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Originally Posted by Longtimer
(Post 10462874)
Glad that all humans onboard survived but evidently there were pets in the belly compartments and their fate is still not determined.
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Runway 10 is not grooved. Is this yet another fast tailwind landing on a non-grooved wet runway (with a thrust reverser inop)? Let's see first what the touchdown point and delta Vref was, and start our learning experience from there. Not to land is most man's last line of defence. Another interesting data point would be the 500' AFE profile and speed/thrust. Unlike some other investigation agencies, NTSB has remained strong in naming what needs to be named. |
Originally Posted by JamaicaJoe
(Post 10464118)
Where is the WX radar equipment that should have been under that missing radome?
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I see in one mainstream US news media today more column inches are given to the loss of four pets in this aircraft's hold than to 41 fatalities in the Moscow accident.
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On May 5th 2019 the NTSB reported in their press conference, weather has complicated their efforts. The FDR was read out, preliminary information indicated the IAS at touchdown was 163 knots, 178 knots over ground (about 15 knots tail wind) at 30 degrees of flaps, ground spoilers deployed 3 seconds after touch down. The left hand thrust reverser was inoperative and the aircraft was dispatched under MEL. |
Originally Posted by WHBM
(Post 10464476)
I see in one mainstream US news media today more column inches are given to the loss of four pets in this aircraft's hold than to 41 fatalities in the Moscow accident.
Security concern is proportional to the relevance of the story for the individual, his or her family, social group and societal group, in declining order. At some point there is a Boundary of Relevance, beyond which the change is no longer perceived to be relevant, or newsworthy. |
On May 5th 2019 the NTSB reported in their press conference, weather has complicated their efforts. The FDR was read out, preliminary information indicated the IAS at touchdown was 163 knots, 178 knots over ground (about 15 knots tail wind) at 30 degrees of flaps, ground spoilers deployed 3 seconds after touch down. The left hand thrust reverser was inoperative and the aircraft was dispatched under MEL. |
ALD or RLD?
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Originally Posted by FlightDetent
(Post 10464536)
ALD or RLD?
I do not know the actual landing weight, however according to the preliminary data the incident aircraft touched down at approximately 15 knots faster than the maximum weight Flaps 30 approach speed with a 15 knot tailwind. This is 30 knots total faster than the entry condition for the calculations above. Given what we currently know, it does not appear that the aircraft could have been stopped within the confines of the runway even if they had landed in the touchdown zone with no subsequent bounce. |
Why did they not divert to KDAB, KMCO. KJAX. All within spitting distance and all with over 10000 feet runways. |
Why did they not divert to KDAB, KMCO. KJAX. All within spitting distance and all with over 10000 feet runways. |
According to the BBC the Left Reverser was not operational.
Florida plane accident: Landing feature failed on aircraft
The Boeing 737, operated by Miami Air International, ended up in a river after landing during a thunderstorm. Officials said 21 people were taken to hospital with minor injuries, and at least four pets kept in the hold died. They are now looking into the failure of the "thrust reverser", as well as a request by the pilot to change runways.The flight, which had flown from Guantanamo Bay in Cuba to a military base in the city of Jacksonville, is said to have landed heavily in the storm before skidding into St John's River. The 136 passengers and seven crew members on board evacuated the Boeing 737-800 via its wings. Investigators have obtained the flight data recorder but the cockpit voice recorder remains in a submerged area of the plane. Authorities must wait until the remaining fuel - around 1,200 gallons (4,500L) - is removed before attempting to salvage any evidence. "The aircraft had been in maintenance and the maintenance log noted that the left hand thrust reverser was inoperative," Bruce Landsberg, vice-chairman of the US National Transportation Safety Board, told a press conference on Sunday. Mr Landsberg added that shortly before they landed, the pilots had asked to change to a runway which had equipment set up on it, and which therefore had less space available. "We don't know what they were thinking or why that was their choice," he said. On Sunday, the Naval Air Station in Jacksonville confirmed that the bodies of a dog and two cats were recovered from the aircraft. Another animal that had travelled in the cabin was removed alive by its owner. 'Terrifying' momentOne passenger on the plane, Cheryl Bormann, described the "terrifying" moment it slid off the runway."The plane literally hit the ground and bounced - it was clear the pilot did not have total control of the plane, it bounced again," she told CNN. "We were in the water. We couldn't tell where we were, whether it was a river or an ocean," she said, adding that she could smell jet fuel leaking into the river. In a news conference, Captain Michael Connor, commanding officer at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, said it was a "miracle" that there had been no serious injuries or fatalities. Miami Air International is contracted by the US military for its twice-weekly "rotator" service between the US mainland and Guantanamo Bay, Bill Dougherty, a base spokesman said. Officials say the people on Friday's flight included civilian and military personnel. It said it was providing technical assistance to the US National Transportation Safety Board, which is investigating the incident. The aerospace giant has been under increased scrutiny following two fatal crashes involving its 737 Max 8 planes - a different model to the one involved in the incident on Friday. |
Originally Posted by 737 Driver
(Post 10464571)
In the NTSB briefing (link posted above) it was stated that the available landing distance for this runway was 7800 feet. At maximum landing weight on a wet grooved runway, a 737NG will require approximately 6800 feet of runway with both reversers, Flaps 30, max braking (air distance included). On a wet ungrooved runway (braking advisory medium), the calculated landing distance exceeds 8,300 feet. If braking action was medium to poor, the calculated distance exceeds 9500 feet. To be fair,
I am looking specifically at the choices done w.r.t. the landing performance before accepting the destination. It's a pet subject this year. I think that after harmonization the rules are similar on both sides of the Atlantic. Somebody correct me: - Flight test data are no longer legally approved to be used operationally - FCOM Perf data are now "Operational Landing Distance" = OLD = Flight test + 10% - Wet distances typically carry another 15% penalty unless flight tested. Legal requirement before dispatch: Regulatory Landing Distance = RLD = OLD + 67% --> now, here you can cheat around tailwind claiming landing will be on the runway into the wind (*) --> whether the TAF shows relevant precip at time of landing is debatable. Especially if delayed, it is still a must pass check at dispatch. Legal requirements before landing: Actual Landing distance [A commander shall ensure himself by a reasonable means that landing can be accomplished within LDA - not an exact quote but close enough]. And the expected landing distance is the = OLD (see above) or, in some jurisdictions = Factorized LD = FLD = OLD + 15% --> here you definitely cannot cheat around present tailwind --> here you definitely cannot cheat around wet (real achieved BA is still guesswork though) Observe, that for low visibility and inclement weather: - Everybody knows not to descend without visual reference below DH. - Everybody knows there's approach ban altitude limit. - Everybody knows that sometimes you cannot even depart due to destination WX. --> and these rules serve the industry well, having been put in place for a great number of very tragic reasons. We have exactly the same tools available for runway overruns. - Do not land beyond the distance marking stripes (if painted properly **) - If the in-flight calculation OLD or FLD is not satisfied, landing is not authorized - If the dispatch calculation RLD is not satisfied, the flight shall not commence. --> are we using these tools properly to make sure we do not paint ourselves into a Human Factors corner? --> is there some point in the chain of events in this accident, where it should not have been allowed to unfold - if the job was done by the book given what is written already? 737 Driver Similar to your assessment of the MCAS issue I think we have the responsibility to G/A and not land deep. Clean our side of the street. Also, it is inevitable on a global scale that due to unfortunate reasons a good number of us won't on a bad day. Whether or not I will fall into the second pool when Reaper comes knocking is badly predictable (wonkazoo's experience explains). So are there any stops, barriers or fences that I may have crossed even unknowingly? I think there are already sufficient tools, and wait in anticipation for the Burbank SWA report to read what was the legal authority to attempt that landing at all. Kind regards, FD. https://www.pprune.org/10335076-post114.html anyone cares to do similar view for this latest one? * = NOT IN THE BURBANK CASE ** = NOT IN THE BURBANK CASE |
That only the rght thrust reverser was working may explain why the airplane left the runway on the right hand side.
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Originally Posted by Longtimer
(Post 10464663)
Mr Landsberg added that shortly before they landed, the pilots had asked to change to a runway which had equipment set up on it, and which therefore had less space available.
Originally Posted by Longtimer
(Post 10464663)
"We don't know what they were thinking or why that was their choice," he said. As you can hear in the liveatc.net audio linked above, the approach controller suggested that runway 10 might be the better option. Looking at the radar picture archived by weather.us around the time of the mishap at 0143Z the weather is still over the field but the approach from the west looks better: https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....6c8ab725da.png Navy Jax is in the circled area near the bottom center of the radar plot. Jax International is north of town and in the clear, AA2004, an A320, and Challenger N541PJ shot visual approaches to JAX a few minutes before the mishap at NIP. Looking at the NOTAM's posted earlier it looks to me like both runways were about 8000 feet long for landing. The 7800 foot number from Bruce Landsberg is from his estimate that the barrier was 1200 feet from the threshold on the 9000 feet piece of pavement. M0196/19 NOTAMN Q) ZJX/QMRCM/IV/NBO/A/000/999/3014N08140W005 A) KNIP B) 1903281254 C) 1905302300=left E) RWY 28 TORA 8,002FT, TODA 8,002FT, ASDA 8,003FT, LDA 8,003FT. M0194/19 NOTAMN Q) ZJX/QMRCM/IV/NBO/A/000/999/3014N08140W005 A) KNIP B) 1903281251 C) 1905302300=left E) RWY 10 TORA 8,003FT, TODA 8,003FT, ASDA 8,006FT, LDA 8,006FT. Landsberg says the pilots were advised of the arresting gear or wire barrier (which is it?) on runway 10. I'm unable to find any mention of this in the approach control recordings, perhaps it was discussed after they switched to Navy Jax GCA on final approach to runway 10. When LL293 first checks in with Jax Approach they say they are unable to get the ATIS and the controller gives the winds as 350 degrees at 4 knots. He mentions moderate to heavy precip on approach to both runways and the initial plan is RNAV runway 28. The runway swap to 10 is later suggested by the controller as I posted above. |
Well I'm confused. Isn't saying they changed to "a runway with equipment on it" a misnomer? Aren't 10 and 28 just different directions on the same piece of asphalt? If it has equipment on it in one direction, doesn't the equipment exist in the other direction? (Unless landing on 28 they would fly over the equipment...which reduces available runway anyway.)
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https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....a22bd4e573.jpg
The E-28 arresting gear is charted for both runways 10 and 28 in the current airport diagram. It does not affect runway length calculations as far as I recall [but, it appears from the Boeing article linked below that some operators do indeed reduce the usable runway length - Airbubba]. :confused: However, a displaced threshold for runway 10 is depicted. Down in the fine print (the find the faces in the picture test) the runway 10 landing length is given as 8006 feet. Anybody have a Jepp chart for this airport? I also notice that Navy Jax doesn't have a VHF ATIS frequency listed. However, most of us get ATIS by digital means these days I suppose. I didn't hear the approach controller read the actual ATIS and weather sequence but he did paint a very unfavorable picture of field conditions after his call to NIP Tower. |
Here's a Boeing article on arresting barriers and arresting gear impact on airliner operations:
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_13/runway.pdf From the article: Adjustments to declared distances. Some airlines that operate on runways with arresting cables have reduced the available runway length by the distance from the operational end of the runway, or threshold, to the cable. For example, an 8,000-ft(2,438-m) runway could be reduced to 5,000 ft (1,524 m) of usable runway length for each of the following declared distances: takeoff distance available, takeoff runway available (TORA), accelerate stop distance available, and landing distance available (fig. 6). If the distance between the threshold and the cable is not used, however, the remaining runway substantially reduces the available payload on a 737-800 and MD-83 operation, based on the conditions of a standard day, optimal flap setting, zero wind, no obstacles, and zero slope (table 1). This method may be usable for a short-haul flight, but it is not a preferred long-term solution. |
And yes, there have been calls to change the NIP identifier for Navy Jax for at least four decades. It is viewed in some quarters as culturally insensitive. |
NTSB B-roll video of the investigators examining the aircraft interior and the defueling operation.
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