"Safe Airline" vs. Unsafe Culture. We're discussing the wrong thing!
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Originally Posted by AB
PLOG fuel to MAD in july with PROB40 TS? BOAC, I know you can be outspoken fella but I had no idea you are completely barking mad, or blind drunk. That is the daftest thing I've ever heard! If you can justify that with such a forecast I can't visualise a situation where it would EVER be necessary to take extra fuel...
If you would then it's not daft or dangerous.
Sorry Rat5
Maybe some of it is born of past experience, advertising and expectation?
* Air travel, by and large, getting safer, even as it expands.
* Flights timed (and measured) to the minute, punctuality very important.
* Despatch reliability, comfort, noise, etc. all improving as fleets modernise.
* People are told (and expect) that they will get there on time, on price.
* Flying is presented as a seamless alternative to other means.
So pressure from customers as well as management. Not only that, it is possible to take questionable actions (in retrospect), on the basis that it's good for your clients and everyone who's a team player wants that, don't they? Part of what we see might not be people caving in to threats from the airline(s) but from a genuine desire to do what appears to be the right thing as a team that's 'onside'.
Maybe after you've taken "plog" fuel for 20 sectors, it becomes more difficult to justify extra as it feels "wrong" somehow? When I first got my command, the boss *told* me not to worry about fuel and that he'd be happier knowing I wasn't being distracted by it in the early stages. Later, I had a period of benign weather and took almost a month of minimum fuel (with no problems) then did a trip to the far east - the FOs both wanted more fuel and my initial reaction was to think "that's spoiling my record" and shortly afterwards "thank **** someone's thinking straight!". I was a bit shocked that I'd managed to lapse into minimum = good, even when it wasn't; needless to say we took a fair bit extra which we needed most of at the other end.
I think other posters are near the mark when they point to regulation, company ethos, training and "normalisation of deviance" being munged up together to make an unholy brew. There are multiple reasons and it is somewhat unfair to single out any person or organisation. FR get a lot stick but considering the size of their operation their incident rate is probably pretty low.
* Air travel, by and large, getting safer, even as it expands.
* Flights timed (and measured) to the minute, punctuality very important.
* Despatch reliability, comfort, noise, etc. all improving as fleets modernise.
* People are told (and expect) that they will get there on time, on price.
* Flying is presented as a seamless alternative to other means.
So pressure from customers as well as management. Not only that, it is possible to take questionable actions (in retrospect), on the basis that it's good for your clients and everyone who's a team player wants that, don't they? Part of what we see might not be people caving in to threats from the airline(s) but from a genuine desire to do what appears to be the right thing as a team that's 'onside'.
Maybe after you've taken "plog" fuel for 20 sectors, it becomes more difficult to justify extra as it feels "wrong" somehow? When I first got my command, the boss *told* me not to worry about fuel and that he'd be happier knowing I wasn't being distracted by it in the early stages. Later, I had a period of benign weather and took almost a month of minimum fuel (with no problems) then did a trip to the far east - the FOs both wanted more fuel and my initial reaction was to think "that's spoiling my record" and shortly afterwards "thank **** someone's thinking straight!". I was a bit shocked that I'd managed to lapse into minimum = good, even when it wasn't; needless to say we took a fair bit extra which we needed most of at the other end.
I think other posters are near the mark when they point to regulation, company ethos, training and "normalisation of deviance" being munged up together to make an unholy brew. There are multiple reasons and it is somewhat unfair to single out any person or organisation. FR get a lot stick but considering the size of their operation their incident rate is probably pretty low.
If you go back to the 1960s/1970s during CPL training there was much emphasis on the responsibilities and legalities (Air Law) of being an Aircraft Commander (how often is that term used these days? - one usually hears the term "Captain"). How much emphasis does CPL training these days give to the responsibilities of being an aircraft Commander?
Since then we have seen a continual eroding of the authority and respect shown towards the Aircraft Commander from various Operators. Whilst I am in favour of CRM and the like we seem to be breeding aircraft "managers" these days.
There are occasions when the person in charge (especially where lives are on the line) has to have the moral courage (aka b***s) to do the right thing (= leadership) as opposed to doing "things right" (= management). This would include (but not be limited to) the carriage of fuel above flight plan. This would also include going against the (Company) "party line" (in the sense of applying a greater margin of safety).
In a Company which I once flew for significant changes in procedures were announced which, in my opinion, were more to do with concerns to do with who would get the blame if anything went wrong; these procedures were, in my opinion (and those of other pilots I talked to), less "safe". I was flabbergasted that the pilots were never consulted about said changes. With CRM Commanders are encouraged (rightly) to consider fellow crew member's views on operational decisions, yet it would seem the Company had the attitude of "we know best" QED
Since then we have seen a continual eroding of the authority and respect shown towards the Aircraft Commander from various Operators. Whilst I am in favour of CRM and the like we seem to be breeding aircraft "managers" these days.
There are occasions when the person in charge (especially where lives are on the line) has to have the moral courage (aka b***s) to do the right thing (= leadership) as opposed to doing "things right" (= management). This would include (but not be limited to) the carriage of fuel above flight plan. This would also include going against the (Company) "party line" (in the sense of applying a greater margin of safety).
In a Company which I once flew for significant changes in procedures were announced which, in my opinion, were more to do with concerns to do with who would get the blame if anything went wrong; these procedures were, in my opinion (and those of other pilots I talked to), less "safe". I was flabbergasted that the pilots were never consulted about said changes. With CRM Commanders are encouraged (rightly) to consider fellow crew member's views on operational decisions, yet it would seem the Company had the attitude of "we know best" QED
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Let's say I am the CEO of an airline. I would like my HR dept to hire people whom I could trust to be good ambassadors of my company and its culture: people who would like to invest themselves in a career to promote my own philosophy and product to the customers. I would then like my training dept. to promote captains whom I could trust to be special ambassadors for my company and promote its safe, customer caring product to the passengers and public where-ever they are. Captains whom I could trust to make sound judgement for the safety of the flight while regarding the sound commercial aspect of the hand that feeds them. I would monitor performance for good business reasons and advise where necessary and trust the message was received and agreed upon. I would listen to concerns and maintain trust.
If I couldn't trust my captains to do that simple job then I had the wrong guys. I would expect them to trust me in return, and be proud to be my ambassador, and we would have a professional trusting relationship.
How often does that happen today? Answers on a postcard to...........
If I couldn't trust my captains to do that simple job then I had the wrong guys. I would expect them to trust me in return, and be proud to be my ambassador, and we would have a professional trusting relationship.
How often does that happen today? Answers on a postcard to...........
Last edited by RAT 5; 19th Aug 2013 at 20:59.
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you can have the best procedures, best people, best planes and still have some bad luck.
you can have marginal procedures, marginal people, beat up planes and be lucky.
for many years I've asked the question of my peers: is it better to be good or to be lucky.
everyone says lucky.
you can have marginal procedures, marginal people, beat up planes and be lucky.
for many years I've asked the question of my peers: is it better to be good or to be lucky.
everyone says lucky.
"Best planes"
I know I'm being picky here, but how do you define a good plane and a bad plane? Obviously some models have poorer reliability records, inefficient and noisier, but surely the job, whether its good or bad, is to transport passengers from A to B?
Surely the most important thing is that its serviceable and maintained IAW company SOPs, its AMP and industry regulations, whether it be a B757 of a 25-year vintage or a shiny brand new A320 with sharklets straight out of Toulouse?
I know I'm being picky here, but how do you define a good plane and a bad plane? Obviously some models have poorer reliability records, inefficient and noisier, but surely the job, whether its good or bad, is to transport passengers from A to B?
Surely the most important thing is that its serviceable and maintained IAW company SOPs, its AMP and industry regulations, whether it be a B757 of a 25-year vintage or a shiny brand new A320 with sharklets straight out of Toulouse?
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As someone said above it doesn't matter how much extra fuel you took, if you declare a fuel mayday you didn't take enough. I'd add to that or you did not correctly manage what you had.
Last edited by Aldente; 19th Aug 2013 at 21:19.
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Dannyboy, Not really fair Concorde skewed the statistics the way she did.
Back to Safety vs Culture. I often wonder how much of the safety inspectors and regulators instructions is simply based on trust. How good is regulation oversight in Europe?
Back to Safety vs Culture. I often wonder how much of the safety inspectors and regulators instructions is simply based on trust. How good is regulation oversight in Europe?
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This excellent thread cannot ignore the poor safety culture exposed by the need for triple fuel maydays. Since captain choice of fuel quantity is such a common event, consideration of that issue is more practical than, for example a B777 crash where few of us are actually current.
Many times, near minimum fuel would have had me concerned about the progress of my flights. I always removed those concerns with additional margin fuel. Airlines never queried my fuel choice.
Some airlines may seek to distance themselves from minimum fuel pressure and greater liability with company instructions like:
If one airline becomes very profitable by enforcing a particular culture on flight crew, that airline has the capacity to expand and take market share from other operators. To stay in business, competitors need to also take on board the profit based culture. As they do so the original particular culture airline needs to more aggressively expand its successful business model. Finally all have similar safety culture, subordinate to profit.
How can pilots and regulatory authorities, identify the degree of safety subordination and determine the minimum permitted level? Well, I think pilots have identified that unacceptable management pressure currently degrades safety. Now it is up to regulators to come to the same conclusion. The solution is clouded by other foreign operators being able to operate with poor safety cultures. I can think of one or two north asian airlines for a start.
EU administration is not well regarded by many, but somehow an enquiry and a united approach to the safety aspects of airline management is needed. Pilot representation is essential.
Many times, near minimum fuel would have had me concerned about the progress of my flights. I always removed those concerns with additional margin fuel. Airlines never queried my fuel choice.
Some airlines may seek to distance themselves from minimum fuel pressure and greater liability with company instructions like:
- Company policy is to take minimum fuel.
- More than XXX Kg extra requires a short report of the circumstances.
- Captain is responsible for safe fuel quantity for each flight. In the rare event that this fuel turns out to be insufficient, diversion for added fuel is accepted. If there is no suitable diversion airfield, conserve fuel and declare a fuel mayday.
If one airline becomes very profitable by enforcing a particular culture on flight crew, that airline has the capacity to expand and take market share from other operators. To stay in business, competitors need to also take on board the profit based culture. As they do so the original particular culture airline needs to more aggressively expand its successful business model. Finally all have similar safety culture, subordinate to profit.
How can pilots and regulatory authorities, identify the degree of safety subordination and determine the minimum permitted level? Well, I think pilots have identified that unacceptable management pressure currently degrades safety. Now it is up to regulators to come to the same conclusion. The solution is clouded by other foreign operators being able to operate with poor safety cultures. I can think of one or two north asian airlines for a start.
EU administration is not well regarded by many, but somehow an enquiry and a united approach to the safety aspects of airline management is needed. Pilot representation is essential.
Last edited by autoflight; 20th Aug 2013 at 02:37.
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Well, I think pilots have identified that unacceptable management pressure currently degrades safety. Now it is up to regulators to come to the same conclusion
The CAAs make it even easier by allowing anonymity too.
But I fear a huge part of the problem we have in aviation is just a mirror of a problem we have in society in general these days...apathy.
eg. "I don't like this fuel load because of X, Y & Z, but the company say we shouldn't take extra because it affects profitability and if I do, I might get in trouble or lose my job, but I really don't like it..."
Flight goes ok, at least to the point no emergency or Pans were declared, perhaps final reserve was on board on landing, perhaps it wasn't.
How many crew are taking the time to file a safety report with their authority because they feel they can't do it within the structure of their company.
I fear not many and this is down to the rise of a hugely apathetic society with regards to principles and making an effort over and above when one believes they have finished their duties.
"Ah, the flight ended up going ok, no one died, I am tired and my duty is finished, I am not going to potentially make trouble for myself by writing a report in my own time, I'm off to the hotel"
Apathy, it's destroying our society and when society's mindset changes in general, then surely those people within society also bring that state of mind into whatever job they happen to do too.
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Well, I think pilots have identified that unacceptable management pressure currently degrades safety. Now it is up to regulators to come to the same conclusion.
This falls into the category of many things I've experienced in my career: there is a perceived or real problem, but as yet no smoking hole; the XAA seem hesitant to agree because they do not see a solution if they acknowledge the problem, or it will be too inconvenient to implement the solution. Under the carpet with it. That carpet is very lumpy now.
How many crew are taking the time to file a safety report with their authority because they feel they can't do it within the structure of their company.
Big difference between an employee in a union airline and a contractor in a non-union airline. One will keep their job for stirring it, the other will be on their bike. Both might be correct, but will the XAA back the latter to the hilt. It won't matter because a contractor is always vulnerable.
This falls into the category of many things I've experienced in my career: there is a perceived or real problem, but as yet no smoking hole; the XAA seem hesitant to agree because they do not see a solution if they acknowledge the problem, or it will be too inconvenient to implement the solution. Under the carpet with it. That carpet is very lumpy now.
How many crew are taking the time to file a safety report with their authority because they feel they can't do it within the structure of their company.
Big difference between an employee in a union airline and a contractor in a non-union airline. One will keep their job for stirring it, the other will be on their bike. Both might be correct, but will the XAA back the latter to the hilt. It won't matter because a contractor is always vulnerable.
Last edited by RAT 5; 20th Aug 2013 at 14:56.
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There appears here to be the assumption that the more fuel you carry, the safer you are, and vice versa. This is not correct.
It is only the decision making process prior to, and once airborne that is important.
If you require 10 tonnes of fuel to fly your Boebus from A-B, but your company in their infinite wisdom tells you, you can only carry 9 tonnes, the flight can be conducted perfectly safely. (Certainly if it's within Europe) It just will not reach the destination.
If you don't reach your destination frequently enough, expect the company to allow you to carry more fuel. That's a commercial decision. The captain's decision as to where s/he goes, is what makes the flight safe. Nothing to do with the amount of fuel.
Fuel policies are written to allow an a/c to divert and land at it's planned alternate with only Reserve Fuel (30 mins) remaining. Since a pan should be declared if you feel you may land with less than Reserve, and a Mayday if you will land with less than Reserve, it should be no great surprise that diverting a/c sometimes declare a Mayday should it?
This definitely isn't the first time, and won't be the last!
There are of course situations in which is acceptable to commence an approach knowing that if you were to Go Around from the missed approach point, insufficient fuel may remain in the tanks to reach your nominated diversion. There are other circumstances in which it is acceptable to dispense with all destination alternates prior to take off!
How dangerous.
It is only the decision making process prior to, and once airborne that is important.
If you require 10 tonnes of fuel to fly your Boebus from A-B, but your company in their infinite wisdom tells you, you can only carry 9 tonnes, the flight can be conducted perfectly safely. (Certainly if it's within Europe) It just will not reach the destination.
If you don't reach your destination frequently enough, expect the company to allow you to carry more fuel. That's a commercial decision. The captain's decision as to where s/he goes, is what makes the flight safe. Nothing to do with the amount of fuel.
Fuel policies are written to allow an a/c to divert and land at it's planned alternate with only Reserve Fuel (30 mins) remaining. Since a pan should be declared if you feel you may land with less than Reserve, and a Mayday if you will land with less than Reserve, it should be no great surprise that diverting a/c sometimes declare a Mayday should it?
This definitely isn't the first time, and won't be the last!
There are of course situations in which is acceptable to commence an approach knowing that if you were to Go Around from the missed approach point, insufficient fuel may remain in the tanks to reach your nominated diversion. There are other circumstances in which it is acceptable to dispense with all destination alternates prior to take off!
How dangerous.
Last edited by 4468; 20th Aug 2013 at 15:48.
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Dark,narrow, twisty, country road on a winter's night in heavy rain with a slippery road surface.
Speed limit (in UK) 60 mph.
I'm doing 59 mph.
Legal? Yes
Advisable? Probably not
Safe? NO!
Have I made my point?
PS
Been doing it for years and never had an accident......
Speed limit (in UK) 60 mph.
I'm doing 59 mph.
Legal? Yes
Advisable? Probably not
Safe? NO!
Have I made my point?
PS
Been doing it for years and never had an accident......
Last edited by Aldente; 20th Aug 2013 at 16:18.
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Or, your car may do up to 60 on a two lane road
It may do up to 60 in rain
It may do up to 60 in fog
It may to up to 60 over a hump-back bridge
It may do up to 60 at night
It may take a corner at up to 60
All quite clear? A list of sensible limits.
So, you take your car on a wet, foggy 2 lane road at night over a hump back bridge with a corner right after it at 60 and...that's modern rostering.
If you survive the company indignantly cries about a 100% safety record, impeccable training, what are you slanderng us for?
If you die they maintain it was perfectly legal, no rules were infringed, accidents happen.
It may do up to 60 in rain
It may do up to 60 in fog
It may to up to 60 over a hump-back bridge
It may do up to 60 at night
It may take a corner at up to 60
All quite clear? A list of sensible limits.
So, you take your car on a wet, foggy 2 lane road at night over a hump back bridge with a corner right after it at 60 and...that's modern rostering.
If you survive the company indignantly cries about a 100% safety record, impeccable training, what are you slanderng us for?
If you die they maintain it was perfectly legal, no rules were infringed, accidents happen.
Last edited by Agaricus bisporus; 20th Aug 2013 at 16:27.
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Normalisation of Deviance
FullWings - spot on with your post #62 referring to 'Normalisation of Deviance'.
For those who are unaware of the concept:
Professionalism/Diane Vaughan and the normalization of deviance - Wikibooks, open books for an open world
Examples:
The 1986 Challenger space shuttle launch decision.
or
The decision to keep driving a vehicle - after losing a head light.....
Almost impossible for present pilots
to keep ALL their decisions both legal and decent?
As a 'past' pilot
, I can write these things.
For those who are unaware of the concept:
Professionalism/Diane Vaughan and the normalization of deviance - Wikibooks, open books for an open world
Examples:
The 1986 Challenger space shuttle launch decision.
or
The decision to keep driving a vehicle - after losing a head light.....
Almost impossible for present pilots
to keep ALL their decisions both legal and decent?As a 'past' pilot
, I can write these things.
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Contract pilots with Stockholm Syndrome
I see a response trend on this and some other threads where low safety culture airlines are exposed. A good number of posts give examples of poor safety culture and some suggest, and give examples of, alternative philosophies and procedures that would add to a safety culture.
I accept that all have their opportunity for input and different alternatives are normally welcome by all.
A study of the responses defending poor safety management indicates that some are suffering from Stockholm Syndrome. Company management has them by the balls. Fail to toe the party line exactly and risk reduced flying hours and reduced salary. Any suggestion of complaints “outside the company structure” are bad for self employed contractors. Pilots are locked in by contracts or lack of other positions. One could even say held captive. Managements are well aware of Stockholm Syndrome and in fact it is starting to look like it is part of their business models. Sufferers will enthusiastically defend their captors.
Those enthusiastically defending minimum fuel have got something wrong with them. Now we know what it is.
I accept that all have their opportunity for input and different alternatives are normally welcome by all.
A study of the responses defending poor safety management indicates that some are suffering from Stockholm Syndrome. Company management has them by the balls. Fail to toe the party line exactly and risk reduced flying hours and reduced salary. Any suggestion of complaints “outside the company structure” are bad for self employed contractors. Pilots are locked in by contracts or lack of other positions. One could even say held captive. Managements are well aware of Stockholm Syndrome and in fact it is starting to look like it is part of their business models. Sufferers will enthusiastically defend their captors.
Those enthusiastically defending minimum fuel have got something wrong with them. Now we know what it is.
Last edited by autoflight; 21st Aug 2013 at 01:28.
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This is a good thread.
GluBall, I would take issue about your comment that ... 'The biggest safety threat comes from a self-made clusterf**k of airline instructors and training captains who are rabid on total automation'...
There is a huge number of trainers out there who are not 'rabid on total automation' but are really trying to balance the need for an 'appropriate level' of automation, whilst respecting your very valid point that,
... 'Today's industry produces pilots who have an acute aversion of manual flight; pilots who are challenged when disconnecting A/P & A/T; pilots who, when offered, will decline a visual approach in clear daylight. They won't ever accept a 5 mile base, they insist on flying a full ILS procedure'...
This issue raised so well, goes way beyond the trainers and even training management. We need a fundamental shift in the regulation of this to catch up with what is actually going on out there with our reliable, safe automated machines.
GluBall, I would take issue about your comment that ... 'The biggest safety threat comes from a self-made clusterf**k of airline instructors and training captains who are rabid on total automation'...
There is a huge number of trainers out there who are not 'rabid on total automation' but are really trying to balance the need for an 'appropriate level' of automation, whilst respecting your very valid point that,
... 'Today's industry produces pilots who have an acute aversion of manual flight; pilots who are challenged when disconnecting A/P & A/T; pilots who, when offered, will decline a visual approach in clear daylight. They won't ever accept a 5 mile base, they insist on flying a full ILS procedure'...
This issue raised so well, goes way beyond the trainers and even training management. We need a fundamental shift in the regulation of this to catch up with what is actually going on out there with our reliable, safe automated machines.