All those 777 crashes, if they had been occurring with Airbuses, would have been the starting point of a big media and internet campaign against those aircraft with a "French" logic.
Now, being Boeing and american aircraft, nothing of that - just talking about "aircraft pitfalls", that you have to know the automatisms better, and all that. You know, all the stuff "american pilots are basic, so we make aircraft basic.." "if it's not Boeing, I'm not going"
Taking glory about the airframe solidity because nobody was killed in three crashes in succession (BA, Asiana, EK) simply shows how desperate you are to find something positive in all that.
7000 flight "hours" for each pilot ? virtually all of them on long-range flights, looking at the motionless instrument panel when not taking control rest ? Where is the experience ? where is the experience ?

What happens to the throttles/thrust levers if you keep your hand on them?
If they advance to TOGA will you notice?
If they don't advance to TOGA will you notice?

If you disconnect the a/t's and advance the throttles will the engines accelerate?

Not exactly.
After 8 seconds enough thrust to perform a steady climb of a 3.2% gradient must be available, this does not necessarily have to be full thrust. Especially at landing weight a twin engine aircraft will be able to do much more than a 3.2% climb at go-around thrust.

recceguy - you may have a sort of point but I don't think its germane to this thread...............

Not sure if you are serious but the answer to your questions is yes to all.
In Boeing aircraft the throttle moves wether in autothrust or not, meaning manualy pushing the throttle fwd will allways give you more thrust. When autothrottle commands more thrust the throttles will equally move forward as in manual thrust. Keeping your hands on the thrustlevers will therefore always give you feedback about thrust commanded.

However although pushing the throttles fwd when autothrottle is on will increase power, it returns to previous commanded thrust when hand is taken off unless autothrottle mode is changed as well.

Not to be overly anal about it, but that's why I specified "go around" thrust rather than full thrust - for purposes of go-around calculations you can only take credit for the amount of thrust available after 8 seconds (in reality, with modern FADEC engines, 8 seconds from approach idle will result in very close to max TO).

Go arounds should be part of the retraining every 6 months, practiced in several different situations. The emphasis should be centered on what is not carried out on normal line flying, to state the obvious. Have witnessed quite a few GA's mishandled by some very experienced and competent pilots, in the sim. A GA is not normally an emergency maneuver but very quickly could become one, if not carried out correctly.

If I wasn't offered what I thought an acceptable amount of GA's at retraining I would request more.

Sleeper - I'm amazed, and dismayed, by the over-reliance on automation, especially auto throttles. There's a chance the report might be summarized in one line - button pushed, button didn't work, the plane crash without the pilots attempting to fly manually.

Power awareness, sensed by throttle position (Boeing) and verified by N1, or just verified by N1 on AB products, is one of the biggest degradation of flying skills that I've observed over the last 25 years. Must pilots use the auto throttles vs maintaining a healthy awareness of what the auto throttle is doing.

To be fair - the over reliance on Automation is a vicious circle.

A lot of carriers discourage manual flying and I know of some that will actively punish those that break such SOPs. The swing of that is, when the automation fails, its a case of crash and burn (Pardon the pun)

Truth is - to these airlines, you (Pilot), Me (PAX) don't really matter - the only time we do is when one bites the dust and lets face it - it's easier to blame the dead crew than actually get a handle on the core issues - probably cheaper too!

Training - Manual Flying - Working hours. It all stems back to a capitalist market, where profit is more important than safety. The irony is, the big carriers would rather spend millions of dollars trying to repair a Hull to avoid a write off then they would on training crew and improving safety.

What nonsense! If you can't stand the cost of safety, just try an accident!

The irony is, some big carriers would rather spend millions on expensive advertising, promoting football teams, F1, cricket, Hollywood stars etc rather than spend the money on its core business. That might include such trivia as improving training resources and budgets. It would also include ensuring sufficient engineering cover, not 'forced' overtime on days off, as well as having rested pilots and cabin crew by reducing overall monthly working hours. It would mean paying & treating it's front line staff well enough that they don't wish to leave and be replaced by lower qualified & less experienced personal.

Of course, it's not for me to say who those big airlines are, the public can decide that themselves.

Harry

That's why I Always followed through until power was set and stable before removing my hand. That way it is muscle memory and wil be done even in stressfull moments. Nowadays a lot of pilots move from cadet status to airline after 200 hrs and thus will never achieve the muscle memory since it is button pushing in the sim from day one with very little handflying. Not their fault, but the airline training regime.

This mentality might not have sprung up suddenly, but been creeping along under the carpet for years. In 90's I flew under Italian FTL's. We did long-haul duty times with 2 pilots equal to the CAP 371 heavy crew times. There was no crew rest area (only 2 pilots). The XAA considered the autopilot as the 3rd crew member. Not only that, but the rest time was always within the 18-30hr 'best to be avoided'. Sleeping on the cockpit floor over the N.Atlantic on the night return sector was the norm. The A/P was in CMD. Good game.

Maybe this should also be on the fatigue topic?

IF the accident was caused by TOGA buttons not providing the expected result, it does seem a strange decision process by Boeing to disable the function at a point in the flight where if it is selected it's obviously an oh #hit moment.

I mean the take off part of the TOGA is pretty standard, most flight start like that, and you can understand there maybe hundreds of systems and functions that are checked, up to and including the handbrake being off and the in flight service trolleys being parked properly - before all hell lets rip.

but if the plane is in the landing phase and TOGA is pressed that isn't something open to a committee of electronics to discuss is it? PIC wants to get the hell out of here, lets go.

I can understand it would be disabled once airspeed drops below 50kt or so to avoid speeding into the terminal, but it seems to me Boeing added an extra rule to prevent inadvertent use, that may well be very 'advertant'.

(I'm not saying the crew shouldn't check the aircraft was responding as expected)

It's starting to look like one of those accidents where a number of opportunities existed to "fix the immediate problem":

1. If the TOGA function is inhibited due to A/C being on ground then get an automated voice to call out "MANUAL THRUST REQUIRED" or some other warning.

2. Or "Don't inhibit TOGA operation if nose wheel isn't on the ground" (or would that be more dangerous if hit accidentally at the wrong time?)

3. Pilots change SOP to shadow thrust levers

Probably a few more minor variations as well.

How many times a year does a b777 pilot select TOGA by firewalling the thrust levers?

And how many times a year does that same pilot select TOGA from the switches?

When you have had an unexpected go around (and it must be last second, otherwise the wheels wouldn't touch) and muscle memory kicks in for TOGA, is there not a danger that the "wrong" procedure is applied, as it's the one always used?

In other words, in a procedure that is seldom performed and unexpectedly required at the last second you have to apply a different procedure to achieve the same outcome as the procedure that you follow on a near daily basis.

Muscle memory shouldn't be 'click TOGA'. It should be - power up, pitch to target attitude, drag reduction(g/a flap setting), PRGU, heading, altitude.

Yes, TOGA, and the autopilot if engaged, make it very simple *IF* they're working. Blind reliance on automation leads to tears. Not doing timely, and correct, increase or decreases to the level of automation leads to floundering.

looking at all of the responses, it will be interesting to sort through the coding and track the sequencing if/then when weight on wheels is detected.

Zero? Sim included? As in manual thrust...

Is it time to change the title of this thread? Is gear collapse still the best description?