Human Factors: Effects of employment insecurity on aviation safety?

[Trim Stab]

This is a human factors subject that seems not to have been well researched, especially given current economic situation. Does anybody here have any leads to some previous quality research?

[Genghis the Engineer]

I don't know of any research, although if I was looking I'd start at Google Scholar,which is free to use (and frankly often better than the very expensive Web of Science).

My instinct is to believe that employees worried about their jobs are perhaps likely to be better and more careful, rather than the converse? It's the rest of their lives that are more likely to suffer. But, I have no evidence to back up this instinct.

G

[kwateow]

French employment law is designed so it's almost impossible to fire anyone.

Air France employees must feel pretty secure (complacent?).

Look at their safety record.

[Brian Abraham]

Some years ago there was a crash of a Citation belonging to one of the aviation teaching academies in the USA. The crash was fatal to all on board and the stress caused to the pilot, who had a senior administrative role in the academy, by the FAA was put forward as a likely major contributor to the cause. The FAA were out to get him, much like the unsavoury Bob Hoover case. Was much written about in the aviation press at the time.

Untitled Page

[IGh]

pending LAYOFF -- ? continue work ?

"... employment insecurity ... safety?... a human factors subject ... given current economic situation.... previous quality research?"

?Furlough-sabotage? Or mere distraction?

This element has CHANGED over the past few decades. In earlier decades with massive layoffs, at the big manufacturer, when the list of weekly layoffs arrived, then the manager would physically accompany that now former-employee off the property (too much risk to have the man near the product).

Then in the early 1990's the USA law required the big manufacturer to continue paying the man for several weeks (?two months?) after notification of layoff.

Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN)
(29 USC §2101 et seq. ; 20 CFR Part 639)

"... WARN protects workers, their families, and communities by requiring employers to provide notification 60 calendar days in advance of plant closings and mass layoffs...."

During earlier decades, at the airlines, cycles were more frequent -- most of us were on furlough for years, some pilots suffered multiple layoffs. At the airlines too, these new laws kept soon-to-be ex-employees near aircraft, even flying in the cockpit, for weeks after their "notice" of impending furlough.

There have been massive layoffs since 2001. The damage to facilities was sometimes obvious (baggage smashers destroying sections of terminal), but very little sabotage to aircraft, and only a few mentions of the impending furlough in mishap reports.

I had suspected that the new laws (with soon-to-be ex-employees staying on property) would lead to Furlough-sabotage, but it proved not so bad. [To be honest, there were many co-pilots who shouldn't have been near an aircraft after the furlough announcement; but the company couldn't afford to give away several weeks of pay without service.]

[grounded27]

This has been a fact of life since 3 months into my career. I deal with this as a career factor. The bottom line is the worse I had been treated by the bottom feeders, the more I have driven to excel and progress. Nasty fact of life anyone entering an aviation career should understand before making any commitment.

[HAWK21M]

Being concerned about your job will enable the person to work better instead.

[Denti]

In my experience it makes flying a lot worse. We were bought up by another airline and we were about to be closed down, but nobody knew in what fashion and if we would keep our jobs, just in another much worse company.

There was non-stop talking on the flight deck, crew room and of course on stopovers about the situation, the financial dangers and so on. So much so that work related talk stopped nearly completely, check lists were forgotten, radio calls missed etc. During that time we had numerous small incidents, thank god nothing big.

[Brian Abraham]

Denti, a bit like that airliner that over flew its destination by a hundred miles or so while the crew were deep in discussion (with laptop) about airline/rostering/seniority matters recently.

[Denti]

Indeed, there is a certain similarity. Although one could argue that being faced with not being able to earn enough money for your family is a different topic than rosters. But the general mechanism is the same.

[scrubba]

Trim Stab,

It's a great question. The commenters who suggest that insecurity is a great motivator know nothing about human factors, good management practises or what it is to feel insecure.

For the serious people, there is only anecdotal and subjective commentary on the subject. The reason: the age old problem of measurement.

How do you measure employment insecurity? How do you measure the different reactions between human beings to employment insecurity? How do you measure the correlation between the reactions of human beings generally and operational performance? How do you measure the correlation between the operational performance of individuals and the safety of a flight? How do you measure aviation safety?

Tough subject for objective research....

[framer]

Well....could you look at the number and type of FOQA soft alerts and hard alerts during a time of known insecurity and run them against previous data to see if there is a statistically relevent increase?

[grounded27]

HAWK21M

Being concerned about your job will enable the person to work better instead.

Man you sound like kool aid drinking slave labour. I would say with ought a doubt that stress equals poor performance, rash decisions et cetera. My position is that aviation is one of the most stressfully industries and least reliable but there can be great personal and financial reward if you play your cards right.

Now to give credence in the quote, a determined man thrives in this environment pushes hard to gain experience will have the upper hand, but how is this different from any other industry.

Forgive me but I have seen too many people bow at the industry and management. Arse kissers have their place I suppose. My allegiance is to the $$$ with a love of aviation. Stress reduction is almost a job in it's own.

[RainingLogic]

Only research I can give you is 'in the field'...when a boss remarked on the problems of another flight department, where the pilots were held in indentured servitude with contracts and such. He thought it was nuts to make pilots unhappy, then give them planes and people to fly around.

I know from personal experience that many pilots are barely capable of doing more then getting the plane from point a to b...add in stress, money problems, apathetic attitudes, lack of ethics, morality, etc, and it's a deadly combination of a pilot that is now just 'past it' when dealing with an in flight problem.

Sim instructors load up pilots all the time to failure...pilots bringing in all their problems to the sim, just means they hit the wall sooner.

[thermostat]

Human Factors

Trim Stab, back in 1988 I bought a book "Human Factors in Flight" by Capt. Frank H. Hawkins. He was the HF consultant for KLM where he flew for over 30 years. The book is priceless and I do recommend that you get a copy and enjoy it's contents. He does have some info on stress which you may find useful.
Good luck with it.

[fwjc]

Funny, feeling insecure about my own job made me re-evaluate my position and choose to start on the path to commercial aviation. Figured I'd rather work hard for something that I wanted to do...

As for the impact on productivity, if I'm honest I've seen several colleagues give up caring. If the employer cares so little about the staff, why should they care? Alternatively there are those who have seen repeat waves of redundancies as opportunity to make themselves indispensable. And there are some people who will always maintain standards, because that's the way they are.

[Shell Management]

1999 Citation Accident mentioned by Brian

the stress caused to the pilot, who had a senior administrative role in the academy, by the FAA was put forward as a likely major contributor to the cause

If you read the link Brian posted you will actually see this is not correct.

The probable cause was:

The pilot descended below the minimum altitude for the segment of the GPS approach. Factors relating to the accident were low ceilings, rain, and pilot fatigue.

Some with political agendas may focus on the fact that the FAA were engaged in an action against the school's part 145 repair station, following an inspection, which revealed several deficiencies to adequately monitor, document and perform required maintenance, and falsely conclude this created the fatigue. However any safety expert will see other issues in the report

It is said in the NTSB report that:

The school showed a "strong dislike of the FAA."

So no doubt that encouraged the enforcement action to be held up by some parties as more significant.

Other comments in the NTSB report are:

"They are very proud ... They don't receive any government money. They would rather you (the Federal Government) weren't here." An FAA inspector said, "the folks down there didn't like us roaming around."

If you look at the factual toxicology evidence you start to see other reasons for the fatigue:

The results of FAA toxicology testing of specimens from the pilot revealed concentrations of Doxepin in kidney and liver. The Physicians' Desk Reference states that "... drowsiness may occur with the use of this drug, patients should be warned of the possibility and cautioned against driving a car or operating dangerous machinery while taking the drug." The physician who prescribed the Doxepin to the pilot said that he was using it to treat the pilot's "irritable bowel" condition.

Precautions stated in the PDR include that "... drowsiness may occur with the use of this drug, patients should be warned of the possibility and cautioned against driving a car or operating dangerous machinery while taking the drug."

You will also see comments on his workload that also explain the fatigue:

The pilot served as the Director of Aviation Science at the College of the Ozarks. According to the 1999-2000 College Catalog, the Aviation Science program prepares students to become Aviation Maintenance Technicians, qualifies students for certification by the FAA as Aviation Maintenance Technicians with Airframe and Powerplant ratings, and assists those students involved in the aviation industry with additional training as necessary to meet current demands in the field of air transportation. The program enrolls approximately 72 students total, and accepts 24 students into the program at the beginning of each fall semester.

The pilot's duties as director included curriculum development and implementation, oversight of the college's maintenance school program, oversight of the 14 CFR Part 61 flight school, counseling and advising students, and managing the department's faculty and staff.

Additionally, the pilot was the manager of the M. Graham Clark Airport. Responsibilities assigned under the airport manager's duties included parking and servicing transient aircraft, facilities management, hangar rentals, car rentals, fueling of aircraft, rental of the college's airplanes, oversight of the 14 CFR Part 145 aircraft repair station, weather observation, fire and emergency operations, managing the airport staff, and overseeing special airport projects.

The pilot was responsible to the college administration for the Aviation Science school budget and the budget covering the operation of the airport.

Prior to the accident, the pilot was involved in preliminary negotiations of a contract designed to move and extend the airport's runway.

The pilot was also a designated pilot examiner and administered all of the students' private pilot checkrides. The pilot also administered check flights for additional ratings in airplanes.

The pilot was the only person at the college qualified to pilot the Cessna 525 airplane, at the time of the accident. Between the time the college received delivery of the airplane, in August, 1998, and the time of the accident, the pilot logged 328 hours in the airplane.

Interviews with several members of the college's staff and faculty, and students, revealed that college's administration and staff were aware of the pilot's workload. They described it as the pilot having "a full plate."

What is more, as one FAA inspector testified:

"He ran the place with a tight fist. He had the final say with regard to everything."

There is also a statement that:

A friend, who spoke with the pilot just before the accident flight, confirmed the pilot saying "I haven't slept for three days."

Yet he still did the flight.

While this may be a good example of commercial pressure it is not a reason to be critical of the FAA enforcing compliance with regulations.

[Piltdown Man]

Yet he still did the flight.

This statement shows why people like Shell Management should have absolutely NOTHING to do with aviation safety. Ignorant, vindictive, small minded, poisonous little men like this should only get as close as a photograph of an aeroplane to real aviation.

I don't have enough information in the report to even start to understand what happened. But firstly I'd ignore the toxicology - unless the word "may" is replaced by "will" I'll not buy that as anything more than a possible contributory cause. But I'd like more information about how this guy deals with stress. His 'full plate' (admin, examining, teaching, charter, combined with impending action by the FAA and certain personality traits means that he may not be the clearest thinker and have a clear mind (distraction?) just before the accident. Here the important word is 'may'. I'd also like to know how he flew.

With regard to the Feds., they should be able to recognise a 'one-man band' who's bitten off more than they can chew and other such potential problem areas. My limited exposure to these at the local/regional level is that guys have a pretty good feel for what is going on in their neck of the woods. They'll know the personalities, their abilities and one would have thought, their weaknesses. However, no additional information has come from this source. It would be fair to ask why not.

But overall, not unless you can get inside the minds of people like this pilot can we prevent a re-occurrence. Which is after all, what "safety" is all about.

PM

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Denti;

I went through a similar experience in the '90's when flying on the North Sea. A contract came up for renewal and the oil company concerned (Shell, now you come to mention it) were prepared to re-award so long as the price was cheaper than 5 years before.

We went through months of uncertainty, and like you I watched as highly experienced crews became very distracted and concentration on the job in hand was lost. There were incidents, luckily nothing major, but there was a feeling in the crew room that if the situation had gone on much longer then a major incident would have happened.

It was a huge relief to all when it was over and the redundancy notices had been handed out, all of us walked away glad that nothing had gone wrong and pleased that the guys we knew off shore were sorry to see us go.

It amazed me that a company who spouted safety as much as Shell could leave pilots and engineers under such stress for such a long time, it was almost cruel.

I worked there for another four years and walked the next time Shell started their usual antics.

SND

[Shell Management]

Sir Niall Dementia

If you know as much as you claim, you will also know that Shell specify better equipment, greater training and more extensive experience requirements then any other oil company. They were the first to require an SMS, well before ICAO and also since 1999 required a full HEMP Safety Case.

I'm sorry but your competition clearly offered a safer service and a lower price, demonstrating just the continuous improvement needed to enhance safety.

Having a go at me now does not change the fact you state that you were on the losing side.

Ofton operators just get a bit complacent and think they can milk their customer on price and safety.

Thats one reason that in places like the North Sea Shell maintains call off contracts with all the major operators, so they can audit them and keep an eye on the ones that are making improvements, which makes switching so much easier.

IT IS POOR MANAGEMENT THAT CREATES UNCOMPETITIVENESS AND THE ASSOCIATED COMMERCIAL PRESSURES - NOT CUSTOMERS (OR REGULATORS) DEMANDING SAFETY COMPLIANCE!

Piltdown Man

As the NTSB said, the pilot himself was saying he hadn't slept for 3 days. While you decline to draw any conclusions on this and dismiss toxicology evidence I see you are happy to rudely and childishly draw others when a fact is simply stated.

Quote: Yet he still did the flight.

This statement shows why people like Shell Management should have absolutely NOTHING to do with aviation safety. Ignorant, vindictive, small minded, poisonous little men like this should only get as close as a photograph of an aeroplane to real aviation

Though I think is hilarious that you then go on to say:

But overall, not unless you can get inside the minds of people like this pilot can we prevent a re-occurrence.

Which was sort of my point. Why on earth would someone who recognised they were short of sleep carry on and fly?

You then abandon all effort of analysis

I don't have enough information in the report to even start to understand what happened.

Well luckily the NTSB did have enough information - or are you doubting their competance?