Virgin Atlantic A340-600 fuel incident
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Virgin Atlantic A340-600 fuel incident
Once more we have an incident towards the end of longhaul flight.
On the one hand I'm amazed that the crew failed to notice that the tanks feeding the engines were running dry (basic airmanship?), but on the other hand I know that I could make just the same mistake after many hours airborne, tired and jetlagged. I also know that the Big Bus (indeed any Bus) can confuse the most unflappable pilot.
The Qantas Bangkok accident happened at the end of a long duty and after nearly 24 hours without sleep. I can't believe that they did what they did but, again, maybe I would do just the same in their shoes.
The CAA wants the A340 fuel system modified. Fair enough, but isn't this incident more about the insidious effects of longhaul flying on crew performance? Particularly with the A380 arriving and sectors getting even longer.
On the one hand I'm amazed that the crew failed to notice that the tanks feeding the engines were running dry (basic airmanship?), but on the other hand I know that I could make just the same mistake after many hours airborne, tired and jetlagged. I also know that the Big Bus (indeed any Bus) can confuse the most unflappable pilot.
The Qantas Bangkok accident happened at the end of a long duty and after nearly 24 hours without sleep. I can't believe that they did what they did but, again, maybe I would do just the same in their shoes.
The CAA wants the A340 fuel system modified. Fair enough, but isn't this incident more about the insidious effects of longhaul flying on crew performance? Particularly with the A380 arriving and sectors getting even longer.
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Think you got that about right.
Getting problems at the end of a long flight is not very nice.
Sounds like the crew did a great job when the second motor was having problems. Very well done.
Getting problems at the end of a long flight is not very nice.
Sounds like the crew did a great job when the second motor was having problems. Very well done.
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I'm not a pilot myself, so correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought on long-haul flights such as LHR-HKG there would be an crew change half way through the flight? If this was the case, would I be correct to assume that the crew that experienced the fuel problem would not have been on the controls since take-off at HKG?
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r304ndy,
Yes, you are right, but regardless of relief crew it's impossible to feel good towards the end of a long sector and a few days of extreme jetlag.
Think how you would feel as a passenger (even in business class) after flying UK to Hong Kong and back over 4 days, and you've been resting the entire way!
Yes, you are right, but regardless of relief crew it's impossible to feel good towards the end of a long sector and a few days of extreme jetlag.
Think how you would feel as a passenger (even in business class) after flying UK to Hong Kong and back over 4 days, and you've been resting the entire way!
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Long Haul is not safe
Excessive fatigue on long haul is a potential killer and is continually ignored by the airline bosses the Caa and the greedy accountants and shareholders.
Short of fuel;you are always short of fuel,the ground bound bean counters wont even let you take Sword fuel ie (flt plan fuel),it costs fuel to carry fuel,
Always the same "Mantra",search for a new Flt level try to find stronger tailwinds or less strong headwinds they will send you off 3 tons light on your fuel reqd fig, if the flt is a success you get "I told you ,you could make it",not thanks a lot for increasing the profits. If the flt is a failure and you have to divert or land with fuel starved engines then it's your fault and you may not fly again.
Remember Concorde /LHR so short of fuel that the Sf/o and the Flt/eng disassociated themselves from the landing, and as far as I remember the Cpt was boss pilot of the fleet .He was trying to make a point.He certainly did that,I think he flew a desk after that.
Remember the Luton based B757/737 carrier who used to dock money off the Cpt's wages if they carried too much fuel?
Long Haul; Excessive fatigue, short on fuel and multiple sneezzes, and diseases contracted from the pax not to mention
Solar radiation and Dvt risk to air crew.
It's a criminal disgrace that it should be allowed,thats why I got out.
Bloody dangerous have nothing to do with it.
Remember the drival, from the Caa Atpl Flt planning exam for the Uk licence,and the final fuel fig nauseating wasn"t it and a complete waste of time and effort. in reality managers in the real world would deduct at least 3 tons.
Remember the Human performance and limitations waffle of an exam ref fatigue. More waffle which was never been put into practise by our World Leading reglatory body at the Belgrano.
long haul crews are permanently tired not just tired completely knackered.
I firmly beleave that long haul cuts your life expectancy considerably
Short of fuel;you are always short of fuel,the ground bound bean counters wont even let you take Sword fuel ie (flt plan fuel),it costs fuel to carry fuel,
Always the same "Mantra",search for a new Flt level try to find stronger tailwinds or less strong headwinds they will send you off 3 tons light on your fuel reqd fig, if the flt is a success you get "I told you ,you could make it",not thanks a lot for increasing the profits. If the flt is a failure and you have to divert or land with fuel starved engines then it's your fault and you may not fly again.
Remember Concorde /LHR so short of fuel that the Sf/o and the Flt/eng disassociated themselves from the landing, and as far as I remember the Cpt was boss pilot of the fleet .He was trying to make a point.He certainly did that,I think he flew a desk after that.
Remember the Luton based B757/737 carrier who used to dock money off the Cpt's wages if they carried too much fuel?
Long Haul; Excessive fatigue, short on fuel and multiple sneezzes, and diseases contracted from the pax not to mention
Solar radiation and Dvt risk to air crew.
It's a criminal disgrace that it should be allowed,thats why I got out.
Bloody dangerous have nothing to do with it.
Remember the drival, from the Caa Atpl Flt planning exam for the Uk licence,and the final fuel fig nauseating wasn"t it and a complete waste of time and effort. in reality managers in the real world would deduct at least 3 tons.
Remember the Human performance and limitations waffle of an exam ref fatigue. More waffle which was never been put into practise by our World Leading reglatory body at the Belgrano.
long haul crews are permanently tired not just tired completely knackered.
I firmly beleave that long haul cuts your life expectancy considerably
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Elsewhere on this forum there is a thread about whether or not airlines can and should take action over crews with alcohol problems. Neither they nor the authorities are yet prepared to take action over fatigue.
Here we have (circumstantial) evidence of a crew making mistakes when fatigued, yet the problem is still not addressed directly.
When (not "if") we have an accident, the error will be put down to the crews. There has been study after study that firmly stated that pilots are flying fatigued and making errors of judgement or errors in operation of the equipment. And yet the fundamental reason for those errors is not corrected. And why not? Because a safer system will cost the airlines money.
N.B. The opinions expressed in this post are mine, and do not (necessarily) represent the view of PPRuNe management.
Here we have (circumstantial) evidence of a crew making mistakes when fatigued, yet the problem is still not addressed directly.
When (not "if") we have an accident, the error will be put down to the crews. There has been study after study that firmly stated that pilots are flying fatigued and making errors of judgement or errors in operation of the equipment. And yet the fundamental reason for those errors is not corrected. And why not? Because a safer system will cost the airlines money.
N.B. The opinions expressed in this post are mine, and do not (necessarily) represent the view of PPRuNe management.
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Virgin Atlantic A340-600 fuel incident
Quote
----------------------------------
nojh
Long Haul is not safe
“Excessive fatigue on long haul is a potential killer and is continually ignored by the airline bosses the CAA and the greedy accountants and shareholders.”
….
“… waffle which was never been put into practise by our World Leading reglatory body at the Belgrano.”
---------------------------------------
There has been a deliberate policy of government to reduce health and safety regulations in the workplace ie to deregulate it. There are now over 12,000 deaths of workers in the UK per annum. If Al Quaeda had killed so many UK citizens our government would be up in arms. As it is, it is the regulatory bodies that accomplish this devastation in hand with bosses, the regulators and the greedy accountants and shareholders. How many ‘in service ‘ pilot deaths there are is not on record. For the general worker population of the UK this could be likened to a civil war.
A Report has been sent to CAA regarding the premature death of a pilot (and BALPA member). The CAA are currently ignoring it.
This is in accordance with comments made after the Mt. Erebus crash by Justice Mahon who said that he thought that he had been forced to listen to “a litany of lies” by the airline and investigatory authorities.
The Mount Erebus disaster in 1979 supplied new thinking on how correct investigations could lead to higher standards of safety. The general statement given to the press following most disasters gave ‘pilot error’ as the cause.
The Chief Inspector of Air Accidents had left no room for manoeuvre. His verdict was pilot error. However, evidence pointed to a computer error programmed into the system. (A mistake that continues to be made. ) However, the Chief Inspector, who had no expertise in the piloting or navigation of sophisticated jet airlines, relied on verbal hearsay. He kept his own view that the “probable cause” was due to flying in cloud, and pilot error. The airline received virtually no criticism.
A Commission was set up to assuage public uneasiness and the rising anger felt by the airline pilots investigating team and next-of-kin of the crew members. The Inquiry under the auspices of Justice Mahon, and assisted by barristers, David Baragwanath and Gary Harrison, was meant to ‘rubberstamp’ this view. This case changed that. They found the ‘probable cause’ theory untenable.
Finally, the Mahon Report put the blame squarely on the airline.
Justice Mahon ordered the airline to pay $150,000 as a contribution to the public cost of the inquiry. The company had failed to ‘put all its cards on the table’, he said. It had denied every allegation of fault and had counter-attacked by ascribing total culpability to the crew, against whom it made the untenable allegations that there were no less than 13 separate varieties of pilot error.
Justice Mahon went on to say (in a video) that, “in this case the palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not be the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so, in regard to particular items of evidence to which I have referred, I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies.”
Finally, Justice Mahon said,
“That type of situation always make an enquiry complex where some disaster or scandal involving some Government agency and the procedure adopted by some Governments, the United Kingdom in particular, is to set up such an enquiry, then wait to see what the findings are. If the findings are in favour of the government it warmly supports the report, if on the other hand the findings implicate some government agency then the tendency is for the government of the day to reject the report and they will say that it is wrong. This does not happen in Australia of course, but in England and New Zealand, such an approach is in accordance with the hallowed traditions of the Westminster style of government.”
The Government has continued this tradition; worse BALPA have remained surpringly quiet about the early death of one of its members – what an opportunity lost! We, like our New Zealand cousins, are no longer surprised that the CAA ignores reports, but that a union follows suit is inexplicable. So I invite BALPA to respond - how many pilot deaths in service are there per annum? Who’s counting? Transparent, researchable answers please.
----------------------------------
nojh
Long Haul is not safe
“Excessive fatigue on long haul is a potential killer and is continually ignored by the airline bosses the CAA and the greedy accountants and shareholders.”
….
“… waffle which was never been put into practise by our World Leading reglatory body at the Belgrano.”
---------------------------------------
There has been a deliberate policy of government to reduce health and safety regulations in the workplace ie to deregulate it. There are now over 12,000 deaths of workers in the UK per annum. If Al Quaeda had killed so many UK citizens our government would be up in arms. As it is, it is the regulatory bodies that accomplish this devastation in hand with bosses, the regulators and the greedy accountants and shareholders. How many ‘in service ‘ pilot deaths there are is not on record. For the general worker population of the UK this could be likened to a civil war.
A Report has been sent to CAA regarding the premature death of a pilot (and BALPA member). The CAA are currently ignoring it.
This is in accordance with comments made after the Mt. Erebus crash by Justice Mahon who said that he thought that he had been forced to listen to “a litany of lies” by the airline and investigatory authorities.
The Mount Erebus disaster in 1979 supplied new thinking on how correct investigations could lead to higher standards of safety. The general statement given to the press following most disasters gave ‘pilot error’ as the cause.
The Chief Inspector of Air Accidents had left no room for manoeuvre. His verdict was pilot error. However, evidence pointed to a computer error programmed into the system. (A mistake that continues to be made. ) However, the Chief Inspector, who had no expertise in the piloting or navigation of sophisticated jet airlines, relied on verbal hearsay. He kept his own view that the “probable cause” was due to flying in cloud, and pilot error. The airline received virtually no criticism.
A Commission was set up to assuage public uneasiness and the rising anger felt by the airline pilots investigating team and next-of-kin of the crew members. The Inquiry under the auspices of Justice Mahon, and assisted by barristers, David Baragwanath and Gary Harrison, was meant to ‘rubberstamp’ this view. This case changed that. They found the ‘probable cause’ theory untenable.
Finally, the Mahon Report put the blame squarely on the airline.
Justice Mahon ordered the airline to pay $150,000 as a contribution to the public cost of the inquiry. The company had failed to ‘put all its cards on the table’, he said. It had denied every allegation of fault and had counter-attacked by ascribing total culpability to the crew, against whom it made the untenable allegations that there were no less than 13 separate varieties of pilot error.
Justice Mahon went on to say (in a video) that, “in this case the palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not be the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so, in regard to particular items of evidence to which I have referred, I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies.”
Finally, Justice Mahon said,
“That type of situation always make an enquiry complex where some disaster or scandal involving some Government agency and the procedure adopted by some Governments, the United Kingdom in particular, is to set up such an enquiry, then wait to see what the findings are. If the findings are in favour of the government it warmly supports the report, if on the other hand the findings implicate some government agency then the tendency is for the government of the day to reject the report and they will say that it is wrong. This does not happen in Australia of course, but in England and New Zealand, such an approach is in accordance with the hallowed traditions of the Westminster style of government.”
The Government has continued this tradition; worse BALPA have remained surpringly quiet about the early death of one of its members – what an opportunity lost! We, like our New Zealand cousins, are no longer surprised that the CAA ignores reports, but that a union follows suit is inexplicable. So I invite BALPA to respond - how many pilot deaths in service are there per annum? Who’s counting? Transparent, researchable answers please.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Gorgo - your penultimate paragraph cues neatly into Brian Dixon's Chinook enquiry campaign
PS If you have not read it yet, it is HUGELY long and has SOME rubbish in it (as usual!) but is a good example.
PS If you have not read it yet, it is HUGELY long and has SOME rubbish in it (as usual!) but is a good example.
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Virgin Atlantic A340-600 fuel incident
BOAC – what a thread! It took me most of the day to read – and as you say there is some rubbish in it and there are some bozos who seem to lack the ability to empathize with Brian and others.
It makes you wonder who is running aviation – who is in charge? Who is knowledgeable enough to understand the problems? As Brian pointed out, there is a “fundamental question of governmental accountability.”
I wonder what the response of Virgin Atlantic has been to the fatigue of these unfortunate pilots.
It makes you wonder who is running aviation – who is in charge? Who is knowledgeable enough to understand the problems? As Brian pointed out, there is a “fundamental question of governmental accountability.”
I wonder what the response of Virgin Atlantic has been to the fatigue of these unfortunate pilots.
