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A few people have privately asked about my recently deleted post.
Rather than attempt to repost it here, it is available at the link below MH370 - time to think of it as a criminal act Presumably the mods won't object to this. |
Interim Report
Most interesting event to me is 'controlled' flt from IGARI to join N571 at VAMPI to fly to N of MEKAR before disappearing.
Why do that if intention was to fly South eventually. Loads of theories but that's all they can be:confused: |
one thing seems a little strange to me .. the Captain on the radio to ATC..he seems to be having some kind of trouble with virtually all the read backs ..lots of aa..ahh ..err.. ehhh..malaysia ONE ...7370 ... etc
small things maybe and yes its the middle of the night and he had flown a lot of hours in the previous 28/90 days.. the only read back without any prefix of err ahh aa etc is the very last one . very precise ( although with no new frequency mentioned) probably means nothing at all ,just made me think a bit . |
Originally Posted by Scubascooby
(Post 8893964)
Is there ever a requirement for a proper handover rather than a simple hand-off ?
Like a courier delivering a parcel that has to be signed for, the current ATC must hear contact with the next ATC before the handover can be confirmed. The assuming controller has normally been prewarned by the system and has usually been watching the aircraft track approach the boundary in the 'area of common interest' and will accept the handoff and provide the frequency for the aircraft to call. These handoff's become extremely routine and both the controllers and often the flight crews know the frequencies and know each other by voice in most cases. Some systems internally have made the handoff even simpler into what they call a 'silent handoff'. In those the assuming controller will see the aircraft track approaching his boundary become a 'full data block' instead of a simple limited data block. When the releasing controller is ready to hand the aircraft over then the data block starts flashing, the receiving controller 'clicks on' the flashing data block and it stops flashing for him and starts flashing for the transferring controller indicating the acceptance of handoff. The transferring controller then sends the aircraft to the frequency for the next controller. There are multiple variants between those types of handoff. For example another common method is to ask the aircraft to contact the next center on 'their second box' when the next controller is ready to accept them they will cancel service from the current sector. This is common on transfers to oceanic where the contact may be by HF or by CPDLC rather than by voice. |
ian w. there are rules for controllers covering handovers which " people who might get a little restive with emergency actions etc" ignore at their peril. malaysian dca lists them in their Interim Report and it is likely all atcc's have similar versions. it seems some were not followed in this case according to the report.
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http://mh370.mot.gov.my/download/InterimStatement.pdf
In the Interim Statement they state the aim is the prevention of future accidents or incidents. They list seven organisations and details of factual information and evidence gathered. As part of this process they don't mention having gathered the medical records of the crew members. However, in 8.4 they mention they are now going to gather information on crew. Seems a bit strange they have waited so long. |
As part of this process they don't mention having gathered the medical records of the crew members. However, in 8.4 they mention they are now going to gather information on crew. Seems a bit strange they have waited so long S8.4 of the Interim Statement is merely listing the various headings under which they are conducting analysis of said factual information. |
My reading of the factual information is it relates to the medical records that MAS themselves hold and not necessarily medical information gathered from any Doctor the crew may have attended and which may not have made it into their medical files at MAS.
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Originally Posted by slats11
(Post 8894591)
A few people have privately asked about my recently deleted post.
Rather than attempt to repost it here, it is available at the link below But I'm afraid I stopped reading at the probability it lies within a relatively small search area may be less than the probability it lies in one of an enormous number of individually less likely locations |
Since the definition of underwater search areas in the ATSB's report of 26 June 2014, it has always been clear that the "Priority Search Area" of 60,000 square km's, as the name implies, is only a fraction of the area of possible locations of the airplane that are compatible with INMARSAT's data log and the fuel-limited "performance boundary":
(Bolding mine) This suggested that, for MH370, it was possible that after a long period of flight under autopilot control, fuel exhaustion would occur followed by a loss of control without any control inputs. Note: (...) Also allowing for the fact that a maximum glide distance of 100+ NM would result in an impractically large search area, the search team considered that it was reasonable to assume that there were no control inputs following the flame-out of the second engine. Accordingly the aircraft would descend and, as there would be some asymmetry due to uneven engine thrust/drag or external forces e.g. wind, the descent would develop into a spiral. As the BEA found in their study, in the case of an upset followed by a loss of control, all the impact points occurred within 20 NM from the point at which the emergency began and, in the majority of cases, within 10 NM. |
There has been an interesting discovery with regard to MH370 wreckage, on a West Australian beach.
An unopened towelette in its packaging, with the Malaysia Airlines symbol in it, has been discovered by beachcombers. The item has been sent to the National Capital, Canberra, for further examination to see if its origin can be more precisely indentified. It's a long shot, but it does focus attention to this area of the coastline, which could possibly lead to a more concrete find, such as a readily-identifiable MH370 component. Towelette washed up on W.A. beach being tested for connection to MH370 |
It's a long shot, but it does focus attention to this area of the coastline, which could possibly lead to a more concrete find, such as a readily-identifiable MH370 component. |
and they decide to hand it in 8 months later? they really dont know about the massive search going on down there? ermm...
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As with many innocent finds, the finders possibly dismissed the towelette as of no importance for 7 months - then they were urged by others to hand it in, on the basis it may have come from MH370.
It's certainly a very tenuous link, and the towelete may have origins totally unrelated to MH370. It is possible the towelette was kept unopened from a flight by a passenger, and carried to the area and then dropped, unopened, by that same passenger. That would all hinge on how many people who have been on a Malaysia flight, and who have a habit of keeping airline towelettes, travel that section of coastline. I'd expect that chance would be extremely low. Coming from a frugal upbringing, I have a tendency to keep items such as towelettes from flights, but I doubt if very many airline travellers do. The chances of the towelette floating down from around Malaysia are extremely low. The general current drift is towards the W.A. coastline from the Southern Indian Ocean. I do not know what the likelihood is of even being able to verify if it came from MH370. It would seem to me to be very difficult to ID it as such. However, there is a real chance now, that people will step up their beachcombing for MH370 aircraft wreckage along the coastline in the region, so hopefully this may lead to a verifiable find. |
I find it hard to believe (of course... Some news no matter how small can be good news for closure etc...) that of all things on board an aircraft. A Small paper towelette in a wrapper be the first/only piece of MH370 to surface.
There are far more buoyant things on board than a paper towelette. Such as life vests/rafts and seat cushions. |
Flotsam
However, that is only a drift of 700 metres per hour (0.4 Kt) from the search area, well within the scope of tide and wind! No evidence is ever wasted, even negative evidence.
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This suggested that, for MH370, it was possible that after a long period of flight under autopilot control, fuel exhaustion would occur followed by a loss of control without any control inputs. Note: (...) Also allowing for the fact that a maximum glide distance of 100+ NM would result in an impractically large search area, the search team considered that it was reasonable to assume that there were no control inputs following the flame-out of the second engine. Accordingly the aircraft would descend and, as there would be some asymmetry due to uneven engine thrust/drag or external forces e.g. wind, the descent would develop into a spiral. As the BEA found in their study, in the case of an upset followed by a loss of control, all the impact points occurred within 20 NM from the point at which the emergency began and, in the majority of cases, within 10 NM. |
Sometime last year, there was a claim that the frequency offset in the final satellite logon was consistent with a rapid descent. I don't know whether that's still considered true after the more detailed analysis of that data.
But, yes, if someone was flying at that point, the wreckage could be a long way from the final arc. On the other hand, if they tried to extend the flight as far as possible, you could probably estimate the position by just extending the possible tracks between the last three arcs... still a big chunk of ocean, but not a million square kilometres. |
Problem with Math or units?
http://mh370.mot.gov.my/download/FactualInformation.pdf
On page 63 of the Factual Information Report the loadsheet is published with TOW 223469 (Kg?) and TOF 49100 (Ltr or KG?) On page 64 we have 5 ACARS reports containing the following numbers: time/ altitude / GW / TotFW / 1641:34 / 10300 / 492520 Kg / 49200 kg 1651:43 / 21193 / 486240 kg / 46500 kg 1706:43 / 35000 / 480600 kg / 43800 kg The original printout is on page 65. If my math is still worth a bit, than the GW over the period of time reduced from 1641:43 to 1706:43 by 11920 kg, while the TOTFW reduced only by 5400 kg? If the fuel is in the same units on the loadsheet as on the ACARS report, than they had more fuel at 10.000 feet than on takeoff. Could it be, that despite the name factual report they do not have their facts together and the GW in the ACARS report is in lbs and the fuel in Liters? The GW in the ACARS report is more than double of the TOW, and more than max allowed TOW, maybe the loadsheet GW is in KG ? Unsure....... |
rtd f4. dont know where exactly the mil radar mentioned is located but the turn south would have taken the aircraft down the E94 deg 25" longitude which passes within 45nm of banda aceh at the tip. indonesia has many mil radars so draw your own conclusions.... for the mil radar mentioned to have seen as far as igari would give it a range of around 350nm from java.
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