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-   -   Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/558654-airbus-a320-crashed-southern-france.html)

Diesel8 27th Mar 2015 16:56


Originally Posted by NigelOnDraft (Post 8921624)
Hi Dieseal8I am giving, I admit, a rather extreme example. But it does get to the basis of the issue.

So if my example is invalid, maybe you can give the most extreme scenario where the CC could be trained in when and how to intervene and countermand the actions of the (acting) aircraft Commander?

Again, the FA is not there to over ride the remaining pilots actions. The second person is there in case of sudden incapacitation of the remaining pilot. That person is also there for access security.

Had there been a second person in the Flight Deck that morning, that person could have opened the door for the Captain. This crash more than likely would not have occurred had that been the case. You agree?

Many carriers around the world operate on this principle, a few more have now announced they will change their procedures to always have two people on the flight deck. Why that wasn't the case before is beyond me considering the lock mechanism now employed.

Ziaii 27th Mar 2015 16:56

Challenge for regulators
 
The challenge is how to prevent these lunatics from entering the flight deck.
With due respect to doctor-patient confidentiality, there should be a regulation for reporting (to employers) if the doctor recognizes a red flag.

Operators cannot just wash their hands by saying 'he hid his illness'.

darkroomsource 27th Mar 2015 16:57

There is no solution to this problem.
Period.

For every situation that you attempt to prevent, there is a different situation that can arise as a result of that solution.
For example, if the emergency code opened the door, and the PF was unable to prevent that, then in the case of the captain who went "nuts", the FO could not prevent him from entering the FD.
If we used a CC to stand inside the door and wait until the PNF returned, then verified them through the peep hole, we have the possibility that the PNF has been incapacitated by a hijacker and is standing there with a gun to his back.
If you have a completely isolated FD (moving the locked door back), then what do you do if the crew become incapacitated (bad fish dinner).

Whatever "solution" you come up with, there will always be another situation that is not covered by that solution.

This is not something that can be solved by putting in more or different technology. It is a symptom of our society, and we need to address the problems in society.

But that's a far greater challenge.

(all of the above is based on accepting the - to my mind extremely premature - conclusions of the investigations so far) OR if you don't accept those conclusions, then at least considering the possibility of a pilot who "loses it" and decides to either lash out against the other pilot, or prove to his "ex" that they will miss him, or thinks that it will ensure something or other in the life hereafter. We have to remember that the person who wants to destroy the pilot, could be on either side of the door.

So we can only have a partial solution, one that solves a percentage of the problems, and then we have to hope that we've chosen the right portion.

And, as some have attempted to say that this policy is worse than the opposite, because "more have died" from this policy than it has saved, then we should recognise that there is absolutely no way to count the number that have been saved.

OPENDOOR 27th Mar 2015 16:58


@Murexway: It obviously detects when the aircraft is in landing config although EGPWS is still active.
Would have made a mess of Scully's ditching in the Hudson with the gear up ;)

mcdunav 27th Mar 2015 17:00

@Diesel8: I am not but what point are you trying to make? Are FAs trained to operate the door switch? In case the FA was present in the cockpit how would have things be different if the FO was looking for an opportunity to crash the plane?

@darkroomsource: I agree with you on the fact that their is no exact solution to this problem. Pilots are humans too and are susceptible to health issues just like any one else. But what do we tell the general public who put their faith in the crew when they enter the aircraft?

ciderman 27th Mar 2015 17:01

Can anyone hazard a guess if insurance will be valid in a case like this? 150 payouts in millions of dollars is going to hurt someone. This is not to denigrate the awful grief families must be suffering.

hsxnl 27th Mar 2015 17:04

Duesseldorf University Hospital: Not treated the 27-year-old pilot for depression.
 
By The Associated Press
March 27, 2015 - 11:17 am EDT
A Duesseldorf hospital says the co-pilot of Germanwings flight 9525 had been a patient there over the past two months.
Duesseldorf University Hospital said in a statement Friday that Andreas Lubitz last came to the hospital for "diagnostic evaluation" on March 10. It declined to provide details about his condition but denied German media reports that it had treated the 27-year-old pilot for depression.

Coagie 27th Mar 2015 17:04

Lubitz was able to fly in this case on the condition, that he get periodic psychiatric evaluation. The problem with this is, apparently the results of this evaluation are self reported. In order to be able to fly, there should have been a mechanism to waive doctor/patient confidentiality, where the doctor could be required to inform the airline immediately, that Libitetz was unfit to fly.
I am of the opinion, 20/20 hindsight of course, that he shouldn't have been permitted to fly at all, but it's pretty ridiculous that an illness that can affect public safety, and can remain concealed, be only self reported. Require people to sign a waiver, if they are flying on such conditions.

pattern_is_full 27th Mar 2015 17:06

Of note:

A mental-health professional was quoted this morning on one of the U.S. news channels as saying "My obligations and responsibilities regarding patient confidentiality just came to an end on a French mountainside."

Expect the laws to change regarding PC - especially for professions that hold such a great responsibility for the lives of others.

Regarding the presence of CC or a relief pilot in the cockpit to cover the temporary absence of one pilot:

By law (at least in many jurisdictions) seated pilots are required to be strapped into their seats during flight. And may be required to have their O2 masks on when alone at the controls (in case of a rapid decompression event).

Exactly how is a pilot so restrained, and in the cramped confines of the cockpit, going to attack or disable the second person in the cockpit so rapidly that (s)he cannot call for help, or unlock the cockpit door for assistance to enter?

The mere presence of another human, with eyes and a brain and a moral conscience (as opposed to a passive video system) changes the psychological dynamics in the cabin, compared to being alone. There are some things it is simply much harder to do - psychologically - when someone else is present and observing you.

Think not? Why did this co-pilot wait until he was alone to take this action? Egypt Air shows that he could have - with some probability - brought the aircraft down even with the PIC trying to stop him in a full fist-fight.

But doing it alone - in "secret" and hidden from the eyes and judgements of others - made it easier.

@NigelOnDraft - the "Commander" of an aircraft is the person with 4 stripes on his/her shoulders. Regardless of whether that pilot is PF or PM, in the left seat, or in the loo, or taking a kip in the crew rest area.

If the rules say a second person shall take his position (certainly not his place as a pilot) when absent, it is implicit that that person is also "deputized" - to monitor the remaining pilot, not for flight actions as such, but for possible physical or mental impairment. As well as simply being a pair of hands to open the d**n door when needed.

On the continuing allusions to the FO possibly having suffered hypoxia - how did this happen to him alone? The pilot was functional enough to knock and bang on the door.

On the "premature" release of evidence and some conclusions from the investigation:

Once you have reasonable suspicion of a criminal act ("probable cause"), time is of the essence. You have to start looking for additional clues RIGHT NOW, before they get destroyed. The FO's discarded down-check notice was in the trash - and might well have been lost except for prompt action by authorities.

Murexway 27th Mar 2015 17:07


mcdunav:@Murexway: It obviously detects when the aircraft is in landing config although EGPWS is still active.
So? Drop the gear and flaps in the dive....and it still crashes.


About the FA being present in cockpit rule, if the FA hears someone banging from outside how will they prevent who-ever is in cockpit to stop denying entry?
If you don't know the answer to that one, then you don't have the need to know...

Mikehotel152 27th Mar 2015 17:07


There are an awful lot of armchair pilots chucking in theories and a fair amount of nonsense here.


So as a professional pilot, let me tell you my experience of a mental health issue.


I had been flying around 12 years and suffered reactionary depression from a serious life event. I sought help from my GP and was signed off work and prescribed anti-depressants and sleeping tablets. In accordance with the established regulations I reported the matter to my employer and the UK CAA and received a temporary unfit letter. It took time to recover and I used every tool available, counselling, medication and so on. I was off medication and about to return to work for what I hoped would be a managed return when I was disciplined by my airline for absence. I was given a final warning despite my, and Balpa's best efforts. I struggled with the concept of returning to work in what would be a difficult set of circumstances and eventually relapsed into depression again. I had hoped I would have been treated with respect and dignity, I was not.


I was never given a golden ticket into a shiny cockpit. I worked my way their, the old way, PPL, CPL, FI, FO and so on and became a captain at my company and happily flew for them for 9 years without any incident or problem, I can't even remember being off with a cold.


I did recover, regained my class 1 medical and hunted for work. It's been 2 years now. I have never flown anything since. I have drifted from job to job and dream of flying almost every day but now accept it is unlikely ever to happen again. I miss it dreadfully and wish almost every day I had not told anyone, but I did and now I'm paying for it big time.


The whole industry needs a serious shake up in terms of viewing of mental health. Performance management by sending pilots to simulators and bashing the hell out of someone who has suffered from depression is not the way forward. If airlines keep treating crew like something on the bottom of their shoe things will never improve.


None of this of course condones what has happened, if indeed the final investigation proves this to be the case and at no point did I ever fancy killing anyone, although my feeling towards the HR manager weren't very nice at the time.....


Anyway, just my experience, from a former ATPL holder.....

Brave and poignant post, wishicouldland. This is a very important aspect of mental health in aviation. Damned if you do, damned if you don't.

Until the stigma and repercussions of mental health issues are dealt with, those who honestly look at themselves in the mirror and seek help will suffer, while those who tear up sick notes will still go to work, risking the lives of those around them.

LASJayhawk 27th Mar 2015 17:08

It would be a tough sell to the operators, but a requirement for a lav inside the secure area of the flight deck would work.

rideforever 27th Mar 2015 17:08

The more people are tested the more dishonest they will become, and the less treatment they will request. Perhaps we are already seeing the result of this.

Many bad things are happening all over the planet, and people want to keep putting plasters on this or that, or blaming this or that person.

But the overall picture of mass shootings and violent acts just grows.

Most "solutions" are just further denial of the state of our society.

James7 27th Mar 2015 17:09

Flight Deck Door
 
Since 9/11 the FD Doors are now reinforced.

(this is in the public domain)

There are 3 means to open the door.
1. From inside –turn the handle
2. From inside – activate the switch. Door must be pushed.
3. From outside – use the emergency code – takes about 30s for the door to open.

The FD crew or persons in the flight deck can override all the opening methods.

As a backup the Door can be mechanically locked from the inside. The Door can now only be opened from the inside. There is now no magic key or secret code that will open the door. It is dead bolted.

The terrorist or killer as in this case, is free to do whatever he likes.
The only way to open the door would be to use the catering cart as a battering ram, may take about 10 mins to bust the door open. Hopefully if it was a terrorist attack then the pax may have something to say and intervene.

The emergency opening code should be printed on the outside of the door. This will allow anyone to open the door. It can be overridden from the inside. In the Helios incident the purser forgot the code and by the time he entered the cockpit after some 2 hours, the plane ran out of fuel. There is NO security risk. All on board died.

One solution would be to remove the mechanical locks and have a real secret code that will bypass any attempt by persons inside the cockpit to keep the door locked.

Question then is who will have the code. Can the code be compromised?
Solution would be to have this code programmed on every flight. We would now have 3 codes.
1. Door entry code – buzzer inside the cockpit, flt crew open door.
2. Emergency code – door opens in approx. 30 secs – can be overridden.
3. Secret code - disables ALL electronic locks. Door opens. Programmed by Capt on every flight.

It is all very well having a CC member sit in the flt deck but would not take much persuasion for them to leave to get something or other.

Another solution is to remove ALL reinforced doors and have them as they were. They only keep the good guys out anyway.

Basically at the end of the day you have to trust the Driver.

Diesel8 27th Mar 2015 17:10


Originally Posted by LASJayhawk (Post 8921698)
It would be a tough sell to the operators, but a requirement for a lav inside the secure area of the flight deck would work.

You want to block cabin access to the flight deck completely?

susier 27th Mar 2015 17:13

The sick note was not because of depressive illness but physical illness.


I think this changes things. We are still in the realms of speculation of course but if someone is physically unwell, due a medical in a few months and fearful of losing their license on the basis of this, as well as being in a mentally vulnerable condition then you may have the holes in the cheese beginning to align.

Essex Eagle 27th Mar 2015 17:19

There's nothing more to see here.

It was a rare tragedy; there is not much we can do to prevent happening again. Nothing about doors, psych checks, 2 person minimum, etc can stop a determined rogue flyer doing this again.

This type of illness is easy to hide. Then it could only take one unexpected punch to knock out the colleague. It could happen.

Seriously.

Let's just pray it remains unrepeated.

Ingenieur 27th Mar 2015 17:19

His fault and his alone
Had he not locked the door and augered it in it would not have happened
Everything else is an excuse
The reason is moot but obvious: he felt slighted and wanted revenge

Not mommies or daddies
Not his doctor
Not the industry
Not the security measures
Not hiring practice
Not pay/benefits/work environment
Not the company
Not the girl/boy friend
Not the captain
Not those who teased him

His, and his alone
I will not take one iota of responsibity for the death and suffering those innocent souls endured
He did it alone with malice, premeditation and precise controlled action
All the while listening to people begging for their lives and those of their children

TJW 27th Mar 2015 17:20


Duesseldorf's University Hospital issued a statement (in German) saying Mr Lubitz had attended the hospital on 10 March and last month.
Adding that it had handed his medical records over to prosecutors, it said reports the co-pilot had been treated there for depression were incorrect.
Germany's Rheinischer Post newspaper, which spoke to the hospital, quoted its own unnamed sources as saying Mr Lubitz had been suffering from a physical, rather than a mental, illness.'
Well, not quite. The hospital's statement (to which the RP article doesn't add anything) says that he went to the hospital twice for "diagnostic clarification" and that "reports that he was under treatment for depression at the hospital are false". It doesn't say anything about physical illness at all. It could be read that way, but it could also mean that he was treated somewhere else for depression and that he only went to the hospital for some special diagnostic procedure (e.g, MRT). Basically, the statement is a lengthy "no comment", and tells the media to get any further details from the prosecutor.

sandiego89 27th Mar 2015 17:21

No diesel, think folks are saying that if you had a toilet inside the cockpit you would not need to open the door to/from the cabin as often. Some aircraft have it already, but a tough retrofit for many airframes.

Of course you would still have the (secured) door.


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