Fog in Perth (Part 2)
Thread Starter
Fog in Perth (Part 2)
jack red
You do not understand what we are trying to say. There is no requirement and no procedures in place at any aerodrome in Australia for the protection of the ILS sensitive areas because all ILS’s are to CAT 1 only. Nor are there procedures in place for the correct separation of aircraft that would normally be required on a LWMO approach. As keg has said there are considerations regarding backup power, HIAL or lack of and runway and taxiway lights. If you can’t see that a number of critically important safety protection layers of the Swiss cheese have been removed then I'm sorry. There are some of us out there that can and take it very seriously.
No one has said that the QF crew in question didn’t do the right thing and do an auto land. They did. What we are saying is that because they had to do it, the safety of the pax and crew were put at greater risk than if they had to do a CAT 1 ILS to a Cat 1 Minima.
You do not understand what we are trying to say. There is no requirement and no procedures in place at any aerodrome in Australia for the protection of the ILS sensitive areas because all ILS’s are to CAT 1 only. Nor are there procedures in place for the correct separation of aircraft that would normally be required on a LWMO approach. As keg has said there are considerations regarding backup power, HIAL or lack of and runway and taxiway lights. If you can’t see that a number of critically important safety protection layers of the Swiss cheese have been removed then I'm sorry. There are some of us out there that can and take it very seriously.
No one has said that the QF crew in question didn’t do the right thing and do an auto land. They did. What we are saying is that because they had to do it, the safety of the pax and crew were put at greater risk than if they had to do a CAT 1 ILS to a Cat 1 Minima.
Can anyone explain to me why Australia is STILL one of the only places in the world where it is legal to operate without an alternate or remote airport holding? (Yes there are JAR provisions for no alternate but they require very good forcast conditions and are the exception not the rule)
To me it all harks back to the days when ATC had operational control. When that ceased, a suitable cultural framework within companies didn't exist. Note for instance that the QF330 made two attempts with VIS reported below minimum. That would be illegal just about everywhere else in the world as every OPS manual I've operated to had Approach Ban provisions, and for good reason! Go Arounds from Minima in IMC are a reduced-saftey manaeouvre that should occur rarely, yet the culture of "Going and having a look" is still a (Legal!!) part of Australian operations.
Once upon a time Australia did it differently to the rest of the world by having higher saftey standards. Now I believe the opposite is true!
To me it all harks back to the days when ATC had operational control. When that ceased, a suitable cultural framework within companies didn't exist. Note for instance that the QF330 made two attempts with VIS reported below minimum. That would be illegal just about everywhere else in the world as every OPS manual I've operated to had Approach Ban provisions, and for good reason! Go Arounds from Minima in IMC are a reduced-saftey manaeouvre that should occur rarely, yet the culture of "Going and having a look" is still a (Legal!!) part of Australian operations.
Once upon a time Australia did it differently to the rest of the world by having higher saftey standards. Now I believe the opposite is true!
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404 Titan:
Are you sure about lack of protection of ILS sensitive areas? This from MATS (Manual of Air Traffic Services):
2.6.1.1 Multipath effects on ILS facilities may be caused by an aircraft of particular size passing in front of the glide path antenna or operating in close proximity to the localiser antenna. These effects consist of signal fluctuations of the glide path or localiser.
Traffic restrictions in certain MET conditions
2.6.1.2 When meteorological conditions are observed as cloud BKN or OVC at or below 600 FT and / or visibility at or below 2,000 M the following restrictions shall apply to airport traffic:
a. when an aircraft is executing an ILS and is between the OM and the landing threshold or, if the OM is not available, between 4 NM final and the landing threshold:
1. fixed wing aircraft of performance category C or above and all rotary wing aircraft shall be held clear of the glide path critical area;
2. all aircraft shall be held clear of an area which will affect the localiser.
2.6.1.3 The glide path critical area to be protected is a volume of airspace encompassing the lateral dimensions of the defined critical area (see diagram below) from ground level up to a height of 100 FT.
The book goes on to diagramatically describe the glidepath and localiser critical areas.
Are you sure about lack of protection of ILS sensitive areas? This from MATS (Manual of Air Traffic Services):
2.6.1.1 Multipath effects on ILS facilities may be caused by an aircraft of particular size passing in front of the glide path antenna or operating in close proximity to the localiser antenna. These effects consist of signal fluctuations of the glide path or localiser.
Traffic restrictions in certain MET conditions
2.6.1.2 When meteorological conditions are observed as cloud BKN or OVC at or below 600 FT and / or visibility at or below 2,000 M the following restrictions shall apply to airport traffic:
a. when an aircraft is executing an ILS and is between the OM and the landing threshold or, if the OM is not available, between 4 NM final and the landing threshold:
1. fixed wing aircraft of performance category C or above and all rotary wing aircraft shall be held clear of the glide path critical area;
2. all aircraft shall be held clear of an area which will affect the localiser.
2.6.1.3 The glide path critical area to be protected is a volume of airspace encompassing the lateral dimensions of the defined critical area (see diagram below) from ground level up to a height of 100 FT.
The book goes on to diagramatically describe the glidepath and localiser critical areas.
Thread Starter
Green on, Go!
That is the protection required for a Cat 1 ILS when the weather is near the minima. At an airfield that is capable of LWMO procedures from Cat 2 down to Cat3b, even more stringent procedures will be in force. First, special holding points are painted at appropriate places around the airport to ensure the protection and integrity of the ILS transmission. Secondly significant separation is provided in flight to ensure no aircraft on the ILS will be affected by an aircraft in front distorting the localiser and glide slope signal. These are the LWMO Airport Requirements straight from our ops manual we “MUST” follow if we are to conduct a LWMO approach.
That is the protection required for a Cat 1 ILS when the weather is near the minima. At an airfield that is capable of LWMO procedures from Cat 2 down to Cat3b, even more stringent procedures will be in force. First, special holding points are painted at appropriate places around the airport to ensure the protection and integrity of the ILS transmission. Secondly significant separation is provided in flight to ensure no aircraft on the ILS will be affected by an aircraft in front distorting the localiser and glide slope signal. These are the LWMO Airport Requirements straight from our ops manual we “MUST” follow if we are to conduct a LWMO approach.
LWMO Airport Requirements
The Commander must be satisfied that Low Visibility Procedures are in force before commencing any LWMO approach. Clearance to fly a CAT 2 or CAT 3 approach is considered confirmation that LVP are in force.
Low Visibility Procedures − Before commencing LWMO, Airport Operators will implement Low Visibility Procedures (LVP). Pilots must be aware of the ILS sensitive/critical areas and LWMO holding points when taxying to the runway and when using LWMO runway exits after landing.
Serviceability of the airfield and ground equipment is the responsibility of the airfield operator. When LVP are in force, crews should assume the airfield operator has complied with all special procedures, lighting requirements and electrical requirements.
If RVR’s improve during the approach, ATC may cease LVP and revert to CAT 1 operations resulting in a loss of signal protection for CAT 2 and CAT 3 ILS procedures.
At some airports, particularly in Europe, ATC may announce either on VHF or via ATIS, that LWMO is operational to CAT 2 only. This allows ATC to reduce aircraft spacing to less than that required for CAT 3 operations. The airport surface area is still protected, however ILS signals may be affected by preceding traffic, due to the reduction in spacing. In such cases, due to normally high traffic density at such airports, it is unlikely that ATC will approve a crew request for a CAT 3 approach unless RVR values limit CAT 2 operations.
The Commander must be satisfied that Low Visibility Procedures are in force before commencing any LWMO approach. Clearance to fly a CAT 2 or CAT 3 approach is considered confirmation that LVP are in force.
Low Visibility Procedures − Before commencing LWMO, Airport Operators will implement Low Visibility Procedures (LVP). Pilots must be aware of the ILS sensitive/critical areas and LWMO holding points when taxying to the runway and when using LWMO runway exits after landing.
Serviceability of the airfield and ground equipment is the responsibility of the airfield operator. When LVP are in force, crews should assume the airfield operator has complied with all special procedures, lighting requirements and electrical requirements.
If RVR’s improve during the approach, ATC may cease LVP and revert to CAT 1 operations resulting in a loss of signal protection for CAT 2 and CAT 3 ILS procedures.
At some airports, particularly in Europe, ATC may announce either on VHF or via ATIS, that LWMO is operational to CAT 2 only. This allows ATC to reduce aircraft spacing to less than that required for CAT 3 operations. The airport surface area is still protected, however ILS signals may be affected by preceding traffic, due to the reduction in spacing. In such cases, due to normally high traffic density at such airports, it is unlikely that ATC will approve a crew request for a CAT 3 approach unless RVR values limit CAT 2 operations.
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Well stated 404Titan.....
Also Aus ATC are not trained in AWO/LVP ops because there is no requirement yet in Aus, so you are very unlikely to have any protection from the possabillity of LOC/GS deflection from aircraft or ground vehicles.
Can an aircraft follow an ILS all the way down to the ground?.. Yes!
What part of the airport are you happy to land on Jack?...
Without protections in force you and your aircraft manufacturer can not guarantee where you will be.
In Cat 111a or b the only lights you will see (if any) could be the runway or taxiway,or highway.
You will not know which, until they come to dig you out of your cockpit.
Also Aus ATC are not trained in AWO/LVP ops because there is no requirement yet in Aus, so you are very unlikely to have any protection from the possabillity of LOC/GS deflection from aircraft or ground vehicles.
Can an aircraft follow an ILS all the way down to the ground?.. Yes!
What part of the airport are you happy to land on Jack?...
Without protections in force you and your aircraft manufacturer can not guarantee where you will be.
In Cat 111a or b the only lights you will see (if any) could be the runway or taxiway,or highway.
You will not know which, until they come to dig you out of your cockpit.
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I am fully conversant with low viz operations and have operated the same over many years of international flying.
My point was and remains still
...........and for you Shockwave.
One of these days you'll get the opportunity to upgrade to the LHS. When you do, two of the areas you'll be scrutinised on are decision making and risk management. Your statement above indicates to me you'll fail both of these critical areas of Command training.
The QF Captain of the A330 demonstrated just why he is that.
His options were:
1. Auto landing on a Cat I ILS runway.
2. Ditching.
3. Flying around until fuel exhaustion results in a forced (read: crash) landing.
He chose option 1. (good decision) This may have been based on the fact that options 2 & 3 posed a greater threat to himself and passengers than option 1. (good risk assessment).
Have a nice day
My point was and remains still
An aircraft, with auto land capability, arrives at an aerodrome with un-forecast fog, declares an emergency (to ensure vehicles and aircraft remain clear of the ILS sensitive areas) and lands.
The QF crew did exactly what you would expect in the situation they found themselves and did it professionally and with the minimum amount of "pucker factor" ! (I love that phrase)
The QF crew did exactly what you would expect in the situation they found themselves and did it professionally and with the minimum amount of "pucker factor" ! (I love that phrase)
In Cat 111a or b the only lights you will see (if any) could be the runway or taxiway,or highway.
You will not know which, until they come to dig you out of your cockpit.
You will not know which, until they come to dig you out of your cockpit.
The QF Captain of the A330 demonstrated just why he is that.
His options were:
1. Auto landing on a Cat I ILS runway.
2. Ditching.
3. Flying around until fuel exhaustion results in a forced (read: crash) landing.
He chose option 1. (good decision) This may have been based on the fact that options 2 & 3 posed a greater threat to himself and passengers than option 1. (good risk assessment).
Have a nice day
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Jack ,
this discussion about LVP on non approved ILS/Rwys, was and still remains about the fact that it is a big deal. Hence the Mayday call. Mayday calls are not usually used in situations that are classified as "no Biggy"
It was never intended to cast doubts about the QF crew that found themselves in that situation, or the lack of options they had. So Chill!
I do wonder though, how much fuel he will carry next time he heads off in that direction?
I am aware of the QF/Aus fuel policy and use of DPA/PNR points and weather/ fuel requirements so know how this can occure.
My original point about Perth is that it is so far away from any other suitable airport for large Heavy! aircraft that it should be treated differently, ie isolated airport or alternate fuel. That is a decision for your company and its fuel policy or at the last The Captain.
The A330 is a big jet but has many more options available to it than an A340 or 747 or 777 when it comes to diversion possibillities. However, when you arrive with potentially only 30 min of fixed reserve in tanks, your options are pretty limited!
Oh! and as to being trained to the mighty standards of the QF LHS...
The Captains responsibillity (any Captain) is to never let yourself get into the unfortunate position that that crew did.
Remember that! it may help one day.
If you ever, find yourself in a situation where you have to break the rules to survive you are either having a very unlucky day, or you have stuffed up big time.
There are many factors that will have to be investigated about that incident before fingers can be pointed.
Deciding to auto land on a Cat1 ILS given his circumstances on arrival was the easiest decision in the world because he had no options at that time. He/She may well be of the highest standard along with the F/O, but that decision does not demonstrate proof of anything.
How they ended up there however, will be studied very closely.
Factors:
Were they let down by inaccurate, untimely Met services?
Were they pressured into flying with min fuel by a discrimatory fuel monitoring policy?
Were they let down by a flawed fuel policy?
Was there any point that this event could have been avoided enroute?
Were there any other factors like fatigue involved?
Jumping to conclusions about one's decisions or decision making abillities based on few of the facts is usually the domain of management or chip on the shoulder complete tossers. I'm not either.. how about you?
Experience and Rank on PPRUNE means nothing so why jump to conclusions or assumptions. I have probably been training F/Os to be captains for longer than you have been flying, but who really cares ! Stick to the point JR, getting personal is a sign of weakness.
this discussion about LVP on non approved ILS/Rwys, was and still remains about the fact that it is a big deal. Hence the Mayday call. Mayday calls are not usually used in situations that are classified as "no Biggy"
It was never intended to cast doubts about the QF crew that found themselves in that situation, or the lack of options they had. So Chill!
I do wonder though, how much fuel he will carry next time he heads off in that direction?
I am aware of the QF/Aus fuel policy and use of DPA/PNR points and weather/ fuel requirements so know how this can occure.
My original point about Perth is that it is so far away from any other suitable airport for large Heavy! aircraft that it should be treated differently, ie isolated airport or alternate fuel. That is a decision for your company and its fuel policy or at the last The Captain.
The A330 is a big jet but has many more options available to it than an A340 or 747 or 777 when it comes to diversion possibillities. However, when you arrive with potentially only 30 min of fixed reserve in tanks, your options are pretty limited!
Oh! and as to being trained to the mighty standards of the QF LHS...
The Captains responsibillity (any Captain) is to never let yourself get into the unfortunate position that that crew did.
Remember that! it may help one day.
If you ever, find yourself in a situation where you have to break the rules to survive you are either having a very unlucky day, or you have stuffed up big time.
There are many factors that will have to be investigated about that incident before fingers can be pointed.
Deciding to auto land on a Cat1 ILS given his circumstances on arrival was the easiest decision in the world because he had no options at that time. He/She may well be of the highest standard along with the F/O, but that decision does not demonstrate proof of anything.
How they ended up there however, will be studied very closely.
Factors:
Were they let down by inaccurate, untimely Met services?
Were they pressured into flying with min fuel by a discrimatory fuel monitoring policy?
Were they let down by a flawed fuel policy?
Was there any point that this event could have been avoided enroute?
Were there any other factors like fatigue involved?
Jumping to conclusions about one's decisions or decision making abillities based on few of the facts is usually the domain of management or chip on the shoulder complete tossers. I'm not either.. how about you?
Experience and Rank on PPRUNE means nothing so why jump to conclusions or assumptions. I have probably been training F/Os to be captains for longer than you have been flying, but who really cares ! Stick to the point JR, getting personal is a sign of weakness.
Last edited by ShockWave; 23rd Sep 2006 at 14:17.
shockwave: my sentiments exactly.
JR:
And go to KGI, 300nm away. Emergency port? Probably. But still doable. Unless of course he didn't have the gas to do so (or the WX there was no good).
Perhaps it boiled down to the inconvenience of going to KGI verses the relative danger of doing a zero-vis landing using uncertified equipment. From my seat, any legal alternative has to be used before you start doing unauthorised in-the-fog autolands.
There was a similar incident in the recent past about a CBR non-diversion that had a similar result involving a QF A330 at SYD.
Given the inconvenience of diverting one of these largish aircraft, it is surprising they were not carrying diversion fuel, especially when landing at Perth (the most isolated airport in the world?) in the middle of the night after a flight from Singas.
Edit: I meant "the inconvenience of diverting one of these largish aircraft to a non-normal port such as KGI..."
JR:
His options were:
1. Auto landing on a Cat I ILS runway.
2. Ditching.
3. Flying around until fuel exhaustion results in a forced (read: crash) landing.
1. Auto landing on a Cat I ILS runway.
2. Ditching.
3. Flying around until fuel exhaustion results in a forced (read: crash) landing.
Perhaps it boiled down to the inconvenience of going to KGI verses the relative danger of doing a zero-vis landing using uncertified equipment. From my seat, any legal alternative has to be used before you start doing unauthorised in-the-fog autolands.
There was a similar incident in the recent past about a CBR non-diversion that had a similar result involving a QF A330 at SYD.
Given the inconvenience of diverting one of these largish aircraft, it is surprising they were not carrying diversion fuel, especially when landing at Perth (the most isolated airport in the world?) in the middle of the night after a flight from Singas.
Edit: I meant "the inconvenience of diverting one of these largish aircraft to a non-normal port such as KGI..."
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 24th Sep 2006 at 05:57. Reason: Clarification
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There was a similar incident in the recent past about a CBR non-diversion that had a similar result involving a QF A330 at SYD.
Given the inconvenience of diverting one of these largish aircraft, it is surprising they were not carrying diversion fuel, especially when landing at Perth (the most isolated airprot in the world?) in the middle of the night after a flight from Singas.
Last edited by john_tullamarine; 27th Sep 2006 at 21:42. Reason: spelling
The QF Captain of the A330 demonstrated just why he is that.
His options were:
1. Auto landing on a Cat I ILS runway.
2. Ditching.
3. Flying around until fuel exhaustion results in a forced (read: crash) landing.
His options were:
1. Auto landing on a Cat I ILS runway.
2. Ditching.
3. Flying around until fuel exhaustion results in a forced (read: crash) landing.
4. Carry enough fuel to get to an alternate, and divert there instead.....
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Truth SI.. you just put yourself right up there along with JR making posts like that!
It would be a lot more cost efficient and environmentally friendly if they would just upgrade the major airports to Cat11/111, rather than make every one carry alternate fuel. In Europe and the US you can normally get to an alternate in 10-20 min, in OZ its any where between 1-2 hours. A huge waste of fuel when the weather is good most of the time.
It would be a lot more cost efficient and environmentally friendly if they would just upgrade the major airports to Cat11/111, rather than make every one carry alternate fuel. In Europe and the US you can normally get to an alternate in 10-20 min, in OZ its any where between 1-2 hours. A huge waste of fuel when the weather is good most of the time.
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The aircraft will carry out an autoland from an ILS approach unless the pilot presses the disconnect button - and it won't give a damn about legalities or the number of lights seen. If the runway won't be in sight at Cat 1 minima, then how are you going to ditch when the sea only comes into view a few seconds before impact? Option 1 is the only sensible one -hopefully all will take this incident on board and take into consideration Perth's isolation (and other airfields around the world) when fuel-planning.
Too true ,too true, skies full.
But how often does this have to happen before either:
a) the operator's pilots start acting responsibly or
b) CASA tells the operators who is really supposed to be the boss.
And BTW as has been pointed out previously, without the proper certification (guarantee) there is a possibility that the reason you won't see the lights is because you are displaced from their location. Thats why cat 11 cat 111 have larger protected areas.
Bloggs. That previous flight had sufficient fuel to divert, but chose to ignore his own designated latest divert time, and ran himself down to one option.
Maui
But how often does this have to happen before either:
a) the operator's pilots start acting responsibly or
b) CASA tells the operators who is really supposed to be the boss.
And BTW as has been pointed out previously, without the proper certification (guarantee) there is a possibility that the reason you won't see the lights is because you are displaced from their location. Thats why cat 11 cat 111 have larger protected areas.
Bloggs. That previous flight had sufficient fuel to divert, but chose to ignore his own designated latest divert time, and ran himself down to one option.
Maui
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Gents and Ladies, I pose the question as an ex aviator but not airline.
How is it that we now have aircraft resorting to the use of autoland in order to extract themselves from difficulties? Three come to mind in recent times, 330 Perth, 330 Sydney and 320 Adelaide. I dont recall any stories of the 707, 727, DC-9 days of old finding themselves in similar situations (OK there was a F-28, was it Pt Headland? that ended up on country strip). How has the industry changed? Economics driving fuel policy with an unspoken "they've got autoland if they find their backs to the wall"? Or did the people of old find themselves occasionally having to fly a ILS to touch down with the rudimentary equipment they had? No offense meant, just interested.
How is it that we now have aircraft resorting to the use of autoland in order to extract themselves from difficulties? Three come to mind in recent times, 330 Perth, 330 Sydney and 320 Adelaide. I dont recall any stories of the 707, 727, DC-9 days of old finding themselves in similar situations (OK there was a F-28, was it Pt Headland? that ended up on country strip). How has the industry changed? Economics driving fuel policy with an unspoken "they've got autoland if they find their backs to the wall"? Or did the people of old find themselves occasionally having to fly a ILS to touch down with the rudimentary equipment they had? No offense meant, just interested.
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QF had another incident with fog in Perth on a 767 back in the 80s, which resulted in an autoland I think.
Since that time the amount of traffic has increased both domestically and ineternationally quite a lot.
The science of flight planning and met briefings/info has also developed to a very high level allowing operators to use minimum fuel more often safely.
There is also a huge amount of pressure on crews to carry less fuel which results in less aircraft weight and less fuel burn, resulting in bigger proffits and paycheck for the CEO.
To carry less fuel means not adding extra at the Captains discretion, to do this you are expected to trust the system more than your own fear factor.
A lot of airlines also have fuel monitoring policies to check up on Captains and how much fuel they uplift above minimum and their fuel burn.
However, Captains are still responsible for how much fuel is enough and are expected to carry it when they can explain the need. Both by Gov Regs and their company.
No sane pilot would ever rely on auto land to enable him to carry less fuel to a non CAT11 airport, it is a last resort emergency only.
I also don't think any airline would expect this either.
Since that time the amount of traffic has increased both domestically and ineternationally quite a lot.
The science of flight planning and met briefings/info has also developed to a very high level allowing operators to use minimum fuel more often safely.
There is also a huge amount of pressure on crews to carry less fuel which results in less aircraft weight and less fuel burn, resulting in bigger proffits and paycheck for the CEO.
To carry less fuel means not adding extra at the Captains discretion, to do this you are expected to trust the system more than your own fear factor.
A lot of airlines also have fuel monitoring policies to check up on Captains and how much fuel they uplift above minimum and their fuel burn.
However, Captains are still responsible for how much fuel is enough and are expected to carry it when they can explain the need. Both by Gov Regs and their company.
No sane pilot would ever rely on auto land to enable him to carry less fuel to a non CAT11 airport, it is a last resort emergency only.
I also don't think any airline would expect this either.
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I dont recall any stories of the 707, 727, DC-9 days of old finding themselves in similar situations
.. the history books say otherwise - there has been the odd case of aircraft landing on fumes and having engine(s) flame out during the rollout - I can recall a few such events from my time in Oz airlines. [ days of old, indeed .. but these were "real" aeroplanes ..]
The situation in Oz (and, I have no doubt, in many other countries) is that several airports can be a tad unpredictable with fog and it is a little disconcerting to be on base/final and watch the vis disappear rapidly as the OAT drops that last fraction of a degree .. particularly when the forecast didn't give the true story. Sometimes the commander has made a perfectly reasonable call on fuel and, having proceeded past the last PSD, finds Mother Nature conspiring against him/her. Invariably it is easy to criticise from the comfort of one's armchair a week or so later on .. but the reality is that the commander has to assess and make the call .. very occasionally that call, subsequently, may be seen to be suboptimal ...
For the pilot/operator should one
(a) be conservative and always carry a fat contingency allowance ? Means you leave passengers and freight behind sometimes and push down profits overall.
(b) be realistic in systems planning with a sensible and appropriate attention to risk assessment and control ? This infers that pilots place a reasonable level of trust in the airline's systems. Indeed, it is a lemma that different airlines will have slightly different ways of tackling the problem. It follows, also, that the Regulator must maintain an appropriate oversight of those systems and practices.
(c) leave it to the pilot's tactical planning decision making so that one doesn't need a system planning novel to cover all the ins and outs ? A slightly different gameplan sees (b) and (c) working in concert.
(d) hide one's head in the sand and hope the occasionally inevitable doesn't happen ?
May I be so bold as to suggest that (a) and (d) are a bit outmoded and/or unacceptable ?
If one can propose that the middle field be adopted, then I think that would be the approach seen generally in the Industry.
However, as with life generally, it is not a matter of guarantees; rather probabilities. There are risks associated with every strategy .. the secret is getting a good mix of benefit/risk. After the event Monday morning quarterbacking is fine for refining the system and protocols but none of us has that elusive crystal ball which allows us to get it totally "right" in advance.
.. the history books say otherwise - there has been the odd case of aircraft landing on fumes and having engine(s) flame out during the rollout - I can recall a few such events from my time in Oz airlines. [ days of old, indeed .. but these were "real" aeroplanes ..]
The situation in Oz (and, I have no doubt, in many other countries) is that several airports can be a tad unpredictable with fog and it is a little disconcerting to be on base/final and watch the vis disappear rapidly as the OAT drops that last fraction of a degree .. particularly when the forecast didn't give the true story. Sometimes the commander has made a perfectly reasonable call on fuel and, having proceeded past the last PSD, finds Mother Nature conspiring against him/her. Invariably it is easy to criticise from the comfort of one's armchair a week or so later on .. but the reality is that the commander has to assess and make the call .. very occasionally that call, subsequently, may be seen to be suboptimal ...
For the pilot/operator should one
(a) be conservative and always carry a fat contingency allowance ? Means you leave passengers and freight behind sometimes and push down profits overall.
(b) be realistic in systems planning with a sensible and appropriate attention to risk assessment and control ? This infers that pilots place a reasonable level of trust in the airline's systems. Indeed, it is a lemma that different airlines will have slightly different ways of tackling the problem. It follows, also, that the Regulator must maintain an appropriate oversight of those systems and practices.
(c) leave it to the pilot's tactical planning decision making so that one doesn't need a system planning novel to cover all the ins and outs ? A slightly different gameplan sees (b) and (c) working in concert.
(d) hide one's head in the sand and hope the occasionally inevitable doesn't happen ?
May I be so bold as to suggest that (a) and (d) are a bit outmoded and/or unacceptable ?
If one can propose that the middle field be adopted, then I think that would be the approach seen generally in the Industry.
However, as with life generally, it is not a matter of guarantees; rather probabilities. There are risks associated with every strategy .. the secret is getting a good mix of benefit/risk. After the event Monday morning quarterbacking is fine for refining the system and protocols but none of us has that elusive crystal ball which allows us to get it totally "right" in advance.
This is all about poor forecasting, pure and simple. Had this involved a 146 or any other of the myriad types that use Perth without autoland and YPEA also clamped, things could have been very different.
Captains can use commonsense and all the resources in the world, but if the forecast is wrong?
I hope the forecasters learn a good lesson from this, and/or QF puts a fuel-permitting alternate on Perth for dark arrivals, just as MMA had on YPPD and YPKA in the 70s because of the possibility of unforecast fog...
Captains can use commonsense and all the resources in the world, but if the forecast is wrong?
I hope the forecasters learn a good lesson from this, and/or QF puts a fuel-permitting alternate on Perth for dark arrivals, just as MMA had on YPPD and YPKA in the 70s because of the possibility of unforecast fog...
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Had this involved a 146 or any other of the myriad types that use Perth without autoland and YPEA also clamped, things could have been very different.
Brian Abraham summed it up in his second last sentence !
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John, about the only argument we have is the definition of a real aeroplane. Mine is one that has an engine that spits, belches, smokes, f*rts and can otherwise misbehave in polite company.
Given the past incidents you relate and given that forecasting is 50% science and 50% art do you not think that Perth may be deserving of a more conservative policy than that seemingly in use - payload and profit not withstanding, it becomes part of the cost of doing business. As people have found you can drive through a red light and get away with it for only so long before you find yourself at best embarrassed or worse dead. Have we reached the point of embarrassment? Getting something wrong now and again is human nature. Allowing that error to create a calamitous
accident chain is bad risk management. The shame of it all seems as ShockWave puts it "There is also a huge amount of pressure on crews to carry less fuel" There ought to be no pressure or having to explain in writing to the CP why you elected to load extra. Who takes the wrap after all if things don’t go as well as one hoped. I'm reminded of a quote,
Career flying is an uptight, stressful occupation. Laymen have little conception of the pressures under which a professional works. His work is regulated to the point of absurdity by non flying management and federal officials who pretend to understand flying better than he does. He carries a thick book of rules so confusing even its authors can’t explain them. In effect, a committee of deskbound experts ride with him on every trip, instructing, admonishing, warning, watching – until there’s a problem.Then all fingers are pointed at him.
Tried 0/0 Jack in the sim for the machine I flew which drifted over the fence at a leisurely 70 knots and is not one I'd wish to repeat for real, although when in the navy we used to practise GCA's to touchdown using the navy no flare method of landing, which of course the aircraft were built to take.
Given the past incidents you relate and given that forecasting is 50% science and 50% art do you not think that Perth may be deserving of a more conservative policy than that seemingly in use - payload and profit not withstanding, it becomes part of the cost of doing business. As people have found you can drive through a red light and get away with it for only so long before you find yourself at best embarrassed or worse dead. Have we reached the point of embarrassment? Getting something wrong now and again is human nature. Allowing that error to create a calamitous
accident chain is bad risk management. The shame of it all seems as ShockWave puts it "There is also a huge amount of pressure on crews to carry less fuel" There ought to be no pressure or having to explain in writing to the CP why you elected to load extra. Who takes the wrap after all if things don’t go as well as one hoped. I'm reminded of a quote,
Career flying is an uptight, stressful occupation. Laymen have little conception of the pressures under which a professional works. His work is regulated to the point of absurdity by non flying management and federal officials who pretend to understand flying better than he does. He carries a thick book of rules so confusing even its authors can’t explain them. In effect, a committee of deskbound experts ride with him on every trip, instructing, admonishing, warning, watching – until there’s a problem.Then all fingers are pointed at him.
Next time you're in your 146 sim, get the instructor to set the viz to 100 metres and fly the ILS manually until you see the runway lights. You may be surprised.
Career flying is an uptight, stressful occupation. Laymen have little conception of the pressures under which a professional works. His work is regulated to the point of absurdity by non flying management and federal officials who pretend to understand flying better than he does. He carries a thick book of rules so confusing even its authors can’t explain them. In effect, a committee of deskbound experts ride with him on every trip, instructing, admonishing, warning, watching – until there’s a problem.Then all fingers are pointed at him.