Wheel Well Fire Actions....
Joined: Jun 2005
Posts: 1,420
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From: AEP
As 411A mentions here, correct.
Regarding the 727 accident - UAL 1969 off Santa Monica...
xxx
Was one of our favorite classroom subject for F/Es then.
The plane had been dispatched with 1 GEN INOP.
It was a 727C or was not, but here was a slight difference between the two.
Battery switch and galley power switch next to each other.
Both switches were NOT GUARDED.
NOTE - After the accident, all airlines installed a GUARD on the BAT switch.
xxx
They got down to ONE GEN operating - it tripped, overload.
The flight engineer intended to switch galley power OFF.
He confused the two switches, and got the BAT switch OFF.
Cockpit became dark, nothing electrical operating.
In these days there was NO standby attitude indicator SAI.
NOTE - After accident, all airplanes got requirement for SAI with battery.
xxx
A part of the story I got from a UAL pilot... is it a legend...?
Apparently, SAI equipment had been offered for UAL airplanes as option.
But would have cost a lot of money. So they said NO.
Daughter of the UAL idiot that decided not to install SAI, was a F/A aboard.
xxx
Happy contrails
Regarding the 727 accident - UAL 1969 off Santa Monica...
xxx
Was one of our favorite classroom subject for F/Es then.
The plane had been dispatched with 1 GEN INOP.
It was a 727C or was not, but here was a slight difference between the two.
Battery switch and galley power switch next to each other.
Both switches were NOT GUARDED.
NOTE - After the accident, all airlines installed a GUARD on the BAT switch.
xxx
They got down to ONE GEN operating - it tripped, overload.
The flight engineer intended to switch galley power OFF.
He confused the two switches, and got the BAT switch OFF.
Cockpit became dark, nothing electrical operating.
In these days there was NO standby attitude indicator SAI.
NOTE - After accident, all airplanes got requirement for SAI with battery.
xxx
A part of the story I got from a UAL pilot... is it a legend...?
Apparently, SAI equipment had been offered for UAL airplanes as option.
But would have cost a lot of money. So they said NO.
Daughter of the UAL idiot that decided not to install SAI, was a F/A aboard.
xxx
Happy contrails
Joined: Dec 2002
Aviation Qualifications: ATP+Mil
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From: Where the Quaboag River flows, USA
BelArgUSA
Ref UAL accident: aviation is terribly unforgiving or stupidity or inattention!! The price to be paid is high.
BTW, I pm'd you about the El Al B747 AMS accident, if you have the time to answer, please.
GF
Ref UAL accident: aviation is terribly unforgiving or stupidity or inattention!! The price to be paid is high.
BTW, I pm'd you about the El Al B747 AMS accident, if you have the time to answer, please.
GF
Aviator Extraordinaire
Joined: May 2000
Posts: 2,396
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From: Oklahoma City, Oklahoma USA
411A and BelArgUSA
That was the accident I was thinking of. I should have researched it before posting, as I remembered someone telling about the accident and the cause, which was wrong, instead of looking it up. The actual cause makes more sense, as having all those generator lights on at night would be very hard not to notice just before takeoff. The very last thing I did on every takeoff before going onto the runway in the 727 was to look back at the FE panel to make sure no lights were on.
Thank you.
(Hey, at least I got the type of aircraft correct.)
That was the accident I was thinking of. I should have researched it before posting, as I remembered someone telling about the accident and the cause, which was wrong, instead of looking it up. The actual cause makes more sense, as having all those generator lights on at night would be very hard not to notice just before takeoff. The very last thing I did on every takeoff before going onto the runway in the 727 was to look back at the FE panel to make sure no lights were on.
Thank you.
(Hey, at least I got the type of aircraft correct.)
Joined: May 2007
Posts: 257
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From: Castlegar
Designer-err? or PILOT err?
From slot #21:
"... that NationAir story.... It was also in an older type with poor (or no) overheat loop protection..."
Part 25 still does NOT require Wheel Well Fire Warning -- the DC8, DC10, MD80, MD11 still have NO Wheel Well Fire Detection. We'll need another Nation Air exemplar -- in the USA -- to get that fire safety feature included in future Part 25 Cert' Standards. That's how a FIRE inside ValuJet Cargo Compartment prompted regulator to re-establish the same Fire Safety standard [detection in Cargo] that had first been law in 1947 (after "Star of Lisbon"), but then later abandon in the early '50's (in favor of the narrowbody's newer air-tight concept for the Cargo Compartment on B707).
"... that NationAir story.... It was also in an older type with poor (or no) overheat loop protection..."
Part 25 still does NOT require Wheel Well Fire Warning -- the DC8, DC10, MD80, MD11 still have NO Wheel Well Fire Detection. We'll need another Nation Air exemplar -- in the USA -- to get that fire safety feature included in future Part 25 Cert' Standards. That's how a FIRE inside ValuJet Cargo Compartment prompted regulator to re-establish the same Fire Safety standard [detection in Cargo] that had first been law in 1947 (after "Star of Lisbon"), but then later abandon in the early '50's (in favor of the narrowbody's newer air-tight concept for the Cargo Compartment on B707).
Joined: May 2007
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From: Castlegar
pwrd Stdby Attitude Indicator (rather than elect Turn Ind)
Some pilot-bashing several slots above (degrading a B727 Crew).
FAA & airline permitted MEL of that Gen-inop during prior 42-Hrs of flight time; then T/O LAX, ENGINE FIRE warning (nuisance) ...
You can see some of the comments earlier in this thread disparaging the PILOTS and FE of a UA B727. Note the comments -- from other pilots -- focusing NOT ON the REGULATOR, nor on DESIGN, but instead focusing on some mythical pilot-err. These rumors start early after any mysterious mishap, the rumors are difficult to stop, even decades later, even with the AAR publicly available.
From the NTSB AAR:
PC is on the bottom of AAR pg29:
From page 26, “Analysis” Section
"...the story I got from a UAL pilot... is it a legend...?"
UA266 / 18Jan69 B727-222QC N7434U Night T/O from LAX at 1817 hrs (climbed into low cloud), reported Fire Warning on #1 Engine; then loss of all electrical power, after a minute-and-a-half crashed into sea [950 feet depth].FAA & airline permitted MEL of that Gen-inop during prior 42-Hrs of flight time; then T/O LAX, ENGINE FIRE warning (nuisance) ...
You can see some of the comments earlier in this thread disparaging the PILOTS and FE of a UA B727. Note the comments -- from other pilots -- focusing NOT ON the REGULATOR, nor on DESIGN, but instead focusing on some mythical pilot-err. These rumors start early after any mysterious mishap, the rumors are difficult to stop, even decades later, even with the AAR publicly available.
From the NTSB AAR:
PC is on the bottom of AAR pg29:
The Board determines ... probable cause ... loss of attitude orientation during a night, instrument departure in which the attitude instruments were disabled by loss of electrical power. The Board has been unable to determine
-- (a) why all generator power was lost or
-- (b) why the standby electrical power system either was not activated or failed to function.
Among the Rec'd:-- (a) why all generator power was lost or
-- (b) why the standby electrical power system either was not activated or failed to function.
In his response of July 28, 1969, the Administrator stated that the FAA had issued NPRM 69-26 which provides for the installation in large turbojet-powered airplanes used in the air carrier service of a third independently powered attitude indicator. [note #33] The proposal embodied in NPRM 69-26 was adopted on January 8, 1970, and became effective on February 5, 1970, as Section 121.305(j) of the FAR, which requires that the additional attitude indicator be installed on all large turbojet aircraft after August 5, 1971.
"... In order to remove any doubt as to the status of the standby system during a "Loss of all Generators" emergency, it is further recommended that the second officer on a B727 be provided a positive indication on his panel when the standby system is being powered from the battery. Such an indication could take the form of a light ..."
Think of the poor pilot attempting to fly INSTRUMENTS, night, IMC, after FIRE WARNING, loss of all generators, Thrust asymmetry with the #1 pulled Fire Handle:"... In order to remove any doubt as to the status of the standby system during a "Loss of all Generators" emergency, it is further recommended that the second officer on a B727 be provided a positive indication on his panel when the standby system is being powered from the battery. Such an indication could take the form of a light ..."
From page 26, “Analysis” Section
... "I don't know (what’s going on). [comment from S/O]”
"The remaining question concerns the causal relationship between the electrical system problems discussed above and the eventual crash. Flight tests indicated that electrical power outages would not have a substantial impact on the flight control system. It therefore appears that the most significant adverse effect of the electrical power loss on the capability of the pilots to fly the aircraft would have involved the attitude reference instruments, which are so critical to the operation of an aircraft under instrument conditions.
The basic instrument in the cockpit from which a pilot in a B-727 derives attitude information is the attitude indicator, which in turn receives data from an electrically powered vertical gyro. When N7434U was initially started up, this vertical gyro would have established a vertical plane with reference to the ground. When electrical power was lost in flight, a flag labeled "gyro" would have appeared in the lower face of the attitude indicator instrument and the indicator would have ... [default-bias] to a 90-degree pitchup attitude. [see footnote #29]
Upon restoration of power, the attitude indicator presentation of 90-degree pitchup would have rolled [repositioned] back toward the attitude of the vertical gyro. In addition, the vertical gyro would have gone into the fast erection cycle. However, if the gyro had precessed during the period electrical power was lost, or if the aircraft were in a position other than level when power was restored, the gyro would not be referenced to the ground, but rather would be sensing and erecting toward a false vertical plane. Accordingly, if the captain had attempted to change the attitude of the aircraft toward an instrument indication of level flight under the above conditions, he would have been maneuvering the aircraft with reference to a false "horizon," which would have served to aggravate further an already serious orientation problem.
"The remaining question concerns the causal relationship between the electrical system problems discussed above and the eventual crash. Flight tests indicated that electrical power outages would not have a substantial impact on the flight control system. It therefore appears that the most significant adverse effect of the electrical power loss on the capability of the pilots to fly the aircraft would have involved the attitude reference instruments, which are so critical to the operation of an aircraft under instrument conditions.
The basic instrument in the cockpit from which a pilot in a B-727 derives attitude information is the attitude indicator, which in turn receives data from an electrically powered vertical gyro. When N7434U was initially started up, this vertical gyro would have established a vertical plane with reference to the ground. When electrical power was lost in flight, a flag labeled "gyro" would have appeared in the lower face of the attitude indicator instrument and the indicator would have ... [default-bias] to a 90-degree pitchup attitude. [see footnote #29]
[footnote #29, on page 26 bottom) The only other instrument in the cockpit which provides attitude information, the turn needle, is controlled by an electrical signal and therefore would also have been rendered inoperative. When the electrical signal to this instrument was removed, the needle would have remained centered, thus indicating level flight.
The gyro itself would then have started to coast down, although a certain amount of stability would have been retained in the gyro assembly. However, if the aircraft attitude were altered from the level position by climbing or descending, or banking left or right, precession of the gyro gimbals would have occurred.Upon restoration of power, the attitude indicator presentation of 90-degree pitchup would have rolled [repositioned] back toward the attitude of the vertical gyro. In addition, the vertical gyro would have gone into the fast erection cycle. However, if the gyro had precessed during the period electrical power was lost, or if the aircraft were in a position other than level when power was restored, the gyro would not be referenced to the ground, but rather would be sensing and erecting toward a false vertical plane. Accordingly, if the captain had attempted to change the attitude of the aircraft toward an instrument indication of level flight under the above conditions, he would have been maneuvering the aircraft with reference to a false "horizon," which would have served to aggravate further an already serious orientation problem.
Joined: Mar 2000
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From: Arizona USA
UA266 / 18Jan69 B727-222QC N7434U Night T/O from LAX at 1817 hrs (climbed into low cloud), reported Fire Warning on #1 Engine; then loss of all electrical power, after a minute-and-a-half crashed into sea [950 feet depth].
"...the story I got from a UAL pilot... is it a legend...?"
The referenced flight had departed about five minutes prior to my approach to 25L at LAX, and the tower controller asked if we could proceed out to sea, and agree to be radar vectored to where the target disappeared.
I agreed, and did so.
I don't recall any clouds being present, and we were able to circle the location for about ten minutes, at 500 msl (in a BE99 type aircraft) while other aircraft and surface vessels were enroute.
I returned for landing at LAX and resumed normal duties.
There was no fire in any engine that I know of, and yes, the airplane had been dispatched with an engine generator inoperative, in accordance with the MEL.
Sorry. Igh, it was crew error, plain and simple.
The Flight Engineer switched OFF the battery switch after the remaining engine generators had tripped off line.
A fatal mistake.
Joined: Jun 2005
Posts: 1,420
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From: AEP
Loss of all GENS - 727
Hola IGh -
xxx
Read posts nº 41 and 42 above.
Exactly as you state in your own post.
At the time of the accident 1969, I was a brand new PanAm 727 F/E.
This accident was subject of long briefings in classrooms and simulator.
xxx
N7434U was a QC - Yes there was a slight difference with PAX 727s
On 727C/QC the BAT + GALLEY PWR switches were placed next to each other.
There was then NO GUARD on 727 BAT SW.
The F/E intended to reduce KW load on the remaining GEN.
One of the first power reduction items on CK-LIST is "GALLEY PWR - OFF".
Unfortunately, he moved the BAT SW to OFF. Killed all power and lights.
xxx
After the accident, a GUARD (RED) was placed on BAT switches.
And SAI with independant battery power were installed as new requirement.
xxx
So, exactly as you describe. What is your point...?
Do you have 20/20 vision in the dark...?
Happy contrails
xxx
Read posts nº 41 and 42 above.
Exactly as you state in your own post.
At the time of the accident 1969, I was a brand new PanAm 727 F/E.
This accident was subject of long briefings in classrooms and simulator.
xxx
N7434U was a QC - Yes there was a slight difference with PAX 727s
On 727C/QC the BAT + GALLEY PWR switches were placed next to each other.
There was then NO GUARD on 727 BAT SW.
The F/E intended to reduce KW load on the remaining GEN.
One of the first power reduction items on CK-LIST is "GALLEY PWR - OFF".
Unfortunately, he moved the BAT SW to OFF. Killed all power and lights.
xxx
After the accident, a GUARD (RED) was placed on BAT switches.
And SAI with independant battery power were installed as new requirement.
xxx
So, exactly as you describe. What is your point...?
Do you have 20/20 vision in the dark...?
Happy contrails
Joined: Jun 2000
Posts: 4,507
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From: last time I looked I was still here.
What happened to the maxim "if there's doubt, there is no doubt? If you land and find no problem you have covered your backside in bullet proof material. If you don't you will have some explaining to do. The outcome of that will depend on your relationship with CP.
However, what would you do if in ETOPS territory or Africa? The nearest suitable/available could be a very long way away. I wonder if your decision would be the same as when over central Europe. Remember, you are likely to ground the a/c.
However, what would you do if in ETOPS territory or Africa? The nearest suitable/available could be a very long way away. I wonder if your decision would be the same as when over central Europe. Remember, you are likely to ground the a/c.
