There is no regulation that says a touchdown after the commencement of a go-around cannot occur.

Any go-around that occurs in the very late stages of an approach to land should be accompanied by an expectation that the aircraft could touchdown.

That scenario was discussed, and dismissed, very early in the thread.

Airbubba's post #1001 shows a copy of the ATC report stating that they observed this and that, 'approach, pass, lift'. The very vagueness of the wording suggests that they actually observed very little, if anything at all.

The letter is based only on the Approach Controller written report and from his location he could not see outside. The Report of the Tower controller is the one I would be interested to see..

100% agree . My point was that it is not that unusual and does happen in real life .

When a go around is initiated at 40 to 50kts higher than Vapp second touchdown should not happen. Back stick and Aircraft will be more than a few hundred feet even without thrust.

[SLF ... although having some knowledge of aviation law (and....lots of hours, of reading PPRuNe)]
The video from Blancolirio (Euclideanplane #1118) has the gent noting, with not very subtle emphasis, how the R/T included one of the crew saying they were "comfortable" with, or on, the approach profile on which they were proceeding.
Fairly sure that's a non-standard term, "comfortable".
If that's correct, is it a term that nonetheless has cropped up in R/T in previous accidents?
(I'm not speculating at all as to what could have led to usage of that term; it is greatly to be hoped the AAIB will report with compelling thoroughness and conformity to contemporary Annex 13 standards and, expected practices rather than those merely "recommended".)

Maybe aiming for is a more accurate description...

I'd not read much/anything into the use of "comfortable" per se WillowRun. "Standard phraseology" is used to provide unambiguous standard calls during routine events to ensure things aren't missed or misunderstood particularly for key activities (such as clearances and readbacks thereof). When something needs confirmation or things are out of the ordinary, it's quite standard to use normal language to describe/emphasise things. All the Captain appears to be doing is pointing out to ATC that, despite the issue raised by ATC (significantly excess height over range), he is happy/comfortable to continue despite their rather odd position. Either word seems to sum up the Captains feelings.

Interestingly, that second bit of your quote which you put in brackets is actually at the very heart of this matter and is far more important than the actual word used - what on earth possessed an experienced Captain to think/state that they were "comfortable" (or any similar word) in a situation which many on PPruNe, particularly those who fly pax jets day in and day out, realise was pretty much an impossibility to pull off - as was sadly proved during the first part of this accident when they initially arrived over the runway. The undesirability of their start point is exactly why I chose my moniker on PPruNe!

They had lost their situational awareness from a long time all that they needed was a capture of the false glideslope to feel secure and comfortable. The same thing happened on the same date in 2010 in Mangalore in India. The question how can I be on glideslope when I was never on the profile didn't occur to them. PIA accident is even worse in terms of Altitude and speed.

There were two pilots. Keeping each other honest when the system is working. Whatever happened here started there.

As mentioned in my post 851. QED.

Since the AF447 threads, it's always a pleasure to read your contributions, WillowRun.

Re, "comfortable", etc., good question. It's like the phrase I've heard on occasion, "yeah, we'll do all that...", which is peculiar to the U.S. Generally it's not a problem, just like, "we're comfortable" generally isn't. Such responses may creep in in less formal RT environments but they're not recognized as standard. Most of the time it works but it always leaves both sides of the communication potentially mis-understanding one another.

The one accident I can recall as having communications confusion as a primary cause is the Tenerife accident, and maybe the TCAS - mid-air in Germany, (the accident reports can be consulted).

I look forward to the timeline of communications and hope it is sync'd with a CVR transcription.

I do recall that the sudden loss of AF447 and long thread interpreting the cryptic ACARS messages to determine what happened that could result in them being transmitted in the sequence in which they had been sent, (and even that was in question). And then the data indicated a 15deg pitch up at cruise altitude with sidestick input that was held until the stall and almost all the way down.

I know that that's what happened but I still find it difficult to accept that an airline crew could perform this way. But that's what this one is going to be, I think.

Well there is a formal and compliant way to say exactly that and this is "Roger". So what would have been different had they replied in the formal way? It's not what you say, it's what you do that makes the difference.

Re the term "comfortable with." Good discussion. It is not standard phraseology and the problem with all those non-standard expressions is that they are subject to interpretation from both sides.
I cannot remember having heard it directly as a controller in my career but I would interpret it, as: "I know what I am doing" , but perhaps it was meant as, "I think we will be ok "
As a general aviation pilot I have many times heard people using sentences like: "it will be OK" or, "it will pass" more to reassure themselves or convince themselves that they were taking the right decision.

One accident I remember investigating long ago (1993) was the Contactair Dash-8 that crashed short of 28 in CDG. They were on ILS runway 27, which became blocked. The APP controller asked the pilot: "Can you make a side step to the left to the ILS runway 28?" The Captain replied: "Yes of course!"
That reply led the controller to believe the pilot was happy with the suggestion (i.e. avoiding a go-around) and did not gave further instructions/assistance.
In reality it was a complex maneuver, as the threshold of 28 is 2500m ahead of 27. They tried to capture the glide from below but ended crashing 1/2 NM before the threshold.
Lots of discussion at the time about the initial request and the interpretation by the controller of the "Yes of course" . It ended badly for him in court later.

But again: Had he replied in the correct way saying "Affirm" then the outcome would have been exactly the same. It was not the phraseology that caused this crash but the crew (I happen to have some inside information on this specific accident).

Here, no difference.
But the point is, in all communications there are always two and "what you do" is based upon a clear understanding of what the other said, even if one does nothing. The controller was both saying something and offering something: "Are you guys ok?, if not, here's a way out". The rest is the captain's decision unless/until the aircraft presents danger to other aircraft.

"I saw a very large 200mph blur bouncing down the runway."

Even standard phraseology can be non-standard - take conditional clearances which can be quite convoluted! And I bet ATC didn't interpret the Captains "I'm comfortable" as being the truth given his position on the approach - but what do they do next? Of course, we are applying our view on what is normal both in initial understanding and then subsequent activity - read on.

I've mentioned "cultural dynamics" a while back and this links to ferry pilots comment about the crew keeping each other honest - and ATC keeping them honest. I did a course some years ago with 3 guys from Pakistan - all 3 were the same Rank ... but one was a sort of Boss - on what basis I never found out. Not once in 3 months did I see the other 2 do anything professionally (or socially) without seeking the approval of the "Boss" even when, nominally, they were "in charge" of an activity and, as I said, they were of an equivalent Rank throughout. After 3 months I got used to this. All 3 were great blokes but No 2 and No 3 were not permitted to do anything on their own - professionally or socially. In such a culture, I could easily see a FO having no say at all in what the Captain did. Odd? To us Brits yes! To them? It was complete SOP!!!!!!

Use of "I'm comfortable!" is a red herring here - there are much more important questions as I suggested earlier. Even the "they were out of SA at the start" is questionable - deciding they (or the Captain deciding!) they could do something almost impossible would swiftly lead to SA setting in as the jet flew off ahead of them. So the cause may not be a loss of SA, but of setting themselves up so that that a loss of SA was an inevitable by-product. Does the "culture" then preclude the Captain from admitting he's lost SA and asking for help? Based on that course I was on - I could see that quite easily happening. So to blame loss of SA may well prevent looking further back as to why they lost SA in the first place and, having lost SA, why they may not have asked for help when prompted - which may be uncomfortable reading and, sadly, beyond rational solution.

The more one looks at humanity in all it's glory - the more one marvels as to how few disasters there are. Even "decision making" (thanks to the person who pm'd me a link to that topic) is an "art noire"!!!! Hell, it now takes me 10 minutes to get out of bed just after reading that link on decision-making!!!! Actually, it's almost time for bed in an hour or so .... so here I go assessing all the options I have relating to how to get from my PC to bed safely, ensuring the cat is in and the house locked up........

If I read (and understood) everything correctly the controller did not offer them anything but instead instructed them to turn onto a specific heading away from the approach. To make them get rid of excess altitude and speed. So there should have been no captain's decision but compliance with that instruction. We really need that CVR transcript to understand what was going on.