A ‘thinking’
Blue Eagle would not necessarily know where the ‘bang’ during takeoff originated. Therefore it would be unwise to prejudge an engine failure – on one side or the other, not knowing which, and then not use reverse or only asymmetric reverse; to realize afterwards that the ‘bang’ was a tyre failure where all available stopping effort may be required.
This is the core point of my previous post – don’t prejudge the situation; if you have decided to reject a take off follow that procedure without modification. There have been many accidents where the crew’s perception has failed them; good example comes from the
DC 10 overrun, although the reject was erroneously after V1.
Here are some relevant extracts from the accident report:
All the members of the flight crew reported that the sound was unlike anything they had heard before. Not only was the bang very loud, but it was difficult to specify its point of origin. None of the crew saw the engine fail light illuminate, nor did they notice the drop in N1. The only cue the captain received to indicate that the take-off was no longer normal was the loud bang, followed by a series of thuds and vibrations. Because the situation did not match any of the captain's previous training or actual flying experience, he was required to respond instantly to the situation by drawing on whatever knowledge or other experience he had. The captain's decision to reject the take-off was based on his perception of the circumstances.
the loud bang was neither similar to any compressor stall symptom that he knew about, nor similar to sounds that he had heard in training or experienced during actual flying.
his action was probably also influenced by the fatal DC8 occurrence that he had witnessed and which resulted in his mental rule of thumb that if structural failure were suspected, he would not take the aircraft into the air.
In support of
GlueBall’s post, I heard the Captains description of the above event first hand; similarly after interviewing other pilots who have experienced severe in flight events; it is my conclusion that that the level stress in this type of incident narrows the though process to such a degree that most rational thought is not possible, only the deep-seated / inbred responses such as an RTO procedure remain. This can be mitigated in part through training (hence wise use of the simulator) and with experience, but these are the sort of experiences that we would not wish to have.