No, only up to stick shaker, which might be very much lower initially and which incidentally gives the actual best performance getting away from what is the greatest threat: The ground.

Isn't that the foremost objective when you're hanging in the air, close to ground?

It might sound strange, but such bounced/balked landings, if due to pilot error or ambient conditions, were what brought the three MD11 down and now a -300. All of them seemingly tried the procedure with holding actual attitude and then trying to go around .....

I can see the reluctance to propagate such a drastic manoeuvre, but it seems to me, that drastic situations sometimes require drastic measures.

.... and it's just a suggestion ....

The experience, training and procedures are all there and, in many airlines throughout the world, are in practice.

It's just getting the airline management to stop seeing training purely as a cost to be trimmed to it's absolute legal minimums and see it as a forward projecting benefit to the company. Apply the experience, procedures and training that we already possess!

The stick shaker gives you a predfined margin to stall, but that only accidentially would mean it is the speed of steepest climb. You may already fly slower than the best climb performance speed if you pull up to the stick shaker.
However, If you do not have time to figure out the best speed, pulling up to the stick shaker is not totally off.
The speed of steepest climb is related to engine power, the stall speed is not. So that difference varies with OAT and wind. A clever modern PFD should be able to display it accurately...

Pulling up to the PFI's is the EGPWS pull up go-around manoeuvre and whilst it will give you the most rapid of climbs it also can activate the stick shaker which is a huge distraction to both crew members especially when so close to the ground!

Call the Go-Around, PNF selects F20, a smooth application of pitch at 2-3 degrees per second towards 15-20 degrees at landing weights with simultaneous application of full manual thrust, both engines functioning whilst monitoring the airspeed and vsi will take you between 5-7 seconds, hit the TOGA switches and follow the FD's.

Throw a stick shaker in there and your workload has gone through the roof. This is not a tricky manoeuvre from a flight position you are unsure of (unlike EGPWS!)

IMHO of course! :[

You are right, my mistake it should say:
pushing the TOGA switches leads to selection of go-around thrust guaranteeing a vertical speed of at least 2,000 ft/ min, automatic disengagement of all of the previously selected AFDS modes, and automatic engagement of the go-around roll and pitch modes. Pressing a second time leads to selection of maximum thrust. :ok:

Exactly! :-D Hence the requirement during the climb to review and reselect lateral modes as required. Hdg Sel, LNAV etc.

Sorry, I should have been more specific. I meant the FD part of the A/P. By disengage, do you mean turn off the A/T switches or are you saying that the A/T will not respond to the TOGA switches with the A/T switches armed when in the air? (before or after a bounce)

A/T disengage switches are on either side of the thrust levers. Pressing TOGA will re-engage the A/T as will selecting the A/T switch on the MCP or selecting FLCH.

TOGA after a bounce will not re-engage A/T as the switches are inhibited for 5 secs. If A/T is off then the pilot has manual thrust control, if A/T is active then the thrust will be being commanded to idle. If you push the throttles forward and release them A/T will command them back to idle again!

Anyone remember the Jetstar incident back in 2007 involving an A320 where a go around was attempted but TOGA didn't engage and the aircraft kept descending and got within 38' of the ground ? This could have had the same ending as the EK incident but on this occasion the holes in the Swiss cheese didn't all line up.

Parallels can be drawn between the two occurances even though they involved different aircraft manufacturers and happened seven years apart.

The two engined go around receives far less attention than the single engined one, possibly as it is assumed to be a routine manoeuvre which should be well within the capability of any crew. A visual approach was regarded in a similar manner until the Asiana crash.

Perhaps simulator training needs to revisit the basics more often. Back in 1973 D.P. Davis was complaining in "Handling the Big Jets" about pilots who had forgotten how to fly.

Jetstar makes changes after go-around mishap | Australian Aviation

Maybe / maybe not relevant to proceedings but best post here.

World's best practice Framer, world's best...

hi

I ‘ve a simple and clear question for qualified pilots on the triple 7

This concerns only the 777:
AP Off
AThr speed On / FD On
on short final approach, with a tailwind gradient of 10 knots for example, don't you think it would be better if auto-throttle keep managing the thrust after pulled them to idle -a few seconds earlier- to absorb the speed suddenly taken, caused by the 10 kts (tail wind)

Do you not think it would be better to have a similar management of the speed as is the case for the 737 or the A320/330/340/380

Volume:

That's what i meant

But the stick shaker limits you with stall, everything above gives you margin

Wirbelsturm:

No, you didn't get the idea: BECAUSE of the suggested "Pull-Up", the pilot would EXPECT a stick shaker as limit. He will NOT be surprised.

What i would describe as the beauty of such a procedure is, that there is no mode to be achieved, chased and checked or misinterpreted, only manual max thrust, manual wings level and pitch up and as limit the shaker.
It seems to me the most simple and straight forward action for the first few seconds.

The astronautical and sublime automation operator can be displayed once safe ....

Posted in the ME section:

Images Of The Emirates Plane That Burst Into Flames In Dubai, Photo Gallery

Shows the large nose gear doors open.

A Go-Around, whether mandated by ATC or due to approach instability, deep landing or a bounce is not, nor should it be considered an emergency manoeuvre! It is something we are all trained to do and should all be briefing before the instigation of the descent checklist. It comes under the Non Normals and that's it.

There is no reason to pull to the PFI's and the stick shaker. In fact, in this case if the evidence really does point towards TOGA mode not being engaged then pulling to the stick shaker would have exacerbated the situation! Especially on a 300 series where a baulked landing with a rapid pull up could well puncture the tail!

Add into the mix of pulling up to such high levels of climb then you have a greater possibility of busting your go-around climb limits particularly when they are set low, such as 2000' due to controlled airspace above. Remember the MAP is a mandated 'procedure'.

In the event where situational awareness has degraded to such a point that you are unaware of terrain around you and suddenly get an unannounced EPGWS pull up warning then yes, absolutely correct to apply max thrust, dump the speed brake and pull to the PFI's. A normal Go-Around manoeuvre, in controlled airspace above an airfield? Not necessary IMHO.

No, in at least one MD-11 prang (Narita), there were gross nose-down movements which resulted in the prang. Nothing like "holding the attitude" as you suggest. I wager that had the 521 crew pulled up to the stick shaker they'd all be dead.

AFAIK the reason behind the MD11 crash was that the aerodynamic authority of the tail plane to control pitch is severely reduced at below recommended landing speeds and post any bounce (where the speed might have reduced below Vapp) the SOP was a full power go-around not an attempt to recover the landing.

Never flown the MD-11 so perfectly happy to be corrected. :)

The Jetstar flight in Melbourne referred to was the result of attempting a TOGA tap (pushing the thrust levers to TOGA momentarily then pulling them back to the climb detent to prevent overspeeding from too much thrust). They didn't actually hit TOGA and their company procedure at the time was to check for positive rate and call gear up before checking the FMA. As a result the aircraft was still in Land Mode. The 777 is quite different in that TOGA commands a maximum of 2000' per minute so no issues with too much power.

Watch the video on Youtube. Had they done what you suggest, they would have been OK.

You only pull up to the PLIs (stick shaker) if ground contact is still imminent after the initial pull up to 20 degrees. The only time you wouldn't achieve 20 degrees is at very low speed - if you've got a low speed event and GPWS then you really have screwed up. A pull up manoeuver from a baulked landing could result in a tail scrape, then massive energy and ROC which would likely bust the MAP altitude. It's not necessary and would be innapropriate.

Actually, it was a full power GA with initially no conf change ....... which comes pretty close to a ...... initial pull up manoeuvre.

Anyway, it seems that my suggestion is a bad idea.

By the way, i have flown and nicely survived both the Maddog and the Rotating Rubbish -300 and with that experience in my backpack, guess what i would most probably do if trapped in such a situation ....

The problem is the current GA manoeuvre is adequate IF it is flown correctly.

The past has shown that relatively simple manoeuvres are often messed up leading to potentially catastrophic events. Where does that fault lie? You could produce a procedure with the most perfect series of actions that would guarantee the successful resolution of the event but if they aren't carried out in the correct order the whole thing fails.

Is this automation reliance, fatigue, training or complacency or a combination of all of those factors?

We all know that some training takes place with the minimum amount of time devoted to consolidation. The mandatory LPC/OPC box ticking exercises leave little or no time to 'have a look' at some procedures that you may wish to brush up on. Additionally home pressures, rostering, capacity and cost may often preclude getting an hours sim practice time and 'having a go' no jeopardy!

The simple fact is that the human machine has flaws. Flaws that we can train out but which seem to have too high a training cost for many operators these days.

All IMHO of course. :8

If a shipping man can chip in - if you have time to look at a check list or at the QRH, it's education. If it has to be done without conscious thought, it's training, and it must be trained for until it's automatic. This training comes at a cost.

All the talk about rotation angle is irrelevent if the engines delay into spooling up to provide the required thrust, which is strongly indicated in this event.

funfly,

I agree entirely, the discussion there was the viability of pitching to the PFI's. The question with this event is why did the engines take so long or fail to spool up properly? Was it system or human error.

When/if the interim report comes out and if it holds the full un-redacted account of what happened then we'll know.

All the talk about rotation angle is irrelevent if the engines delay into spooling up to provide the required thrust, which is strongly indicated in this event.

Which brings about the answer we are waiting for: why did they attempt a GA if the engines were already at idle, i.e. flare? Given all the sources of definitive information are available I'm going to wait for the definitive answer.

Assumptions
 

Wirb, #702 "Flaws that we can train out ..."
This is a gross assumption considering all of the challenges in modern aviation.
James Reason provides a more balanced view, in that the "human condition is difficult to change, but changing the working conditions can be more effective and often easier".
In particular by avoiding opportunity for combination of factors, e.g. its difficult to 'train out' a bounced landing, but the thrust control system could be improved to cover a greater range of situations with the same procedure.
The principle is to reduce complexity, aid consistency, and thence reduce training and documentation costs. Aim to reduce the need for the the human to detect and differentiate between situations or remember alternative procedures.

Similarly, in your #680; whereas technology should reduced workload you resort to workarounds to counter system deficiencies, introduce additional checks (FMA SOPs), place greater demands on human attentional resources, and thus with higher workload challenge the human ability (time) to appreciate what the aircraft altitude, speed, and thrust levels are.

@safetypee: as usual, you offer excellent insights.

Back to the basics of attitude flying and the old saw of pitch plus power equals performance. (Long running theme in the AF 447 accident discussion).

If the pilot flying the aircraft controls pitch and power (and correct wing attitude) he / she has set the conditions for what comes next. The pilot monitoring/co-pilot assists with the plethora of other tasks that take more hands, and require checklist, trigger the challenge reply chains, etc.

Has the system, in trying to reduce workload, cluttered up task management in a critical phase of flight? (Landing is a critical phase of flight).

safetypee,

I perfectly understand your reasoning it's just that the implementation sometimes isn't as straight forward as the engineering, both hardware and software, would want it to be.

Unfortunately this scenario has resulted in highly complex machines with a vast plethora of integrated systems which all rely upon each other with varying degrees of redundancy to mitigate for the inadequacies of the human mind.

As Tesla have demonstrated, where both the cars automated systems and the driver failed to detect a scenario which hadn't been anticipated by either the software designers or the hardware designers, the result was the loss of the drivers life. I am aware that Tesla state that the automation is in Beta but seriously? How far do we let the automation go?

Aircraft are seriously complex pieces of machinery. I like simplicity, it makes my day to day life easier and enables me to fly the sometimes ludicrous duty times I fly. However the increased tendency to 'hide' complexity and system cross over from the operating crew has a darker side. If the technical knowledge isn't there as to the cascade effect that a singular system failure might precipitate then the workload on the flight crew at a time of high stress will also increase. Complex systems presenting simple information should never replace the innate ability of those designated to 'fly' the machine from performing their job. We are rapidly approaching a point where the systems cascade of multiple failures or, even in the case of a single failure (AF), might cause sensory and capacity overload in under trained and overwhelmed crews.

The reason we have SOP's is simply to allow people who often have never flown before together to be able to work as a team and to realistically expect to get a standardised product from your colleague. Irrespective of what seat they might occupy.

Ironically the FMA purely supplies the information to the pilot as to exactly what mode the Autopilot system is in thus ensuring that the modes you've selected on the MCP are the actual modes the A/P is giving you! It's not an additional check more of an affirmation.

As the previous couple of posts here have alluded to the question here is WHY did the aircraft not climb adequately after what should have been a routine manoeuvre albeit with ground contact. Was there a failure of the A/T system? Did the engines fail to spool due to an EEC fault/logic problem or, more simply, did the crew fail to remember that the TOGA switches are inhibited after touchdown? A simple check of the FMA by the NHP would have seen that the A/T system was not in TOGA in that case.

So whilst I agree that simplicity is best we simply cannot ignore that we must train the next generation of pilots to understand that it is an aeroplane and as such they must also understand that occasionally it might need to be flown like one without the bells and whistles.

Reading, understanding, and knowing what you want on the FMA would fix most problems.

Read Mr. Bailey's article with interest. He present a compelling argument for the confusion may have happened (or not) when the PF initiated the TOGA using the switch. But I didn't see where he explained why the PNF (apparently mistakenly) thought the aircraft had achieved the positive rate of climb necessary before retracting the landing gear, or why, even if it he thought it had, he didn't leave the gear down as Boeing recommends for a TOGA after a bounced landing.

Cognitive failure? Close to the ground so thought it was a standard 'take-off' perhaps? Selected Gear instead of Flaps? They've all happened before. The FDR will clear most of it up along with the crew accounts.

Wow! So many rumours!
 

This thread is going all over the place. We have contradictory evidence from those supposedly in the know.

Wheels down, wheels up. Bounced or didnt bounce? How can we tell? (except perhaps by listening to pax testimony?)

Impossible to call with so much conflicting info...

Just as pilots shouldn't "rely" on automatics, but rather use them in a "Trust, but verify" manner at an appropriate level depending on the regime or maneuver, this mantra also holds true for working as a crew. A PF's command to raise the gear after a PNF/PM's "Pos Climb" callout should only be given after PF also verifies the pos climb and therefore the callout is appropriate. I'd be shocked if EK's SOPs left only one pilot in a loopless, monitoring/decision-making/action process for a configuration change, pushing blind reliance on him/her by the other during a critical phase of flight.

Since my assumption is that EK SOPs provide for gear-retraction as a 2 pilot-looped operation, a cognitive breakdown/mistake on the part of one, whether PF or PNF/PM, is expected to be picked up by the other via verification before any action takes place. This is fundamental and has nothing to do with the intricacies of automatics peculiar to specific aircraft, but has everything to do with with a mindset of "reliance". Because humans are fallible, blind reliance on another human w/o verifying leads down the road to merely parroting a script of commands at certain triggers regardless of reality and, in the wrong set of circumstances, outside every pilot's prime directive to always fly the aircraft.

Reliance on automatics due to their complications and/or peculiar gotchas get a lot of bandwidth, deservedly so, but it shouldn't be forgotten that countering the root...a propensity to lapse into a mindset of reliance (which is a lapse in SA) itself...has a broader application that helps maintain vigilance across the spectrum to include fallible humans as well.

Who to believe?
 

Ironically, one (inside) post claims positive rate of climb (for a while) and wheels left down. The latter being a boon, apparently

This is one case where I think sitting and waiting for the facts might be the best tactic...

Because it's speculation as to a possible cause not a 'call' as the actual information from what caused the crash hasn't been made public yet. It would be inappropriate to attempt to discuss 'definitives' when they don't exist and in poor regard to the operating crew.

If the aircraft reached 150 feet in the bounce and the attempted goaround then the PNF was probably justified in calling "positive rate". One of the characteristics of the 777 is that although the landing flare is done with only one hand the rotate and goaround manoeuvre is done with both hands. Anyone who has seen lots of go-arounds on a 777 simulator will note the handling pilot gives a quick push on the TOGA switches and then pulls up to 15 degrees using both hands and looks at the PFD. The thrust levers then (should) go forward on their own. In the olden days the good old flight engineer made sure they did. These days the P2 very rarely backs them up. In the accident situation the non handling pilot was probably bringing the flap in to 20 and calling positive climb and raising the gear and then looking for the FMA indications and then wondering what was happening. Pitch and power saves the day however looking for and calling out the FMAs uses up valuable time, especially if you have not got the FMAs you are expecting (Thrust Toga Toga) The Asiana accident and now probably this one involved manual flying and an expectation of autothrottle to provide the required thrust.

I'd be hard pressed to believe that any landing could result in a 150 ft. bounce. Such a landing would probably result in collapsed landing gear and a severely buckled fuselage.

This is a very interesting incident in that it is (on first blush only) nearly identical to the Asiana incident at SFO. If the current hypothesis (that the crew went around and expected the AT to spool up the engines, when in fact they hadn't engaged TOGA for whatever reasons) then it is a fact that the evolution of both incidents was pretty much identical: Crew makes large pitch change that requires excess thrust to compensate for and expects AT to react accordingly, and within a few seconds things fall apart as the aircraft sheds airspeed because there was no corresponding increase in thrust.

And in both cases the failure to monitor the throttles happened in the final phase of landing, and in both cases it happened when things were not as expected. (Asiana was not stabilized and was high and hot for way too long, EK 521 appears to have bounced the landing for whatever reasons...) But in any case this would represent the second time in several years that a 777 was a total loss due to the crew failing to properly manage the AT in a critical phase of the landing process.

It could be a training failure, it could be a programming failure, it could be both, or it could be something else, but what I am seeing here is a specific problem with (at least) the 777 series, one that Boeing and regulators need to recognize, acknowledge, and work to ameliorate.

This is obviously all speculative at this point, but the similarities are surprisingly close, as is the outcome- it will be interesting to see if these two incidents result in a major phase or process shift in either training or operations, and/or in the programming of the machine itself.

Cheers,
dce

In that it involved a 777, yes. Beyond that ... really?

1. This crew didn't get 37 knots slow on final.
2. The weather as reported was less benign than the SFO event.
3. Operating philosophy similarities between the two airlines? Give that some time get sorted out.

Are you sure you want to take the "blame the machine" line, per your last paragraph? Seems premature. (A malfunction may have occurred that has yet to come to light ...)

I was thinking about this accident flying back across the pond this morning.

It appears there were some GAs by other aircraft prior to the event itself. A tailwind on approach turning to a headwind on landing is a positive shear and leads to increasing IAS, the auto throttle reducing power and a tendency to get high and/or float.

If a GA was initiated due to instability or landing deep, the IAS might have been quite high, so if you went to a GA pitch attitude, there might indeed be c.150’ worth of climb there (triggering a "positive rate") even with the engines at approach idle. After that the speed would wash off and the aircraft sink back towards the runway. If the pitch was raised further approaching the deck you’d get a bit of cushioning from going back into ground effect and a tail strike near the stalling angle...