Just to clarify a point about the Monitored Approach.
The technique, as developed by BEA, is extremely useful in aircraft which do not have autoland. IMHO it is less advantageous on those which have a good auto-coupled and/or autoland capability.
One spin-off is that, until the sector pilot takes control, (s)he is doing the RT and does not have to refer to the other pilot for a decision. As a company SOP it works well.
Once had a captain who joined us from a subsiduary and, like some posters here, was determined to demonstrate how wrong BEA was by flying his own approach on a dark and dirty night. He totally screwed it up and burst all the maingear tyres. Before anyone asks what the FO was doing, I warned him and he still continued. I've given that one some thought and really, the only other thing I could have done with this nitwit was to physically fight him for control and that seemed to be the greater of the two weevils.

I've flown six different SOPs and can't get worked up about the detail. As a chief pilot dear to some on another forum said: "Just do it!" . . and thereafter was known as JDI.
Others get paid to argue over the Flying Manual detail so why bother?


ExSp33db1rd,
OK, sorry you had to get the monitored approach which wasn't your SOP but, in exchange, we had to stop using intercom and shout at each other which is probably why my hearing's nearly as bad as that of an ex Shack crewman I was shouting to last week :)

Let's not get too bogged down in who's SOPs are better than others, with regards to monitored approaches etc. I think the important thing is that everyone is singing from the same hymn sheet, and secondly the right hymn sheet.

BA (BEA really) brought in the monitored approach after a nasty accident, involving a CAT 1 break out, with the pilot doing it all himself. It's a very hard thing to do, to go off instruments, and transition visually at 200 odd feet, in lousy weather, unless you're 411a of course.....

The monitored approach is less relevant now, as most aircraft and airports are more sophisticated, when bad weather hits, but I believe BA still thinks it has relevance, as regardless of the conditions, both pilots are more involved in the outcome of the approach - one briefs the other on how it should be flown, and then a discussion about potential threats might well develop, even from the lowliest low timer. Of course, 411a no doubt just informs his lackey what is required of him, and the outcome is always a complete success, due to his pure brilliance. The rest of us are happy to listen to any points made by other people, and act on them if necessary.

None of this detracts from the captain's overall responsibility for the flight - something 411a appears to cling to with terrified determination, afraid to let his FO drive the aeroplane, even when on the ground. As mentioned earlier in this thread, the captains who intervene on the most trivial of issues, are usually the under confident ones, or incompetent ones. I wonder which category Tristar Warrior falls into?!

Incidentally, I did an intersection departure from an Italian airport today. The alternative was a 400m backtrack, thus, further delaying my passengers, whilst waiting for someone else to land. What a foolhardy bozo am I.......:hmm: I fly to Jersey regularly, which is shorter than any intersection available to me at LGW. Should I never take an intersection at LGW, or demand Jersey build a bigger runway, else I'm not taking off.:ugh: Be practical people.

This is all a bit of thread creep. I'm pretty sure the incident above did not happen due to BA "giving sectors" to FOs - the captain is still supervising, and I'm sure it didn't because the FO was taxiing. In most modern airlines, you are team, and whilst someone is still in charge, everyone else from the dispatcher to engineers to cabin crew have safety critical responsibilities.

The "why" is more important, so that everyone else learns (apart from 411a, who knows everything anyway). So, is it how/why did it happen, let's look into it and learn from it, or the 411a answer - 3200 BA pilots are all "bozos", poorly trained, with ingrained personality defects? That is almost half of all British commercial pilots BTW......

I particularly like the emphasis on co-pilot. I would agree with with you, if the first officer was a monkey, simply there to do as he was told (tellingly obvious, in the position of the gear lever, flap lever, and speedbrake lever in Boeings), but the World has moved on from "Atlantic Barons", and monkeys in the RHS, as Boeing intended. We have First Officers and Captains in BA, and either will act as co-pilot on a day to day basis. This does not detract from the Captain being in charge one iota - at least, not my flights.

And this is priceless:

Gee, thanks for your magnanimity, 411a, but I somehow doubt you'll be at the centre of any BA investigation, or involved in any subsequent disciplinary or training matters. I'm sure we'll manage fine without you. We'll all learn from it, but clearly you won't - there's nothing for you to learn, after all, is there?

Slickster

Good post. You said all I would have wanted to say.

regards

BBK

Not very much, no....especially from still wet behind the ears co-pilots.:E

Might I urge retirement in that case?

At least that way your arrogance won't be a factor in an accident.

For some reason, I know not why, I'm reminded of the Jasper Carrott one-liner about the elderly motorist who "had never had an accident but seen thousands".

Negative, still have work to do, training new Captains.:)

Speaking with my moderators hat off....

I've worked for several years to BA's SOP's. Prior to that, I worked in the PF/PNF environment. Both work admirably well. If anything, BA is one of the few airlines that empowers copilots, unlike others that neuter them. That leads, in my experience, to a more rounded level of command; we can all make mistakes, we can all learn. Couple that with a learning, no-blame, open culture, and you see this incident, which was not picked up by any monitoring system, but revealed and owned up to by the operating crew. After all, if they'd STFU'd, then nothing would probably ever have come out.

I would rather work within THAT culture, than any other. That is perhaps the hidden message behind this; they screwed up, they got away with it, they owned up. In a culture where the Captain is God, would this have been revealed? Given such a culture, how do you then continue in the same manner when found so wanting?

I am having trouble recognising the stereotype image of BA and BA Captains perpetrated here by 411A. I certainly flew with commanders with the attitude he describes, however, unfortunately, it was in my previous company. BA is far more relaxed and open in all manners whilst still maintaining a very professional operation, than people realise from the outside.

The word on the street is that all BA fleets are to be fitted with the system that tells you how much runway you have available, and warns if it less than acceptable. Is that not a fair and reasonable outcome from an incident where there was a mistake made, owned up-to within the positive safety culture, and lessons learned by all? To limit this discussion to the merits or demerits of empowering FO's or having a monitored approach system in place is missing the main point. I'd rather have the culture I work within, though some who prefer to rule-the-roost OPENLY may differ with that preference.

Squid

Oddly enough, BA was one of the first to have this equipment, long ago...and yes, on L1011 aircraft.
Having used it at other airlines (leased BA aircraft) it worked just fine, thank you....IF operated and set properly, for each takeoff.
Many times..a very big IF.

4!!A, I think you'll find it now works from an independent GPS feed, therefore not reliant on any prior input, but that is a good point.

Out of curiosity 411a are you talking about the GRM?

I believe so, yes...the correct term.
As I recall, it worked very well, indeed.

One of my 'co-pilot' colleagues was once flying with one of BOAC's North Atlantic Barons, a breed apart, and after three calls - inserting the word Sir, but without first being spoken to ! - that the speed on short finals was low and dropping, finally advanced the throttles.

After landing said N.Atl B. said " MR xxxx, if you ever touch MY throttles again they will be the last throttles you touch in BOAC. "

Them were the days ! ( are you listening, 411A ? )

names witheld to protect the innocent.

If you think it's difficult to line up at the wrong intersection, how about the closed but parallel RUNWAY, as happened to a well known S.E.airline with a previously good safety record and flight deck culture ( I worked for them ! ) at Taipei one dark and dirty night. ( and Lexington, of course )

We can all make mistakes and to deny that possibility is sheer folly.

411a: The GRM ( ground roll monitor) was only ever used in 'British Airways' by one of its predecessor airlines, BEA ( British European Airways). BEA took delivery of the L1011 2 years ahead of the merger with BOAC, (this merger creating British Airways.)
BEA had pioneered autoland operations with the DH121 Trident many years before, using a triplex autopilot system. Many of the features of that system were incorporated directly onto the L1011, although moving to a 'dual-dual' autopilot system, rather than triplex. BEA were keen to maintain their lead in low vis operations with the L1011 and were intending to work towards CAT3C regularity, i.e operating in virtually zero visibility. The GRM was designed to get the aircraft from the gate to the runway by a strictly defined route at a limited number of airfields, via distance run and heading information. We used to practise the technique in good visibilty and occasionally as a back up in CAT 2/3 conditions. It was never fully operationally approved and the ideal of CAT3C was dropped as being completely impractical at a time when there was no airfield ground movement radar and because fire services would never find you in an emergency. Also, the general environmental clean up in the UK post 60's meant that the UK rarely went below 100m vis, at worst, from mid 70's on. It used to go below 50m in the smoggy old days.
The GRM was an interesting toy, but would never have had a use at basic airfields in the Caribbean in preventing an erroneous line up. The GRM preload data would not have been available.
The GRM never provided information on the takeoff run available, it was just a tool to get you to the correct runway threshold.
The best technology available to pilots to prevent these erroneous line-ups is now the active airfield map in the electronic flight bag.. Its the newest kit on the latest B777s.

All very interesting, however...I never worked for BOAC/BEA/BA, so, does not apply.;)

'Oddly enough, BA was one of the first to have this equipment, long ago...and yes, on L1011 aircraft.
Having used it at other airlines (leased BA aircraft) it worked just fine, thank you....IF operated and set properly, for each takeoff.
Many times..a very big IF'




' Quote:
Out of curiosity 411a are you talking about the GRM?



I believe so, yes...the correct term.
As I recall, it worked very well, indeed'



'The GRM never provided information on the takeoff run available, it was just a tool to get you to the correct runway threshold.
The best technology available to pilots to prevent these erroneous line-ups is now the active airfield map in the electronic flight bag.. Its the newest kit on the latest B777s'





( are you listening, 411A ? )

All very interesting, however...I never worked for BOAC/BEA/BA, so, does not apply'





Oh dear another case in which 411a seems not to know what he is talking about. The BS flag has been well and truly raised on you here old chap.



His schizophrenic views on his First Officers are well known here as are increasingly, his ignorance of anything other than the L1011 and whatever third world country he is buzzing around in these days :p

Poor 'ole stilton, his reading comprehension has gone south, once again.:rolleyes:
777fly.
We used it for distance remaining during the takeoff roll, seemed to work OK for us.

Prior to BA I worked for a UK Charter outfit that had the man and dog approach to the Flight Deck. The usual stuff, FO never taxis, never makes a fuel decision, never handles the thrust levers on take off, right down to having to ask for the captain to deploy the spoilers on his behalf. As I say, man and dog... not unsurprisingly they had a huge chop rate on command courses.

On my initial conversion into BA, on the 747-100/200 on about detail four the instructor stops the sim, turns up the lights, leans forward and says to me.. "do you not like your sim partner?" A little confused, I replied that we got on just fine, and had survived the carrel together, so no conflict at all. He then asked, "then why do you not help him? you can see what he needs... give it to him." My reply was that he had not asked for it, so I would not dream of doing anything unless asked first." The trainer replied... "That is not how we do things here in BA. We work as a team, and if you can see he needs help, or a frequency, or whatever, you help him." With that out the way, I realised I had arrived into a very different world.

BA expects a FO to make decisions, run the sector, own the sector if you will. BA assumes that an FO is an adult, and a Captain in waiting. The buck always stops in the left hand seat, as ever. However because of this Captains need to step up to the plate. It requires line captains to have the ability and capacity to supervise, and teach, and pass on attained knowledge.

It makes for a happier, more adult, and ultimately it makes for a much safer operation.

My vision of the First Officer was first created in the Mercantile Marine where the First Mate runs the ship on behalf of the captain. His is an important and respected appointment.
It was a vision which, upon arrival in the world of aviation, required rapid and drastic revision.

Why certainly.

Let's see...
1. Continual role reversal on the FD, IE, non-standardized duties at a critical time, whilst entering the runway.

2. The 'oh, let's all be friends' attitude that seems to permeate the BA flight deck culture, such as it is.

3. Quite possibly the presence of a non-authorized crew member on the FD at the time of this incident (which could well have been a very serious accident, as most would agree) leading to distraction of the FD crew at rather critical time IE: entering the runway prior to takeoff.

4. Poor signage at the affected airport, a definite airport management liability.

From the above list, we can clearly see several major deficiencies in the way BA manages their FD operations, and last but not least, improper/incomplete survey of intended destination airports, to ascertain the quite obvious runway/taxiway signage deficiency problem.

In conclusion, clearly to an outside observer, BA urgently needs to reorganise their FD operations policies, and further, to remedy the other deficiencies noted.

And yet, we have some contributors here who proudly proclaim that 'the BA way is the only way' and 'our policies are the best in the business' etc.

As British Airways has been, to date, the only airline to have crashed a B777, one wonders if they are trying to enter the record books as the only airline to do so...multiple times.

411a
411a, Not really a fair comment. There was a technical cause to this accident that had to do with the airframe/engine design interface. BA's only mistake was their choice of engines, and that wasn't the fault of the aircrew in any case. If you have to have an accident, that one turned out very well.

Wrong: It was the FO's sector. It is standard for the FO to taxi the aircraft.

Wrong: CRM is not about "oh, lets all be friends." It might be in your book, but not in BA.

Wrong: Where is the evidence for that? If no evidence then this is simply libellous.

To suggest that the 777 accident at LHR is BA's fault is ridiculous. How exactly is it BAs fault that the fuel froze in an completely "new" way, u8nknown to the airframe or the engine manufacturer.

Once again your bigoted, and increasingly racist view of BA gets in the way of any logical thought processes you may have.

Not really a problem, as it's the way we operate, so not "non-standardised" at all, unless you read the "Bible According to 411a". Luckily, most of us don't, but read FCOMs.

Yeah, let's all be nasty to each other, and point-score - that'll make for a safer operation. Some of the guys I fly with are friends, others not, and others I don't know from Adam. As you have self-confessed to never applying to BA, how on earth do you know what the atmosphere on a BA flight deck is like?

Quite possibly completely irrelevant. I regularly have authorised people on the flight deck, and no sane BA pilot would ever have anyone unauthorised there - it would be in the papers before you'd taken off. I love the opportunity to offer a jumpseat to CC; it gives them a different view of our world, from what they are used to, and in the long term, can only foster flight safety.

And last, but not least, our intrepid aviator finally hits the mark. That's not to excuse the error, but mustn't have helped.

This incident has nothing to do with BA SOPs, and everything to with Human Factors. You can change your SOPs a million times, and God knows, I've seen a few, but whenever there are humans, there is the potential for a screw up. It happened, we all learn from it, and hopefully move on.

I wonder how much stuff goes on that we never hear about. Often I see an airline, and comment "I'd love to be fly on the wall in that flightdeck". I can't wait to see a Tristar - I'll even know who's taxying it. We don't hear about what goes on, because they are not as open as BA is. You are only giving us the benefit of your questionable wisdom due to BA's open culture.

Rubbish.
Human factors aside, it has everything to do with SOP's, or rather, lack thereof, applied in a proper way.

One primary example.
IF the referenced airplane had been taxied to the end of the runway, there would quite likely not have been an incident.
Ergo, BA allows intersection departures (even when the full length is available) and the pilots simply could not find the proper interesction. Even the tower thought this was odd, and the Captain mentioned that the runway looked rather short, and told the co-pilot (who was pilot handling) to perform a static engine runup...and yet, they still departed, without due regard to the safety of the operation.

As for BA's supposed 'open culture', the pilots simply could not have gotten away with this fiasco unnoticed, as it was observed by too many people, not the least of which was the BA ground engineer (who knew the position on the airfield was incorrect)...therefore it was bound to come out in the end.

I am shocked that current and former pilots at British Airways would condone this irresponsible bahavior on the part of the referenced crew, and continue to make any number of excuses...none of which hold much water.

One wonders when the next pile of aircraft rubble will have British Airways painted all over it?

This BA incident was gross FD crew negligence, without a doubt.

Any journalist worth his name would only ever look to an anonymous forum for a pointer, at the very best. Never a direct quote and most certainly never for reliable information that doesn't need bang-to-rights verification.

Just look at the garbage and nonsense on the UPS crash which was being written by PPRuNe posters - while at the same time they had the gall to criticise journos for not checking their facts.

There are already websites claiming to offer professional aviation news but which are prepared to paste unsourced and unverified information - from places like PPRuNe - in a bid to be first, and those same websites then get quoted here. What a shambles.

Sort of correct. In fact, if the aeroplane had been taxied to the correct intersection, there would not have been an incident either. They got the wrong intersection. Don't tell me you've always used the full length. Most airlines I know use intersections, if it suits their's and ATC's purposes. What next? Build an infinitely long runway, always fill her up to the brim with fuel, because that's safer?

Nobody is "condoning" anything about this, but even yourself has presented mitigating circumstances, re. signage. I'm not defending the crew for screwing up, and I haven't seen a single person doing likewise.

Most of us are scratching our heads, and wondering how it happened, so that we can all learn from it.

It is poor logic to say BA has a "supposed open culture" by linking it to the fact that the incident was noticed. The airline has an open reporting culture. Fact. You can decry that fact till you are blue in the face, but the fact remains is that it does.

I am most certainly not condoning his irresponsible behaviour. Not is anyone else. Indeed neither is BA, as the gentlemen concerned has lost his command. What I, and my fellow pilots are wanting to do, is learn from the incident, to see what can be done better.

There but for the grace of God go I.

You on the other hand are obsessed with blame, obsessed with BA, and continue to rant in your usual bigoted way.

How did they manage to do that ?
 

Rubbish :=

For those wondering with the "how did they" part of the thread, I commend: Amazon.com: The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations (9780754619246): Sidney Dekker: Books for a read.

It gives several explanations as to why they did what did and has some good case studies too ( I suspect this one would also make a good example).

As for the BA bashers and that fool who called for a criminal investigation (:bored:), get real. There are those who have screwed up and those who will...

I think it perfectly probable that the crew did not want to backtrack and turn on the runway. But it is stretching a point to say that it is impossible. The airfield chart clearly shows turning areas at each end. I am pretty sure 777 pilots would rarely be required to backtrack at the airports they normally fly into.

411A

Seems it wasn't just the Brits who had problems with their 777's. Care to give us your opinions of the performance of Delta's flightcrews?


NTSB investigates Heathrow-like Trent 800 engine issue

Some observations from operating into St Kitts, something I've done every couple of months in a twin jet airliner for a few years.

The ramp sits south of the runway. It is lower than the runway and both taxiway entrances are uphill. The grass is relatively long and blocks the runway from view into on the taxiway entrances.

As one departs the terminal ramp taxiing westbound, the first runway entrance is a half right turn. This is where BA entered the runway. To get to the proper entrance point, one must make a jog to the left to continue taxing. At this incorrect entry point, one is looking at what looks like the proper entry point (it isn't), and when looking at the proper dogleg left turn, it looks incorrect since it appears to be a long rectangular parking ramp and not a legitimate taxiway. The proper entry point at the far west of the ramp is not visible from this point. The correct way is to take the dogleg left and find the entry point hidden behind the sloping grass at the far end.

How do I know it's a little confusing? My last trip there, out of 10 or so in the last couple of years, we were cleared from the ramp to backtrack on the runway for takeoff. I taxied west on the terminal ramp, started making the right trun at the wrong exit point and suddenly realized something wasn't right and stopped. After reviewing the airport diagram, I had enough room to make the left dogleg for the proper route. I still felt I was going the wrong way until finally seeing the hidden entry point at the end. It was a beautiful sunny afternoon, I was reasonably familiar with the field, yet I still almost entered where BA did.

In my case, it was a loaded 737 and would not have attempted an intersection takeoff, nor would I at St Kitt's. As a former 777 crew member, the 737 is a ground loving pig compared to it. I see no problem with a light weight 777 performing the proper intersection takeoff at St Kitt's. My case could have been a problem if an unseen landing aircraft exited into me at high speed.

From my experience flying into SKB and on the B777, I can say that those pontificating here on the intersection takeoff are basically ignorant. that wasn't the issue.

The fact that the FO may have been taxiing the aircraft per procedures is another non-issue despite of what some greasy out of work, arrogant geriatric may have to say on the issue. If it's company procedure, it should not have been a problem. the Captain is in charge and can monitor ground operations like any other inflight phase. If it was two new guys and a new procedure, maybe it could be a problem.

As for general takeoff performance of the B777, we once had a 3000' ground roll with the aircraft loaded full of pax and 11 hours of fuel. The BA aircraft probably had the thrust to weight ratio or better of that of a light 20-series Learjet. Fortunately for them of course.

Any large airline with thousands of weekly operations will eventually test the safety chain at some point. The challenge is keeping the safety chain intact to prevent tragedies.

:ugh::ugh:

To be fair to 411A ( though given the Brit bashing it requires a British thick skin to do so) you should be able to turn a 777-200 at the runway ends, using the turning pads. Whether you would choose do so during routine operations of a lightweight 777 is another matter.

Now about Delta and it's rollback.....

WhatsaLizad:

Thanks for that post - Your comments confirm what I heard about the taxiways, visibility and charting from other St Kitts regular's in the months following this incident.

and now for some light relief .......

Many years ago ( of course ) I was at an Asian airport when the incoming crew brought us a 747 with the body-gear steering inop.

According to The Boeing How-to-fly-a-747-Book, this would seriously increase the turning circle prescribed by the aircraft in making a 180 deg. turn at the end of the runway, and maybe scrub some tyres. Not a good idea as the width of the runway without a turning circle was deemed to be inadequate.

First Solution ........ taxi across the runway, enter the Country's Air Force property, turn left, turn left, turn left on to the runway from the other side. Brilliant - except ..........

Entry from the other side meant that we would be making an intersection take-off, albeit with only a small reduction in overall length, but this was not catered for on the airfield charts at our disposal, or in our Ops. Manual of RTOW field length calculations for take-off.

How much length are we losing by starting from taxyway A, we asked the tower, no idea, was the reply, but we have some charts here that you can examine.

Off to the Tower, where we were given UK War Office Survey charts dated circa. 1940, used to construct the then RAF Base during W.W.II, and from them measured the reduction in present length from the threshold to the Air Force taxiway that we would use.

Slide rules, and reference to long remembered (!) instruction on Performance A calculations needed to obtain an ATPL, resulted in a unanimous decision that we had enough length to complete the take-off on the slightly reduced length. ( in practice it was about 100m of a 10,000 m runway, so was a No-brainer issue from the start, but in the event of a Subsquent Court of Inquiry the crew " had satisfied themselves that they had sufficient length of runway and First Stage Climb Profile - over the sea - to safely conduct the operation " QED.

but ..........

Permission would be needed from the Air Force Commander to taxi through the Base, but yes, sufficient width, and bearing strength - they said - of taxyway was available.
Get it.
It's 03.00
That's why he is the Air Force Commander - ring him.
Permission granted. No problem, except.....
The Air Force Taxyways were blocked by H.M. The Queens' aircraft - H.M. being on a Royal Visit to an ex-Colony - and her support aircraft.

Why didn't you tell us, we asked ATC, before you awakened the Air Vice Marshall at 03.00
You didn't ask us, was the reply.

Second Solution........ ground engineers confirmed that they had a good tractor so we were pushed backwards to the threshold, started up, and blasted off. No problem.

If you question the intelligence of ATC in the above( or even mine ! ) it was akin to another ATC controller at an African Airport who told us the temperature was 28 C. We were cold, and it was about 10 C in our opinion. The Stn.Mgr. suggested we took his car to the tower, which we climbed, to find the ATC controller swathed in an old army greatcoat, balaclava, gloves with the ends of the fingers cut out, and huddled over a one bar electric fire that he had smuggled into the tower, and which was placed under a wooden, room thermometer hanging on the wall.

We asked him for the field temperature, and he pointed to the wall thermometer. What about this, we asked, pointing to the instrument on his control console ? " No Sah, dis is the temperature "

International Operations still fly through that African station.

My lips are sealed.

Now, I might have missed this as a previous comment...normally do.
But when lning up it is beholden of both pilots to check that their end of the runway and approach is clear of any 'unexpected' traffic. Would this not then highlight the point that there seems to be an awful lot of runway behind us?
Now would then be the time to troubleshoot. To try and rectify this scenario by standing on the brakes when you perceive the runway to be too short ahead should trigger at the very least some sort of doubt that what you have done is incorrect. Now think about it for a few seconds and put it right.
A training captain I used to fly with, told me that a mistake is never made if it is rectified in time, that is how we learn. Wise words from someone wiser than I'll be. Also, he was the first guy to tell me that 'if there is ever any doubt....then there is no doubt' as we are again beholden to put it right.
None of us are perfect that's why there are two of us, and in a perfect world..three. I make mistakes on a daily basis, be they major or minor, but I am always chuffed to bits when my f/o points them out, and I learn a little bit more........
Just my twopenneth worth, for what it's worth.

Intersection 'A' is still several hundred metres from the threshold and they would be looking straight into a low sun and mainly thinking about approaching aircraft.

Another implication of 'A' not being near the threshold is that the ATC query about further backtrack would not necessarily have raised any mental alarm bell.

One may suggest cognitive polyphasia at work. One's logical mind convinced all checks are done so all must be well, some baser instinct saying "take care".

You didn't "speculate", you gleefully danced and pointed your finger before the bodies were cold.

The investigation did prove they killed themselves and didn't fly the aircraft according to procedure. The fact remained that immediately after the crash you picked out your favorite cause (agreeably a high percentage one) and jumped on it. Wow, a light twin crashes on T.O., what are the odds it was an engine failure handled wrong? :D

At that time it could have been many other possible factors, bad fuel, flight control failure, birdstrike ect. Jumping up and down and assigning blame without the facts was scummy, vindictive, immature, not respectful of the dead and their families who may have read your post seeking answers. It was also not very smart considering the other possible factors.They were AA and you were going to make them and every AA pilot pay no matter what. In the end, yes you were right, but even a broken clock is right twice a day.

Thanks for proving my point. I was too lazy to dig up the archives and open up another of your foul smelling posts of despicable thought.

I wondered if you were that lacking in judgement and brains to basically indict yourself, but you did a wonderful job.

My apoligies to the board for dredging this up from the archives.

Mods, please keep these posts, they are relevant to 411A's contribution to this board. I will not further comment on him on this thread. Thank you.

Now back to SKB.

Who are you to make such an assumption !

Gross neglegence implies an almost willful neglect of the rules or a deliberate attmept at a reckless activity for unkown purposes.

This was nothing but an unfortunate case of incorrect mind set and a loss of situational awareness leading to the TO form an incorrect position ( ie not the point as briefed ).

I would like to know why BA felt it necessary to demote the Cmdr - I could see some retraining and informing the rest of the company about the pitfalls, but busting him seems harsh.

The act of him telling the FO to "stand on the brakes" during engine run up is interestering. Their mind set was telling him that they were good, but a latent cue ( not a lot of runway ) was telling him something else - hence that directive ? Or was it a standard proceedure for the B777 ( I have no experience on that type apart from as SLF ).

"The act of him telling the FO to "stand on the brakes"
 

"The act of him telling the FO to "stand on the brakes" during engine run up is interestering. "

This is a really interesting post - if training could help pilots emerge their uneasiness, then some take-off incidents might be averted. After all these are NOT mechanical incidents or reactions to outside events.

These threads were a healthy aircraft mispositioned or misconfigured by the crew just barely scratches its way into the sky with the help of a higher being are a recurrent theme on PPrune. And a disturbing one.

Maybe a new action category the "takeoff go around" should be introduced - no penalty to the crew, can be called instantly, pilot in-command or pilot flying says "I feel uneasy, let's go-around", and the aircraft goes back to the loading point, all take off numbers are recomputed, cabin crew gets asked if they see anything out of the ordinary, walkaround gets done again, all preflight checks rerun, and the taxi is done again?

Edmund

An obtuse conclusion to draw. Perhaps he's just familiar with the idea that punishing people for making mistakes doesn't stop mistakes being made, it just stops people telling you about them.