Reversing an engine during Fire Warning operation.
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Moleslayer (and Alf) - I would suggesty that you CAN modify the brief if you feel it enhances safety - in fact that is the Captain's responsibility. To attempt, as PH, to identify a burning engine in minimal vis by looking in would almost certainly result in an excursion, and I need to know BEFORE I stop which way to turn my aircraft, hence PNH should identify the engine. If I am able, I can confirm that, if not, I'll turn as necessary. It is too late when you have stopped straight ahead with a right quarter wind to find out you should have turned to the right!
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I note that Boeing via their FCTM do not offer a recommendation as to the wisdom or otherwise of reversing an engine that is on fire during a rejected take off. One assumes this falls under the captain's authority to use his good judgement. Trouble is that rigid company SOP's tend to inhibit lateral thinking at times...
modify the brief if you feel it enhances safety
There is a subtle difference between a briefing and a SOP. Clearly a brief can modified if you feel it enhances safety; the danger is if the modification infringes a SOP, and then by misperception of a safety threat it could expose the operation to other hazards.
SOPs are ‘Standard’; their strength is that they are (should be) well thought out before flight, judged against a range of threats, and adequately documented. If anyone believes that SOPs could be enhanced or should modified then discuss this with management. It is just as likely that the SOP author has missed a situation or failed to communicate the original intention as any mistake on your part. Thus the industry should encourage individuals to take ‘ownership’ of company SOPs; it is up to the users to aid the authors – communicate all concerns.
Another danger in modifying a briefing or encouraging lateral thinking in ‘standard’ situations is that whilst there are adaptable people who can cope with these changes or a myriad of alternatives, others cannot. Thus unless the briefer is absolutely confident that the changes have been well though through and completely understood then stick with the simple solution. As pilots we are rarely rated against our peers; we do not have a good understanding of how other pilots perceive risk, understand briefings, or indeed how they think. Pilots who have been ‘rated’ are often those involved an incident or accident.
The mitigation of a safety threat often depends on how it is perceived. If a student pilot has been taught that an engine fire is doom, death, etc, and warrants urgent action, then it may be very difficult to change that perception later in life. Often quoted is ‘Train for the threat’; less often are accurate definitions of the threat.
It is very beneficial to discuss use of reverse following a fire warning and the benefits of turning into wind, but the discussion must put many other aspects into context. Thus with a fire warning and RTO what is the dominant threat, what are the consequential threats? Is the warning real? (In my book all warnings are real, only the engineers can tell you afterwards). Are there flames or is it a hot air leak? Is there a fuel leak? Did the warning cease after shut down, was this a cure or did the system burnt through? (Design requirements require a degree of containment of both engine parts and fire within the cowling).
Where so many imponderables exist, one should stay with the known facts, the basics: - there has been a warning; stop: drills: decision to evacuate. Remember the fatalities at MAN were due to smoke not flames; thus a quick evacuation is a high priority.
We are required to take the safest option, but where we do not have the facts, time or thinking resource to fully evaluate the situation, then don’t guess, don’t prejudge. However, come the day and you do have the facts and time then turn into wind on the runway, but then the facts about the wind and turn direction should be known before you roll.
SOPs are ‘Standard’; their strength is that they are (should be) well thought out before flight, judged against a range of threats, and adequately documented. If anyone believes that SOPs could be enhanced or should modified then discuss this with management. It is just as likely that the SOP author has missed a situation or failed to communicate the original intention as any mistake on your part. Thus the industry should encourage individuals to take ‘ownership’ of company SOPs; it is up to the users to aid the authors – communicate all concerns.
Another danger in modifying a briefing or encouraging lateral thinking in ‘standard’ situations is that whilst there are adaptable people who can cope with these changes or a myriad of alternatives, others cannot. Thus unless the briefer is absolutely confident that the changes have been well though through and completely understood then stick with the simple solution. As pilots we are rarely rated against our peers; we do not have a good understanding of how other pilots perceive risk, understand briefings, or indeed how they think. Pilots who have been ‘rated’ are often those involved an incident or accident.
The mitigation of a safety threat often depends on how it is perceived. If a student pilot has been taught that an engine fire is doom, death, etc, and warrants urgent action, then it may be very difficult to change that perception later in life. Often quoted is ‘Train for the threat’; less often are accurate definitions of the threat.
It is very beneficial to discuss use of reverse following a fire warning and the benefits of turning into wind, but the discussion must put many other aspects into context. Thus with a fire warning and RTO what is the dominant threat, what are the consequential threats? Is the warning real? (In my book all warnings are real, only the engineers can tell you afterwards). Are there flames or is it a hot air leak? Is there a fuel leak? Did the warning cease after shut down, was this a cure or did the system burnt through? (Design requirements require a degree of containment of both engine parts and fire within the cowling).
Where so many imponderables exist, one should stay with the known facts, the basics: - there has been a warning; stop: drills: decision to evacuate. Remember the fatalities at MAN were due to smoke not flames; thus a quick evacuation is a high priority.
We are required to take the safest option, but where we do not have the facts, time or thinking resource to fully evaluate the situation, then don’t guess, don’t prejudge. However, come the day and you do have the facts and time then turn into wind on the runway, but then the facts about the wind and turn direction should be known before you roll.
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I have to agree with everything that alf has posted. I would not encourage anyone to go against their company SOP's, and I have never advocated that.
As he says, it is up to the individual to commit himself to ownership of his company's procedures and training. Perceived wisdom changes continually, and it is also incumbent on the individual to keep himself appraised of what developments occur in the industry - this is all part of professionalism.
Particularly in view of the Manchester 737 fire, making a turn on the runway as you come to a halt is now an accepted method of reducing the danger to the aircraft and its occupants and slowing the effects of a fire.
Furthermore, if you are going to order an evacuation, you need to know which side to order it, since you will want to keep passengers away from the blaze as they evacuate upwind.
I don't see much problem in PNF, after calling "STOP, STOP, STOP", as the PF brings the aircraft to a gradual stop (aborting from 100+ kts takes a while) identifying which side the purported fire is on and advising the PF accordingly. Since the turn will have been included in the brief, nothing will come as a surprise to anyone and the requisite PA call can be made without further consultation and clarification and everyone is in the loop.
Not to make such a turn is, IMHO, failing to learn from the past.
As for the subject of using reverse, well, that's a call only the man on the spot can make. Aircraft performance manuals state, of course, that the aircraft brakes alone will bring the aircraft to a stop within the distance available, and the editor's decision on that is final
so reverse should not be necessary. If I had heard a loud bang out one side followed by other nasty noises from the general direction of the engine, followed by the flight deck lighting up like a Christmas Tree and further bells and whistles, I would be reluctant to use reverse much, if at all. But as I say, it's a call only the man on the spot can make.
As he says, it is up to the individual to commit himself to ownership of his company's procedures and training. Perceived wisdom changes continually, and it is also incumbent on the individual to keep himself appraised of what developments occur in the industry - this is all part of professionalism.
Particularly in view of the Manchester 737 fire, making a turn on the runway as you come to a halt is now an accepted method of reducing the danger to the aircraft and its occupants and slowing the effects of a fire.
Furthermore, if you are going to order an evacuation, you need to know which side to order it, since you will want to keep passengers away from the blaze as they evacuate upwind.
I don't see much problem in PNF, after calling "STOP, STOP, STOP", as the PF brings the aircraft to a gradual stop (aborting from 100+ kts takes a while) identifying which side the purported fire is on and advising the PF accordingly. Since the turn will have been included in the brief, nothing will come as a surprise to anyone and the requisite PA call can be made without further consultation and clarification and everyone is in the loop.
Not to make such a turn is, IMHO, failing to learn from the past.
As for the subject of using reverse, well, that's a call only the man on the spot can make. Aircraft performance manuals state, of course, that the aircraft brakes alone will bring the aircraft to a stop within the distance available, and the editor's decision on that is final
so reverse should not be necessary. If I had heard a loud bang out one side followed by other nasty noises from the general direction of the engine, followed by the flight deck lighting up like a Christmas Tree and further bells and whistles, I would be reluctant to use reverse much, if at all. But as I say, it's a call only the man on the spot can make.
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Hudson - The Boeing manuals can be particularly vague in certain areas! This is not the way the Boeing pilots and engineers would have it but the way of the Product Liability lawyers. In 1983 the product liability premium for Boeing was USD$50,000,000 and for UTC, (which includes Pratt & Whitney), $250,000,000 so you can imagine how much it would be to-day!
I think that if I heard a big bang I might consider not using reverse on the engine with the fire but if it was just a fire warning then I think I would use it to speed up coming to a halt.
I think that if I heard a big bang I might consider not using reverse on the engine with the fire but if it was just a fire warning then I think I would use it to speed up coming to a halt.
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Blue Eagle says: "...I think that if I heard a big bang I might consider not using reverse on the engine with the fire..."
The application of measured reverse thrust and the amount of brake pressure applied during an abort are foremost based on instinctive reactions rather than upon thought processed responses. For example, if the airplane is aborted at V1 at maximum takeoff weight on a wet, short runway there is no time to think. Speed, brake action, momentum and rate of closure with the end of the pavement would override any concerns about engine fire or about "hearing a big bang."
The application of measured reverse thrust and the amount of brake pressure applied during an abort are foremost based on instinctive reactions rather than upon thought processed responses. For example, if the airplane is aborted at V1 at maximum takeoff weight on a wet, short runway there is no time to think. Speed, brake action, momentum and rate of closure with the end of the pavement would override any concerns about engine fire or about "hearing a big bang."
Experiences that we would not wish to have
A ‘thinking’ Blue Eagle would not necessarily know where the ‘bang’ during takeoff originated. Therefore it would be unwise to prejudge an engine failure – on one side or the other, not knowing which, and then not use reverse or only asymmetric reverse; to realize afterwards that the ‘bang’ was a tyre failure where all available stopping effort may be required.
This is the core point of my previous post – don’t prejudge the situation; if you have decided to reject a take off follow that procedure without modification. There have been many accidents where the crew’s perception has failed them; good example comes from the DC 10 overrun, although the reject was erroneously after V1.
Here are some relevant extracts from the accident report:
In support of GlueBall’s post, I heard the Captains description of the above event first hand; similarly after interviewing other pilots who have experienced severe in flight events; it is my conclusion that that the level stress in this type of incident narrows the though process to such a degree that most rational thought is not possible, only the deep-seated / inbred responses such as an RTO procedure remain. This can be mitigated in part through training (hence wise use of the simulator) and with experience, but these are the sort of experiences that we would not wish to have.
This is the core point of my previous post – don’t prejudge the situation; if you have decided to reject a take off follow that procedure without modification. There have been many accidents where the crew’s perception has failed them; good example comes from the DC 10 overrun, although the reject was erroneously after V1.
Here are some relevant extracts from the accident report:
All the members of the flight crew reported that the sound was unlike anything they had heard before. Not only was the bang very loud, but it was difficult to specify its point of origin. None of the crew saw the engine fail light illuminate, nor did they notice the drop in N1. The only cue the captain received to indicate that the take-off was no longer normal was the loud bang, followed by a series of thuds and vibrations. Because the situation did not match any of the captain's previous training or actual flying experience, he was required to respond instantly to the situation by drawing on whatever knowledge or other experience he had. The captain's decision to reject the take-off was based on his perception of the circumstances.
the loud bang was neither similar to any compressor stall symptom that he knew about, nor similar to sounds that he had heard in training or experienced during actual flying.
his action was probably also influenced by the fatal DC8 occurrence that he had witnessed and which resulted in his mental rule of thumb that if structural failure were suspected, he would not take the aircraft into the air.
the loud bang was neither similar to any compressor stall symptom that he knew about, nor similar to sounds that he had heard in training or experienced during actual flying.
his action was probably also influenced by the fatal DC8 occurrence that he had witnessed and which resulted in his mental rule of thumb that if structural failure were suspected, he would not take the aircraft into the air.
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Gentlemen, please note, I said think and deliberately put it in italics! I haven't been there so can only guess at my reaction but perhaps I should have said "........accompanied by some very
obvious engine indications".
And yes, I agree, instinctive reaction will be to select all four and then de-select the 'broken' one and it's opposite number.
obvious engine indications".
And yes, I agree, instinctive reaction will be to select all four and then de-select the 'broken' one and it's opposite number.
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You're entitiled to your opinion forget, but the AAIB spent months even years investigating the facts of the accident and are not afraid to come up with controversial findings (such as there ongoing battle to fit smokehoods in all cabins). Who are you to sit there and dismiss their findings and pass judgement based on only a rudimentary knowledge of the facts?
I think there have been some other very good posts on this topic and I think RTOs are one of the most emotive topics becaus it is the one instance in an airline pilots job where an instant decision is required in about 1 sec (a 2 sec delay causes a 400ft over-run!), often under great stress and fear (see alf's post). There is no time for discussion, thought, reflection, review. Its go / no go. That's why the SOPs are written and why V1 is so important.
As someone said, if you here a loud bang from one side it could be all the tyres exploding, in which case the brakes are not going to stop you before you go off the end of the runway. All engines in reverse will be a big help in this case.
The Boeing FCTM states :
"Simultaneously close the thrust levers and apply max brakes....Rapidly raise the speedbrakes and apply max reverse thrust consistent with the conditions". Maintain reverse thrust and braking until runway length remaining permits transition to normal landing roll procedure".
Where it says 'consistent with the conditions' I take this to mean runway and crosswind conditions (ie on a slippery runway and strong crosswind directional control may not be able to be maintained with full reverse).
I think there have been some other very good posts on this topic and I think RTOs are one of the most emotive topics becaus it is the one instance in an airline pilots job where an instant decision is required in about 1 sec (a 2 sec delay causes a 400ft over-run!), often under great stress and fear (see alf's post). There is no time for discussion, thought, reflection, review. Its go / no go. That's why the SOPs are written and why V1 is so important.
As someone said, if you here a loud bang from one side it could be all the tyres exploding, in which case the brakes are not going to stop you before you go off the end of the runway. All engines in reverse will be a big help in this case.
The Boeing FCTM states :
"Simultaneously close the thrust levers and apply max brakes....Rapidly raise the speedbrakes and apply max reverse thrust consistent with the conditions". Maintain reverse thrust and braking until runway length remaining permits transition to normal landing roll procedure".
Where it says 'consistent with the conditions' I take this to mean runway and crosswind conditions (ie on a slippery runway and strong crosswind directional control may not be able to be maintained with full reverse).
Quote from The FAA Take Off Training Guide (endorsed by Boeing): “Basically, full brakes must be applied, the thrust must come to idle, the speedbrakes/spoilers must be raised and maximum reverse thrust consistent with airplane controllability must be applied until the crew is assured that the airplane will stop within the remaining runway.” (Appx 3c - viewfoils)
Extracts and the viewfoils from the Training Guide are here: Take Off Training Guide.
Extracts and the viewfoils from the Training Guide are here: Take Off Training Guide.
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Wind impact on fire fighting
Hello;
I am a Fire Officer working in Canada. Your post is very interesting. It is critical for the pilot, when able, to stop and position his (her) aicraft into the wind when the aircraft might be threatened by an outside fire. It is one of the most important factor that could ensure the occupants survivability. By doing so the flames and smoke will pushed towards the back of the aircraft freeing exits (at least front and over wing ones) and keeping flames away from the skin of the aircraft. It allows the foam stream from the ARFF vehicles to carry the product further and to be more effective. Also it makes our job easier because it allows us not to push the fire towards the fuselage (foam stream displaces huge volumes of air - 10000 cubic feet / min) and the stream will be applied lengthwise in relation to the aircraft.
Some airports would like you to vacate the runway asap to keep business running but often it is not in your best interest. I strongly suggest that you take the time to meet your friendly airport fire fighters from time to time and discuss these issues further.
Good Day.
I am a Fire Officer working in Canada. Your post is very interesting. It is critical for the pilot, when able, to stop and position his (her) aicraft into the wind when the aircraft might be threatened by an outside fire. It is one of the most important factor that could ensure the occupants survivability. By doing so the flames and smoke will pushed towards the back of the aircraft freeing exits (at least front and over wing ones) and keeping flames away from the skin of the aircraft. It allows the foam stream from the ARFF vehicles to carry the product further and to be more effective. Also it makes our job easier because it allows us not to push the fire towards the fuselage (foam stream displaces huge volumes of air - 10000 cubic feet / min) and the stream will be applied lengthwise in relation to the aircraft.
Some airports would like you to vacate the runway asap to keep business running but often it is not in your best interest. I strongly suggest that you take the time to meet your friendly airport fire fighters from time to time and discuss these issues further.
Good Day.
