Some pilot-bashing several slots above (degrading a B727 Crew).
"...the story I got from a UAL pilot... is it a legend...?"
UA266 / 18Jan69 B727-222QC N7434U Night T/O from LAX at 1817 hrs (climbed into low cloud), reported Fire Warning on #1 Engine; then loss of all electrical power, after a minute-and-a-half crashed into sea [950 feet depth].
FAA & airline permitted MEL of that Gen-inop during prior 42-Hrs of flight time; then T/O LAX, ENGINE FIRE warning (nuisance) ...
You can see some of the comments earlier in this thread disparaging the PILOTS and FE of a UA B727. Note the comments -- from other pilots -- focusing NOT ON the REGULATOR, nor on DESIGN, but instead focusing on some mythical pilot-err. These rumors start early after any mysterious mishap, the rumors are difficult to stop, even decades later, even with the AAR publicly available.
From the NTSB AAR:
PC is on the bottom of AAR pg29:
The Board determines ... probable cause ... loss of attitude orientation during a night, instrument departure in which the attitude instruments were disabled by loss of electrical power. The Board has been unable to determine
-- (a) why all generator power was lost or
-- (b) why the standby electrical power system either was not activated or failed to function.
Among the Rec'd:
In his response of July 28, 1969, the Administrator stated that the FAA had issued NPRM 69-26 which provides for the installation in large turbojet-powered airplanes used in the air carrier service of a third independently powered attitude indicator. [note #33] The proposal embodied in NPRM 69-26 was adopted on January 8, 1970, and became effective on February 5, 1970, as Section 121.305(j) of the FAR, which requires that the additional attitude indicator be installed on all large turbojet aircraft after August 5, 1971.
"... In order to remove any doubt as to the status of the standby system during a "Loss of all Generators" emergency, it is further recommended that the second officer on a B727 be provided a positive indication on his panel when the standby system is being powered from the battery. Such an indication could take the form of a light ..."
Think of the poor pilot attempting to fly INSTRUMENTS, night, IMC, after FIRE WARNING, loss of all generators, Thrust asymmetry with the #1 pulled Fire Handle:
From page 26, “Analysis” Section
... "I don't know (what’s going on). [comment from S/O]”
"The remaining question concerns the causal relationship between the electrical system problems discussed above and the eventual crash. Flight tests indicated that electrical power outages would not have a substantial impact on the flight control system. It therefore appears that the most significant adverse effect of the electrical power loss on the capability of the pilots to fly the aircraft would have involved the attitude reference instruments, which are so critical to the operation of an aircraft under instrument conditions.
The basic instrument in the cockpit from which a pilot in a B-727 derives attitude information is the attitude indicator, which in turn receives data from an electrically powered vertical gyro. When N7434U was initially started up, this vertical gyro would have established a vertical plane with reference to the ground. When electrical power was lost in flight, a flag labeled "gyro" would have appeared in the lower face of the attitude indicator instrument and the indicator would have ... [default-bias] to a 90-degree pitchup attitude. [see footnote #29]
[footnote #29, on page 26 bottom) The only other instrument in the cockpit which provides attitude information, the turn needle, is controlled by an electrical signal and therefore would also have been rendered inoperative. When the electrical signal to this instrument was removed, the needle would have remained centered, thus indicating level flight.
The gyro itself would then have started to coast down, although a certain amount of stability would have been retained in the gyro assembly. However, if the aircraft attitude were altered from the level position by climbing or descending, or banking left or right, precession of the gyro gimbals would have occurred.
Upon restoration of power, the attitude indicator presentation of 90-degree pitchup would have rolled [repositioned] back toward the attitude of the vertical gyro. In addition, the vertical gyro would have gone into the fast erection cycle. However, if the gyro had precessed during the period electrical power was lost, or if the aircraft were in a position other than level when power was restored, the gyro would not be referenced to the ground, but rather would be sensing and erecting toward a false vertical plane. Accordingly, if the captain had attempted to change the attitude of the aircraft toward an instrument indication of level flight under the above conditions, he would have been maneuvering the aircraft with reference to a false "horizon," which would have served to aggravate further an already serious orientation problem.