Not on the A320.

No, there isn't. A slip up i have seen made by every former boeing pilot at least once was selecting the lower altitude, and then watching astonished that the aircraft did not start to descent. Been there, done it myself, more than once. However, usually that is really a non issue as the bus drops like a ton of bricks if you really want to, much less of a problem getting it down and slow than a 738 for example.

I’m in the middle of a fascinating discussion with the FR24 people about that. Their data shows a constant 314 KTAS from FL100 all the way down to the go-around, only reducing (abruptly, to around 220 KTAS) when passing through 3000’ downwind after the GA.

So far, they are insisting that 200 KIAS during the GA isn’t incompatible with their 314 KTAS value. At sea level ?? Really ??

I suppose the moral is that you can have all the data in the world, and still not understand any of it. :ugh:

Talking of data: Is Flight Data Monitoring a feature of PIA operations?

If so, what protocols existed to ensure that any “shortcoming trends”
are nipped in the bud.

Way back when, wasnt it established = localiser established and fully established = localiser and glide slope

But perhaps they had established on a false glideslope due interception from well above. False glideslopes typically occur at 9 degrees and 12 degrees (normal being 3 degrees). A very high rate of descent would be apparent of course when established on a false glideslope, it’s up to the crew to recognise it as such.

Despite crew being visual all that time, I would'nt be surprised the least if the bus surprisingly just captured a false g/s signal...
learner . . . ;)

Unlikely but could happen. Then again, I am sure a professional crew wouldn’t be caught out by something so simplistic. Next you’ll be telling me someone could turn the EGPWS off and land wheels up......

Not automatically descending just because you have reached the computer predicted descent point, is a good thing. ATC might have denied descent clearance - there might be something below you, which the aircraft would hit if it descended without a pilot's say so. The decelerate message is to try not to get too far above the profile.

The approach phase engages automatically when you are in managed nav and you fly over the decelerate icon, the "strawberry", some call it. If you are flying vectors using heading, approach phase will not automatically engage - again, another safety feature, requiring the pilots say so before starting an approach.

Both these functions make perfect sense to me because the aircraft does not know everything and cannot make such decisions on its own. And I think one has to rely on at least one pilot being professional, engaged and awake in commercial operations, otherwise we might as well all give up and let Mr Musk or someone build us pilotless passenger aircraft.

Proper training. Proper testing of pilots. Following proper SOPs and proper CRM does work. We know how to do this now. It is very sad that in 2020, aircraft are still continuing unstable approaches and crashing.

Happens now and then coming in to JFK. Not a big deal since in the Airbus you have a new device called a moving map and actually know where you are. I mean these were professional pilots correct? Do you have to be a old school pilot to still crosscheck altitude at the outer marker and be running 3 to 1 calculations?

The A320 has thoughtful safety features built in to the automation, eg when going into HDG whilst climbing in NAV mode, the CLB goes into open. When descending if HDG is selected the descent goes into V/S at current rate rather than open descent. Also it will not capture the glidepath unless LOC is captured first.

These guys certainly wouldn't be the first to keep on going past TOD, some even keep going past the airport. I knew someone who woke up from a short nap and was puzzled as to why the DME was counting up instead of down, he soon worked it out.

Agree 100%.

45 pages of comments........ Are we any nearer to knowing whether: a) this was a horrible gear-up landing and go-round, that then got even worse; or b) was this a poorly executed gear-down go-around, with the gear then raised well before a positive rate of climb? The focus here seems more on how they crew got themselves into the mess, without anyone being sure what the mess was they got themselves into.....

Of course proper training and testing is relevant.

That said, it is interesting that a 737, even a classic, can automatically switch into the approach phase even on vectors, and does of course descend automatically if a "descend when ready" clearance has been given and the lower altitude has been selected on the MCP (or FCU in airbus speak). It simply makes life easier for the pilot. Of course it does not follow the managed descend profile blindly without a clearance entered into the aircraft system.

Probably quite irrelevant in this instance, but i have been caught out by it, so have many pilots that have switched from boeing to airbus. The airbus requires extra help to do simple stuff, it is in many ways quite old fashioned. Does it explain this case? Obviously not, but it could be a tiny part of the chain.

I think that although possibility b is easier to understand (excuse?), the physical evidence/data better supports a.

do we not already have reports from ATC interviews that gear was UP on approach?

Early on in the thread, calculations were made about - if the gear were down to start with - how long the gear would take to retract so that no damage was made to the doors when the pods scraped, as seen in video. The conclusion was that the gear was never down.

When photographs and video emerged of the runway scrapes, it became clearer that there was not enough time for the full gear retraction cycle to have taken place. Therefore, the gear was never down.

The "false glideslope" theory holds no water.

ATC queried their position and offered alternatives, the crew's reply was indicative that they knew they were high and would press on with the approach.

It was VMC and being "local" pilots they would know that the view out of the window wasn't normal.

Absolutely NOTHING in the speed and height data looks normal.

As a former ATCO, what does bother me is that the TWR controller wasn't keeping a good eye on his piece of real estate and the customer and missed the runway contact.

cbfkoh
 

It looks like fast rushed approach. Attempted fast landing with speed above the inhibiting speed for undercarriage not down and first appreciation of that was when the engines touched the runway.