Early Config change

[411A]

You may indeed be correct about some models of the HS.121, Final 3 Greens.

And, as for excitement with the older straight-pipe 707's...ah, yes, 'tis true.

Rolling for 11,500 feet on a 12,000 foot runway, and then finding the climb not what I expected, hmmm, yes interesting indeed.
Having said this, once you got the aeroplane cleaned up, and accelerated, it did quite well, even if it did suck up fuel like a big Hoover.
Hey, it was old and I was a brand new Captain...an interesting combination, to say the least.

Also, on another subject, some new(er) pilots might be surprised that some companies only use a couple of the approved flap setting for takeoff, altho the manufacturer may indeed provide a rather wide range of flap configurations for takeoff.
One size does not fit all...

[hambleoldboy]

Or in the case of the MD11 with 'Dial-a-flap' an infinite number of flap settings for takeoff...

[Few Cloudy]

More on closing the loop.

Jondc9,

What I should also have written, just to round off the procedure on the last page, is that the Flying Pilot (PF) then checked the indication to be sure the manipulation had been correctly carried out and came back with "checked".

It sounds unwieldy but we soon got the hang of it and it worked well.

FC.

[jondc9]

few cloudy

thanks. I am totally in favor of making the cockpit way more professional.

instead of saying gear up and that 's that for example, I believe in something like:

PF: Gear Up

PNF: positive rate of climb confirmed, gear selected up, gear in transit, gear up and locked, uplatch check complete, gear selected "off" .pressure checked and quantitiy checked ok

or something like that.


less is no more in the cockpit for intelligent disciplined pilots. for morons, well better just hope for the best!


all the best and bombs away!

jon

[Smudger]

What? Are you drunk?

[jondc9]

no smudger, I'm not drunk

you must not fall in the first catagory of pilots I listed

there is quite a bit of slop in many cockpits and I for one am against it.

j

[Oh that's super!]

Originally Posted by jondc9

I am totally in favor of making the cockpit way more professional.

instead of saying gear up and that 's that for example, I believe in something like:

PF: Gear Up

PNF: positive rate of climb confirmed, gear selected up, gear in transit, gear up and locked, uplatch check complete, gear selected "off" .pressure checked and quantitiy checked ok

or something like that.

That seems like a lot of effort! Think WORKLOAD MANAGEMENT... Surely you are trying to wind us up?

[Junkflyer]

Why would anyone want more useless drivel immediately after take off? Our co procedures has the pnf call positive climb then pf asks for gear up. It seems to work reasonably well.

[jondc9]

workload management, drivel. ha!

if your airline is not taking on new people and there is a long time for promotion (seniority wise) less can be more...but if you are taking on new people, having people upgrade on new types right along with brand new copilots who are new to the line and the type, more discipline and professionalism in the cockpit pays off.

workload management, more like: limited ability to process information? or tunnel vision?


cheer up! whoops

jon

[Pilot Pete]

I am totally in favor of making the cockpit way more professional.

instead of saying gear up and that 's that for example, I believe in something like:

PF: Gear Up

PNF: positive rate of climb confirmed, gear selected up, gear in transit, gear up and locked, uplatch check complete, gear selected "off" .pressure checked and quantitiy checked ok

or something like that.

less is no more in the cockpit for intelligent disciplined pilots. for morons, well better just hope for the best!

You'd better get on to Boeing and Airbus and tell them to remove all their warning systems because it will make pilots more professional. The whole reason they put them in place is to REDUCE your workload and do the monitoring for you, only warning you when there is a problem.

Your idea of upping the PNF workload into the stratosphere just after takeoff if completely flawed. I would assume you are advocating similar complex drills for movement of every lever and switch, otherwise you are not being consistent? As for it making a pilot more professional, I think you will find it would do the opposite. As others have pointed out, it's about workload management. The PNF is primarily moving the levers for the PF at this stage, but equally important is MONITORING the PF. Your system would have the PNF over-worked, especially if the PF is hand-flying the aircraft. Your idea is a naive opinion about 'professionalism' in the flight-deck. To have any credibility you should have suggested checking of these system functions at a more appropriate time, oh, just like my SOPs tell me to do with the After Take-off Checklist.

PP

[omnidirectional737]

I would like to add my name to the list of people who have turned the hydralic pumps off instead of the engine anti-ice, distracted talking to ATC at the same time. Luckily I was looking at the lights and noticed the amber instead of the blue and immeadiately turned them back on. Embarassing and the other guy said he had done it before aswell. I am extra vigilent now and also echo everybody who says take that extra bit of time to think.

[jondc9]

Pilot Pete:

using the warning systems to reduce your workload...you are just asking for trouble.

recall the MD80 (northwest airlines) at KDTW. took off with incorrect flap/slat setting crashed killing all but one miracle child (purple fingernail polish was the only identifiying mark).

In that case the warning system failed.



you see, warning systems CAN and do fail.

The PNF of course monitors the PF...but can and should do more.

j

[AerocatS2A]

Originally Posted by jondc9

I flew a very nice plane at one time called the North American -Rockwell Sabreliner (40). The leading edge devices would automatically extend or retract based on the aerodynamic forces on the wing. Fancy springs calibrated for a certain relative wind/airspeed. The pilot could only control them by changing speed (aoa I suppose really).

I've also flown an aircraft that had automatic slats, though the pilot could also lock them in the retracted position if they desired.

It was called a Tiger Moth .

[Pilot Pete]

Originally Posted by jondc9

Pilot Pete:recall the MD80 (northwest airlines) at KDTW. took off with incorrect flap/slat setting crashed killing all but one miracle child

What's that got to do with increasing your workload just after take-off by using the method you discribed? I agree you shouldn't 'blindly' rely on warning systems, but your idea is rediculous and potentially DECREASING flight safety, certainly not improving it.

As I pointed out, my company SOPs already get the PNF to check the system you mentioned (landing gear) at a more appropriate time (when doing the After Take-off Checklist), not at the point of calling for it to go up.

I would like to add that my company SOPs also call for the PNF (always right seat occupant whilst taxiing) to challenge me with "Flaps" in the Before Take-off Checks. The workload is not high when I reach over, grasp the flap handle, ensure the handle is gated correctly, check the flap guage to ensure that the needles agree with the selected position and I have the 'green light' illuminated (737), which I have just mentioned in my Before Take-off Review, ensuring we have everything set correctly and it is still appropriate to the conditions.......

See, someone put a lot of thought into producing APPROPRIATE checks at APPROPRIATE times, backing up configs and performance in order to ENHANCE flight safety. You sir, have apparently not put the same amount of thought into your procedure and if you have, then you are deluded to think it enhances safety, because it doesn't, which is probably why no airline that I can think of has adopted it.

PP

[jondc9]

ppand mike jenev


interesting thoughts from closed minds!

you indicate:

PNF: positive rate

PF: gear up


what happens when due to human error:

PNF: V1/Rotate...oh bugger ENGINE FAILURE

PF: max power!


max power!


and there is no cue for gear up since PNF has forgotten to say "positive rate"?



you believe in the less is more theory. I disagree with it. I've seen what happens in procedures developed when this theory is used...not good.


I believe in strict procedures that work in all situation and pilots capable of doing them while monitoring basic airmanship.

with the verbal diahreah as you call it, the systems are really checked, memory engrams are etched and deviations easily observed.


Do you recall a continental airlines dc9 that landed gear up in houston awhile ago? great procedures there!


have fun

jon

[Pilot Pete]

what happens when due to human error:

PNF: V1/Rotate...oh bugger ENGINE FAILURE

PF: max power!


max power!


and there is no cue for gear up since PNF has forgotten to say "positive rate"?

What ARE you talking about? So where in your procedure

PF: Gear Up

PNF: positive rate of climb confirmed, gear selected up, gear in transit, gear up and locked, uplatch check complete, gear selected "off" .pressure checked and quantitiy checked ok

or something like that.

is HUMAN ERROR prevented? The shock effect of the engine failure is just as likely (if not more likely) to affect the PF, who is now concentrating hard on flying the aircraft. Why do you put faith in the PF remembering to call "gear up", when you have no faith in the PNF remembering to call "positive rate"? Your thinking is flawed. I'm not 'closed' to good suggestions, but yours patently isn't.

you believe in the less is more theory. I disagree with it. I've seen what happens in procedures developed when this theory is used...not good.

Do enlighten us.

I've worked for a company that advocated calling EVERY FMA change. This wasn't better than the Boeing philosophy of ONLY calling them when they are NOT what you expect. I'm not advocating not using system knowledge and monitoring what you are doing, but giving a running commentary during high workload times is NOT beneficial.

So I ask you again to expand on your theory. Do you advocate similar callouts every time a switch is moved? If not, why not? From my experience, the more you have to say in SOPs, the more pilots slip into paying lip service to the words.

Your cause is admirable, but your process is flawed. Why can't a PNF put the gear up when called for, check what he is doing and only mention a malfunction if he sees one? Why recite all the things he is checking? Should I recite all the switches I am moving and their effect during scan flows? Your theory moves into the absurd when taken beyond your one example.

We already monitor what happens when we move switches/ levers/ press buttons to ensure they have the desired effect. There is no need to recite all that if the effect is as expected. Call it if it DOESN'T HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT.

I don't know the specific incident you refer to regarding a gear up landing, but I bet you the landing checklist called for a check that the gear was down. If pilots don't action checklists thoroughly then it doesn't matter what you write in them. So, tell me the incident details and show me a copy of the 'great procedures' you mention and then perhaps we would be in a position to make a judgement. You haven't convinced me yet that a diatribe would be better, nor the major manufacturers..........

PP

[jondc9]

PP

I am not trying to convince you of anything. but let me put it to you this way:

suppose every day you took the stairs to your place of business. 10 flights every day. on all vacations at hotels you always took the elevator 3 stories to your room.

if the elevator failed in the hotel, you would be well equipped to handle the stairs.


so too in flying. if you are always doing the minimum and haven't forced your brain capacity to expand by doing more all the time you won't have the reserve to handle the unexpected.


the system I described also mentioned the scenario in which new types of planes are introduced to new pilots. This also allows for a more thorough learning of systems and procedures and sets you up to be able to study and understand even newer planes as they are introduced.


as to trying to convince the manufacturers, a friend just showed me the official BOEING checklist for takeoff in the B767... he commented that it didn't even metnion turning on the transponder. why? well you don't NEED the transponder to fly now do you?


to the builder of the planes, the less you put on the checklist, the less you are liable for.


I do hope you will look up the DC9 incident mentioned. Make out of it what you will.

[Pilot Pete]

Originally Posted by jondc9

if you are always doing the minimum and haven't forced your brain capacity to expand by doing more all the time you won't have the reserve to handle the unexpected.

Sorry, what on earth has making protracted, unnecessary calls regarding the gear being put up during a critical phase of flight got to do with having 'more reserve to handle the unexpected'? It is part of being a professional pilot to know your aircraft systems. I don't need to make a diatribe about what I am checking to have enough reserve to handle the gear not going up when the lever is placed up! I say again, that I think what you are trying to achieve is admirable; i.e. pilots having better knowledge of the aircraft systems, but making long winded SOP calls is, in my opinion, not the way to go about it.

As for the manufacturers SOPs, I agree, some of it is based around litigation, but I am talking SOP philosophy, not single items that one airline does but another, or the manufacturer doesn't. You are advocating a philosophy of constant chatter about every switch that is being moved, I would advocate no chatter unless something doesn't happen as expected, but that doesn't stop the individual pilot from silently monitoring what he is doing and what occurs as a result, incorporating your ideas about this.

I think we are going to have to agree to disagree, because I still don't see the merits of increased 'spoken words' when everything is occuring as expected and the workload is already high between the crew members.

PP

[jondc9]

dear tiger moth guy...very cool, also cool is: a friend is going to the UK to participate in a tiger moth fly in this summer.

but I digress,


Dear PP:


I do think we want the same thing. I have seen too many times in the cockpit when a pilot, especially a new copilot aiming to please goes through the motions of doing something and it doesn't really get done.

For example.While "hand flying" climbing out of BWI, I was watching traffic on the left side and I called for climb thrust/power. The f/o just said it was set thinking the autothrottles had done their job, but had not really monitored the situation.

When the traffic had passed clear, I looked down and takeoff thrust was still set. The copilot was more interested in watching the traffic even though I had divided the workload, me watching traffic, him to watch engine gauges.

I have found that when pilots are new to a plane or a company, reinforcing the training process (which is all too short these days) with the extra verbiage as I described may have long term benefits.


There is also the rare scenarios of subtle incapacitation . In your philosophy (which i admit is the prevailing one) a no callout of deviation can also mean the pilot is incapacitated. Even a short episode of microsleep could cause something to be missed with nothing to check on it.


In my philosophy, the lack of a callout and the verbal diahrea as you call it, would be an alert to incapacitation.



AS the pilot population ages, incapacitation may become more and more prevelent, especially with the age 65 possibilities (us / europe seems to have gone that way).

As new pilots/types are added, the additional verbiage strengthens the training.



regards

jon

[jondc9]

Regarding sim training and "reserve for the unexpected". Did you know that in the US, sim training is now once a year instead of every 6 months?

it is also quite possible for a pilot with some incapacitation to not recognize the problem and continue to report for duty...this lack of reserve for the unexpected might not be found out in a "quiet cockpit".