Small point to note whether doing "the soft-shoe shuffle", "one man band", "single pilot IFR" or any combination/extrapolation thereoff http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/confused.gif:
On any aircraft which has to have the FD fed with info in order to present sensible demands when flying with autopilot disconnected, the non-handling (at the time) pilot has the additional workload of data and mode selection in addition to RT.
This applies whether using the BA or any other system and may not be the safest way to operate the a/c in a busy terminal area.

Never ever presented problem so far!

The only time it presents a problem is if you happen to have worked for any length of time for someone else.
Then it can be most confusing - change for the sake of change.
I'm sure someone, once in high places, had the need to make a name for himself.

;) :rolleyes: ;)

If BA SOPs were that bad, then surely the Campaign Against Aviation wouldn't have approved them.

Statistically, there is less chance of a go around due to no visual reference using the monitored approach.

We're not allowed to keep one set of flight directors on in the ***bus! They're both on or both off, just in case the 'aeroplane' decides to throw a wobbly.

As with most large corporations, BA have adopted the N.I.H. syndrome, which is now part of their corporate culture, and not just SOP's. "Not Invented Here" is simply a myopia to other companies' way of doing things, even in this extreme case where the a/c manufacturers have developed their SOP's in line with the a/c development.

Within BA, There are many other such NIH examples, but it is not really kind to label the company as Blindly Arrogant, so let's leave them to get on with it themselves.

BA must surely have considered the legal/litigation consequences of an accident occurring during their operations whilst following SOP's not standard or recommended by the maker of the a/c. ??

Everytime this tiresome topic rears its ugly head on these pages, I like to offer just one thought:

statistically speaking, a 'BA style' monitored approach is less likely to result in Controlled Flight into Terrain - regardless of weather conditions.

This is surely reason in its self to fly approaches in this way every single time.

As pilots, can anyone disagree with this logic ?



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"After V1, we'll take the emergency into the air - You call 'Positive Climb' and I'll ask for the gear up. We'll climb away at V2 +15"

Positive Climb:

Being largely unaware of the finer points of monitored approaches perhaps you'd like to explain to the uninitiated why it is any less likely to result in a CFIT. Do you perhaps, mistakenly, think that every other airline's non-handling-non-flying pilot sits and catches up with his/her embroidery whilst the descent and approach is flown?

I seem to remember a famous case study, which I'm sure BA bring up often in their CRM courses, of a jumbo going into Nairobi which touched down almost ten miles before the threshhold due to the QNH being mis-set and not picked up by either of the three crew! What I can't remember is the actual date of this ocurrence and so am willing to wear women's underwear and walk like a chicken for a week if it was pre-BA SOPs. No fatalities, admittedly.

Secret squirrel,

This thread is discussing why B.A. chooses to operate in a different manner to the majority of other airlines. I merely drew attention to one of the more important reasons behind it. It is up to each individual to make up their own mind as to the merits of either method. My point was that there are good reasons why BA operates in this way and it is not done 'just to be different' as has been suggested on this thread.
As for the example you cited - I feel you have somewhat over-simplified it as there were several other more complex environmental factors involved in the chain of events leading to that incident.
No one here believes for a minute that flying an approach in a particular way will eliminate the risk of CFIT fully, but if this method has been proven to lessen the liklihood of it, then surely it has a proven worth ?

Regards,

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"After V1, we'll take the emergency into the air - You call 'Positive Climb' and I'll ask for the gear up. We'll climb away at V2 +15"

CAT 1 only ILS at SVO in January RVR 800m Overcast at 60M. Helped us get in safely using monitored approach.
If none of you, who operate in the 'Non-BA Sphere', have ever looked up at '50 above' DH and not seen a sausage, looked back in ...errr.. it's now DH...look out...err ....LAND. Then you have to admit that on that occasion you probably operated the aircraft outside its limits.

BA SOP's rid the crew of that grey area and consequently can only promote a safer environment at that critical stage during the final approach.

At all other times it can seem unnecessary, but had we not had that SOP at SVO earlier this year we would have had an unscheduled nightstop in HEL.

My My Magnus!! very eloquent

So is a SVO nighstop not Hell?
( or is it Hell in HEL )

CAT 2 on the ATP ( manual ldg) would have been impossible without the monitored approach !

cheers

SS,
There's a grain of truth in your understanding of the CFIT incident. The 'whole truth' (a difficult animal to find I'll admit) as related by BA contacts is:
1. The aircraft did not fly into the ground but was well on the way to doing so. No GPWS available at that time and when introduced was immediately referred to as the Game Park Warning System :)
2. It was a BOAC flight and they did not use the monitored approach SOP. The Mon App was a BEA SOP and became standard in the newly formed BA.

Although I'm not convinced that use of the monitored approach would reduce the incidence of CFIT incidents I feel that it is a useful final approach tool, particularly during a manual approach to low MDA or when flying a coupled approach to low DA.

Positive Climb
"After V1, we'll take the emergency into the air - You call 'Positive Climb' and I'll ask for the gear up. We'll climb away at V2 +15"

Why V2 +15?
With an engine failure you climb at V2.
It's the only way to get the correct performance if you're Climb Limited.

Whilst I couldn't agree more with the sentiment of "who cares what BA do", I spent 2 years working for a low cost version of BA (which also meant low cost pay - but hey, there you go). For what it's worth, I found the BA SOPs at best odd if not downright bizarre. The idea of the RHS (but PF) doing all the good stuff is fine if he / she can taxy the aircraft (requires a tiller on the right) and if the Captain/PNF can remember what drills/calls he/she is supposed to make at the important times. It was bad enough trying to remember all that stuff - try training ex SQ/CX/GF/EK skippers to do it as I was sometimes tasked to do.

I've been out of that scene for over a year now but I still get funny looks from (PF) F/Os when I grab the reverse thrust during the landing roll. Naturally,when I explain that it was a bad habit learnt from the worlds favourite airline they are eternally grateful for my input :).

Cheers, Scottie.

Go on, SS, do it anyway!

Good spot Silvershadow,

I've been wondering about the logic behind
Positive Climb's signature for ages, just haven't had the time to take him to task on it!

Never mind PC, here's a silly one of my own... :)


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The humble line pilot, having covered its back so often, at last made the first step on the evolutionary ladder that was to eventually become... a tortoise!

SS

The game park incident was some twenty years before the 'change hands' SOP was introduced on the 747 'Classic'.
Could we please have a photo of the chicken walk (not sure about the womens clothing).

Airclues

Whats all the fuss about, I flew the BA procedures for years on the 737. They are just different, now I fly a corporate BBJ and they are different just get on with it.
PS everyhting is easier in the corporate world, less chances of messing up.

I recall many years ago watching a BA Trident go around from about 200'at LHR in CAVOK weather. When the tower enquired about the reason for the GA, they were informed that it was the SOP if a GS flag appeared prior to touchdown. Whilst I can see the sense of that in full IMC and during an autoland, but when the vis was 30km plus and no cloud at all, then I'm a little less sure!

Mind you that was brought to you by the same airline that had a crew divert back to LHR on a shuttle flight to GLA, when the Capt discovered that his breakfast hadn't been loaded!!!

Silver Shadow / Eager Beaver - what you say is not strictly true:

"if an engine failure occurs below V2, the target climb speed is V2. If an engine fails at an airspeed between V2 and V2 + 25, climb at the speed at which the failure occurred. If an engine failure occurs above V2 + 25, increase pitch attitude in order to reduce airspeed to V2 + 25"

" follow the SID unless an emergency turn procedure is published. Limit bank angle to 15 degrees unless speed is greater than V2 + 15"

source: 737 Flying Manual

Therefore, Silver Shadow it is incorrect to state that following an engine failure, V2 is the only acceptable airspeed to ensure climb performance as our performance data is based on a climb produced by V2 + 25.

However, not wishing to be pedantic, maybe this make you a little happier -

------------------
"After V1, we'll take the emergency into the air - You call 'Positive Climb' and I'll ask for the gear up. We'll climb away at a minimum of V2 and a maximum of V2 + 25"

Flying Scotsman

A couple of points:

Virtually all BA aircraft have tillers both sides.

You said:

'if the Captain/PNF can remember what drills/calls he/she is supposed to make at the important times.'

I would suggest that it is no more difficult than remembering any other procedure of any other airline.

In 15 years in both long and short haul I have never had a problem in not handling my own reverse thrust. As an aside it is policy on certainly two fleets, and I would guess the rest as well, that we only use idle reverse unless more is appropriate.

How about another BA horror: First Officers are allowed to start engines - gasp!

My last company only captains were considered competent to handle engine start.

I have worked for other companies and done it their way and believe me every company is different depending who wrote the manuals.

Even with my limited intellect and memory I have not had a problem remembering an SOP.

Finally, why is there always such a fuss about BA SOPs. They are SOPs, they are rigidly observed by virtually everybody I have ever flown with in either seat, they work well and they are safe. What is the problem?



[This message has been edited by M.Mouse (edited 06 June 2001).]