Probe heat is automatic on the 767 (all heated probes). Any probe heat failure generates an EICAS message.

Not to answer for EXDAC, but I flew Capt on the Mad Dog for 12 years and swapped legs if there was another qualified Capt on the crew list (rare), but never swapped seats. I did go to the lav a few times :) but only in cruise and nobody sat in my seat. If the sequence was over 8 hrs flying or 14 hrs duty (very rare) we had a relief crew, but the seat exchange was done at the gate.

This has been done to death and back. With that you'd throw away all the valuable contributions of engineers, ATC personnel, psychologists, sociologists, human-machine interface specialists, safety practitioners, and even *gasp* regulators and managers, etc., and end up a pilots-only echo chamber. I guess you can have that if you want, but that is not what this place is intended to be.

Bernd
(aerospace safety engineer, accident analyst, private pilot)

There are aviation professionals who are nutters, and who wear tin foil hats. And there are non-aviation professionals who have a great deal to contribute.

Do you want to exclude those of us with no medical due to silver hair ?

No way!!! Too many of us a bit wetter behind the ears are so busy staring at the single tree we have been assigned to manage that we can miss the shape of the forest. All of us certainly need the wisdom of those of you who have been around long enough to see how we got where we are to have some sense of how to move forward. It's hard to know how to get out of the woods if you were born in the thick of it and grew up not knowing any better. As one a little past half way between newbie and certified grey beard I implore all of you who have been around the block a few times to keep sharing your insights with the rest of us. Lord knows we need every bit of help we can collect!

As gums might say, FCeng defers ...

Seats have to be swapped in cruise for a long flight that requires a relief pilot.

Apparently Wall Street and Business Insider reporting NTSB stating pilot error as the cause of the crash. In the final minutes, pilots increase thrust passing through wx, overreact to nose up pitch due to thrust increase, end up 49deg nose down. NTSB saying reaction very strange for experienced aviators, as is obvious. Very strange

Salute!

Couldn't resist.....
by ater'pester"
Well, I still consider myself a "professional". And had a little bit of time as a government-paid triggerman that allowed me to gain a degree of experience with aerodynamics and avionics and.... All in planes that I could not stand up in or walk to the loo ( deference to the Poms) or grab a fresh cup of coffee. So for a good test try sitting in a small chair with oxygen mask on and maybe a relief tube to help, or a box lunch so the crumbs clogged up your valve in the mask, for 13 or 14 hours.

Just my "whine of the day" at the pester!

Gums remembers....

Jez thot we needed a bit of light commentary and this thing is very sad.

Looks like the aircraft operated KONT/KMIA/KIAH. Assuming this crew flew it out of KONT they'd be looking at about a 10 hour duty day.

So who exactly were the crew complement?
 

I am a little confused: I thought the airplane was a B767, not a MD80, in which case you are correct - the MD80 doesn't have the legs for a relief pilot. BUT...the crashed airplane was a B767, cest na pas?
As for the chatter about changing crew positions:
a. How many crew were assigned to the flight, and how many were type-rated and current on type (I may have missed that somewhere in the posts)?
b. Was the jump-seater (assumption) rated and current on type with the operator?
I opine that it would be a very "courageous" captain to permit a non-type rated company pilot to occupy either CM1 or CM2 seat at any stage of the flight.
I wait to be enlightened.

You must be reading a different article.

From the one that you linked to:

Which do you think is more likely to be something that the NTSB would actually say ?

More than a year for the final report, probably. But by the preliminary report which should be out in a couple of weeks, there will be some pretty strong hints.

Because it's an air carrier accident, sometime prior to the final report the NTSB will open a docket. The docket will have a wealth of factual reports including the CVR transcript.

Got this info from my airlines unofficial forum. Unofficial of course .

The initial bobble is from turbulence at 6200’. When the FO called for flaps 1, the captain accidentally hit the toga button. Toga didn’t engage until after flaps were set to 1, which then brought engine power to full, and started the initial pitch of 10 degrees nose up. The FO was startled, and shoved the nose forward... The CVR is startling, and baffling. The CA was pulling so hard against the FO that he sheared the pins on the stick and at that point had no control. They were IMC at the time. When they broke out into VMC, the FO said oh schit and started to pull. That was the round out you see. I won’t get into anything more until everything comes out. The records, the CVR, and what happened in the flight deck is truly shocking. They hit a negative 4 G dive initialy on the FOs push. All you hear is stuff hitting the ceiling and at one point a loud thud. They think the thud may have been the JS hitting the ceiling and maybe not wearing the shoulder harness. Like I said, I won’t get into anything more about the background of how it all happened. This is the accident in a nutshell. The facts that will come out are shocking.

TOGA not even armed until flaps are not up.

Nor does GA mode give you full power...

But you can envision continuous contact with the switches with the arm while moving the flap handle to 1. Would the thrust levers continue to advance because the rate of climb was not being acheived?

And the FO never learned to use the attitude indicator? With -49° pitch everything will be brown - easy to see.

Just got the same sequence of events from an old classmate. Only thing additional was that the FO apparently entered the weather and turbulence with the speed brakes fully deployed. I also got the extra stuff about the FO.

So this might be relevant: https://www.businessinsider.com/amaz...exWYzCom2nO24E

Remember in the first page of this thread when someone filtered the ATC audio (background noise from foreground) and the last transmission was Ok. Well that pull you hear at the end is supposedly the jumpseater telling the crew to pull up.

We'll be able to confirm once the transcripts come out, but I've heard the same narrative as above.

Sounds like the PF got disoriented by the pitch up from TOGA being engaged, the buffeting from speedbrakes made him think they were stalling so he pushes it over (way more aggressively than you'd expect) freezes and then when they break out he comes to but by then recovery is impossible.

Yes, but even at the major pax carriers life isn't perfect. Back of the clock flying and contract violations on the part of crew schedulers (who are being pushed) are part of life. But I'm sure it's much worse at the freight outfits below FEDEX and UPS.

Only additional stuff I saw was that the airplane crashed with the autothrottles and A/P engaged and the elevators were split due to cross inputs on the control columns. It was only 18 seconds from 6,300 to the ground.

I agree completely. Even the best person can screw up on a bad day, even more so when tired.

The flight was during the day. If the crew had been up all night then yes fatigue may/will have come into it. If not then I hope it wasn't self inflicted e.g. crew commuting
Only the final report will confirm. May they RIP

Wow. Just ... wow.

I understand the pitch up illusion (and in this case, reality, at least to 10 degrees) you get when going TOGA in the clouds.

But how can you possibly pitch down to 49 degrees in response??

I don't care if you were trained only on Cessna's before this flight ... you don't even do this in a Cessna!

If this is at all true, and if the FO didn't do that intentionally, it boggles the mind.

I suspect the stated sequence is a bit off - i.e. the captain selected flaps 1, then bumped TOGA. TOGA is armed as soon as 'flaps not stowed' is true which would happen almost immediately after flaps 1 selected.
Sounds like spacial disorientation strikes again :(.

IIRC, on all aircraft I've flown that had TOGA switches, the buttons are inset, to prevent accidental activation. That means a digit has to be inserted into the cup to select TOGA, not just bumping against the switch.