the stress caused to the pilot, who had a senior administrative role in the academy, by the FAA was put forward as a likely major contributor to the cause
If you read the link Brian posted you will actually see this is not correct.
The probable cause was:
The pilot descended below the minimum altitude for the segment of the GPS approach. Factors relating to the accident were low ceilings, rain, and pilot fatigue.
Some with political agendas may focus on the fact that the FAA were engaged in an action against the school's part 145 repair station, following an inspection, which revealed several deficiencies to adequately monitor, document and perform required maintenance, and falsely conclude this created the fatigue. However any safety expert will see other issues in the report
It is said in the NTSB report that:
The school showed a "strong dislike of the FAA."
So no doubt that encouraged the enforcement action to be held up by some parties as more significant.
Other comments in the NTSB report are:
"They are very proud ... They don't receive any government money. They would rather you (the Federal Government) weren't here." An FAA inspector said, "the folks down there didn't like us roaming around."
If you look at the factual toxicology evidence you start to see other reasons for the fatigue:
The results of FAA toxicology testing of specimens from the pilot revealed concentrations of Doxepin in kidney and liver. The Physicians' Desk Reference states that "... drowsiness may occur with the use of this drug, patients should be warned of the possibility and cautioned against driving a car or operating dangerous machinery while taking the drug." The physician who prescribed the Doxepin to the pilot said that he was using it to treat the pilot's "irritable bowel" condition.
Precautions stated in the PDR include that "... drowsiness may occur with the use of this drug, patients should be warned of the possibility and cautioned against driving a car or operating dangerous machinery while taking the drug."
You will also see comments on his workload that also explain the fatigue:
The pilot served as the Director of Aviation Science at the College of the Ozarks. According to the 1999-2000 College Catalog, the Aviation Science program prepares students to become Aviation Maintenance Technicians, qualifies students for certification by the FAA as Aviation Maintenance Technicians with Airframe and Powerplant ratings, and assists those students involved in the aviation industry with additional training as necessary to meet current demands in the field of air transportation. The program enrolls approximately 72 students total, and accepts 24 students into the program at the beginning of each fall semester.
The pilot's duties as director included curriculum development and implementation, oversight of the college's maintenance school program, oversight of the 14 CFR Part 61 flight school, counseling and advising students, and managing the department's faculty and staff.
Additionally, the pilot was the manager of the M. Graham Clark Airport. Responsibilities assigned under the airport manager's duties included parking and servicing transient aircraft, facilities management, hangar rentals, car rentals, fueling of aircraft, rental of the college's airplanes, oversight of the 14 CFR Part 145 aircraft repair station, weather observation, fire and emergency operations, managing the airport staff, and overseeing special airport projects.
The pilot was responsible to the college administration for the Aviation Science school budget and the budget covering the operation of the airport.
Prior to the accident, the pilot was involved in preliminary negotiations of a contract designed to move and extend the airport's runway.
The pilot was also a designated pilot examiner and administered all of the students' private pilot checkrides. The pilot also administered check flights for additional ratings in airplanes.
The pilot was the only person at the college qualified to pilot the Cessna 525 airplane, at the time of the accident. Between the time the college received delivery of the airplane, in August, 1998, and the time of the accident, the pilot logged 328 hours in the airplane.
Interviews with several members of the college's staff and faculty, and students, revealed that college's administration and staff were aware of the pilot's workload. They described it as the pilot having "a full plate."
What is more, as one FAA inspector testified:
"He ran the place with a tight fist. He had the final say with regard to everything."
There is also a statement that:
A friend, who spoke with the pilot just before the accident flight, confirmed the pilot saying "I haven't slept for three days."
Yet he still did the flight.
While this may be a good example of commercial pressure it is not a reason to be critical of the FAA enforcing compliance with regulations.