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-   -   Atlas Air 767 down/Texas (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/618723-atlas-air-767-down-texas.html)

dgordon42 13th Mar 2019 15:35


Originally Posted by suninmyeyes
My only suggestion (and this is pretty remote) would be that someone could have been adjusting his seat and in turbulence it slid forward and jammed the control column forward

Jump Seat pax getting out of a 'front seat' after sampling the B767 perhaps?
(See post #327 in this thread)

Dave.

last747fe 13th Mar 2019 15:52


Originally Posted by GlueBall (Post 10416748)
​​​​​​Below 10,000 feet the pilots would normally be strapped in by the shoulder harnesses, making a full slump-over into the control column less likely.

I seem to remember that ATC offered a vector around weather when the crew said which way they wanted to go they were told to descend Expedishly to 3000 could've been hooking up straps jump seater leaning forward to watch the approach thrown onto pedestal and throttle.

Airbubba 13th Mar 2019 16:32


Originally Posted by dgordon42 (Post 10416811)
Jump Seat pax getting out of a 'front seat' after sampling the B767 perhaps?
(See post #327 in this thread)

Dave.

Not likely in my experience, and why would they swap seats down low approaching a line of weather?

But, most of the other scenarios including an intentional crash don't seem likely either.

There was an infamous incident in 1994 where a crewmember tried to crash a freighter:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federa...ess_Flight_705







golf yankee one one 13th Mar 2019 16:42

Sounds plausible - and remember the Voyager
 

Originally Posted by dgordon42 (Post 10416811)
Jump Seat pax getting out of a 'front seat' after sampling the B767 perhaps?
(See post #327 in this thread)

Dave.

This scenario sounds to me the most plausible explanation for this tragedy. There is a possible similarity to the RAF Voyager incident over Turkey, which was recovered because that occurred at high altitude.

The possibility of a deliberate act seems less likely when details are compared with Germanwings; in that case the pilot was alone in the cockpit, his colleague unable to return because of the security door, and, in retrospect, the pilot had a clear history of mental illness. In this case there is no suggestion that one pilot had left the cockpit, and in addition there was, exceptionally, a third person very close by, making this flight the least likely one during which to commit suicide. Of course we do not know if any of the three individuals had any relevant medical history, and that could tilt the balance of probabilities...

ManaAdaSystem 13th Mar 2019 17:53


Originally Posted by suninmyeyes (Post 10416782)



I agree with Glueball that with a standard 5 point Boeing seat harness and in turbulence an incapacitated pilot would not be able to make any forward control input let alone the hefty sustained input required to override an autopilot and pitch down 45 degrees. My only suggestion (and this is pretty remote) would be that someone could have been adjusting his seat and in turbulence it slid forward and jammed the control column forward. I hope it does not turn out to be a nefarious act as it would increase a lot of already inappropriate security restrictions on pilots.

I believe the seats on the 767 have electric adjustment.

Airbubba 13th Mar 2019 17:57


Originally Posted by ManaAdaSystem (Post 10416994)


I believe the seats on the 767 have electric adjustment.

On a freighter? I doubt it.

Zlinguy 13th Mar 2019 18:01


Originally Posted by ManaAdaSystem (Post 10416994)


I believe the seats on the 767 have electric adjustment.

I flew the 200/300 20 years ago and I'm pretty sure ours were all manually adjusted (I'm not saying that it wasn't a possible option, though..).

tdracer 13th Mar 2019 18:06

The shoulder portions of the five point harnesses on the 767 are the inertia type - so depending on the 'rate' it's quite feasible for a pilot to 'pitch' forward into the controls. Besides, he didn't need to suddenly 'pitch' forward - slumping forward would be sufficient and is unlikely to be fast enough to trigger the inertia reels.
Airbubba - I don't know if it was basic or an option - but as I recall the 767s I did flight tests on over the last 15 years all had electric seat adjusts - and most were new build freighters.

DaveReidUK 13th Mar 2019 18:11


Originally Posted by Airbubba (Post 10416997)
On a freighter? I doubt it.

The airframe in question was a passenger aircraft until a few years ago.

TRey 13th Mar 2019 20:22

Has any determination/guesstimation been made about the ceiling at the time and location of the accident? Or, the likelihood if they were IMC at the time of the "upset"?

Volume 13th Mar 2019 20:37


Below 10,000 feet the pilots would normally be strapped in by the shoulder harnesses,
Not from my jumpseat experience. Maybe 30% of the pilots do actually use them.
Having some poor weather ahead with a lot of red on the radar however, I would expect most of them to strap in properly.

Broomstick Flier 13th Mar 2019 20:38


Originally Posted by ManaAdaSystem (Post 10416994)
I believe the seats on the 767 have electric adjustment.

Two of ours have electric adjustment and all the other have manual adjustment. All built originally as freighters. I guess it must be a customer option.

sequ 13th Mar 2019 21:14


Originally Posted by tdracer (Post 10417021)
The shoulder portions of the five point harnesses on the 767 are the inertia type - so depending on the 'rate' it's quite feasible for a pilot to 'pitch' forward into the controls. Besides, he didn't need to suddenly 'pitch' forward - slumping forward would be sufficient and is unlikely to be fast enough to trigger the inertia reels.
Airbubba - I don't know if it was basic or an option - but as I recall the 767s I did flight tests on over the last 15 years all had electric seat adjusts - and most were new build freighters.

This particular 767 had manual seats.

Saludos,

SEQU

GroundProxGuy 13th Mar 2019 22:02


Originally Posted by flyingchanges (Post 10415913)
Pretty sure all wind shear warnings are inhibited at that altitude.

Predictive Windshear alerts from the weather radar should still function. Airbubba is right, reactive windshear alerts from the EGPWS are inhibited above 1500 feet AGL. So if they were responding to a WS alert at that altitude, it was from the WXR.

MarkerInbound 14th Mar 2019 02:35


Originally Posted by Power (Post 10416713)
no, not if they went through KCM entry

There's no KCM to the MIA ramp areas.

MarkerInbound 14th Mar 2019 02:49


Originally Posted by TRey (Post 10417305)
Has any determination/guesstimation been made about the ceiling at the time and location of the accident? Or, the likelihood if they were IMC at the time of the "upset"?

Galveston was running about 2000 overcast, Hobby was 3500ish BKN and IAH was just reporting cirrus behind the weather.

flyingchanges 14th Mar 2019 11:45


Originally Posted by GroundProxGuy (Post 10417448)
Predictive Windshear alerts from the weather radar should still function. Airbubba is right, reactive windshear alerts from the EGPWS are inhibited above 1500 feet AGL. So if they were responding to a WS alert at that altitude, it was from the WXR.

Might want to check your manual on that one.

ManaAdaSystem 14th Mar 2019 20:11

The NG starts to scan for predictive windshear below 2300 ft RA, and will issue warnings/cautilns below 1200 ft.
Reactive below 1500 ft.
Not the same aircraft, but probably similar WS system.

Murexway 14th Mar 2019 21:31

Don't know if it's true, but I saw an article yesterday saying that Grieg Feith (former NTSB "Mud Stud") mentioned that "the autopilot was still engaged when the aircraft was on its rapid descent, meaning that the pilots were fighting the automation". As an old timer, I can't imagine sitting there below 10,000, watching the throttles go to 100% and the nose dropping to 49 degrees nose low without disconnecting the automation, throttles to idle, deploying the spoilers, and pulling for all I'm worth.

tdracer 14th Mar 2019 21:48


Originally Posted by Murexway (Post 10418810)
Don't know if it's true, but I saw an article yesterday saying that Grieg Feith (former NTSB "Mud Stud") mentioned that "the autopilot was still engaged when the aircraft was on its rapid descent, meaning that the pilots were fighting the automation". As an old timer, I can't imagine sitting there below 10,000, watching the throttles go to 100% and the nose dropping to 49 degrees nose low without disconnecting the automation, deploying the spoilers, and pulling for all I'm worth.

"Disconnecting" the autopilot on a 767 is trivial - just push or pull with a few pounds of force and it disconnects (with an aural alert in case it's inadvertent). Similarly it takes about 2 lbs. force to move a throttle (4 lbs for both throttles) regardless of what the autothrottle is doing. It's also pretty easy to differentiate an autothrottle movement from a manual movement on the DFDR. There is a max A/T rate (six degrees/second at the throttle lever IIRC) so about ten seconds to go from idle to full forward (obviously less if the throttle is at an intermediate setting).

FCeng84 14th Mar 2019 21:51


Originally Posted by Murexway (Post 10418810)
Don't know if it's true, but I saw an article yesterday saying that Grieg Feith (former NTSB "Mud Stud") mentioned that "the autopilot was still engaged when the aircraft was on its rapid descent, meaning that the pilots were fighting the automation". As an old timer, I can't imagine sitting there below 10,000, watching the throttles go to 100% and the nose dropping to 49 degrees nose low without disconnecting the automation, deploying the spoilers, and pulling for all I'm worth.

One of the things that may need to be looked into on this is how the 767 control system responds if the pilot pushes the column while the autopilot is engaged. More recent models recognize pilot intervention via significant controller displacement as time to disconnect the autopilot. On older models the autopilot does not immediately disengage in response to pilot input. There may have been a period of time where both Hal and Row 0 were providing significant control inputs. Learning that the autopilot remained engaged would not necessarily mean that Hal was at fault.

Old Boeing Driver 14th Mar 2019 22:36

This event was going on for 18 seconds. I would assume that one or both pilots had hold of the yoke.

I can't imagine that either did dot push the A/P disconnect on the yoke.

Note: I am assuming there is an A/P disconnect on the yoke as on previous Boeing's.

Airbubba 14th Mar 2019 23:01


Originally Posted by Old Boeing Driver (Post 10418885)
This event was going on for 18 seconds. I would assume that one or both pilots had hold of the yoke.

I can't imagine that either did dot push the A/P disconnect on the yoke.

Note: I am assuming there is an A/P disconnect on the yoke as on previous Boeing's.

There is an autopilot disconnect button on the yoke and a disconnect bar on the glareshield Mode Control Panel on the classic B-763.

Also, the NTSB release said the throttles went to full power before the pitch over.

I also can't imagine not pulling the throttles and speedbrake lever back with the nose pointed down for whatever reason.

Murexway 15th Mar 2019 00:29


Originally Posted by FCeng84 (Post 10418828)
One of the things that may need to be looked into on this is how the 767 control system responds if the pilot pushes the column while the autopilot is engaged. More recent models recognize pilot intervention via significant controller displacement as time to disconnect the autopilot. On older models the autopilot does not immediately disengage in response to pilot input. There may have been a period of time where both Hal and Row 0 were providing significant control inputs. Learning that the autopilot remained engaged would not necessarily mean that Hal was at fault.

No, I'm sure they were trying everything humanly possible, exactly the way we all would have been. But if the darn automation wouldn't relinquish control, that would be a horrible feeling.

niteflyr 15th Mar 2019 01:09


Originally Posted by svhar (Post 10418958)
Why the speedbrake lever? I would rather build up speed and altitude until I figured out what happened.

When you"re 49 degrees pitch down and going thru redline?

A4 15th Mar 2019 01:12

??????......er....if I’m pointing down at the ground (let alone 49 degrees down) I’m going to close the throttles, pull the speed brake and pull.....probably the only way you’re going to get any chance of gaining altitude......once you’ve arrested the descent.....

A4 (10,000+ hrs Airbus)

Murexway 15th Mar 2019 02:31

Also read that their speed increased from their assigned 230 kts to 430 kts in the descent, and that at impact it was close to 500 kts.

Icelanta 15th Mar 2019 02:37


Originally Posted by A4 (Post 10419015)
??????......er....if I’m pointing down at the ground (let alone 49 degrees down) I’m going to close the throttles, pull the speed brake and pull.....probably the only way you’re going to get any chance of gaining altitude......once you’ve arrested the descent.....

A4 (10,000+ hrs Airbus)

then do not use the speedbrakes but very slowly, increase pitch and convert your energy into climb.
putting out the speedbrakes increases your load on the airframe even more, increasing the chance of an inflight breakup.

A4 15th Mar 2019 06:40

I see that.....but accelerating towards the barbers pole (and beyond) also isn’t going to be great for structural integrity! Additionally, it’s dependent upon how much altitude you have to play with......from 20,000 it’s no issue......from 5,000....different scenario. Does the 777/787 have load factor protection like the Airbus? At least you can pull to the limit with out risking structural integrity (if the aircraft (Bus) is in Normal Law). The 767 would obviously require a more nuanced approach to handling.

A4

Australopithecus 15th Mar 2019 07:06

From around 2000’ and 500 kts it would be pretty much a 3 G pull-up. Moot point though if something is preventing full pitch-up control inputs.

RoyHudd 15th Mar 2019 10:11

Deliberate act possible. Examination of pilots' histories needed.

This possible cause should be evaluated in the same way as a technical issue. Methodically and objectively.

Hotel Tango 15th Mar 2019 11:12


Deliberate act possible.
Well, in fact, almost anything is possible until we hear differently!

Sailvi767 15th Mar 2019 12:27


Originally Posted by Icelanta (Post 10419049)

then do not use the speedbrakes but very slowly, increase pitch and convert your energy into climb.
putting out the speedbrakes increases your load on the airframe even more, increasing the chance of an inflight breakup.

Can you explain this statement. How do speedbrakes increases airframe load?

Sailvi767 15th Mar 2019 12:43


Originally Posted by A4 (Post 10419131)
I see that.....but accelerating towards the barbers pole (and beyond) also isn’t going to be great for structural integrity! Additionally, it’s dependent upon how much altitude you have to play with......from 20,000 it’s no issue......from 5,000....different scenario. Does the 777/787 have load factor protection like the Airbus? At least you can pull to the limit with out risking structural integrity (if the aircraft (Bus) is in Normal Law). The 767 would obviously require a more nuanced approach to handling.

A4

The Airbus will limit you to two G’s in the situation you describe. The airframe is required to take nearly double that load at max certified weight. 2.5 G’s is the requirement with no damage and 3.75 before structural failure. At landing weights those limits would be even higher.

Running Ridges 15th Mar 2019 13:18


Originally Posted by Sailvi767 (Post 10419437)
Can you explain this statement. How do speedbrakes increases airframe load?

They move the lift distribution outboard, so if you're pulling 2g with the speedbrakes out the root bending moment will be higher compared to a 2g manouevre with a clean wing.
In any case I doubt you'd still be accelerating if you're pulling 2g+ as the drag would be significantly higher

aterpster 15th Mar 2019 13:56


Originally Posted by Old Boeing Driver (Post 10418885)
This event was going on for 18 seconds. I would assume that one or both pilots had hold of the yoke.

I can't imagine that either did dot push the A/P disconnect on the yoke.

Note: I am assuming there is an A/P disconnect on the yoke as on previous Boeing's.

Yes, there is. The 767 doesn't have "high tech" computer "augmentations." It's a straight-forward, easy airliner to fly. A/T easy to disconnect or override. Autoflight easy to turn off.

Sailvi767 15th Mar 2019 14:05


Originally Posted by Running Ridges (Post 10419482)
They move the lift distribution outboard, so if you're pulling 2g with the speedbrakes out the root bending moment will be higher compared to a 2g manouevre with a clean wing.
In any case I doubt you'd still be accelerating if you're pulling 2g+ as the drag would be significantly higher

At a given AOA the lift the wing can produce is significantly reduced with the speedbrakes out which would unload the wing. If you pulled to a higher AOA to maintain the same G force it may be possible you would shift the bending moment but I doubt it has much impact.

Machinbird 15th Mar 2019 15:02

Cornering Speed
 
Written from a fighter pilot viewpoint. When applying to a transport, there are going to be additional factors to consider such as control hinge moments, wing bending moment, and control system design. (For Airbus FBW, all such decisions have been already made for you.)

With the nose buried downward, and with concern about hitting the ground, you would like to achieve a minimum radius turn, but without tearing the aircraft apart.
The minimum radius turn is generally achieved where max AOA and max allowable G meet on the performance curves.

You can consider using up some of your safety margin when planning what G level to attain. Then look up the performance curves and determine a cornering velocity based upon your most probable gross weight.
Below cornering velocity, you can slightly improve performance by accelerating slightly and pulling into buffet. Above cornering velocity, you must slow down to improve turn performance and meanwhile avoid going beyond your max acceptable G (without a G meter).

Knowing your cornering speed is strictly emergency knowledge and would be used solely to ensure you are not completely out of the ballpark in your pull out efforts.
No doubt, the test pilots and aerodynamics guys can flesh this out better. As I recall, the F-4 cornering velocity was 420 knots. You definitely will not want to be anywhere near that speed when you pull out in your transport.

Sailvi767 15th Mar 2019 16:42

Transport aircraft like the 767 have a reasonably light wing loading relative to fighters. I suspect that at the 230 knots assigned they could generate 3.75G’s. Since there is no where to read G force unless they had recent aerobatic flying that would be very subjective.

EDML 15th Mar 2019 16:51


Originally Posted by Sailvi767 (Post 10419525)


At a given AOA the lift the wing can produce is significantly reduced with the speedbrakes out which would unload the wing. If you pulled to a higher AOA to maintain the same G force it may be possible you would shift the bending moment but I doubt it has much impact.

Correct. Less lift less load. That is how gust load relief via the ailerons works on the bus.

The interesting question would be, how the speed brakes influence the cornering radius pulling out of the dive. However, even here they won't make things worse I would guess.


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