Air Transat - "Panic in the Cockpit" recording
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Disgusted of Tunbridge
Disgusted of Tunbridge
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Well at last I've listened to the recording, and I think most of you will agree with my interpretation. Panic? You think that's panic? You haven't lived? I hear a crew dealing with some mysterious problem, having to shout because of the dratted loud continuous warning chiming going on- absolutely no 'panic'. I heard no panic- urgency yes...and I'm glad there was urgency, but this poor crew are being slated for panic and it's really a little daft, so can we stop being so excitable and using the word 'panic', because that is not what I'm hearing!
I also object to CVR use when it is purely an accident investigation device and is not intended for public entertainment.
I also object to CVR use when it is purely an accident investigation device and is not intended for public entertainment.
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"I also object to CVR use when it is purely an accident investigation device and is not intended for public entertainment."
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It's actually an open mike transmission that was picked up by an unscrupulous journo on his scanner and who immediately made sure it would make the six o'clock news.
Beware my friends, beware... Absolutely everything we say is monitored by someone somewhere.
Beware my friends, beware... Absolutely everything we say is monitored by someone somewhere.
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picked up by an unscrupulous journo on his scanner and who immediately made sure it would make the six o'clock news.
It`s from a group of volunteers, I believe.
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Definition of Panic:
Great agitation and anxiety caused by the expectation or the realization of danger. A sudden, overpowering terror, often affecting many people at once.
Great agitation and anxiety caused by the expectation or the realization of danger. A sudden, overpowering terror, often affecting many people at once.
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Narrative: TSC211, an Airbus 310 operated by Air Transat, was conducting an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight departing from Quebec/Jean-Lesage (CYQB) to Montreal/Trudeau (CYUL). Shortly after takeoff, the pilot declared an emergency (PAN PAN). At the same time, the radar registered a drop in altitude from 3 000 ft to 1 300 ft. The pilot then asked to confirm aircraft speed and altitude. He said there had been a problem with speed indication, which seemed to be resolved now. The emergency was cancelled at 1949Z and the aircraft continued its flight to destination.
Narrative: Update #1: The TSB occurrence number and class of investigation were added. The aircraft registration was added. Event name "Aircraft navigation/communication equipment" replaced with "Weather clear air turbulence (CAT)/wind shear/turbulence. According to TSB Report #A08Q0051, an airbus 310, operated by Air Transat, departed from Quebec/Jean-Lesage (CYQB) bound for Montreal/Trudeau (CYUL). During flap retraction at 3 000 feet, strong wind shears caused fluctuations of altitude and airspeed. The crew declared a PAN PAN emergency. A few seconds later, flight conditions returned to normal. The aircraft continued to climb normally, pursued its flight to Montreal/Trudeau and landed without incident. In accordance with aircraft maintenance manual (AMM) 0551-17, a check was made for severe turbulence and to determine if the aircraft exceeded Mmo/Vmo limits. No damage was found. The flight recorder was also removed. Flight data analysis revealed that load factor was not exceeded.
Narrative: Update #2: Investigation Class 5 changed to investigation Class 3.
A class 3 investigation means that a final report should be issued eventually.
Narrative: Update #1: The TSB occurrence number and class of investigation were added. The aircraft registration was added. Event name "Aircraft navigation/communication equipment" replaced with "Weather clear air turbulence (CAT)/wind shear/turbulence. According to TSB Report #A08Q0051, an airbus 310, operated by Air Transat, departed from Quebec/Jean-Lesage (CYQB) bound for Montreal/Trudeau (CYUL). During flap retraction at 3 000 feet, strong wind shears caused fluctuations of altitude and airspeed. The crew declared a PAN PAN emergency. A few seconds later, flight conditions returned to normal. The aircraft continued to climb normally, pursued its flight to Montreal/Trudeau and landed without incident. In accordance with aircraft maintenance manual (AMM) 0551-17, a check was made for severe turbulence and to determine if the aircraft exceeded Mmo/Vmo limits. No damage was found. The flight recorder was also removed. Flight data analysis revealed that load factor was not exceeded.
Narrative: Update #2: Investigation Class 5 changed to investigation Class 3.
A class 3 investigation means that a final report should be issued eventually.
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This is what i know about the incident.
The Captain is still on stress leave and looks as though he won't come back.
The incident is under serious investigation.
I have heard that they were seconds from crashing.
There was a check captain in the cockpit of this flight, i believe it was his voice we could here on the recordings. "whats going on, whats going on?"
There was no windshear reported so it seems that a major error in the cockpit caused this. Possible wrong settings? something not switched on or off?
The aircraft was found to be in full working order.
The Captain is still on stress leave and looks as though he won't come back.
The incident is under serious investigation.
I have heard that they were seconds from crashing.
There was a check captain in the cockpit of this flight, i believe it was his voice we could here on the recordings. "whats going on, whats going on?"
There was no windshear reported so it seems that a major error in the cockpit caused this. Possible wrong settings? something not switched on or off?
The aircraft was found to be in full working order.
Last edited by MAN2YKF; 4th Oct 2008 at 02:35.
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Be nice when multi-lateration is rolled out everywhere, enabling ATC to give an independent and accurate altitude (and rate of climb/descent if necessary). Might alleviate some worrying situations
I had a look at the TSB Canada website today .The list of reports was from 2007 and this incident took place in 2008 so we will probably have to wait a bit longer for it.
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Silver and Fully...personal chides, whether tounge-in-cheek or not are pretty petty, don't you think?
CVR's are sacred, but once your words are transmitted over the R/T everything you say becomes fair game...including "panic"...
CVR's are sacred, but once your words are transmitted over the R/T everything you say becomes fair game...including "panic"...
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Keep in mind that the copilot was a training captain.
If anyone can translate appendix B from french to english, it would be greatly appreciated.
http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-report...1/a08q0051.pdf
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors
1.The take-off briefing did not take into account the elements that contributed to the aircraft’s exceptional climb performance; as a result, the briefing did not improve cohesion in the cockpit as it should have done.
2.Following the disconnection of the co-pilot’s headset, the “Rotate” call was missed during the take-off run. The aircraft lifted off at 182 knots, or 44 knots above the rotation speed calculated by the crew.
3.The actions required to follow the flight path and climb profile contributed to overloading the crew and resulted in errors. The sequence of actions and standard calls during the climb was disrupted. As a result, the crew did not select Climb Thrust (CL) on the thrust rating panel (TRP).
4.When levelling off at 3000 feet, the captain activated the electric trim until the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) reached its nose down stop. This resulted in an out-of-trim condition.
5.To reduce the aircraft’s speed, the captain retarded the throttles. However, he activated the Go Levers without noticing. The go-around mode was activated, power increased to the maximum, and the aircraft’s speed continued to increase.
6.The unexpected change to go-around mode confused the captain when he had a heavy workload. Exposed to information overload, preoccupied by the aircraft’s increasing speed, and experiencing a somatogravic illusion, the captain focused all his attention on the aircraft’s speed rather than on the instruments. As a result, the captain did not realize that the aircraft was accelerating towards the ground, and mistakenly believed that the indicated speed was incorrect.
7.The captain did not react to the co-pilot’s warnings that the aircraft’s attitude did not comply with the desired flight profile. As a result, the co-pilot took control of the aircraft without recognizing that the aircraft was out of trim.
8.When he took the controls, the co-pilot did not realize that the aircraft was out of trim despite the exceptionally high control column forces. As a result, the pitch trim was not used to reduce the control column forces.
9.Because of the proximity of the ground, the crew had little time to identify the problem, determine and consider the options, and coordinate their efforts. As a result, the effect of the time-related stress could have precipitated each pilot into incorrectly diagnosing the source of the problem.
10.The crew’s performance suggests that some elements of the company’s training program did not reach the targeted objectives regarding the coordination of crew members, the regulations concerning take-off limits, the recognition of an out-of-trim condition, the autopilot use and the understanding and application of abnormal procedures.
If anyone can translate appendix B from french to english, it would be greatly appreciated.
http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-report...1/a08q0051.pdf
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors
1.The take-off briefing did not take into account the elements that contributed to the aircraft’s exceptional climb performance; as a result, the briefing did not improve cohesion in the cockpit as it should have done.
2.Following the disconnection of the co-pilot’s headset, the “Rotate” call was missed during the take-off run. The aircraft lifted off at 182 knots, or 44 knots above the rotation speed calculated by the crew.
3.The actions required to follow the flight path and climb profile contributed to overloading the crew and resulted in errors. The sequence of actions and standard calls during the climb was disrupted. As a result, the crew did not select Climb Thrust (CL) on the thrust rating panel (TRP).
4.When levelling off at 3000 feet, the captain activated the electric trim until the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) reached its nose down stop. This resulted in an out-of-trim condition.
5.To reduce the aircraft’s speed, the captain retarded the throttles. However, he activated the Go Levers without noticing. The go-around mode was activated, power increased to the maximum, and the aircraft’s speed continued to increase.
6.The unexpected change to go-around mode confused the captain when he had a heavy workload. Exposed to information overload, preoccupied by the aircraft’s increasing speed, and experiencing a somatogravic illusion, the captain focused all his attention on the aircraft’s speed rather than on the instruments. As a result, the captain did not realize that the aircraft was accelerating towards the ground, and mistakenly believed that the indicated speed was incorrect.
7.The captain did not react to the co-pilot’s warnings that the aircraft’s attitude did not comply with the desired flight profile. As a result, the co-pilot took control of the aircraft without recognizing that the aircraft was out of trim.
8.When he took the controls, the co-pilot did not realize that the aircraft was out of trim despite the exceptionally high control column forces. As a result, the pitch trim was not used to reduce the control column forces.
9.Because of the proximity of the ground, the crew had little time to identify the problem, determine and consider the options, and coordinate their efforts. As a result, the effect of the time-related stress could have precipitated each pilot into incorrectly diagnosing the source of the problem.
10.The crew’s performance suggests that some elements of the company’s training program did not reach the targeted objectives regarding the coordination of crew members, the regulations concerning take-off limits, the recognition of an out-of-trim condition, the autopilot use and the understanding and application of abnormal procedures.
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Loss of situational awareness leading to an upset down to 1000ft AGL at a speed of 370KIAS is not for the faint hearted indeed.
Translation of French BEA comments in Appendix B:
===quote
The event is considered as loss of control in pitch by the BST. The BEA rather considers that the event is a loss of situational awareness starting at takeoff roll, becoming worse during level off and descent.
Indeed, during takeoff roll the rotate speed is not called off by the crew. A gear down climb to 1700ft follows.
At level off, the aircraft is placed in untrimmed condition when the pilot substantially trims the nose down while he nearly simultaneously pulls the control column, the key element of the event.
Finally during the descent, the crew applies up elevator while remaining in nose down untrimmed condition despite the control column stiffness sensations allowing to become aware of this untrimmed condition.
At an altitude of about 1000ft, despite the trim still nose down, the combination of stick pull and the increase in thrust will allow the aircraft to level off and then begin a climb.
During all these stages, the aircraft responded coherently to the crew actions.
===endquote
The rest of the appendix refers to comments apparently made by BEA on a draft report because they seem to be incorporated in the final report.
Translation of French BEA comments in Appendix B:
===quote
The event is considered as loss of control in pitch by the BST. The BEA rather considers that the event is a loss of situational awareness starting at takeoff roll, becoming worse during level off and descent.
Indeed, during takeoff roll the rotate speed is not called off by the crew. A gear down climb to 1700ft follows.
At level off, the aircraft is placed in untrimmed condition when the pilot substantially trims the nose down while he nearly simultaneously pulls the control column, the key element of the event.
Finally during the descent, the crew applies up elevator while remaining in nose down untrimmed condition despite the control column stiffness sensations allowing to become aware of this untrimmed condition.
At an altitude of about 1000ft, despite the trim still nose down, the combination of stick pull and the increase in thrust will allow the aircraft to level off and then begin a climb.
During all these stages, the aircraft responded coherently to the crew actions.
===endquote
The rest of the appendix refers to comments apparently made by BEA on a draft report because they seem to be incorporated in the final report.
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In retirement I am amazed to read that major airline Airbus pilots seem unable to fly manual throttle and apparently fail to scan their flight instruments sufficiently in a non normal situation to keep their aircraft the right way up.
A warning light or an aural alert seems to auto cancel their ability to fly instruments....they do not seem very good at using the radar to avoid weather either.
A warning light or an aural alert seems to auto cancel their ability to fly instruments....they do not seem very good at using the radar to avoid weather either.
