From the harvested data on this thread so far, I am very curious to know what kind of site-picture was in the minds of both pilots from short final, through the flare, and into touchdown during the first attempt. I want to understand what level of alleged task saturation, target fixation, cultural predisposition, or other cognitive deficit will allow 2 minds to accept the front view, given the energy parameters being suggested so far in this thread.
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Warnings
In another life I did maintenance test flights which demanded, on lift off an engine to idle to check some flight guidance items, gear up and then a descent to check emergency thrust increase etc. Not only did this look awful from the cockpit and the tower (who had been informed in advance) but it set off a barrel load of aural warnings and red indicators.
Even with a meticulous preparation this scenario came as quite a shock - all the warnings from Hell, at the same time. It helps me, in a way to understand the reactions to blatant warnings in this case - and also the 737 Max departures - which were for sure not so planned for. Warnings have their limitations. Only good procedures and discipline could have kept this crew from deteriorating into the chambers of Hell, where reason and experience no longer work. If there is a lesson here, it is not to get outside the envelope in the first place - and if you do, do everything possible to get back inside it before continuing. |
Originally Posted by lederhosen
(Post 10797804)
........We have also had some crusty old pros saying that the Airbus flies just like any other aircraft. At one level that is true. But in reality in normal operation it does a lot of the work for you. Which is where we get back to the insidious skill deterioration that automation encourages. Maybe a Corona enforced reduction in flying, plus Airbus skill atrophy.
I agree with the general spirit of your post that I have quoted from. I have also avoided writing any speculation about why this happened. But come on. The most basic function of every flight is to start descent at a reasonable range from the destination. To slow down and configure in good time. To be fully stable* by 1000' agl, (500' if visual), and to land, or go-around. One cannot blame Airbus or automation dependancy for the pilots' failure to perform this most basic series of operations. *Which in most definitions means: Fully configured for landing. On speed. On track. On altitude/DME, and Landing checklist completed. |
Originally Posted by lederhosen
(Post 10797804)
We have also had some crusty old pros saying that the Airbus flies just like any other aircraft. At one level that is true. But in reality in normal operation it does a lot of the work for you. Which is where we get back to the insidious skill deterioration that automation encourages. Maybe a Corona enforced reduction in flying, plus low blood sugar, plus Airbus skill atrophy lined up the holes in the Swiss cheese. In which case we need to be very careful when we all go flying again.
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*Which in most definitions means: Fully configured for landing. On speed. On track. On altitude/DME, and Landing checklist completed. And I might add as you look fwd you are satisfied with the site picture in-front for you... |
Originally Posted by MPN11
(Post 10798228)
AFAIK, conjecture tending towards assumption.
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Originally Posted by DaveJ75
(Post 10798232)
5 words which describe the entire thread!
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If you were talking about the final report I would agree...
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Originally Posted by bud leon
(Post 10792522)
I'm sure Peter Burkill would agree with you.
I don't see anyone saying a lesser standard is acceptable due to cultural differences, the problem is thinking that cultural differences by default result in lower safety standards. It's a simplistic way of looking at things. Both pilots did their initial training at British Aerospace flying college Prestwick. The Tenerife accident in 1977 at TFN you have referred to was most certainly a CRM / cultural issue. The Staines accident in 1971 at LHR was again most likely caused by awful CRM issues. Kegworth was an eye opener where poor SCCM involvement was most definitely a factor. “Swiss Cheese” The accidents in the 1970’s with ‘western operators’ were a very distinct wake up call where human factors played a significant part. It would be true to say that a great deal of energy has gone into mitigating these threats and minimising the risks. Look at the BOAC video posted 0242 on 28 May on this thread. Certainty I had a good laugh at this British culture / CRM Style post World War II. What is important is that flightdeck styles need to enhance flight safety, with evolvement and develop over time as incidents/accidents occur. If in 50 years time, the new PPRuNers look back to 2020, they will be having a chuckle at our present CRM as well. Cultures and CRMs issues play their parts invariably in all accidents. And for the avoidance of doubt, I am been involved in training not only ‘Asian Muslims’ but others of this Faith from the Middle East, and other Faiths as well for the last 30 years. |
Originally Posted by DaveJ75
(Post 10798260)
If you were talking about the final report I would agree...
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Originally Posted by Nightstop
(Post 10797671)
Axel-Flo:
Secondly, the most effective method of losing altitude with reduced track miles is to keep the speed high, aircraft clean as long as possible to as low as possible, and then decelerate rapidly in level flight using Speedbrake, Gear and then flaps. So, if terrain, ATC and Company SOP permits the method would be selected MMO/VMO clean to 3000’ (say), activate Approach Phase, Managed speed then Speedbrake, Gear, Flaps. Use selected speed during deceleration according to taste. Hold level to kill the speed using airbrake. Drop droop, flaps and gear and resume the descent at the lowest approach speed. A slippery aircraft like e.g the 757 will not decelerate nose down. I used to think it worthwhile to devote some time on the sim course to demonstrating that even being 400' too high at the outer marker with only 20 flap you could rescue the situation by holding level to drop everything and then resuming to be in the slot by 500' Once in a Vanguard diverting from Heathrow over central London at FL100, Approach said the RVR on what was then 28L had gone to the magic (Cat 1) 600m and if we were interested we would be No 1. By using the above technique we made it straight in as the first to land that morning. |
Originally Posted by scotbill
(Post 10798423)
That is completely wrong. You need gradient - not rate of descent.
Hold level to kill the speed using airbrake. Drop droop, flaps and gear and resume the descent at the lowest approach speed. A slippery aircraft like e.g the 757 will not decelerate nose down. I used to think it worthwhile to devote some time on the sim course to demonstrating that even being 400' too high at the outer marker with only 20 flap you could rescue the situation by holding level to drop everything and then resuming to be in the slot by 500' Once in a Vanguard diverting from Heathrow over central London at FL100, Approach said the RVR on what was then 28L had gone to the magic (Cat 1) 600m and if we were interested we would be No 1. By using the above technique we made it straight in as the first to land that morning. |
Originally Posted by Mgggpilot
(Post 10798428)
Both you and Nightstop are right. Depends how far are you from the airport. You can't slow down flaps, gear down 100miles from field even if you are 4,000ft or above higher.
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IMI
so please accept that what I suggested (and Nightstop was so quick to condemn) wasn’t a suggestion of normality at all. However, had one missed TOD, or at 10,000ft and reportedly 250 Krs +/-, Was there a profile that could have been flown to put a crew back in the “SAC” to fly either the ILS or a visual approach to the runway that didn’t result I. Threshold crossing speed of >200Kts, and not full flap and gear down?🤔
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Mgggpilot
You do not have a problem 100 miles from the airport! I have been held at FL 280 by Italian ATC till 35 miles from the airport at Bari. But it was a Trident with reverse available in flight and we were able to join comfortably downwind. |
Originally Posted by scotbill
(Post 10798499)
Mgggpilot
You do not have a problem 100 miles from the airport! I have been held at FL 280 by Italian ATC till 35 miles from the airport at Bari. But it was a Trident with reverse available in flight and we were able to join comfortably downwind. |
Trident , a lovely, but uneconomical aircraft .Seem to remember 10000 hp rpm on center for a/conditioning reverse on 1/3 350/365kt descent circa 16000fpm.
Useful if pushed but far from normal Ops. More useful , the ability to descend and decelerate at the same time. With respect to the PIA issue under discussion the 1000' gate should have given any 'professional' pilot the information he/she/it needed to make a sensible decision. |
Originally Posted by Twitter
(Post 10798049)
In another life I did maintenance test flights which demanded, on lift off an engine to idle to check some flight guidance items, gear up and then a descent to check emergency thrust increase etc. Not only did this look awful from the cockpit and the tower (who had been informed in advance) but it set off a barrel load of aural warnings and red indicators.
Even with a meticulous preparation this scenario came as quite a shock - all the warnings from Hell, at the same time. It helps me, in a way to understand the reactions to blatant warnings in this case - and also the 737 Max departures - which were for sure not so planned for. Warnings have their limitations. Only good procedures and discipline could have kept this crew from deteriorating into the chambers of Hell, where reason and experience no longer work. If there is a lesson here, it is not to get outside the envelope in the first place - and if you do, do everything possible to get back inside it before continuing. |
Originally Posted by Mgggpilot
(Post 10798428)
Both you and Nightstop are right. Depends how far are you from the airport. You can't slow down flaps, gear down 100miles from field even if you are 4,000ft or above higher.
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Potentially an undiagnosed Covid-19 infection in the cockpit could result in crew loss of capacity and be a contributory factor. No doubt this will be tested for by the investigators. Should all operating crews be antigen tested before every flight?
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