The real question, asked rhetorically by many in this thread, is if the PF pushed the TOGA switches, and thereafter followed up (as he was supposed to do) by pushing the thrust levers forward. If he did, then there would have been thrust, if not, then most likely there would have been only idle thrust, not enough to keep the aircraft flying.
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Glofish, sorry but statements such as "has been done in the past"... " can never be" etc are not worth much unless backed up by evidence. There are plenty of sources to refer to, try planecrashinfo.com for worldwide figures:
A sample stat is Causes of Fatal Accidents in % from 2000 to 2010 ( aircraft with 19 pax and above): Pilot Error 34 Pilot Error Weather related 18 Pilot Error Mechanical related 5 Other Human Error 6 Weather 6 Mechanical Failure 22 Sabotage 9 Some food for thought perhaps? |
Originally Posted by Hogger
is if the PF pushed the TOGA switches, and thereafter followed up (as he was supposed to do) by pushing the thrust levers forward. If he did, then there would have been thrust,
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I'm pretty sure the they know exactly what happened.
They have all the information from all the recorders. They will have flown the attempted go around many times in the sim. |
BugSmasher1960 and Rat
I somehow get the feeling that both of you are not in touch with contemporary situation in aviation otherwise you would not be lamenting the demise of the thinking pilot. Rather the whole process of thinking is now well organised. When something happens you don't sit on your hands because somebody said so but Fly(establish control of the flight path or ensure it is still there), navigate(make sure you are going where you want to or make short term decision to hold or change direction) and communicate immediately if deviating from clearance, if not then when convenient. Dealing with abnormal/emergencies every important item like throttle, fuel lever is confirmed by both pilots before acting on it. Once you are finished with it a situational assessment is made like seeing the problem in its entirety, options, risks and benefits of each of them and decision taken in agreement with the other and as you execute the decision it is periodically checked that it still remains the right one. This is not the demise of the thinking pilot but even a dumb pilot is guided to think along a well thought out plans rather than leaving it to random individual brilliance or idiocy to come out with consistent results. Thinking is not dead but rather the pilot is prevented from acting without thinking like in the old days. it doesn't leave much to be unnecessarily creative unless you want to show that you are different. |
portmanteau, # 1063.
One problem with using so called sources of accident data is that there is no explanation of what 'human error' means, nor how such a classification can 'cause' an accident. Thus most of what is quoted is of little use for improving safety. For a mechanical failure, fix the mechanics, for a human 'failure', fix what, how ... For this accident, if the GA system design contributed, is this the major contributor, or is the human because of the weakness in system operation, or jointly; or due to documentation, certification, ... etc. Like many recent accidents this one has the potential for similar complexity. It's not what caused it, it is why the contributions came together at the time, and how we can learn from this will be the important aspect for safety. |
For this accident, if the GA system design contributed, is this the major contributor, or is the human because of the weakness in system operation, or jointly; or due to documentation, certification,
If there is an expectation that TOGA will activate the auto-thrust and save the day it might encourage an 'expectation' and thus less monitoring. If the thrust s always a manual application (with perhaps an auto back-up for low speed?????) would this increase better monitoring? i.e. has automation improved safety in this respect? I understand the conundrum of the condition statement. |
Unless TOGA mode didn't engage, and when he took his hand off the throttles to control the Go Around, they came back to Idle... Simple question - and the most simple way to explain the accident. Is there no 777 driver around who knows this question? Thanks, Dani |
portmanteau:
Glofish, sorry but statements such as "has been done in the past"... " can never be" etc are not worth much unless backed up by evidence. There are plenty of sources to refer to, try planecrashinfo.com for worldwide figures: A sample stat is Causes of Fatal Accidents in % from 2000 to 2010 ( aircraft with 19 pax and above): It is exactly the so called 'evidence' in airline accident reports that i was referring to, when higher 'interests' are at stake. I was close to an accident and its investigation and report some years ago. This makes me take any report with a pinch of salt and caution ..... |
For this accident, if the GA system design contributed, is this the major contributor, or is the human because of the weakness in system operation, or jointly; or due to documentation, certification, If there is an expectation that TOGA will activate the auto-thrust and save the day it might encourage an 'expectation' and thus less monitoring. If the thrust s always a manual application (with perhaps an auto back-up for low speed?????) would this increase better monitoring? i.e. has automation improved safety in this respect? I understand the conundrum of the condition statement. |
I believe at least 2 decades ago NASA came to the conclusion that human beings were poor monitors of automation and it was better to have the automation monitoring the humans. QED What have NASA/airliner manufacturers/airlines done to address that conclusion?? I only ask, because I genuinely don't know. |
Originally Posted by Dani
(Post 9482437)
That's what I'm asking myself many times since it happened. Noone could tell me so far the tech details: What will happen if you touched down, pushed the TOGA switches (unsuccesful, because they're inactive), pushed the throttles and let them go: Are they staying where they are, are the going forward, are they moving backwards.
Simple question - and the most simple way to explain the accident. Is there no 777 driver around who knows this question? Thanks, Dani Autothrottle disconnect occurs automatically: • if a fault in the active autothrottle mode is detected • when either reverse thrust lever is raised to reverse idle • if the thrust levers are overridden during a manual landing, after the autothrottle has begun to retard the thrust levers to idle • when both engines are shut down |
Dani, they'll stay where they are. Inshalla!
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Originally Posted by PEI_3721
(Post 9477622)
The so-called professional comment on the GA video is appalling...
Whilst some of the comment in this forum represents the real professionals in the industry, other aspects suggest that the professional quality is in decline. An emerging concern should be if incorrect or ill-informed comments are influencing the new or inexperienced pilots or unwary management. So here is what Boeing says about tailstrikes on go-arounds... "OVER-ROTATION DURING GO-AROUND Go-arounds initiated very late in the approach, such as during flare or after a bounce, are a common cause of tail strike. When the go-around mode is initiated, the FD immediately commands a go-around pitch attitude. If the PF abruptly rotates into the command bars, tail strike can occur before a change to the flight path is possible. Both pitch attitude and thrust are required for go-around, so if the engines are just spooling up when the PF vigorously pulls the nose up, the thrust may not yet be adequate to support the effort. The nose comes up, and the tail goes down. A contributing factor may be a strong desire of the flight crew to avoid wheel contact after initiating a late go-around, when the airplane is still over the runway. In general, the concern is not warranted because a brief contact with the tires during a late go-around does not produce adverse consequences. Airframe manufacturers have executed literally hundreds of late go-arounds during autoland certification programs with dozens of runway contacts, and no problem has ever resulted. The airplane simply flies away from the touchdown". https://www.facebook.com/FlyingHuman...type=2&theater |
Originally Posted by vilas
(Post 9482183)
BugSmasher1960 and Rat
I somehow get the feeling that both of you are not in touch with contemporary situation in aviation otherwise you would not be lamenting the demise of the thinking pilot. Rather the whole process of thinking is now well organised. When something happens you don't sit on your hands because somebody said so but Fly(establish control of the flight path or ensure it is still there), navigate(make sure you are going where you want to or make short term decision to hold or change direction) and communicate immediately if deviating from clearance, if not then when convenient. Dealing with abnormal/emergencies every important item like throttle, fuel lever is confirmed by both pilots before acting on it. Once you are finished with it a situational assessment is made like seeing the problem in its entirety, options, risks and benefits of each of them and decision taken in agreement with the other and as you execute the decision it is periodically checked that it still remains the right one. This is not the demise of the thinking pilot but even a dumb pilot is guided to think along a well thought out plans rather than leaving it to random individual brilliance or idiocy to come out with consistent results. Thinking is not dead but rather the pilot is prevented from acting without thinking like in the old days. it doesn't leave much to be unnecessarily creative unless you want to show that you are different. If people really are thinking / retaining-situational-awareness why are things like this happening? |
If people really are thinking / retaining-situational-awareness why are things like this happening? Why? Because it is usually so well automated that the parameter drops out of the scan to a greater or lesser extent. If you fly an aircraft with no auto throttle the airspeed is a constant high priority in your scan, after years of flying with an auto throttle it has dropped down the pecking order somewhat. If asked you would probably say that it is very high on the priority list but the reality is that unless you are of unusual design, you will not be scanning it with the same frequency as you were a few years back when you had no auto throttle. That's what the research tells us, I'd be surprised if it wasn't right. Firefly Bobs post about automation monitoring pilots actions is spot on. In an ideal world we never would have actively automated things like auto throttles, the automation would just sit quietly watching us and waiting for a mistake. To change now is just too hard considering the relatively low accident rates v's the cost. |
Can't argue with any of that even a dumb pilot is guided to think along a well thought out plans Thinking is not dead but rather the pilot is prevented from acting without thinking like in the old days. As they say, 'every flight is the same & every flight is different'. |
Originally Posted by Oakape
(Post 9482801)
The thing is, you can't have an SOP to cover every eventuality. SOP's have a very important place & have been developed through hard-won & often bitter experience. But due to the very nature of the business, a pilot needs to be able to know when to apply them, how to apply them, when to modify them & even when to ignore them.
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Originally Posted by 73qanda
(Post 9482792)
They are not maintaining situational awareness in these types of situations. The reason is because they are not monitoring the parameter that is usually automated but for some reason is now not automated.
Why? Because it is usually so well automated that the parameter drops out of the scan to a greater or lesser extent. If you fly an aircraft with no auto throttle the airspeed is a constant high priority in your scan, after years of flying with an auto throttle it has dropped down the pecking order somewhat. If asked you would probably say that it is very high on the priority list but the reality is that unless you are of unusual design, you will not be scanning it with the same frequency as you were a few years back when you had no auto throttle. That's what the research tells us, I'd be surprised if it wasn't right. Firefly Bobs post about automation monitoring pilots actions is spot on. In an ideal world we never would have actively automated things like auto throttles, the automation would just sit quietly watching us and waiting for a mistake. To change now is just too hard considering the relatively low accident rates v's the cost. - Even smarter automation? Fuzzy Logic? - Alerting to situations where the automation has been inhibited (perhaps with a "resolution advisory"?) ("TOGA INHIBITED - USE MANUAL THRUST & ATTITUDE") - Less automation but more monitoring? - Something else? |
A problem with active automation in a case like this is that in aviation in general, we don’t want to hit the ground and/or fly too slowly but unfortunately that is exactly what we want when we land, otherwise we’d never be able to do it.
Where did the accident occur? Over a runway. There’s a fair amount of logic in modern aircraft to allow an approach and landing without setting off a load of safety systems but it is possible for the pilots and the computers to get out-of-phase, if you change your mind enough on the way in. We’re landing... No, we’re going around... No, we’re landing... No, we really need to go-around, etc. You end up in a sort of no man’s land where half the systems think you’re landing and half think you're taking off, which usually doesn’t end well. If you really want to go flying again, push the thrust levers forward and pull back on the yoke/stick when you’ve got enough airspeed. No intervention systems required. You can sort out the automation when safely climbing away... |
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