Tire failure V1-5KTS,GO!
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Somebody once taught me that flying, in particular, is where Murphy's Laws are ignored at your peril...
.... If it can possibly go wrong - be ready for it to happen when you least expect it.
This is a great question and this thread shows the ambiguity that can arise. Sat at a PC, we've got oodles of time to discuss it too!!!
Shows what pprune can do!
I would like to add the Air France Concorde crash of Jul 2000 to the debate. A report I heard (assuming it was correct for the purposes of this discussion) said that the Concorde crew were informed of fire by ATC and responded that they knew, but had already committed to getting airborne. (Past V1?) Sadly, blessed with the benefit of hindsight, we know the result of that decision. If your decision allows you to walk away from a catastrophic failure such as this, then it could be argued (again, in hindsight) that your actions were correct. Ultimately, it might just have been the case that an abort, however hazardous, may have had a different outcome. Your problem may compound itself if you get airborne with a disintegrating tyre.
I am sure this crew handled the emergency they were faced with in an exemplary manner and may sadly have had never had a chance. I don't know all the facts.
However, I think V1 is an important event marker - nothing more. The Captain of the ac will ultimately have to make a go/no-go decision based on all the info he has available to him. A well trained and switched-on Pilot can assimilate a lot of info in a very short period. I guess we all hope for clear cut situations - of course life isn't always that generous.
In the scenario given, I think the 25 knots that is effectively all on the nose will help the abort case. (But not in terms of ease of control). Also, as mentioned, your climb gradient will be completely blown with your gear down. I'm sure the initial scenario had a 200' cloud base - so a visual circuit is out. So you'd have to tailor your decision to the surrounding terrain as well.
Finally, I hope we can all have these considerations worked out before the throttles are pushed up, and long before V1.....
.... If it can possibly go wrong - be ready for it to happen when you least expect it.
This is a great question and this thread shows the ambiguity that can arise. Sat at a PC, we've got oodles of time to discuss it too!!!
Shows what pprune can do!
I would like to add the Air France Concorde crash of Jul 2000 to the debate. A report I heard (assuming it was correct for the purposes of this discussion) said that the Concorde crew were informed of fire by ATC and responded that they knew, but had already committed to getting airborne. (Past V1?) Sadly, blessed with the benefit of hindsight, we know the result of that decision. If your decision allows you to walk away from a catastrophic failure such as this, then it could be argued (again, in hindsight) that your actions were correct. Ultimately, it might just have been the case that an abort, however hazardous, may have had a different outcome. Your problem may compound itself if you get airborne with a disintegrating tyre.
I am sure this crew handled the emergency they were faced with in an exemplary manner and may sadly have had never had a chance. I don't know all the facts.
However, I think V1 is an important event marker - nothing more. The Captain of the ac will ultimately have to make a go/no-go decision based on all the info he has available to him. A well trained and switched-on Pilot can assimilate a lot of info in a very short period. I guess we all hope for clear cut situations - of course life isn't always that generous.
In the scenario given, I think the 25 knots that is effectively all on the nose will help the abort case. (But not in terms of ease of control). Also, as mentioned, your climb gradient will be completely blown with your gear down. I'm sure the initial scenario had a 200' cloud base - so a visual circuit is out. So you'd have to tailor your decision to the surrounding terrain as well.
Finally, I hope we can all have these considerations worked out before the throttles are pushed up, and long before V1.....
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The ASDR must be enough to allow both an all engines stop from V1 and an engine out stop. Thus V1, although based on the concept of engine failure, could easily be said to cover more than just the engine failure case.
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Quite why one would RTO for a burst tyre at V1 -5kts is beyond me, and a decision to reject at that speed with a limiting V1 is likely to result in a very interesting 30 seconds which will probably end up with a rather muddy aircraft.
The Concorde analogy is not really relevant here. Yes they had a catastrophic failure of a tyre, but the subsequent events still seem to have a question mark hanging over them, and the conspiracy theorists would have you believe if they didn't rotate they'd be into the side of an AF 744 with even more catastrophic results.
The Concorde analogy is not really relevant here. Yes they had a catastrophic failure of a tyre, but the subsequent events still seem to have a question mark hanging over them, and the conspiracy theorists would have you believe if they didn't rotate they'd be into the side of an AF 744 with even more catastrophic results.
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The thing which concerns me with this discussion is the inference that such matters ought to be dealt with in a black and white manner and that such an approach is philosophically sound.
In the (typically training) environment, this is a reasonable construct and is useful for the training function.
However, in the real world, life is all about statistics and backing the horse most likely to run first. Doesn't mean that one always is on the money but, overall, one is likely to end up in front.
SOPs are based on this philosophy with the goal of having a win most (in the case of aviation, this means to a very high probability) of the time.
We can easily come up with f'instances of where a non-SOP approach could have (would have ?) saved the day. The Concorde crash is a most suitable such example.
However, SOP cannot be predicated on a very low probability exception to a generally observed "rule".
There are risks associated with aviation, just like with life in general, and, on occasion, a few of us are going to be caught out by a risk coming in on long odds. It is tragic when the result is catastrophic but that is the reality of the certification basis for aircraft ... it doesn't revolve around guarantees, only low risk probabilities.
Therefore, SOPs are based on the general rule(s) rather than the exception. On the infrequent occasions where something comes in out of left field, the outcome may be problematic. Sometimes the result is catastrophic (eg Concorde, O'Hare) .. sometimes the crew can pull off a miracle (eg Sioux City).
In the (typically training) environment, this is a reasonable construct and is useful for the training function.
However, in the real world, life is all about statistics and backing the horse most likely to run first. Doesn't mean that one always is on the money but, overall, one is likely to end up in front.
SOPs are based on this philosophy with the goal of having a win most (in the case of aviation, this means to a very high probability) of the time.
We can easily come up with f'instances of where a non-SOP approach could have (would have ?) saved the day. The Concorde crash is a most suitable such example.
However, SOP cannot be predicated on a very low probability exception to a generally observed "rule".
There are risks associated with aviation, just like with life in general, and, on occasion, a few of us are going to be caught out by a risk coming in on long odds. It is tragic when the result is catastrophic but that is the reality of the certification basis for aircraft ... it doesn't revolve around guarantees, only low risk probabilities.
Therefore, SOPs are based on the general rule(s) rather than the exception. On the infrequent occasions where something comes in out of left field, the outcome may be problematic. Sometimes the result is catastrophic (eg Concorde, O'Hare) .. sometimes the crew can pull off a miracle (eg Sioux City).
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Hand S. I'm sorry but I cannot see how you can argue that the Concorde analogy is irrelevant and then throw a "conspiracy theory" into the thread????
John T is wise to draw our attention to a black and white world or perhaps a blind obedience of SOP's. Whilst I would not for a second wish to suggest operating outside these fundamental guidelines. Life is just not always like that.
There is nothing in the SOP to suggest holding an ac down on the runway beyond Vr to pass under a (Very) large bird for example...
I think it is important to consider as many scenarios as possible in training. Hypothetical problems can also be discussed, as we are doing here, so that if (or when) something does come out of the left field, that we give ourselves the best possible chance of resolving it safely.
I hope the Concorde example was not just an obvious "well I wouldn't have done it like that". More a contribution of possible considerations.
John T is wise to draw our attention to a black and white world or perhaps a blind obedience of SOP's. Whilst I would not for a second wish to suggest operating outside these fundamental guidelines. Life is just not always like that.
There is nothing in the SOP to suggest holding an ac down on the runway beyond Vr to pass under a (Very) large bird for example...
I think it is important to consider as many scenarios as possible in training. Hypothetical problems can also be discussed, as we are doing here, so that if (or when) something does come out of the left field, that we give ourselves the best possible chance of resolving it safely.
I hope the Concorde example was not just an obvious "well I wouldn't have done it like that". More a contribution of possible considerations.
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Indie - the tyre failure may or may not have done for Concorde. There is a strong school of thought that says if the Flight Eng hadn't shut down an engine without telling anybody they might have had sufficient thrust and hydraulic power to make Le Bourget. Using the Concorde crash as a justification for rejecting a take off for a burst tyre ignores the myriad other factors involved in the crash.
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I like the thought put to me by a very experienced and respected management checkie during a line check on the old Boeing three-holer many years ago ... "Lad", he suggested, "Lad, the Ops Manual omits a very important note on page one .. and that is to read it with a modicum of commonsense ...". Eventually, experience taught me the meaning of his words .. viz., if things are going fine, then one ought to stick with the words of wisdom to minimise angst and excitement .. but, when it gets decidedly pear shaped, there may be a reasonable need to be innovative to the extent necessary to fill in the gaps in the SOPs on the occasion .. seemed a pretty reasonable philosophy to me. It also follows that
(a) a well developed general and specific technical knowledge
(b) a high level of manipulative skill, and
(c) a cool head ...
can help out at such times ... I commend to your reading the example of the crew on United 232 some years ago at Sioux City as a singular example of these matters ...
As an aside, this chap was quite remarkable .. an exceptionally capable pilot, gifted musician, near photographic memory recall .. etc., etc. .. and a thoroughly pleasant and affable sort of joker. The sort of fellow who made not a bad role model for young chaps coming up through the ranks.
(a) a well developed general and specific technical knowledge
(b) a high level of manipulative skill, and
(c) a cool head ...
can help out at such times ... I commend to your reading the example of the crew on United 232 some years ago at Sioux City as a singular example of these matters ...
As an aside, this chap was quite remarkable .. an exceptionally capable pilot, gifted musician, near photographic memory recall .. etc., etc. .. and a thoroughly pleasant and affable sort of joker. The sort of fellow who made not a bad role model for young chaps coming up through the ranks.
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United 232
" There are five important factors that contributed to the degree of success that occured during the events that led to our landing at Sioux Gateway Airport: luck,communications, preparation, execution and cooperation." Captain Al Haynes
For example, the DC-10 in Vancouver that rejected after V1 for a compressor stall. It has to sound bad for an experienced well trained crew to reject after V1.
I saw the report but do not know the full story, on that one.
For example, the DC-10 in Vancouver that rejected after V1 for a compressor stall. It has to sound bad for an experienced well trained crew to reject after V1.
I saw the report but do not know the full story, on that one.
Last edited by Perseverando88; 5th Apr 2006 at 18:34.
P88:
This has all been discussed before on a previous thread. The DC-10-30 that abandoned take-off just after V1 because of a simple tyre burst belonged to Spantax and the fatal accident took place at Malaga.
Tyres do burst from time to time and they cause a lot of noise and vibration.
As I said on the previous thread, I am one of very few pilots who has suffered the loss of all 16 mainwheel tyres on landing due to a bizarre technical fault, I have never ever again worried about losing the odd tyre.
Certainly you should keep going. Once you shut the throttles then you have no further options. Get airborne and you have hundreds of options.
This has all been discussed before on a previous thread. The DC-10-30 that abandoned take-off just after V1 because of a simple tyre burst belonged to Spantax and the fatal accident took place at Malaga.
Tyres do burst from time to time and they cause a lot of noise and vibration.
As I said on the previous thread, I am one of very few pilots who has suffered the loss of all 16 mainwheel tyres on landing due to a bizarre technical fault, I have never ever again worried about losing the odd tyre.
Certainly you should keep going. Once you shut the throttles then you have no further options. Get airborne and you have hundreds of options.
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Originally Posted by The Real Slim Shady
I do apologise for repeating myself,
V1 only relates to an engine failure situation.
Is everyone else ignoring this?
V1 only relates to an engine failure situation.
Is everyone else ignoring this?
But, it also is the ability to STOP for the reasons outlined in all the other posts. You're not saying that you'd abort prior to V1 only for an engine failure?
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Have to disagree with u "slim"...V1 is the speed above which a rejected takeoff for whatever reason within the remaining runway is unlikely to be successful given a balanced field length scenario with blown tire(s) stopping is even more unlikely
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Originally Posted by Junkflyer
At our company it is always the captains decision to abort. Fo should call v1 etc., never stop or abort. A blown tire is not that big a deal just leave the gear down.
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this thread has me thinking of one time when an RTO incident at TEB after Vr and a subsequent crash into a building saved everyone's life. remember that corporate jet Bombardier Challenger???, that was forced into an abort due to an inabililty to rotate? I think in this case the dispatch people lied about the weight and loaded in the plane beyond CoG limits, therefore the stab. setting was incorrect...amazing what money can do, if i have my story straight
. Well, the pilot aborted after Vr ran across a highway and into a building... but if he didn't close those thrust levers and pull RT, he would have been at extreme KE making the crash unsurvivble. After the crash the pax excaped and the Capt and FO were pinned severly injured and covered in Jet A1, but they lived. the point of this, which I think also supports john_tullamarine's and other's here feelings on this issue; is that the lesser of two evils applied; Mr. Murphy was defeated and IMHO sometimes it just left up to God, who at times trumps the SOP's, AFM, AC's, Mr. Boeing, FAA, JAA, CAA..............
. Well, the pilot aborted after Vr ran across a highway and into a building... but if he didn't close those thrust levers and pull RT, he would have been at extreme KE making the crash unsurvivble. After the crash the pax excaped and the Capt and FO were pinned severly injured and covered in Jet A1, but they lived. the point of this, which I think also supports john_tullamarine's and other's here feelings on this issue; is that the lesser of two evils applied; Mr. Murphy was defeated and IMHO sometimes it just left up to God, who at times trumps the SOP's, AFM, AC's, Mr. Boeing, FAA, JAA, CAA..............
Last edited by rhovsquared; 29th Apr 2006 at 15:50.
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Could any one tell me how you recognise a tyre failure at this speed? Any time you try to stop with less than the prescribed number of wheels or brakes you are going to be in no mans land as regards to how long it will take. GO!
