Except that MCAS activation doesn't present as runaway trim (not continuous and can be briefly interrupted by operation of column trim switches), so it wasn't recognized by at least two crews. Then there's the problem of trimming manually, perhaps from full nose-down, at high speed and low altitude, while trying to fly the airplane -- with any number of other distractions bombarding the senses and causing distraction and confusion.

This has been discussed exhaustively and compellingly in these threads, but some still insist that the problem is pilot error. I suppose it's OK for individual pilots to think that way, but, when engineers, manufacturers, regulatory authorities, etc. do, the result is all too likely to be catastrophic loss.

Well I've only been an aviation professional for 52 years, so what do I know. :) Seriously though, the Turkish Airlines case illustrated poor failure monitoring within the RADALT (Not to MENTION complete crew unawareness and monitoring) of IAS. RAD ALT inputs to AFCS typically is used for gain gearing and throttle retard and usually have good self monitoring (But not in this case of course).
The QANTAS A330 case has yet to be completely and adequately explained ADIRU fault, the suspect was a data labelling issue. (GREAT airmanship by the QANTAS crew however). The ADIRU functions certainly are monitored and compared.
For ANY flight control system, ALPHA as well as Ps & Pt inputs are invariably monitored.. The absence of an Alpha disagree function of MCAS is at the very best negligent to the extreme, as has been the whole frantically rushed throwing together of this appalling system. Pilots and passengers deserve FAR better than this.

How many times does it have to do the same thing before you consider it to be continuously doing something you do not want. My number would be 2.

The Seattle Times runs an article with some bold claims, including that factual errors have crept in the certification process, and where raised to the attention of Boeing and FAA days before the ET302 crash. It is not paywalled where I stand.

In addition to often mentioned lack of fidelity in the ads-b info available on the internet. It is normal to see a VSI indication dip slightly at rotation. well, it used to be, not familiar with the most recent 15 years of aircraft development.

Any reason there is not a warning light on the 737 MAX to indicate MCAS has activated?

Ever flown a 737?

I can think of one reason: It was meant to be a secret! :*

Thx Silver for clearification:ok:

Does anyone know? If you have a 737 Max , airborne, flaps up, really high speed, full nose down trim, electric stabilizer trimming motors shut off, how much back pressure does it take to raise the nose with the elevator? While applying this large force to the elevator, how much force is required to turn the stabilizer trim hand wheel? How many turns of the hand wheel per degree of stabilizer trim. In other words, is it possible to get into a position in which it is impossible to recover, not enough elevator authority due to force required and or inability to retrim the stabilizer manually due to it binding from a combination of speed and forces being applied through the elevator.

As FCEng says in post #1946 you cannot overcome the StabTrim with elevator at high speed.

I understand all that, and yes, I vaguely remember the trim brake. but the question is still this. Is there a conceiveable way to load the stabilizer to the point that it cannot manually be trimmed back to a point were elevators will work again?

I know it may look a bit stupid but I need to clarify that. I would like if someone who flies 737 could reply.
Why Boeing put MCAS to MAX? As I understood there was problem with pitch moment created by engines at some occasions. But is it possible to fly without it and it will be just difficult or it is impossible to handle the aircraft without MCAS? I though it is there just to be safer and easier for pilots but I have read many strange things about that. But I think that is just mess made up by media.

I also wonder if the forward position of the engines, which gives a pitch up moment at high angles of attack, and led to the addiction of MCAS, could possibly give a pitch down moment at low angles of attack?

I cannot speak to the potential for binding of the horizontal stabilizer control (either via electric motor or via manual turn of mechanical trim wheel) but I can shed some light on the first question. Where the stabilizer needs to be for trim is a function of all of the contributors to pitching moments that must be balanced. CG is the biggest factor and will have the most influence on where the stabilizer sits for trim(i.e., no column push or pull required for steady flight). How "out of trim" the airplane is with the stabilizer moved all the way to its airplane nose down limit depends on where you start (i.e., what position represents "in trim"). If the CG is at its forward limit, trim will involve a fair amount of airplane nose up stabilizer so there will be a larger increment of stabilizer travel from there to the nose down limit. If the CG is at is aft limit, trim will place the stabilizer much closer to the airplane nose down limit so the increment from there to full nose down will be smaller.

Also with regard to your reference to "very high speed" specifics make a difference as Mach effects come into play along with dynamic pressure. At cruise speeds and faster elevator travel is limited by actuator force capability. The faster you go the less the elevator can be deflected and thus the more critical it is to have the horizontal stabilizer near its trim position.

DING DING DING We have a winner!

That’s one of the biggest elephants (gorillas?) in the room. By the time you’ve thought “hmm, that’s not quite right” at low-level the situation has gone from nuisance to critical. The 737 trim is on the move all the time, be it from pilot inputs or STS/MCAS/Autopilot. Clickety-clack is the most heard noise on a 737 flight deck as the trim wheel spins it’s merry way backwards and forwards. Add an unreliable airspeed scenario to the above and no wonder things go from bad to worse. I really feel sorry for the crews who were dumped in this situation. :(