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Let the Great Experiment begin...
Let the Great Experiment begin: Science will reign supreme against the detritus of more primitive gods, and tens of thousands of passengers will be as guinea pigs to prove as self-evident the safety of airline profitability and political power...
New London VAAC NWP Volcanic Ash Concentration Charts rely on so-called "standard threshold" - anyone know what this is? According to CAA statement of 20 April: "Our way forward is based on international data and evidence from previous volcanic ash incidents, new data collected from test flights and additional analysis from manufacturers over the past few days." Anyone know where materials of these data and analysis are located? |
The 1991 Pinatubo eruptions and their effects on aircraft operations
Found this 21pg public domain document from the USGS There's extensive detail and information as well about aircraft incidents - just some excerpts below The 1991 Pinatubo eruptions and their effects on aircraft operations - Documents & Publications - Professional Resources - PreventionWeb.net The 1991 Pinatubo Eruptions and Their Effects on Aircraft Operations By Thomas J. Casadevall,1 Perla J. Delos Reyes,2 and David J. Schneider3 1 U.S. Geological Survey. 2 Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology, Quezon City, Philippines. 3 Michigan Technological University, Department of Geological Engineering, Houghton, MI 49931. ABSTRACT The explosive eruptions of Mount Pinatubo in June 1991 injected enormous clouds of volcanic ash and acid gases into the stratosphere to altitudes in excess of 100,000 feet. The largest ash cloud, from the June 15 eruption, was carried by upper level winds to the west and circled the globe in 22 days. The June 15 cloud spread laterally to cover a broad equatorial band from about 10°S. to 20° N. latitude and contaminated some of the world's busiest air traffic corridors. Sixteen damaging encounters were reported between jet aircraft and the drifting ash clouds from the June 12 and 15, 1991, eruptions. Three encounters occurred within 200 kilometers from the volcano with ash clouds less than 3 hours old. Twelve encounters occurred over Southeast Asia at distances of 720 to 1,740 kilometers west from the volcano when the ash cloud was between 12 and 24 hours old. Encounters with the Pinatubo ash cloud caused in-flight loss of power to one engine on each of two different aircraft. A total of 10 engines were damaged and replaced, including all four engines on a single jumbo jet. Following the 1991 eruptions, longer term damage to aircraft and engines related to volcanogenic SO2 gas has been documented including crazing of acrylic airplane windows, premature fading of polyurethane paint on jetliners, and accumulation of sulfate deposits in engines. Ash fall in the Philippines damaged aircraft on the ground and caused seven airports to close. Restoration of airport operations presented unique challenges, which were successfully met by officials at Manila International Airport and at Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Subic Bay. Lessons learned in these clean-up operations have broad applicability worldwide. Between April 12 and June 9, 1991, Philippine aviation authorities issued at least eight aeronautical information notices about the preeruption restless state of Mount Pinatubo. The large number of aircraft affected by the Pinatubo ash clouds indicates that this information either did not reach appropriate officials or that the pilots, air traffic controllers, and flight dispatchers who received this information were not sufficiently educated about the volcanic ash hazard to know what to do with the information. INTRODUCTION Jet aircraft are damaged when they fly through clouds containing finely fragmented rock debris and acid gases produced by explosive volcanic eruptions (Casadevall, 1992). Clouds of volcanic ash and corrosive gases cannot be detected by weather radar currently carried aboard airplanes, and such clouds are difficult to distinguish visually from meteorological clouds. In the past 15 years, there have been more than 80 in-flight encounters between volcanic ash clouds and commercial jet aircraft. The explosive eruptions of Mount Pinatubo volcano in the Philippines in June 1991 injected enormous clouds of volcanic ash and gases into the stratosphere to altitudes in excess of 100,000 ft. Within several days of the June eruptions, at least 16 commercial jet airplanes had been damaged by in-flight encounters with the drifting ash clouds from Pinatubo. Closer to the volcano, ash fall in the Philippines damaged about two dozen aircraft on the ground and affected seven airports. This report describes the effects of the 1991 Pinatubo eruptions on aircraft and airports, seeks to understand why so many encounters occurred, and reviews the solutions to the ash-cloud hazard reached by Philippine authorities. Incident number Date Time (G.m.t.)1 Location Latitude Longitude Altitude (feet) Aircraft type Comments 91-01 6/12/91 0420 170 km from volcano; 60 nautical miles from LUBANG along air route B460. 14°00' 119°30' 37,000 747-300 During a 3-min encounter with volcanic ash, crew experienced thin haze inside aircraft that smelled like a burning electrical wire. Aircraft landed safely at Manila Airport. Aircraft and engines were inspected and serviced at Manila in accordance with recommended procedures. When aircraft attempted to depart, its four engines had a strong vibration, and aircraft was grounded at Manila for detailed maintenance and replacement of all four engines. 91-02 6/12/91 uk 720 km west of volcano on route from Singapore to Tokyo. 13°50' 113°50' 37,000 747-400 No significant damage to aircraft when inspected on ground in Tokyo. 91-03 6/12/91 1630 Approx. 1,000 km from volcano; between way points ADPIM and 11°10' 112°10' 33,000 DC-10 series 40 Flight from Kuala Lumpur to Tokyo; observed a discharge phenomena on windshield for 20 min. Ground inspection at Narita revealed no LAVEN. damage. Encounters 3 and 11 involved same aircraft. 91-04 6/15/91 1740 Approx. 1,150 km from volcano; between way points SUKAR and CAVOI. 13°10' 110°50' 29,000 747-400 Aircraft encountered ash cloud at 29,000 ft at approximately 600 nm west of volcano. Crew observed St. Elmo's fire on the windshield and a scent similar to an electrical fire in the cockpit for 6 to 8 min as they went through the ash. There was no abnormal indication in the cockpit. The crew observed a green echo, which seemed to be ash on weather radar, but it disappeared when they were clear of the ash. Flight attendants reported thin (whitish) fog in the cabin, most dense in the upper deck compartment, followed by the forward cabin. The flight was continued to Tokyo, where engine inspection revealed that all four engines were damaged and were replaced. First- stage nozzle guide vane cooling air holes were 70-80% blocked. Other damage occurred to the cockpit windows, cabin windows, Pitot static probes, landing light covers, navigation lights, and all leading edge areas. 91-05 6/15/91 1547 Over Vietnam on route from Hong Kong to Singapore; in Bangkok FIR. 13°00' 108°00' uk 747-SP Ash and sulfur odor, electrostatic discharge, blue-green light over Vietnam. Ground inspection revealed no significant damage, and aircraft continued in service. 91-06 6/15/91 uk uk uk uk uk 747-200 freighter Aircraft flew through "heavy volcanic ash." Cockpit and cabin areas were contaminated with volcanic ash. No additional information available. 91-07 6/15/91 uk Route between Tokyo and Singapore. uk uk 35,000 747-251 Flight from Narita to Singapore was rerouted to Manila due to weather in Singapore area. En route to Manila, encountered volcanic ash cloud at 35,000 ft for approximately 12 min and was then diverted to Taipei. Engines set at cruise. Sparks were noted coming from windows and Crew reported hearing ash hit the aircraft. EGT for all four engines rose 40-50°C and started to fluctuate. One hour later all EGTs were back to normal. Ground inspection in Taipei revealed no significant damage to exterior or to engines. Aircraft continued in service. 91-08 6/15/91 uk <200 km from volcano; on approach to Manila from south. uk uk uk DC-10 series 30 Flight from Sydney to Manila encountered ash on approach to Manila from south. Engines set at low power but found to contain "lots of ash" when inspected after landing. Exterior abrasion visible, including engine cowls. 91-09 6/15/91 uk Route between Singapore and Osaka. uk uk uk 747-300 Aircraft was in ash cloud for 29 min while en route from Singapore to Osaka. Date of encounter uncertain, probably 6/15; one report indicates 6/19. Inspection of aircraft exterior showed no significant damage. Engines #1 and #4 were replaced; "90% of the first-stage turbine blades have bullseyes on the airfoil's mid-span pressure side and some first-stage vane leading edge ash buildup at 3 o'clock position." 91-11 6/15/91 1730 Approx. 1,050 km from 15°15' 110°30' 29,000 DC-10 series 40 Flight from Kuala Lumpur to Tokyo; volcano; between way points SUKAR and CAVOI, 120 nautical miles from CAVOI. observed a discharge phenomena on windshield for 25 min. Ground inspection at Narita revealed no damage. Encounters 3 and 11 involved same aircraft. 91-12 6/15/91 1910 Approx. 1,050 km from volcano; between way points SUKAR and CAVOI, 120 nautical miles from CAVOI. 15°15' 110°30' 29,000 DC-10 series 40 Flight from Singapore to Osaka; crew observed a discharge phenomena on windshield for 30 min. Ground inspection at Narita revealed no damage. 91-13 6/15/91 0910 Approx. 100 km from volcano; flight from Manila to Hong Kong. uk uk uk 747-428 After takeoff from Manila, airplane skirted a volcanic ash cloud. On the ground in Hong Kong, black marks were noted on the exterior of the left wing. Engines were borescoped and no discrepancies were found. Airplane continued to Delhi. Preparing to leave Delhi, unable to start engine #1. Fuel pump was replaced and additional inspections of airplane revealed no damage. Airplane continued to Paris. 91-14 6/16/91 uk Route between Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu. uk uk uk 737-200 freighter Indications that aircraft flew through volcanic ash cloud were apparent only after aircraft underwent ground inspection in Kuala Lumpur, which revealed abrasion of plexiglass landing light covers and navigation lights, which were totally opaque. Cowling intakes were abraded and rough to the touch, while compressor blades were remarkably clean. Landing gear bays were covered in ash with ash sticking to oily surfaces. No apparent damage to windshields. 91-15 6/17/91 (?) uk Flight likely on Tokyo to Singapore uk uk uk DC-10 Airplane reportedly encountered ash from Pinatubo on June 17. #3 route. engine was reported to have been shut down in flight; ash encounter may have caused in- flight shutdown. Inspection of engines revealed "heavy deposits" of what was presumed to be volcanic ash. No information about flight route, encounter duration, and such. 91-16 6/17/91 0412 930 km from volcano; 50 nautical miles east of way point IDOSI on route A901. 19°30' 112°40' 37,000 747-200B Flight from Johannesburg to Taipei via Mauritius. Encounter occurred at 37,000 ft 50 nm east of way point IDOSI on route A901; entered a cloud at 0412 G.m.t.; temperature increased from -48°C to -37°C in 2 min; aircraft descended to 29,000 ft and landed at 0540 G.m.t.; engine #1 surged and was shut down; engine #4 lost power; descended to 29,000 ft to restart #1. Aircraft landed safely at Taipei. Service terminated. Engine #1 replaced and aircraft returned to South Africa on 6/21 for further inspection. 91-17 6/15/91 na Aircraft on ground at Manila International Airport. 14°30' 121°00' On ground L-1011 Maintenance crew attempted to remove volcanic ash from window by using wiper blades. Resulted in abrasion of windows, which required replacement. DAMAGE When a jetliner flying in excess of 400 knots (740 km/h) enters a cloud of finely fragmented rock particles, the principal damage will be abrasion of the exterior, forward-facing surfaces and accumulation of ash into surface openings (Casadevall, 1992). An example of the exterior damage to one jumbo jet after an encounter with a Pinatubo ash cloud is shown schematically in figure 7. Ingestion of ash into the engines will cause abrasion damage, especially to compressor fan blades. Because jet engines operate at temperatures in excess of 700°C, melting of ash and accumulation of this ash in the turbine section is an important problem as well (Przedpelski and Casadevall, 1994). Remelted ash may block the passage of air through the engines and cause the engine to stop. In an least one airplane (incident 91-04 in table 1), first-stage nozzle guide vane cooling holes were 70 to 80 percent blocked. Figure 7. Damage to exterior surfaces of a 747-400 jumbo jet following an encounter with the June 15, 1991, ash cloud from Mount Pinatubo. The majority of the Pinatubo encounters occurred at distances of up to 2,000 km from the volcano with an ash cloud that was at least 12 h old. The aging of the ash cloud allowed the coarser ash to settle from the cloud and prevented some of the more severe damage such as that which occurred to jumbo- jet aircraft from earlier encounters with volcanic ash (Smith, 1983; Tootell, 1985; and Casadevall, 1994). In the Pinatubo case, there were few reports of abrasion of forward-facing cabin windows, so it is suggested that particles larger than about 30 m in diameter had already settled from the cloud. Particles smaller than this diameter are efficiently swept over the window surface by the slipstream and do not impact the window surface (Pieri and Oeding, 1991). Longer term damage related primarily to the SO2 gas and sulfuric acid aerosols produced by the eruption (Self and others, this volume) did not become apparent until months after the eruption. Some Asian-based carriers noted that jet engines on their airplanes have accumulated deposits of sulfate minerals such as anhydrite and gypsum in the turbine. This material blocked cooling holes in the first- stage nozzle guide vane at the inlet to the turbine section of the engine and thereby interfered with the cooling of the turbine. As a result, engines overheated. The sulfate deposits found in the turbine section appear to be related to ingestion and oxidation of SO2 and sulfuric acid aerosols that originated in the Pinatubo eruption clouds of June 15 (Casadevall and Rye, 1994). Additional problems related to the acidic aerosols include the increased incidence of crazing of acrylic windows (Berner, 1993) and fading of polyurethane paint on jetliners (T.M. Murray, Boeing, written commun., 1993). Unlike the circumstances involving in-flight encounters with the ash clouds, which were largely restricted to the region west of the volcano, the gas cloud from Pinatubo has been widely dispersed throughout the Northern Hemisphere and has thereby affected aircraft that fly in this airspace. A similar increase in the incidence of window crazing was observed for several years following the eruptions of El Chichón Volcano in 1982 (Rogers, 1984; 1985; Bernard and Rose, 1990). Pinatubo erupted nearly 3 times more SO2 than did El Chichón (Bluth and others, 1992). Thus, the types of problems related to volcanogenic sulfur gas and sulfuric acid aerosols may be expected to persist longer following the Pinatubo activity than after El Chichón. LONG-TERM DAMAGE In addition to the aircraft damage that was immediately evident in the days following the June 15 eruption, damage related primarily to SO2 gas has been reported by some airline companies and manufacturers. One year after the eruption, in June 1992, there was an incident involving loss of engine power on a jumbo jet owing to accumulation of sulfate deposits in jet engines. Isotopic studies of these deposits suggest that the sulfate is derived from the ingestion and oxidation of SO2 and sulfuric acid aerosols that originated in the Pinatubo eruption cloud of June 15 (Casadevall and Rye, 1994). Related problems recognized in 1992 such as the increased incidence of crazing of acrylic windows (Berner, 1993) and fading of polyurethane paint on jetliners are also due to volcanogenic sulfuric acid droplets in the atmosphere. Frequent inspections of aircraft should reveal any corrosion problems due to volcanogenic sulfur gases. |
Willie Walsh's boardroom? :E
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Infrequent. You're a satellite interpretation/atmospheric dispersion expert now are you? And what does volcanic ash look like on a satellite image? Excellent. Then no doubt you know the Eurocontrol charts are based on data provided by the Met Office. (Under ICAO the MO are the ONLY body allowed to produce VAAC charts….but no doubt you knew that).
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Let the Great Experiment begin...
Further:
"In addition, the CAA’s Revised Airspace Guidance requires airlines to: · conduct their own risk assessment and develop operational procedures to address any remaining risks; · put in place an intensive maintenance ash damage inspection before and after each flight; and · report any ash related incidents to a reporting scheme run by the CAA." Anyone has info on these? Specs, instructions, instrumentation for inspections...? Location of reports or CAA reporting scheme...? |
how can these SOPs be up and running already so that all these flights were able to go- I do not understand this, it takes the company I work for weeks/months to get a gobal one of these signed off!!! These companies have got them in place in one night shift! How can their maintance teams been able to buy into/ contribute to these as some of it will depend on them?
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Phalken Post/pre Flt Volcanic Ash Inspections
Initially, the God given Mk 1 Eyeball - like we have been using for years!!!
Mind you, It might have to be Licensed for Volcanic Ash Inspections :ugh: |
Interesting ...
Anyone care to comment as to why this, frankly quite interesting and useful page appeared and then rather quickly disappeared from the VAAC website?
Met Office: Icelandic volcano - Ash concentration charts |
Let the Great Experiment begin...
As any coal-miner will tell you: silicosis is diagnosed only after your lungs are bleeding, when you have already begun to cough and splutter, and loose your breath until your legs give way...
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put in place an intensive maintenance ash damage inspection before and after each flight |
Metoffice response to CAA
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One would imagine longer than a 30 minute turnaround allows.
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Someone was asking for mass-flow numbers earlier on. RR's Web site gives an intake mass-flow for the RB211-535E4B (I picked an engine arbitrarily) of 1,177lb/sec or 533.87kg/sec. Based on the figure of 0.3 milligrams per m3 given for Stranraer, at an air density of 1.2kg/m3 at sea level (obviously we're not interested in sea level, but at least it's wrong in a known way - the ash measurement is a sea-level one and I guess RR's figures are test-stand measurements, so it's consistent) that would be 444m3 of air a second and 0.133g of ash a second - 478g of ash per engine-hour. (Although, the -535 is a very high bypass turbofan, so perhaps we need the core mass flow...) Now, scientists and engineers have agreed a threshold concentration for ash of 0.002g per cubic metre of air. At or below this concentration, there is no damage to the engine. Thats a pretty high level. |
Germany is back to unrestricted air traffic since noontime today. IFR anywhere possible again in Deutschland.
German language source based on DFS statement: DFS: Deutscher Luftraum wieder uneingeschränkt nutzbar - FLUG REVUE |
Let the Great Experiment begin...
Quote:
Now, scientists and engineers have agreed a threshold concentration for ash of 0.002g per cubic metre of air. At or below this concentration, there is no damage to the engine. What time scaling: 15 min? hourly? 8 or 24 hours? ...like terrestrial air pollution? Where are the specs? "Considering that a commercial aircraft will travel about 150 km (80 M) in 10 minutes and that volcanic ash can rise to flight levels commonly used by turbine-engine aeroplanes in half that time, timely response to reports of volcanic ash is essential." from ICAO EUR/NAT OFFICE (Paris): Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan EUR Region (Second Edition September 2009) Page 3 |
RR et al
My take is ICAO have been trying to tackle this issue for years on 2 fronts - (1) where is ash and provide warning for it (VAAC) and (2) what is the engine susceptibility level.
They got nowhere on (2) and then set a susceptibility threshold of 0 which the CAA, and NATS adopted to the letter. One particle in the whole airspace means close it! It seems one of the culprits for this fiasco over the years is the engine manufacturers not supporting efforts on volcanos - plus the head of ICAO, CAA and BA not persuading them to. I don't understand how in PPRUNE and the wider press, RR et al have so far got away scott free. |
"Considering that a commercial aircraft will travel about 150 km (80 M) in 10 minutes and that volcanic ash can rise to flight levels commonly used by turbine-engine aeroplanes in half that time, timely response to reports of volcanic ash is essential." If not that from what level are they talking about and where...... all this scientific detail is amazing. :ugh: Pace |
Per the AMM chapter 5 it will be progressive. Initial inpsection includes evidence of windshield crazing, paint erosion, erosion of pitot tubes, TAT probes, AOA sensors, engine inlets etc, smells in air conditioning etc If findings found during this process then you move on to engine boroscopes etc etc. each manufacturer's AMM will be different but thats a very basic explanation.
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Volcanic dust encounter
Re: Airvanman's post:
"Thomas Cook TCX952P registration G-JMCF (Boeing 757-28A) just made a u-turn to Manchester, it was out over the North Sea off Nofolk/Suffolk, it reported to London and Manchester Control it had an engine bleed problem after an 'intense smell of volcanic ash in the cabin during the climb between FL160 and FL200." FYI here is a partial transcript of what went on: "For information we got the smell of the ash from about 16,000 feet in the climb, it stayed with us even when we were well above FL200. We had no smell at all on the way down and we're passing 14..." ATC: "so between 160 to 200?" "Difficult to say when it stopped in the climb because we still have the smell in here, and it took a while to clear. There are still traces of the smell but it was quite intense in the climb..." (Later) "Negative emergency, no special handling, everything is normal, its just that we have lost one of our engine bleeds, possibly through a contaminated valve." Comments please? |
Re: RR et al
People have been assigning some blame to the engine manufacturers. On here certainly if not in the mainstream media.
As a side note, this is an interesting article covering possible future directions for the manufacturers: The Great Debate UK Debate Archive Impact of the volcano disruption on the airlines | The Great Debate | |
Let the Great Experiment begin...
The simple fact is that a 20+ year-old, worldwide safety regime was overthrown at a 2 hour meeting packed with British politicians and airline executives.
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risk management
Long time 'lurker' - felt compelled to chime in..
Hello to all... I'm not a pilot, aircraft engineer or vulcanologist. orig. post didn't turn up for some reason so here goes again: Thoughts go out to stranded travelers and those impacted by the current ash situation. The dynamics of the debate and the political, business and management pressures on the one hand versus the aircraft engine designers on the other (saying 0 tolerance for ash) is reminiscent to me of events surrounding the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster. I think there are some lessons to be considered there. Space Shuttle Challenger disaster - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Use as case study The Challenger accident has frequently been used as a case study in the study of subjects such as engineering safety, the ethics of whistle-blowing, communications, group decision-making, and the dangers of groupthink. It is part of the required readings for engineers seeking a professional license in Canada[52] and other countries. Roger Boisjoly, the engineer who had warned about the effect of cold weather on the O-rings, left his job at Morton Thiokol and became a speaker on workplace ethics.[53] He argues that the caucus called by Morton Thiokol managers, which resulted in a recommendation to launch, "constituted the unethical decision-making forum resulting from intense customer intimidation."[54] For his honesty and integrity leading up to and directly following the shuttle disaster, Roger Boisjoly was awarded the Prize for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility from the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Many colleges and universities have also used the accident in classes on the ethics of engineering.[55][56] Information designer Edward Tufte has used the Challenger accident as an example of the problems that can occur from the lack of clarity in the presentation of information. He argues that if Morton Thiokol engineers had more clearly presented the data that they had on the relationship between low temperatures and burn-through in the solid rocket booster joints, they might have succeeded in persuading NASA managers to cancel the launch.[57] Tufte has also argued that poor presentation of information may have affected NASA decisions during the last flight of Columbia. The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, also known as the Rogers Commission (after its chairman), was formed to investigate the disaster. The commission members were Chairman William P. Rogers, Vice Chairman Neil Armstrong, David Acheson, Eugene Covert, Richard Feynman, Robert Hotz, Donald Kutyna, Sally Ride, Robert Rummel, Joseph Sutter, Arthur Walker, Albert Wheelon, and Chuck Yeager. The commission worked for several months and published a report of its findings. It found that the Challenger accident was caused by a failure in the O-rings sealing a joint on the right solid rocket booster, which allowed pressurized hot gases and eventually flame to "blow by" the O-ring and make contact with the adjacent external tank, causing structural failure. The failure of the O-rings was attributed to a faulty design, whose performance could be too easily compromised by factors including the low temperature on the day of launch.[34] More broadly, the report also considered the contributing causes of the accident. Most salient was the failure of both NASA and Morton Thiokol to respond adequately to the danger posed by the deficient joint design. However, rather than redesigning the joint, they came to define the problem as an acceptable flight risk. The report found that managers at Marshall had known about the flawed design since 1977, but never discussed the problem outside their reporting channels with Thiokol--a flagrant violation of NASA regulations. Even when it became more apparent how serious the flaw was, no one at Marshall considered grounding the shuttles until a fix could be implemented. On the contrary, Marshall managers went as far as to issue and waive six launch constraints related to the O-rings.[35] The report also strongly criticized the decision making process that led to the launch of Challenger, saying that it was seriously flawed.[36] “ ...failures in communication... resulted in a decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.[37] ” One of the commission's most well-known members was theoretical physicist Richard Feynman. During a televised hearing, he famously demonstrated how the O-rings became less resilient and subject to seal failures at ice-cold temperatures by immersing a sample of the material in a glass of ice water. He was so critical of flaws in NASA's "safety culture" that he threatened to remove his name from the report unless it included his personal observations on the reliability of the shuttle, which appeared as Appendix F.[38] In the appendix, he argued that the estimates of reliability offered by NASA management were wildly unrealistic, differing as much as a thousandfold from the estimates of working engineers. "For a successful technology," he concluded, "reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled. |
This was the biggest farce in our company´s history! I completetly lost faith in our management and political leadership in the last couple of days.
No one seems to have the slightest understanding of what safety in aviation means. Stick to known procedures for example, or at least brief unusual procedures thoroughly. How on earth can someone in his right mind consider it safe if a passenger jet goes VFR through airspace E at 1200ft AGL 20 miles away from the field trying to find his way towards the runway while trying to seperate itself from small Cessnas and to establish a sequence to other big jets doing the same?? |
So how long does this take? (put in place an intensive maintenance ash damage inspection before and after each flight) Paraphrasing from a knowledgeable fella on another board Assuming engine has cooled down a bit and there are no hiccups in doing the job 5 minutes to get the cowls opened, 3 minutes to get the boroscope plugs out, 5 minutes to get access to turn the N2 rotor through the gearbox, 10 to 30 minutes for inspection X mins to send pics for analysis if there's an obvious issue/concern 30 -60 minutes to get the plugs back in and locked, 5 or ten to get the N2 drive pad access cover back on Y minutes for a leak check (possible engine run rqd) 5 minutes to close the the cowls Total time required = 63 + X + Y minutes (varies per engine type) Summary - you could expect an average of somewhere between 75 - 90 minutes |
Re: Let the great experiment begin
It's true but something had to be done, otherwise the situation would have gone on forever. And it wasn't just the UK - exactly the same thing obviously happened the previous day when Eurocontrol's ash map magically changed after pressure from the EU.
It's been quoted several times on here already, but I think it's important to bear in mind the warning that the ICAO themselves made about their own policy back in 2008: "As remote sensing techniques improve, it is likely that the aggregate areas where ash is sensed or inferred will increase, possibly leading to over-warning for ash and cost-blowouts for airlines." |
The simple fact is that a 20+ year-old, worldwide safety regime was overthrown at a 2 hour meeting packed with British politicians and airline executives. |
But this is a TV news report. How are measures taken? What time scaling: 15 min? hourly? 8 or 24 hours? ...like terrestrial air pollution? Where are the specs? There will be very few measurements, it will be based on the Met Office predictions which will now be taken as Gospel as they allow flights to precede. The Met office provided the wrong answer, so the question has been changed. |
According to news reports from Germany, it was the "right kind of ash" after all. It appears that the Eyjafjallajökull ash consists of basalt, which only melts at 1,200°C, a temperature in the engines normally only reached during take-off. The ash of many other volcanoes (including Pinatubo, Mount St. Helens or volcanoes in the Andes) consists of andesite, which melts at below 1,000°C, a temperature in the engines reached much more frequently.
The abrasive properties of basalt appear to be the same as those of andesite though. Ergebnisse des Messflugs: Vulkanasche schwebt in 3,5 bis 6 Kilometer Höhe - SPIEGEL ONLINE - Nachrichten - Wissenschaft |
What did BA tell yesterday's pax?
Just curious to know what the pax on those 10 flights were told. That they were going to be guinea pigs on a test of the aircraft's response to ash? That diversions were likely if WW's bluff was called?
I wonder if anyone declined to travel on that basis. |
Has anyone read the Daily Star's headlines today
Saw the headlines of the Comic The Daily Star which shows photo of a 747s engines all on fire as it flies through the volcanic ash cloud...... what it doesnt tell you is its a still from Air Crash Investigation off sky relating to the BA flight in the 80s c/o cpt Moody...... if thats not arse end scare mongering from journalists who should actually be washing the salad at Mcdonalds instead of scaring the general public... i dont know what is, the airlines have had enough of a battering from this and the downturn without them making s@*t like this up.... they should be hung drawn quartered and dipped in battery acid for a week and then forced to watch their relatives on Jeremy Kyle.... is that a bit harsh... rant over:}
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Just curious to know what the pax on those 10 flights were told. LHR was previously forecast to be open by 19.00BST as part of the phased opening starting at 07.00 in the north. Notice that the BA flights started to arrive in time for that 19.00 opening - BA124 being the first to show up crossing the Dutch coast at about 18.45. By the time it was announced that the planned re-opening wasn't going to happen, all BA's were en-route. Who can blame them for continuing hoping for things to change. |
Re: Has anyone read the Daily Star's headlines today
According to the Guardian, they had to remove these newspapers from shops in Gatwick and Manchester airports to avoid panicked passengers.
Pretty irresponsible stuff from the editor. |
BA inbound
Pax inbound on BA longhaul last night asked to sign a waiver, I understand, saying that they understood they might be diverted away from LHR...
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Similarities
Similarities between the leadup to the Challenger disaster & the current flying through ash situation I think lie in the element of powerful political, management, public & economic forces wanting to get 'the bird in the air' versus the quiet voice of those involved with the engineering side saying its not wise.
In the case of the shuttle, engineers were warning 'do not launch, safety cannot be guaranteed under these conditions' yet the concerns were ignored. In this current ash debate, powerful voices from the airline industry and politics monopolize the discussion, particularily in the media - whereas those who have expert, detailled knowledge of airplane engines and ash, namely the engineers who design and manufacture jet engines, are less heard (their message: ' ash & jet engines don't mix'). Yet, it appears the public & those in authority to make decisions are hardly hearing the voice of the true experts on the subject during this crisis. Uncharted territory... I'm hoping that existing protocols, wind, luck & maintenance regimes will help avoid any potential catastrophic outcomes. Just imagine what an ash-related accident would do to the industry (!)... |
Let the Great Experiment begin...
It's true but something had to be done, otherwise the situation would have gone on forever. |
Lord Adonis stated on 'The world at One' today that there had been an over reaction to the Ash event by the authorities concerned.
Fancy that. I'm no expert, but it seems me that only an idiot would knowingly fly into the plume found above a volcano. However, low levels (too low to see at all from air or ground) must have been encountered countless times over the years with no one any the wiser, and no problems reported, given that there are plenty active volcanoes all over the world. Given that any problems to be caused by ash from Iceland are plainly going to be tiny compared to flying in the plume, why not simply fly on and see if any problems occur- likely none will. I guess we are now in that situation.:rolleyes: Definately, as many on here have said and now had confirmed by the gummint no less, a gross over reaction. |
I counted them all out
Whilst there will be diverse opinions about the events of last night, the fact remains that BA had a number of Speedbirds inbound to LHR and LGW and whatever was going on in COBRA, with some still in holds long after they could have diverted a decision was made to act. Note - DECISION. Whilst it's easy from the armchair to "fly the plan" sometimes someone needs to step up and take a tough decision.
If WW did indeed bring pressure to bear to get UK FIR's open then I stand by him. After some days of little clear directive other than what some could describe as health and safety syndrome, the fact is that UK airspace cannot be closed for business indefintely without someone or body standing up to be counted. If WW did that then good on him. Safety first yes. But, it takes more courage to stand up and make the call than be part of a group erring on caution no matter what. BA got the planes in. The skies are open and I hope lessons are learned from this so that mother nature cannot be the only one deciding on how we go about our lives. Whatever the context and final outcome, good job to the crews who brought their birds in. Not everyone may agree that BA is still the 'worlds favourite airline' but I for one would say that they are the 'worlds most determined airline'. We sometimes need people to take tough decisions, and I for one prefer a world with them than without. |
Lufthansa Engine Damage ?
Well this is a rumour network, so here goes.
Flew into YYZ from FRA yesterday on LH. Talking to some of the AC staff in YYZ, it seems that LH operated the same flight, A340-600, a day earlier albeit at a later departure time. During the turn round inspection "ash damage" was found in the engines. Aeroplane towed to maintenance area. Any one able to confirm / deny this. I must admit that I was alittle suprised at out routing yesterday, FRA- London - South Wales, to 55N for the crossing, I was expecting to be further South. We were told that the highest reported ash had been FL350, so we went at FL360!!:hmm: ex-egll |
Lord Adonis stated on 'The world at One' today that there had been an over reaction to the Ash event by the authorities concerned. It begs the question: why did Adonis not make this change before? But we know from this morning's Guardian that airlines have opposed revision for their own legal/economic advantage. |
Mr. O'Leary was on RTE news saying that he thought it was fair enough that airspace was closed for a day or two last week while assessments were made of whether it was safe to fly on not. He did not think it justified that it has taken seven days to come to a conclusion on that.
It does not take huge bravery to close airspace, but having closed it, it takes huge bravery to reopen it. |
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