Air India Express pilot flirts with danger 4 times, grounded
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Air India Express pilot flirts with danger 4 times, grounded
MUMBAI: It was a quartet of mistakes that could have had disastrous consequences. In the course of landing an aircraft in a strong crosswind, an Air India Express commander took four erroneous decisions, one after another, endangering a Boeing 737 aircraft and its 87 passengers. Luckily, it all ended with damage done only to the aircraft and the commander's flying record.
The potentially fatal incident occurred on November 3 on the Cochin-Salalah Air India Express flight IX 441 when it landed after three attempts at 9.45am, local time. After a very rough touchdown, the Boeing 737 aircraft hurtled down the runway only to jerk sharply as two tyres burst. One wing almost scraped the runway surface and the landing gear was damaged before the aircraft came to a halt near the runway end. The commander was so flustered that even after the plane stopped, he kept the engines running and did not release his foothold on the brakes for about 15-20 minutes till an engineering team arrived to tow away the aircraft.
Confirming the incident, the Air India Express spokesperson said: "The landing was not in keeping with our standard operating procedures. It indicated a disregard for the SOP by the commander."
The Directorate General of Civil Aviation is investigating the matter.
The series of faulty decisions began when the flight reached Salalah (Oman) airspace and the pilots were informed by the Omani air traffic controller that the wind speed on the ground was 25 knot (46 kmph) gusting (sudden bursts of high-speed wind) to 35 knot (65 kmph). "The aircraft should not have attempted a landing in Salalah as the crosswind (wind blowing across the runway) speed was about 35 knot," said a source. The SOP manual disallows a landing when the surface wind speed is beyond 25 knot, and in this case, it was not only about the wind speed but also about wind direction. Landing in a crosswind is more difficult, as an aircraft is prone to drifting laterally as it approaches the runway.
At this point, the commander should have diverted the aircraft to Abu Dhabi, the alternate airport listed in the flight plan. An aircraft is flown to an alternate airport if the commander perceives that a safe landing is not possible at the destination airport (it is mandatory to carry enough fuel to fly to the alternate). There are instances where experienced commanders have managed to land safely in a strong wind and taken care to ensure that the flight safety department of the airline concerned was not informed about it. "But the best of pilots follow the norms. If a landing is in violation of an air safety norm, it is not done," said a senior commander.
The AI Express commander too tried to land in Salalah, but had to abort the landing. After the first failed attempt, he took the aircraft up 6,000 feet and after 10 minutes attempted a second landing, only to fail again. Finally, he decided to divert to Abu Dhabi, which is one hour, 15 minutes away. But that wasn't the end of the matter. "The commander entered the wrong data into the Flight Management System and it threw up a scare," said the source. "It showed that only six minutes of flying time would be left on reaching Abu Dhabi, which was insufficient to make a landing." In reality, the aircraft had 4.7 tonnes of fuel on board, and the fuel needed to reach and land safely in Abu Dhabi was 4.5 tonnes. But since the commander was under the impression that the aircraft was short on fuel, he panicked and decided to return to Salalah.
It was now the commander's third attempt at landing in Salalah in poor weather, which is something air safety experts warn against. Several airlines worldwide have banned a third attempt at landing at an airport in poor weather and made a diversion mandatory. Air India, however, does not have such a policy yet-the airline spokesperson said this was "under review".
During the third attempt, the commander decided to do an autoland although the cockpit crew was not trained to do so. In an autoland, the aircraft directly takes inputs from ground-based navigation instruments that give guidance to an aircraft on descent profile and horizontal manoevering. But there are wind speed restrictions for autoland, and a 35-knot crosswind is way above the permissible limit for a B737. "The commander also disregarded the limitations by Boeing Company for autoland operation," said the airline spokesperson. "The matter is under investigation by our air safety department."
Air India Express pilot flirts with danger 4 times, grounded - The Times of India
The potentially fatal incident occurred on November 3 on the Cochin-Salalah Air India Express flight IX 441 when it landed after three attempts at 9.45am, local time. After a very rough touchdown, the Boeing 737 aircraft hurtled down the runway only to jerk sharply as two tyres burst. One wing almost scraped the runway surface and the landing gear was damaged before the aircraft came to a halt near the runway end. The commander was so flustered that even after the plane stopped, he kept the engines running and did not release his foothold on the brakes for about 15-20 minutes till an engineering team arrived to tow away the aircraft.
Confirming the incident, the Air India Express spokesperson said: "The landing was not in keeping with our standard operating procedures. It indicated a disregard for the SOP by the commander."
The Directorate General of Civil Aviation is investigating the matter.
The series of faulty decisions began when the flight reached Salalah (Oman) airspace and the pilots were informed by the Omani air traffic controller that the wind speed on the ground was 25 knot (46 kmph) gusting (sudden bursts of high-speed wind) to 35 knot (65 kmph). "The aircraft should not have attempted a landing in Salalah as the crosswind (wind blowing across the runway) speed was about 35 knot," said a source. The SOP manual disallows a landing when the surface wind speed is beyond 25 knot, and in this case, it was not only about the wind speed but also about wind direction. Landing in a crosswind is more difficult, as an aircraft is prone to drifting laterally as it approaches the runway.
At this point, the commander should have diverted the aircraft to Abu Dhabi, the alternate airport listed in the flight plan. An aircraft is flown to an alternate airport if the commander perceives that a safe landing is not possible at the destination airport (it is mandatory to carry enough fuel to fly to the alternate). There are instances where experienced commanders have managed to land safely in a strong wind and taken care to ensure that the flight safety department of the airline concerned was not informed about it. "But the best of pilots follow the norms. If a landing is in violation of an air safety norm, it is not done," said a senior commander.
The AI Express commander too tried to land in Salalah, but had to abort the landing. After the first failed attempt, he took the aircraft up 6,000 feet and after 10 minutes attempted a second landing, only to fail again. Finally, he decided to divert to Abu Dhabi, which is one hour, 15 minutes away. But that wasn't the end of the matter. "The commander entered the wrong data into the Flight Management System and it threw up a scare," said the source. "It showed that only six minutes of flying time would be left on reaching Abu Dhabi, which was insufficient to make a landing." In reality, the aircraft had 4.7 tonnes of fuel on board, and the fuel needed to reach and land safely in Abu Dhabi was 4.5 tonnes. But since the commander was under the impression that the aircraft was short on fuel, he panicked and decided to return to Salalah.
It was now the commander's third attempt at landing in Salalah in poor weather, which is something air safety experts warn against. Several airlines worldwide have banned a third attempt at landing at an airport in poor weather and made a diversion mandatory. Air India, however, does not have such a policy yet-the airline spokesperson said this was "under review".
During the third attempt, the commander decided to do an autoland although the cockpit crew was not trained to do so. In an autoland, the aircraft directly takes inputs from ground-based navigation instruments that give guidance to an aircraft on descent profile and horizontal manoevering. But there are wind speed restrictions for autoland, and a 35-knot crosswind is way above the permissible limit for a B737. "The commander also disregarded the limitations by Boeing Company for autoland operation," said the airline spokesperson. "The matter is under investigation by our air safety department."
Air India Express pilot flirts with danger 4 times, grounded - The Times of India
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automation dependent
That is what automation dependency causes. Can't believe a "pilot" would ever try an autoland because their own flying skills are so lacking that they can't even manage to safely land an aircraft. We all know the basic pilot training in India is a joke. Maybe if the airlines in India spent a little more effort training their pilots these situations could be avoided. It also wouldn't hurt for the "captains" there would allow the fo's to take off and land the aircraft. Also maybe if the company didn't upgrade everybody with the bare minimum experience in order to get rid of the expat pilots these situations could be avoided.
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I've been flying for over 36 years and expatting about 22 years. I've flown with greats and less than great both in the US and in the rest of the world. I've declined to ride a jump seat knowing who was at the controls, both in the US and in the rest of the world.
That said, enough of the Indian Bashing. No matter what part of the world you fly, you are bound to run into an aviator who is a legend in their own mind. You will meet aviators who are true aviators and very humble and enjoy imparting knowlege to their F/Os.
The system bares contributory negligence to who is put into the left seat. Seniority system needs to be revisted. The good old boy network needs to go away too.
Sorry sports fans… endangering your passengers by allowing your fuel to go below divert is no excuse whatsoever. Local or expat… does not make a different where this child of the magenta line is from. He is far better off on the ground and out of the airline industy.
The Indian DGCA along with many others round the world need to be vaporized in their current state and re-created from the ground up. Assisted takeoff and landing qualification. What rubbish!
Airlines need to also step up to the plate and insist that captains allow their F/Os to hand fly the airplane up to at least where cruise climb is initiated… and below, say 15,000’. Check rides need to be rethought as well. Check Airmen need insist on A/P disconnect well before flap extension to ensure that both pilots can successfully manipulate the controls. If not… then they need to be grounded. This is not limited to India either.
That said, enough of the Indian Bashing. No matter what part of the world you fly, you are bound to run into an aviator who is a legend in their own mind. You will meet aviators who are true aviators and very humble and enjoy imparting knowlege to their F/Os.
The system bares contributory negligence to who is put into the left seat. Seniority system needs to be revisted. The good old boy network needs to go away too.
If the guy was going to have only 200kg on arrival at Abu Dhabi, he didn't have enough fuel for the diversion
Sorry sports fans… endangering your passengers by allowing your fuel to go below divert is no excuse whatsoever. Local or expat… does not make a different where this child of the magenta line is from. He is far better off on the ground and out of the airline industy.
It also wouldn't hurt for the "captains" there would allow the fo's to take off and land the aircraft
The Indian DGCA along with many others round the world need to be vaporized in their current state and re-created from the ground up. Assisted takeoff and landing qualification. What rubbish!
Airlines need to also step up to the plate and insist that captains allow their F/Os to hand fly the airplane up to at least where cruise climb is initiated… and below, say 15,000’. Check rides need to be rethought as well. Check Airmen need insist on A/P disconnect well before flap extension to ensure that both pilots can successfully manipulate the controls. If not… then they need to be grounded. This is not limited to India either.
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All stake holders are realising that a major rethink in selection/training is required.
The good news is that the average joe/jane... given adequate experience/exposure can figure out which part of their trng they can use and which to junk.
The problem is there are too many self important low experience "trainers" around(corrupting the thought process)
The newbies are'nt getting to see too many experienced old pros giving them exposure to "how it is done"
The good news is that the average joe/jane... given adequate experience/exposure can figure out which part of their trng they can use and which to junk.
The problem is there are too many self important low experience "trainers" around(corrupting the thought process)
The newbies are'nt getting to see too many experienced old pros giving them exposure to "how it is done"
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the weakness in Indian aviation, is in
a.) senior training captains who are useless and totally irrelevant in modern cockpits.
b.) line training, where poor instruction and a lack of confidence is transmitted to trainees who are not allowed to handle the aircraft.
however, there are a new breed of young instructors who are talented, and up and coming. unfortunately, the system in India is to place the seniors clowns on a pedestal and worship their crap until they drag the whole profession down.
for the trainees, its not what they can learn, but who they should please, never mind if they cannot fly.
a.) senior training captains who are useless and totally irrelevant in modern cockpits.
b.) line training, where poor instruction and a lack of confidence is transmitted to trainees who are not allowed to handle the aircraft.
however, there are a new breed of young instructors who are talented, and up and coming. unfortunately, the system in India is to place the seniors clowns on a pedestal and worship their crap until they drag the whole profession down.
for the trainees, its not what they can learn, but who they should please, never mind if they cannot fly.
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Most Indian captains don´t even look at the wx forecast before signing off the "dispatch suggested" fuel uplift, and whose who do rarely order extra fuel when the wx is marginal.
Why? Fuel is relatively expensive in India, and any "unnecessary" extra fuel uplift warrants a call from the CP. So, bend your neck and hope the Gods (or the autopilot) will help you.
Wonder what the forecast said? What was the contingency fuel? 7-8 minutes?
Proper planning and captaincy?
Why? Fuel is relatively expensive in India, and any "unnecessary" extra fuel uplift warrants a call from the CP. So, bend your neck and hope the Gods (or the autopilot) will help you.
Wonder what the forecast said? What was the contingency fuel? 7-8 minutes?
Proper planning and captaincy?
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The SOP manual disallows a landing when the surface wind speed is beyond 25 knot,
"I don't believe it!" (Apologies to Victor Meldrew.)
Then again, perhaps we should.
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Flew in India for more than 4 years; I'm not surprised at the outcome.
Indian pilots are generally addicted to the AP and automation. On top of that, management is relentless in tracking extra fuel upload.
I think maybe this Captain was subversively trained into fearing additional fuel upload. Shame on him for failing to see who has the final authority (him) but he might definitely be a victim of the system there in India.
I remember last year a former SAS Capt and I shared the company transport home. He told me he was quitting w/o notice the following day. Said the CP at our Indian carrier chastised him for uploading 70kg extra fuel. This guy had over 30 years flying experience before retiring as a WB skipper for SAS. Now his simple actions as a Captain were being "reviewed" by a mid-level manager. Petty behavior on the part of a manager who stopped flying the line years ago and forgot what it's like to be stuck between a rock and a hard place. When I flew there I regularly uploaded 1,000 kg (or more) for every flight. When the CP would call and quarterback my fuel judgement I would tell him to pound sand. My flight, my aircraft, my license. I don't paid enough to be stressed out. I arrive at destination with plenty of fuel to give me all the time in the world to explore any diversion or holding options. I rarely, if ever, worry about fuel. Fortunately, there were enough pilots screwing up on our fleet that the CP was too busy to pick a battle with me.
Captain's authority is just that. Plain and simple.
Regardless of what happened with this chap, he should have recognized the fuel state before he even shot that first approach. So a divert was the obvious choice after the first approach. We always discuss "bingo fuel" at TOD as we review the approach briefing. I think you'd be surprised how little leeway you have in terms of approaches. Often times we determine we have enough for one approach then we go to the alternate. This guy probably didn't realize how tight he was until it was too late. He's lucky he didn't kill anyone. But where was the FO in all of this? Blind leading the blind I guess.
The airmanship skills, or lack thereof, aren't surprising at all. Like I said, they rely too heavily on the AP. So when things go TU, the situation is simply way beyond their capability. I hand fly all the time. It may not be pretty, or on perfect course, but it's within tolerance and it's a no-brainer for me when faced with landing in stormy conditions.
Never ever let your skills go by the wayside.
Indian pilots are generally addicted to the AP and automation. On top of that, management is relentless in tracking extra fuel upload.
I think maybe this Captain was subversively trained into fearing additional fuel upload. Shame on him for failing to see who has the final authority (him) but he might definitely be a victim of the system there in India.
I remember last year a former SAS Capt and I shared the company transport home. He told me he was quitting w/o notice the following day. Said the CP at our Indian carrier chastised him for uploading 70kg extra fuel. This guy had over 30 years flying experience before retiring as a WB skipper for SAS. Now his simple actions as a Captain were being "reviewed" by a mid-level manager. Petty behavior on the part of a manager who stopped flying the line years ago and forgot what it's like to be stuck between a rock and a hard place. When I flew there I regularly uploaded 1,000 kg (or more) for every flight. When the CP would call and quarterback my fuel judgement I would tell him to pound sand. My flight, my aircraft, my license. I don't paid enough to be stressed out. I arrive at destination with plenty of fuel to give me all the time in the world to explore any diversion or holding options. I rarely, if ever, worry about fuel. Fortunately, there were enough pilots screwing up on our fleet that the CP was too busy to pick a battle with me.
Captain's authority is just that. Plain and simple.
Regardless of what happened with this chap, he should have recognized the fuel state before he even shot that first approach. So a divert was the obvious choice after the first approach. We always discuss "bingo fuel" at TOD as we review the approach briefing. I think you'd be surprised how little leeway you have in terms of approaches. Often times we determine we have enough for one approach then we go to the alternate. This guy probably didn't realize how tight he was until it was too late. He's lucky he didn't kill anyone. But where was the FO in all of this? Blind leading the blind I guess.
The airmanship skills, or lack thereof, aren't surprising at all. Like I said, they rely too heavily on the AP. So when things go TU, the situation is simply way beyond their capability. I hand fly all the time. It may not be pretty, or on perfect course, but it's within tolerance and it's a no-brainer for me when faced with landing in stormy conditions.
Never ever let your skills go by the wayside.
Last edited by Geebz; 22nd Nov 2011 at 07:09.
