Engineer who signed Pre-Flight complete-Fail, CM who did (did not) do walk around-Fail-or possibly procedures leading to them to expect to see Pitot Covers-then it should be like a steering bypass pin check-visual sighting required!, Pushback crew-Fail, CM1 and CM2 speed check during Take-off roll-Fail. We are all familiar with Swiss Cheese but this is beyond comprehension. :ugh:

A scary list of mistakes in a multiple protection environment.

I suspect that some of these are not human error but rather continuous fails over multiple flights.

I've seen three layers of protection not work in preventing an accident because

one layer was hidden from any in-service checks and only worked in the eyes of the board designer

one layer could not be relied on because the crew were not adequately trained in its use

and the last layer was just a common flaw with a known failure rate of one in a 1000 flights

The correct procedure should be to make an entry in the Technical Log that Pitot covers have been installed. Same procedure for Gear Pins.

Some Airlines do not have such simple common sense procedures in place.

I've had 2 cases where the Gear Pins were present in the cockpit and during the walkaround I discovered another set of Gear Pins had been installed! Asian Airline.

Third most - airspeed and engines are #1 and #2. Peripheral vision takes care of most of the 'outside'.

Most guys pay special attention to the items that have killed people.

The covers were missed on the walk around, the lack of airspeed indication was missed on initial acceleration, the airspeed check either didn't occur or the lack of airspeed was ignored(both are hard to believe).

It also means that the pilots either didn't look at their airspeed indicators for the entire takeoff roll or for some unbelievable reason ignored the lack of airspeed indications.

Missing, or ignoring the actions I described, is unacceptable behavior among professionals. Please stay a student pilot as the rest of us are are trying to even after decades in the business.

Incident: Malaysia A333 at Brisbane on Jul 18th 2018, unreliable airspeed, hydraulic leak

I presume this is the incident, if it is, then leaving the pitot covers on would hardly have caused a hydraulic leak and nose wheel steering issues. It seems there is more to it.

The picture is simply an aircraft that appears to be on a ramp with the covers on, how do we know it flew with them on? All it takes is one numpty to invent something.

A while back, another middle eastern airline (nameless) had a wasp build up during the turn around time, and returned for landing with no pitot, found blocked by wasps and sand particles.

I can only imagine that it is procedure to protect the pitot's by putting their covers on whilst on turn around, which were forgotten by a few links in the chain of departure.

A single root cause could be that the person(s) who were supposed to catch the pitot covers on a walk-around also missed some gear locking pins.

During operations, would it perhaps be simpler and safer to just keep the pitot heat on even when the aircraft is on the ground?
As is, they seem to be pretty susceptible to fouling, from water or wasps, resulting in serious damage and loss of life

Walk around is completed with the covers on.

Boeing have the 80 knot call check during the take off roll. I always check the ground speed at the same time for a "reasonableness" check. I have not flown an Airbus but understand they have a 100 knot check during the take off roll. The problem with 100 knots is that it is getting into the high speed regime. If something is picked up, such as significant difference between the ASI readings at that speed check, it doesn't leave much time to decide what action to take, as V1 for example, is much closer. I would have thought the 80 knot call recommended by Boeing means the problem is caught earlier and action taken earlier re keep going or rejecting. It is common to see in the simulator the PM calling 80 knots as an afterthought even though the actual IAS was rapidly passing 90 knots at the time he called 80. Poor airmanship indeed.
Boeing recommend that that if an SOP call (such as 80 knots on take off) is not forthcoming by the PM for whatever reason, the PF should make it and give the actual reading he sees. e.g. "Passing 94 knots my side." . Good airmanship.

Not familiar with the Airbus, but I have to ask the question.. how did they call a V1 or Rotate call if they weren't getting any speed indications.

Probably confused when there were no readings at the stage they would expect to see 100 knots, by the time they realised what was going on they decided to take it into the air rather than risk a high speed stop with no idea where they were in relation to V1.

Agree with the statement about an 80 kt call out in post #33, on medium jets at light weight 100 kts isn't that far off V1, particularly at some airports which were designed with turbo props in mind rather than jets.

I will admit that when I first heard of the incident I assumed it must have been the static vent covers which were left in place as normal airspeed readings would be given until the aircraft was climbing. I didn't think the crew of a heavy jet would get airborne without any speed checks.

In the 737 Classic simulator, the indications of a captain's blocked static vent are quite dramatic after lift off; but not before.

When the co-pilot calls "Positive Rate" (his static vent is OK), the first thing noticed is no movement of the captain's main altimeter and his IVSI. Yet we have often seen the captain calling for gear up without confirming his altimeter reading, simply because he is reacting to a call from the PM. A few seconds, later a windshear warning sounds even though there is no windshear. That warning is because the captains airspeed indicator stops moving and starts to go backwards fooling the system into thinking a loss of airspeed is a likely windshear.

With the aircraft climbing normally, but with captain's airspeed indicator needle steadily reducing due to the blocked static vent, (and no movement on his main altimeter and IVSI), eventually his stick shaker actuates and the ASI gradually falls to zero. Unless the pilot has seen this phenomena during his simulator training (and many have not), there is guaranteed confusion as to what is happening. In other words a grand WTF moment. A quick check of the ground speed reading can ascertain the problem and decisions made.

Folks,
How to fool the system:

Quite a while ago now, in one day at YSSY, three aeroplanes got airborne, the gear would not retract ---- two from one airline, the third, as I recall, anther airline handled by the former.

Same reason in all cases, gear pins not removed by the same departure "engineer".

Another example, one of mine, nose gear pins left in at EGLL, a very tidy minded "engineer" rolled up the red flags and held them with a rubber band "so the greasy flags don't leave greasy streaks on the U/C legs"?? Rather defeats the purpose of having bleeding great long red flags, doesn't it??

Another personal experience, doing the walk-around on a B744 ---- no flag at all on the nose gear pin, at least I was following what I always taught trainees ---- look for the "hole in the hole", not just the absence of the flag --- which is why you need a real torch, not a toy. (Ain't modern LED globes great)

Also on the B744, I have had pitot covers, with no flags, left on, to be discovered by me on the walk around,the post facto claim was that strong winds must have torn them off.

In short, if it can be done, one day, somebody will it.

But, in this case, it is certainly a trail of holes all lining up ---- proving anything is possible. The tec. crew is the last line of defense, on the face of it, looks like they screwed up.

Tootle pip!!

Not familiar with the type pitot covers, but could it be that the heaters burned through the covers enough to give some speed indication?

I've seen some pretty burned pitot covers.