Four Donk Plane with two out
I see your point, but I was explaining the philosophy behind use of reverse idle for those not conversant with the use of carbon brakes. And I'm not saying I agree with it. To my mind it's a technique that was invented in the accounts department and not the flight training department. But in modern aircraft ops, reverse is less necessary that it used to be in normal situations.
I now fly the Airbus - and although we use reverse idle most of the time, we use full reverse on wet/short/high and tailwind runways. But the Airbus autobrake system is a bit different to the Boeing's and the carbon brakes wear differently.
When I sais the F/O incorrectly initiated the go around, I was referring to the technique he used. He advanced the thrust levers manually rather than pressing the TOGA buttons. He did this to initiate a faster go around according to the report. But by not pressing the TOGA buttons, the aircraft would still be in flare or rollout mode, he would have to look through the flight directors and fly the go around manually - including the navigation as the flight plan would not have sequenced the go around track. What he should have done is pressed the TOGA buttons and moved the levers manually thus overriding the motor clutch if he wanted a faster advancement. And if the aircraft had gone into the full go-around, the Commander would have felt far less inclined to stay on the runway.
If you press the 744s TOGA buttons once, you get a go around with a climb of 2000fpm. Press them a second time, you get full rated TOGA thrust.
As a matter of interest, Airbus was considering offereing the A320 family without thrust reversers as an option a few years ago. I bet that with fuel prices as they are, the idea is being dusted off again!
An afterthought: If the F/O had pressed the TOGA buttons, the autothrust would have been re-engaged and the thrust levers would have gone forward again. If they had stayed on the runway, they would have gone off the end going a lot faster.
I now fly the Airbus - and although we use reverse idle most of the time, we use full reverse on wet/short/high and tailwind runways. But the Airbus autobrake system is a bit different to the Boeing's and the carbon brakes wear differently.
When I sais the F/O incorrectly initiated the go around, I was referring to the technique he used. He advanced the thrust levers manually rather than pressing the TOGA buttons. He did this to initiate a faster go around according to the report. But by not pressing the TOGA buttons, the aircraft would still be in flare or rollout mode, he would have to look through the flight directors and fly the go around manually - including the navigation as the flight plan would not have sequenced the go around track. What he should have done is pressed the TOGA buttons and moved the levers manually thus overriding the motor clutch if he wanted a faster advancement. And if the aircraft had gone into the full go-around, the Commander would have felt far less inclined to stay on the runway.
If you press the 744s TOGA buttons once, you get a go around with a climb of 2000fpm. Press them a second time, you get full rated TOGA thrust.
As a matter of interest, Airbus was considering offereing the A320 family without thrust reversers as an option a few years ago. I bet that with fuel prices as they are, the idea is being dusted off again!
An afterthought: If the F/O had pressed the TOGA buttons, the autothrust would have been re-engaged and the thrust levers would have gone forward again. If they had stayed on the runway, they would have gone off the end going a lot faster.
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: Arizona USA
Posts: 8,571
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hmmm, it would appear to me, Old Fella, that you were, at one time, a rather senior Flight Engineer.
Having said this, it would be wise for you to remember that Flight Engineers are third-in-command...after the pilots.
Like it or not, that is the way it is....and shall remain.
Just the facts..
Having said this, it would be wise for you to remember that Flight Engineers are third-in-command...after the pilots.
Like it or not, that is the way it is....and shall remain.
Just the facts..
Join Date: Sep 1999
Location: ME
Posts: 5,505
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Old Fella, as a B744 operator, we are changing procedures to F25 and idle reverse on the recommendation of the IATA Fuel Conservation Group..... If you were a FE, you wouldnt have operated the B744, therefore dont make the mistake of believing that its "stopping capabilities" are the same as the Classic.
Mutt
Mutt
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Wingham NSW Australia
Age: 83
Posts: 1,343
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Third in Command
411A, I have never questioned who is in command. Of course it is, and has to be, the Captain unless he becomes incapacitated, either physically or mentally. My point has been that your comments inferred that only F/O's and F/E's were capable of making mistakes and that only the Captain can save the day. I have not inferred that you personally have made mistakes, but unless you are a robot you are as capable of making a mistake as any other human. Yes, I am a retired senior F/E and I had the pleasure of flying for many years with a multitude of extremely able pilots. I also had the displeasure of flying with a very small number who were not only less than confidence inspiring, but also were a "One man band" which, in my view, is not only unpleasant but at times dangerous. Incidentally, I never gave any thought to being "third-in-command", but rather to being a member of a team able to make a contribution to the conduct of the flight. The Company must have felt that to be the case, they paid us the same rate as the F/O's. Your comment that F/E's are "after the pilots - like it or not" is uncalled for and petty. Mutt, thank you for stating the obvious regarding my not having operated the B747-400. I do however understand the difference between the brakes on the Classic as compared to the -400. My basic argument is, and has been all along, that the use of reverse thrust contributes as much as 20% of the speed reduction effort on a contaminated runway and should be used. That your company has chosen to use 25 Flap and idle reverse as a fuel conservation measure is their choice and in most cases probably very reasonable in terms of cost savings. The unfortunate thing with the QF accident was that nobody ever even considered the use of full reverse and 30 flap, and at least one of the crew had never witnessed a 30 flap/full reverse landing.
Your point is extremely valid and well made Old Fella, regardless of how much fuel is saved or brake wear improved, use of idle reverse is, in my opinion, negative training , operators may unconsciously be setting up a situation where these habits may lead pilots to not avail themselves of full reverse thrust capability when needed.
As to 411a, very few crewmembers other than himself of course ever measure
up to his 'standards' you are correct in your statement that in the cockpit, whilst the Captain is always in charge you are a vital member of the team.
His threads always relect a theme of 'but for the Captain all would have been lost' he has a total lack of respect for other crewmembers, very much a 'one man band' and I pity the people who have to work with him.
I am fortunate enough to fly with some of the best First officers in the business, as part of my brief though, I always mention, and emphasise, we ALL make mistakes, what is important is for one of us to catch it, point it out (always with tact if time allows) and correct it.
Later, when I do make one of my mistakes! I make a deliberate point of thanking him /her for pointing it out, this really sets the tone and lets them know I 'practice what I preach'
It is always a pleasure to hear from professionals such as yourselves with such valuable experience.
As to 411a, very few crewmembers other than himself of course ever measure
up to his 'standards' you are correct in your statement that in the cockpit, whilst the Captain is always in charge you are a vital member of the team.
His threads always relect a theme of 'but for the Captain all would have been lost' he has a total lack of respect for other crewmembers, very much a 'one man band' and I pity the people who have to work with him.
I am fortunate enough to fly with some of the best First officers in the business, as part of my brief though, I always mention, and emphasise, we ALL make mistakes, what is important is for one of us to catch it, point it out (always with tact if time allows) and correct it.
Later, when I do make one of my mistakes! I make a deliberate point of thanking him /her for pointing it out, this really sets the tone and lets them know I 'practice what I preach'
It is always a pleasure to hear from professionals such as yourselves with such valuable experience.
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: cloud 9
Posts: 198
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Old Fella - I am not disputing the accuracy of your (ATSB) figures, but as in all planning cases, they are theoretical and probably based on poor braking conditions. However, taking a practical view, those figures may be erroneous given the 'deluge' of the monsoonal rains at that time causing flooding on hard surfaces. What is not disputable, is the poor planning and badly executed landing that resulted in the over-run. (Also not disputable is the thread creep)!
Getting back to the original subject, 747Dieseldude, at 340 tonnes, you would have had a V2 in excess of Vmca( I no longer have 747-200 manuals, but is 157 knots close for Vmca?). If you were below Vmca, then directional control might only be possible by throttling back the good outboard engine, which would compromise the climb ability. Still, an interesting manouevre requiring accurate flying
.
Getting back to the original subject, 747Dieseldude, at 340 tonnes, you would have had a V2 in excess of Vmca( I no longer have 747-200 manuals, but is 157 knots close for Vmca?). If you were below Vmca, then directional control might only be possible by throttling back the good outboard engine, which would compromise the climb ability. Still, an interesting manouevre requiring accurate flying
.
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: US
Posts: 285
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
stilton
Very good post indeed. In my brief I do the same myself, where I encourage input no matter how trivial.
If a person as Captain comes across as agresive, snappy or very arrogant for example, he/she has immediately built a wall, which could stop communication no matter how trivial especially from a not so assertive F/O. Below is a case in point.
Decades ago when a certain airline landed at a new airport. So new in fact it was not yet open, except for their a/c opening it temporally. To cut a long story short, the Captain had been "riding" the f/o, who was leaving the company very soon anyway, lined up for the approach at the wrong airport. That F/O knew they were about to land at the wrong airport but, due to the captain's nature, kept his mouth shut and let him get on with it. The Captain had built a wall between him and the F/O for input. Yes the F/O was at fault to of course but was in a position to avoid very red faces.
Human nature? If you bully people, they will react, one way or the other.
Very good post indeed. In my brief I do the same myself, where I encourage input no matter how trivial.
If a person as Captain comes across as agresive, snappy or very arrogant for example, he/she has immediately built a wall, which could stop communication no matter how trivial especially from a not so assertive F/O. Below is a case in point.
Decades ago when a certain airline landed at a new airport. So new in fact it was not yet open, except for their a/c opening it temporally. To cut a long story short, the Captain had been "riding" the f/o, who was leaving the company very soon anyway, lined up for the approach at the wrong airport. That F/O knew they were about to land at the wrong airport but, due to the captain's nature, kept his mouth shut and let him get on with it. The Captain had built a wall between him and the F/O for input. Yes the F/O was at fault to of course but was in a position to avoid very red faces.
Human nature? If you bully people, they will react, one way or the other.
Indeed! It's Threat and Error Managemen (TEM) which is replacing CRM as the latest flight safety trend. Not that 411A will be following that philosophy. He hasn't got to CRM yet!
The continued use of reverse idle is flight safety factor for the reasons stated, and when I flew the 744, it was so rare to use it I could easily imagine not considering it even when needed. Now, the company I fly the A320 for require us to select full reverse on landing even if idle has been briefed. If idle is to be used, the thrust levers will be immediately advanced to the reverse idle stop before they have spooled up. This doesn't harm engines controlled by FADEC and ensures that the reverse idle setting is selected - it's sometimes a problem finding the reverse idle stop on the A320 as there aren't separate reverse levers. The thrust levers are moved into the reverse section past idle after latches have been lifted. This technique also has the added benefit of making the crew 'full reverse minded'.
On Qantas 01, the crew believed the runway was merely wet when in fact it was contaminated (despite clues to the contrary) which led them to believe reverse idle was satisfactory. And the PF didn't select any revers thrust - let alone full reverse thrust.
The continued use of reverse idle is flight safety factor for the reasons stated, and when I flew the 744, it was so rare to use it I could easily imagine not considering it even when needed. Now, the company I fly the A320 for require us to select full reverse on landing even if idle has been briefed. If idle is to be used, the thrust levers will be immediately advanced to the reverse idle stop before they have spooled up. This doesn't harm engines controlled by FADEC and ensures that the reverse idle setting is selected - it's sometimes a problem finding the reverse idle stop on the A320 as there aren't separate reverse levers. The thrust levers are moved into the reverse section past idle after latches have been lifted. This technique also has the added benefit of making the crew 'full reverse minded'.
On Qantas 01, the crew believed the runway was merely wet when in fact it was contaminated (despite clues to the contrary) which led them to believe reverse idle was satisfactory. And the PF didn't select any revers thrust - let alone full reverse thrust.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Wingham NSW Australia
Age: 83
Posts: 1,343
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
From the "Third-in-Command" according to 411A
Stilton, thank you for your support. I have not wished to "throw stones" at any other poster to this forum, however I find it disappointing that some seem to dismiss any input from other than a fellow pilot. My argument has been put in this thread and I really do not have anything further to add other than that I look forward to more interesting threads to follow and to contribute to if I feel I can say something of value.
Moderator
Perhaps we can all accept that there is a range of styles across the brotherhood of pilots and that all crew members ought to be looking at their own contributions and the contributions of their colleagues for the common good .. ?
Probably not all that productive to dwell upon perceived shortcomings of this or that individual ?
Probably not all that productive to dwell upon perceived shortcomings of this or that individual ?
I spent 19 years in the (respectively) Second Officer and First officer seat before I upgraded to Captain, I always took note of the Left seaters I wanted to emulate and, perhaps more importantly those I wanted to be nothing like.
A safe cockpit is one in which everyone is communicating with each other with no hesitation, this most certainly includes Flight Engineers.
As you know well Old Fella, the best Captains lead by example and almost never even have to mention their authority.
I don't know of any Boeing Or Airbus certified for single pilot operation.
All the very best Old Fella.
A safe cockpit is one in which everyone is communicating with each other with no hesitation, this most certainly includes Flight Engineers.
As you know well Old Fella, the best Captains lead by example and almost never even have to mention their authority.
I don't know of any Boeing Or Airbus certified for single pilot operation.
All the very best Old Fella.
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: Arizona USA
Posts: 8,571
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Probably not all that productive to dwell upon perceived shortcomings of this or that individual ?
Why?
Simply because a few apparently are looking at certain statements by some, who positively know what they are doing, and follow the AFM...versus...those that might well have come from 'other airlines', whose operations were tailored for their specific desires.
As in...'Well, when I was at BA, we did it this way'.
Quite frankly, I couldn't care less.
Nor does the company.
If some folks bring these attitudes to the present, they are politely requested to shape up or ship out.
If they continue, a 'Don't come Monday' letter is issued.
In our particular case, Lockheed issued quite precise recommendations/instructions on how to operate the airplane and the present airline management is simply not interested in accomodating those who think they 'know better'.
Simply because, these few folks do absolutely not know better, as has been proven time and again.
