' the TOCW range. Normally the TOCW was checked just prior to take-off; if it continued to sound then checklist action to resolve the cause was taken. However, with the TOCW still 'live' at the reduced thrust take-off setting, a configuration failure (TPI runaway, perhaps - or uncommanded speedbrake lever movement due to vibration) could still be signalled during the take-off roll. As we practised aborts in the simulator several times per month, a low speed abort was hardly hazardous - but continuing with an unknown configuration error might well have been.
If the interrupter unti is faulty, either a spurious TOCW or a spurious cabin alt warning might result - the crew must then check the actual cause.
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Tree, just wondering who you are referring to as "amateurs"? The airline's that pass on the Boeing suggested procedure to their crew or the complying crew? I personally find the briefing painfully unnecessary but you have to question who the amateur’s are for ignoring the procedure.
