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vilas 18th Aug 2016 09:07

glofish
I think you getting carried away in your lament about lack real experience and lack of virtues of simulator practice. Except flying hundreds of visual and instruments approaches may be in raw data there is nothing else you do in handson flying and if any one needs decades to get the basic throttle and stick skill he may have been better off in another profession. In the days of actual OEI practice in air I know of an accident where during OEI GA due to sudden application of wrong rudder a B737 crashed in dispersal and rammed into a parked aircraft killing people in that aircraft along with it's own pilots. There are hundreds of pilots who retire without ever experiencing an engine failure, wind shear, TCAS or multiple hydraulic or electrical failures. You want to practice these in the air? That will definitely not improve the safety but give rise to avoidable accidents for which the airline would be shut down. You don't have to die to become an expert in living. Modern simulators have significantly improved safety. They are being made more and more like real aircraft like and give you fair idea about environmental conditions like wind shear etc. and feel of serious systemic failures. To enter an airliner cockpit if one has to go through the labyrinthine route as suggested by you and some others then half the travelling public may have to postpone their travel plans by some years.

We will never be able to simulate and fully train every situation that might arise. What helps is experience
Experience of what? Any abnormality in modern aircraft may be the first and last you ever get. I know a manufacturer's instructor who trained some of us on another type when he himself flew in an airline rejected take off in a 747 after V1 and landed up outside the runway. Can happen.Simulators are not merely OK but the only way to experience any serious failure.

glofish 18th Aug 2016 10:41

@vilas

You might have just read into the thread, i don't blame anybody for that. It however distorts some arguments that have been raised earlier. A lot of things you come up with are not exactly what i said, you are correct in a lot of things, but i had treated those earlier.
I will not bore you to death in elaborating again.

@ ruserious

With a lot of automation i thought flight safety will improve, and it did. With some sops i thought a better cooperation with the buddy and machine could happen, and it did.
But with automation coupled with sops that oblige its use, i think we went the wrong way.
Sometimes automation should only be at our disposal and basically nice to use and not need to use or we lose the skill to replace them.
Same goes with all too rigid sops.

woodpecker 18th Aug 2016 10:46

Sim exercise, ZRH, Wind 280/40, cloudbase just above circling limit.

Landing on 14 above crosswind limit for B757 so the plan was for ILS to R14, break-off (when visual) to join downwind left hand for R28.

The new breed of base training captain (must use the automatics) had us sitting in the simulator and creating an approach using V-Nav and L-Nav. Must have taken 25 minutes of valuable sim time to create this masterpiece of height, speed and track changes.

Once finally airborne the exercise was a total waste of time, Apart from flap and gear extension we sat there and watched the automatics!!

On a lighter note I do remember this individual had his name badge made in Hong Kong... Larger than normal BA to cope with his title "Base Training Captain.......". It all changed (and was discarded) when a junior cabin crew member asked him asking if "base training" meant that he had only just joined the airline and was under training!!

PEI_3721 18th Aug 2016 12:46

Buzz, #996, :ok:
We appear to be making the same point about the technical origins and the need to rethink.
However, I disagree with the documentation / training solution as it continues to rely on the human. You cannot get all pilots, all operators, all regulators, to act the same all of the time.
Whilst the 'more training' approach has contributed greatly to the industry's success, we should now consider that this is at the limit of effectiveness (td's sim comment #998), not because the human or aircraft has changed, but that the wider operational environment has evolved, including the way we use the technology.
Hence the need for a systems approach to safety and more focus on managing the unexpected (surprise) and unforeseeable events.

The question is not why the original design was weak or not, it is why this particular design now appears to have a significant safety issue. We don't need the final report or reference to other accidents to consider the question, instead we should look at current operations; has this happened before without adverse outcome, how do pilots manage the system in a range of operational scenarios.

The so-called professional comment on the GA video is appalling, noting that this is an open forum. The explanations for the aircraft's flight path suggest wide gaps in certification and operational knowledge - what the aircraft was designed and approved to do, how it was envisaged to be used, vs how it is trained or expected to be used.
Excepting gross mishandling or weather, a GA in the flare or after touchdown should not invoke concerns of insufficient speed, power response, tail strike, climb performance, control effectiveness, etc.

Whilst some of the comment in this forum represents the real professionals in the industry, other aspects suggest that the professional quality is in decline. An emerging concern should be if incorrect or ill-informed comments are influencing the new or inexperienced pilots or unwary management.
Does the predominance of mis-informed information in social media and open forums present a risk in aviation, does it degrade the standards of communication and belief; c.f recent voting and canvassing practices (UK and US).
Just one aspect of the changing operational environment.

Phantom Driver 18th Aug 2016 14:37

Woodpecker;


Sim exercise, ZRH, Wind 280/40, cloudbase just above circling limit.

Landing on 14 above crosswind limit for B757 so the plan was for ILS to R14, break-off (when visual) to join downwind left hand for R28.

The new breed of base training captain (must use the automatics) had us sitting in the simulator and creating an approach using V-Nav and L-Nav. Must have taken 25 minutes of valuable sim time to create this masterpiece of height, speed and track changes.

Once finally airborne the exercise was a total waste of time, Apart from flap and gear extension we sat there and watched the automatics!!
As Monty Python would have said -" Luxury! ". I remember one sim session in a previous outfit where we performed low vis taxi around AMS to the deicing pad where we carried out full de-ice procedures (including reading it all out from the FCOM Supplementary before doing it). One hour from start up to getting airborne.

What a waste of valuable sim time. I believe a wiser training management team has since got rid of that stuff. They have even introduced more raw data/manual flying exercises. Excellent.

As has already been discussed, SOP's are essential for safe operations, but they have to be reasonable , practical and simple (KISS?). I always remember the old saying--" Rules are made for the guidance of the wise and the obedience of fools ".

Fortunately, bad SOP's usually don't last too long , although it unfortunately takes an incident/accident to highlight the flaws.

Capn Bloggs 18th Aug 2016 15:21

PEI3721, that all sounds a bit iffy to me.

Whilst the 'more training' approach has contributed greatly to the industry's success
Actually, less training is resulting in less and less success. Cut to the chase: we're auto dependent. Fullstop. When we get thrown into a situation which cannot be handled by the automatics, we fail, or should I say almost all situations we fail in are when the autos can't help us. Pilots can no longer fly, It's that simple. "Pilot" training (not button-pushing) hasn't peaked, it (hopefully) has just about bottomed. Maybe a few more prangs/runway excursions/handing mishaps will be needed before the powers that be wake up.

misd-agin 18th Aug 2016 16:08

We don't fail in almost all situations when the automatics fail. We actually succeed in almost all of those situations. We hear about, read about, or have the accidents when guys screw up the automation and DON'T revert to basic flying skills. And then we're left with a situation that is commented on in many of these posts "WTF were they doing?!?"

A large US airline probably has several G/A's every day. Some at 1,500', some at 1,000' and some below 20'. We usually don't hear about them unless there's a screwup, which is often the triggering event for the g/a and the g/a itself is a non-event.

PEI_3721 18th Aug 2016 17:58

Capn, may be more qualification required than iffy.
What was in mind is how to build on what has been achieved without discarding the useful bits.
First we have to consider where we are or think we are on the horizontal axis in fig 3.1. Approaches toSafety: One Size Does Not Fit All
Whilst some areas of the industry may appear to be ultra safe, perhaps they are not, i.e. the industry requires a range of safety activities.
What helps best to manage risk.

BuzzBox 19th Aug 2016 01:32


Originally posted by tdracer
Of course now days, nearly all of that training is done in simulators - with obvious cost savings and it's certainly much safer (I've yet to hear of anyone getting hurt when they crashed the simulator ). But I've also noticed that many (most?) simulators are fixed - full motion simulators being far more costly.
Have we gone too far in the simulation direction?
Whilst there are plenty of fixed base simulators (Flight Training Devices, or FTD), the regulatory requirements dictate that Full Flight Simulators (FFS) are used for zero flight time training/testing and most types of recurrent training/testing. In my experience, FTDs are mainly used during aircraft conversion courses, where they are useful for teaching pre-flight and checklist procedures, and for demonstrating the effects of the cockpit controls on aircraft systems.

My big gripe is that FFS are not being used effectively during recurrent training, where they are mainly used to train 'canned' exercises. In many airlines, recurrent training events have become a 'box ticking' exercise where there is huge pressure to complete as many items as possible in a limited amount of time. That satisfies the various regulatory authorities, but does little to prepare pilots for the unexpected events that occur in the real world. That aspect is slowly changing with the introduction of Advanced Qualification Programs and Evidence Based Training by some airlines, but it remains to be seen if they have much of an effect on safety outcomes.

JammedStab 19th Aug 2016 02:21


Originally Posted by PEI_3721 (Post 9477622)
The so-called professional comment on the GA video is appalling, noting that this is an open forum. The explanations for the aircraft's flight path suggest wide gaps in certification and operational knowledge - what the aircraft was designed and approved to do, how it was envisaged to be used, vs how it is trained or expected to be used.
Excepting gross mishandling or weather, a GA in the flare or after touchdown should not invoke concerns of insufficient speed, power response, tail strike, climb performance, control effectiveness, etc.

Whilst some of the comment in this forum represents the real professionals in the industry, other aspects suggest that the professional quality is in decline. An emerging concern should be if incorrect or ill-informed comments are influencing the new or inexperienced pilots or unwary management.
Does the predominance of mis-informed information in social media and open forums present a risk in aviation, does it degrade the standards of communication and belief;

How about showing us which quotes you feel are incorrect so that the inexperienced will know what not to believe.

megan 19th Aug 2016 02:48


Whilst some of the comment in this forum represents the real professionals in the industry, other aspects suggest that the professional quality is in decline. An emerging concern should be if incorrect or ill-informed comments are influencing the new or inexperienced pilots or unwary management
Has always been a problem on pprune, separating those who really do sit in the front row, and those who are, at best, flight simmers. If you remember our famed SSG he presented himself as a highly credentialed aviator, whereas the reality was the nearest he got to a real aircraft was as a pax in 45C. His views on V1 were a case in point, where an upcoming lad/lass may have taken on board his ludicrous notions because of his self proclaimed "expert" status. Avid flight simmer, and sucked a lot of people in, even professionals. So

How about showing us which quotes you feel are incorrect so that the inexperienced will know what not to believe
is a bit difficult when even the professionals can have widely disparate views at times on a particular subject.

bluesideoops 19th Aug 2016 03:39

It's the whole system that is the problem....
 
I doubt that new or inexperienced pilots are that foolish or easily influenced (unless they read PPRUNE! :}) but what I do believe is that they are probably a combination of first 'big jet' job so still 'living the dream' but secondly, bullied by management (directly or indirectly) and also locked in by bonds which puts them all in a Hobson's choice position.

The most worrying thing is that if you believe in SMS principles particularly the James Reason culpability decision tree , we have an awful lot of 'professional' pilots out there knowing and willfully doing stuff which, while legal, is fundamentally unsafe (fatigue/rosters etc.) and by not saying 'no' they become negligent/reckless as a result - before anyone jumps all over me, I am not pointing fingers and I understand the pressure and reasons that lead to this - the root cause analysis points at management, airlines, company culture, regulators and ultimately ICAO (the toothless tiger!) - unfortunately, the guys sat down the front are the ones at the sharp end who bear the brunt and might pay with their lives in doing so!

The decline in professional quality is that the whole system is going wrong and being corrupted and that SMS is being paid lip-service and flight crew are being forced into situations that they know are unsafe ( although 'legal' - just because its legal doesn't mean its right/safe, right!) but due to greed $$$ and regulatory apathy, they can do nothing about it - the ultimate Hobson's choice - 'your job or your life' - we have reached a very sad place in modern aviation :sad::{

glofish 19th Aug 2016 04:27


but due to greed $$$ and regulatory apathy, they can do nothing about it - the ultimate Hobson's choice - 'your job or your life' - we have reached a very sad place in modern aviation
Agree, the root cause is that said apathy, although they are very agile in reaching out their hands ....
It is more like a "Hobbs choice": The ruthless tiger in their dreams, versus the cuddly toy in reality. :{

deadheader 19th Aug 2016 15:16

complacency creep
 

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs (Post 9477797)
When we get thrown into a situation which cannot be handled by the automatics, we fail, or should I say almost all situations we fail in are when the autos can't help us. Pilots can no longer fly, It's that simple.

A bit grim there, Capn'! History just might teach us that AF447 was the bellwether. And if it was, have we learned all the lessons of that perplexing series of events? I would argue that we must travel further. Irrespective of what the PF assumed the protections were at any given moment, his own logic ought to have saved him, had he been confident enough to overrule the 'infallible' bus with it. Unreliable indicated airspeed, perceived erroneous stall warnings and multiple levels of degraded auto law environments must be challenging to say the least, but unreliable physics is an entirely different prospect altogether.

Unfortunately it appears his confidence in the bus (or automatics more generally) allowed him to ignore the fundamentals of flight, which is deeply concerning and clearly needs to be more fully understood.

I'm not convinced it's quite as grim as you [jest?] above, but we might be in danger of entering a new era of 'complacency creep', ironically as a result of the very automatics we designed to enhance safety in the first place (which they indubitably have).

Just IMHO.

birdspeed 19th Aug 2016 16:53


Originally Posted by bluesideoops (Post 9478396)
In that JAL just prior to touchdown and during the initial phase of the G/A check the control surfaces, especially the elevator! Someone was stirring the porridge that day!

I agree, excessive control inputs. I see this online a lot, when the adrenaline starts to flow on a gusty approach at least half the turbulence is self induced.

You don't see it in the sim, maybe because we don't turn up the turbulence in there.

oblivia 19th Aug 2016 17:26

I sometimes wonder if I live on a different planet to Pprune folk. I doubt if anyone would ever get on a plane in China or India or Africa if it weren't for automation. I'm sure there are some minor issues around the margins and the concern for safety expressed here is excellent, but the idea that automation has made aviation less safe globally is patently absurd.

sailor 19th Aug 2016 20:06

Adherence to SOP etc.
 
Many moons ago flying for a well-known UK based carrier flying charter and scheduled flights with a huge variety of destinations same Flight Inspector allowed us to fly all models of BAC 1-11's, yet insisted our kilted cousins fly either their 200 or 500 models, not both. One charter, the other schedules, so a much more limited variety of flying for each. Never understood that.

Company SOP across all fleets was hand fly going and coming below 10000 feet. Everyone benefited from that hands on handling experience.

My only actual not sim engine failure on the 1-11 occurred at TOD which made life much easier than had it occurred on departure.

Having completed Emergency Checklist, discussed with copilot if there was anything else beneficial we could do and it was agreed that lighting the APU would be a good thing, which surprisingly was not in the aforementioned checklist, which we did. Spare air and electrics obviously plus a teeny bit of additional thrust !! Reminiscent slightly of the Trident poke development.

UK destination CAVOK so elected visual approach which ATC OK'd.

Carried out approach higher than normal such that, in the 10 to the minus whatever likelihood the other motor chose to quit, a deadstick would be possible.

Stacks of those practised in the Hunter in my previous life and also in spare time in the sim in Dublin so felt confident it was an option. Practicality proved on a different mount by the Gimli Glider sometime later and the A300 Azores copy. Neither may I add by me.

Unsurprisingly, good motor continued as advertised, achieved stable powered approach later than normal, still capable of a deadstick should it be a late surprise event, managed the usual greaser and stopped well short of the end.

Wrote and submitted incident report; later discussed event with Fleet Manager who berated me for not carrying out the sim well-established ILS procedure, and refused to admit that the addition of the use of the APU in the Emergency Checklist would be useful. Insisted it was merely a matter of airmanship. I suggested that if it were a good wheeze and as it was quite unusual to experience this event in an average fling career it might just be useful to have in the E C as a reminder to even the top airmanship king. No - simple matter of airmanship old boy ! Fought my case with an eventual concession that the ILS might not perhaps be the only option in these circumstances, but final refusal on APU inclusion. Never did understand that, but then I was only a line pilot.

Subsequent Kegworth B737 event might have been different had they had their APU on.

Plus ca change etc. Goes back a long way and yes, I have done the Long BS Course !

Enjoying retirement but still occasional hankering to be back up there with those of you who are !

Final thought- BGO - no matter how clever and sophisticated the automatics are, which they definitely were in the Global Express which I was fortunate enough to pole in my subsequent aviation career, anyone in the pointy end MUST be able to handfly what they are sitting in and be able to recognise and take over capably in the event of an automatics malfunction. Or everyone could perish.

4468 19th Aug 2016 21:36

I may be the only professional pilot here thinking this, but personally, I'm very glad there are very few (if any?) pilots like you left in the airlines.

The very last person I want to be sitting next to is some astronaut, who thinks he's still in a single engined, single seat fighter!

This job is a TWO pilot operation! Both need to know EXACTLY what's coming next. Keep it SOP. Keep it simple.

Frankly, the industry can't sustain the rates of losses the 'old and bold' generation accepted. We may have different problems now, but flying is infinitely safer, for a very good reason, and it's not purely because aircraft are more reliable!

Though even I'm of an age when I'm seduced by the idea that 'the older I get, the better I was'!

misd-agin 19th Aug 2016 22:23

4468 - exactly what dangerous actions did he undertake? Starting the APU even though the checklist didn't call for it?

Capn Bloggs 20th Aug 2016 05:44


Keep it SOP. Keep it simple.
That's an oxymoron if I ever read one! :}


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