Curious number of new posters piling it up on the pilots of the flight in question, all the while drawing attention away from the true culprits (Boeing & Co). PR at work?

Well brak, that may be true, but countered by the very strongly worded post above. It hits firmly at Boeing, and it's hard to not agree with the fundamental points.

No, it is not Boeing PR. As more information becomes available, and there is more understanding of what actually happened, those of us who actually get paid to fly can see that these pilots made a lot of mistakes.

The ET302 pilots did not follow the proper procedures after takeoff when they were faced with an Angle Of Attack disagreement during a day VFR departure. Boeing has taken steps to make the B737 MAX MCAS safer (foolproof?), but there will always be pilots who are their own worst enemies.

Agree.

Disagree for reasons previously covered. That being said, they were a product of their airline's training and culture.

Agree wholeheartedly.

How did the crew of ET302 know there had been an "Angle of Attack Disagreement"? Was it being displayed on their PFD's?? Did you even read the previous thousand or so postings before you posted yours? I'm curious.

Wow, somebody tell the authorities, Boeing already fixed it! No need for any tests, get that thing back in the air LostinSaigon apparently knows all is fine. I'll file this with all the people asking why they didn't just 'cut the trim switches' until it turned out they did cut the trim switches.

The key words in your post were 'for some unknown reason'. I expect the authorities will want to actually find out what that was before letting the plane fly again. Because they did follow the checklist, and there are points in the FDR which may suggest there is a further problem somewhere in the computers; I believe Boeing has stated they have identified an additional undisclosed problem.

Thank you for providing the proof that pilots were not provided with a way of knowing they have an AoA disagree. Unless they happened to work for American Airines who had the optional extra. And yeh the pilots used electric trim up and then hit the cutout switches. There is a question that may be around the additional problem Boeing is investigating about why they didn't trim up further with the electric trim. It's a question because it happens at the start and the end, and there's no logical reason for the pilots to do that, which suggests there may have been an additional system problem. We shall see.

From a U.S. Private Pilot: My buddy's youngest is a First Officer on the B737 with Alaska. His only comment was that an emergency "CESSNA" button on the instrument panel to kill all digital input except for primary controls, slats, flaps, brakes and steering would be nice; allowing for good old fashioned piloting skills and, hopefully, a safe manual (Cessna) landing.

Possibly an enormous over-simplification but is that possible?

Tim.

That’s basically what the stabiliser disconnect switches do on the 737. Pretty much all the controls are string and pulleys.

In any non-normal situation flying the aircraft manually usually comes at the expense of reduced capacity for troubleshooting and decision making. Deliberately increasing workload would be an unusual step to take.

The 737 Max accidents are (IMHO) mainly influenced by design choices that should never have passed certification and trying to slap a sticking plaster on top of those decisions is missing the bigger picture.

I've been mostly silent on this thread, despite reading all posts. But that one rang a bell.

FACT: As far as the world knows exactly seven qualified commercial pilots have seen the scenarios that let to the loss of Lion Air 610 and ET302.

FACT: Of those seven pilots four are dead.

FACT: Of those seven pilots, and the three who are not dead, the only individual who correctly connected the dots was not either pilot 5 or 6. It was a jumpseater sitting behind them, who wasn't responsible for anything, who interrupted the mayhem and allowed the flight to continue and land safely.

A failure that results in an absolute 86 percent of its pilots being overwhelmed, that represents 66 percent of flights on which said failure happened ending up in microscopic sized pieces, this is not a failure that can be allowed on a modern transport aircraft.

If eight out of ten pilots who were exposed to a real life stressor are overwhelmed (empirically and though observation in known environments), how exactly is this their fault??

A failure that results in an absolute 66 percent of its pilots (and passengers) being killed simply cannot be blamed on the pilots. Could they have done better?? You bet. But statistics don't lie- and the numbers here show conclusively that MCAS is a killer unless you line up the slots in just the right way.

Perhaps more concerning: ANU trim above 300?? KIAS can cause you to have no trim control at all. I'll take on MCAS any day, but a stuck trim wheel with no altitude to give and... That's just nuts. I've been interviewing friends of mine who fly heavy iron. Not one can describe an airplane they have flown which loses all trim authority above a certain airspeed and tail loading.

You 737 drivers out there: If you are clocking 320KIAS and you try to use the trim- will it work if you are somewhat mis-trimmed nose-down?? 300KIAS?? 310KIAS?? Where and when does your trim tab become teh hammer nailing the lid shut on your coffin?? I am stunned to see here that people are not discussing this more. MCAS is an abomination, but alone it is simple stupidity. An Airplane that has an envelope within the normal operating range wherein trim will no longer not only be detrimental, it will me immovable...Really??

On every airplane you've got a handy indication of stall speed clean and dirty. If there is a speed above which your horizontal trim may not work, would there not be a need for a little line, to like, ummm, say "Hey dummy- if you are above this line you've got squat in terms of horizontal stabilizer trim control!!"

Finally:

Please stop trying to find the person to pin the blame to. This was a human failure, and it has literally thousands of possible inputs that could have effected the outcome. It is in Boeing's interest to minimize the actual events, as well as their underlying causes. But it is up to people like those of you here- to suss out the difference between corporate protective blame and actual culpability. The pilots had seconds to make decisions that would impact hundreds of lives. Boeing had at least eight years to make decisions that would have kept the bastard MCAS from entering into service in the first place. It is improper to equivocate the two, and moreso to blame the guys who only had a few seconds to guess and act correctly, as opposed to those who had years to do it right- and didn't.

Don't get me wrong- I know how proud we are. I simultaneously joined the Caterpillar Club and destroyed an entire airframe in 1996. I knew what had happened, but I knew that until the NTSB report came out NOT blaming pilot error I would never be free. And if it did blame me I would be crushed to the point of uselessness going forward. We are a proud profession, and we will eat our young in a heartbeat if we feel they have failed our standards in some way.

Eating our young here is a disservice to the profession. They went to work, did their best, their best was not good enough and hundreds died.

That should be enough penalty no??

Apologies for the rant-
dce

I guess we'll find out in the final report. Although the criminal investigations may preclude that. There are a lot of people here I really hope have no genuine role in aviation safety, so clear is their bias.