time to put a "You are about to screw up and kill us " Button
 

time to put a ''you are about to screw up and kill us" button on the panel next to the flight attendant call button.

press it and a voice booms in the cockpit...you are going to screw up.

and if the pax is right he gets a prize...wrong and he pays.

Facts :- Taxiing is a Critical stage of the flight .

The most useless thing in aviation ,apart from the air in yr fuel tanks , is the runway behind you.

Sorry, gentlemen, but I agree with....
 

Sorry, gentlemen, but I have to agree with 411A. And, I am a major fan of the CRM concept and principles.

The link between the two (this issue and CRM): Standardization is the foundation of good CRM. With good CRM, accidents and incidents are reduced dramatically....almost to nothing.

And, with standardization, there must be explicit/well-defined roles and responsibilities. In practice, this is difficult to achieve with the role-reversal.

The exception is for a TRI/TRE to be giving command training. And, ostensibly, the TRI/TRE has received proper/adequate training for this environment...adequate experience....etc.

Please don not misunderstand what I am saying. I am not in any way looking down my nose at first officers. Many of them I've flown with over the years were extremely competent. And, frankly, on more than one occasion, a good F/O has keep my XXX out of trouble.

But, standardization is critical....and this means well-defined roles. A quarterback and a receiver....we just don't switch places, switch roles.....and one cannot function without the other.

My opinion.....probably worth nothing from this old, retired guy.


Fly safe,

PantLoad

(Sorry about the spelling, etc. It's late, here. What the hell am I doing up this late!)

My company's SOPs require both pilots to positively identify the runway and intersection and to confirm it's correct for the performance calculation. It seems like a bit of a 'noddy' procedure, but it would hae preventd this incident.

I know that the intersection wasn't marked, but there would have been enough clues to warn them. The fact that they were lining up next to the terminal being one - something which the riding engineer noticed.

Can't say it would have made any difference in their start of T/O position but I remember back in the day typing taxi instructions in the MCDU; especially at an airport foreign to me. Could glance at it whilst underway. Even more so when his or her nibs was at the tiller. I'm sure some of them did something similar as they knew full well my pencil too had an eraser.

Well, you can't blame the Tower Controller, how much is he / she supposed to know about B777 performance !



In any case the responsibility is and was the Captains in this case.



411a, the ultimate troll and s**t stirrer likes to postulate this would not happen if BA did not allow their FO's to taxi the Aircraft. This is nonsense, regardless of who is taxiing the Captain is always in charge and should maintain situational awareness at all times.



It seems like good practice and preparation for when a First Officer upgrades to Captain. We don't do it where I work but there is no tiller on my FO's side so that would make it a little difficult :confused:

OKFINE,

You want to be careful there, as there have been incidences of taxi details ending up inappropriately placed in the legs or other pages once airborne due to failing to delete the taxi instructions from the MCDU/CDU data entry line.

Could end up being one of the holes in the Swiss cheese!

SMOC

Your caution is noted. I took care to alleviate same prior to throttle-up. I would hope that had failure to do so resulted in questions being asked, I could respond that at least the aluminum and its contents were intact. Cheers.

Stilton...The tower controller was aware that something was not right. He asked if the aircraft wanted to backtrack(aware that he was at diiferent intersection).When the crew stated they were happy to depart from Alpha....he KNEW that they were in the wrong position. Why he didn't re-iterate that fact is a mystery (especially since there were TWO of them there and the INSTRUCTOR should be looking out for errors EXACTLY like this)

Complacency
 

The other thing no-one has mentioned here is complacency. This pair were out on a little evening jaunt from Antigua and back, after the shuttle it would be back to the bar. The weather was lovely, only a few pax, light fuel load, a bit of VFR big jet flying in the Caribbean, it makes up for the crap days. Their guard was down and it should be a lesson to us all.

PS kotakota, you forgot he other useless thing, blue sky above you.

No procedure in aviation (411A's personal SOP's excepted of course) are perfect. However, to think that any of BA's are implemented on some personal whim or preference misses the point completely.

Everything they do as a company is based on statistical risk assesment - allowing the FO to taxy/park/'run the sector' may lead to certain errors (every SOP can lead2 to errors), but it reduces the risk of (potentially much more serious?) errors committed by that FO when he becomes a Captain, as a result of his exposure to decision making at an earlier stage. Thats not my personal view - in BA it simply would not be SOP if it caused more problems than it avoided. Believe me, the lawyers would see to that.

It's been a while since I've operated there, but from what I can recall, it's not that long of a runway in the first place, why limit your options by choosing an intersection? :confused:

How many of you on the flight deck, at a holding point or lineing up, would interrupt proceedures and interact with pax via cabin crew?

If the attendant call dings whilst lining up I would certainly abort the take off. In my mind I would imagine the cabin becoming unsecured. During the actual T/O roll however I would continue.

To be told that a passenger was sure we had lined up in the wrong place, I don't know, if I had suspected the runway looked short, ATC had questioned the line up point, and now a third point that a pax had gone to the trouble to give a relatively specific point about the wrong intersection, I would HOPE I would seriously question what I was doing. But in reality? Who knows.

I would be extremely concerned at venturing anywhere near any type of flying machine with 411a on board.
The people in the front office are a team. As others have alluded to on here, similar to a football team. So what 411a is saying ostensibly is, only the striker can score a goal. The midfield, defenders even the goal keeper are unable or not allowed to score a goal for the TEAM?

He claims to be a Captain and gives the air of never having made a mistake, because after all he has four gold/silver bars on his wrist.
He also claims to be TRI/TRE, so it must follow it is impossible for him to make a mistake.

The person sitting in the LHS on KLM4805 I seem to recall was a Captain, oh and a TRI/TRE and what a total xxxx up he made. From the ATC transcripts it is more than obvious the F/O and F/E were to intimidated to exercise any form of CRM and dare question not only the Captain, who was not only in charge, but was a TRI/TRE and the "glamour" face of the airline, who in 411a analogy being both a Captain and TRI/TRE NEVER make mistakes.
I view that accident as the Captain was adequately trained/ responsible to handle the tiller enough to backtrack/taxi down the runway, but incompetent to command the aircraft thereafter.

Am I to believe this guy is telling the wider forum and the public that a F/O is adequately qualified to operate the aircraft in all manner of flight, navigation, approach, go-around, land etc but should the God like genius in the LHS become incopacitated die and the F/O gets the aircraft safely on the ground, he is totally incapable of taxiing the same aircraft off the runway?
How does he treat the other members of the team behind the cockpit door?

AFOS

Reading the report it was interesting to notice not only the good call by the positioning engineer to raise his concerns, but also the sound presence of mind, along with the CC, to sit on hands once underway. With the ASDA from B and the V1 in use any prompt to the flightdeck could have lead to an abort and overrun. That said, with the good VMC I'm sure the crew would have made a decision based on the situation ahead of them.
Long live ginger beers.

I'm a Captain who has just converted from a type with a tiller each side to a type with just one tiller.

So now, I'm always PF on the ground.

Therefore it's me who does the walk round, starts the engines, calls for checklists and taxis every single time.

I really prefer it and as the two of us are always doing exactly the same thing while we're on the ground, there is a much firmer regime in force.

I've really no problem with the BA monitored approach, which we use but I was taught that it's the Captain who watches out for the big stuff and the FO who avoids the wee stuff and I think that this SOP keeps the Captain more in the loop than the old one- although, of course a perfect Captain would be unaffected.:)

I'm 100% sure that having non varying duties on the ground is good.

As an F/O, I watch out for all stuff. If the Captain has missed something big, I'll tell him and I expect him to do the same for me.

BA's ground duties do not 'vary', you are either PF or PNF. Everyone knows what PF or PNF are meant to do and most of us are aware enough to know which one we are being during a particular sector!

Dream Land
 

One consideration may be that the 180 "turn on the runway procedure" for the 777, which they would have needed if they had backtracked, is not the most popular manoeuvre and can introduce it's own problems if not handled properly :\. Frankly if the performance figures aren't marginal I would have opted for the intersection.

In BA, the Captain is always the Captain. It's completely untrue to suggest that the FO having 'the sector' then means he/she makes all the decisions. Obviously the intention is to let them run it as much as practical. If I gave the FO the sector and they suggested an unsuitable fuel figure, for example, I would discuss it with them and tell them why I thought it should be something else. Ultimately we take the fuel I am happy with.

When taxying, regardless of who is physically steering, I am aware that if we get lost, enter an active runway without clearance, hit anything or otherwise mess up that it is me, as the Captain, that is ultimately responsible. The excuse of 'it was the FO's sector' is not one that is going to get you very far in the subsequent debrief.

Extra procedures and checks will always be introduced to try and trap this type of error, but in fact it is not possible to design a 'perfect' system which people can't manage to screw up somehow. We all make mistakes and will continue to do so. Adopting a new procedure will not stop this happening again, it will just make the mistake required for it to happen slightly different.

To play devils advocate, with the FO taxiing, the Captain is free to navigate using the airport charts, whilst keeping an eye outside and talking to ATC to negotiate slots etc. Surely maintaining the bigger picture is more important?

Strikemaster 82.

Of course, we all watch out for everything. I think we all know that.

My point is simply that as role reversal is not possible on the ground in my new type (which has paint on it's tail that you would be familier with.;)) the Capt must always be PF when on the ground.

I greatly prefer it this way to the old way when 50% of the time the FO was PF.

Role reversal has a real value but, having tried both ways this year, I really think it works better with each guy doing the same job each time.

Would anybody who has been an FO in an airline where you weren't allowed to drive whilst pootling around on the taxiways care to comment as to how they found the transition when gaining their Captaincy? Would life have been any different had you been allowed to taxi under a Captain's tuition previously?

How many of you on the flight deck, at a holding point or lineing up, would interrupt proceedures and interact with pax via cabin crew?




i would take the measures necessary to listen to any eyes behind the cockpit before take off, and I would like the crew to be responsive to passengers and relay the info that can save my life, if it happens before cycling the seatbelt for take off

two points:

I've been the captain and just as we took the runway, we got an interphone call that something was wrong...we taxied clear and dealt with it...FA heard what turned out to be a faulty door seal. Happy to take care of it on the ground.

I've been a deadheading pilot when the flying crew took the runway with the flaps/slats retracted. I made up my mind that (as I was close to the cockpit) if I heard the configuration warning horn as they throttled up, and then heard them throttle back, that would be ok...but if they rolled I would be out of my seat beating the door down (actually using my key to get in...in the days when just a mechanical key would do). throttles up...HONK...throttle back flaps down...off we go. And when we got to the destination, I read them the riot act.

I also knew that taxiing would be the toughest part of upgrading...especially as I upgraded to a plane I'd never flown as copilot and was on a different route structure than I had been flying. So you take it slow, have your taxi chart out, make sure your f/o has his chart out and you make doubly sure.

MD83FO
 

In general I strongly agree but unfortunately in this specific case the Station Engineer's rush to contact the Cabin Manager at Door 1 Left was triggered after the aircraft entered the runway and as it was lining up, so it's probable the "Takeoff chimes" (the equivalent of cycling the belts) would have already sounded.

This really all depends on your cabin crew. If properly trained and instilled with the 'silent aircraft' rules at crucial times, yes, I would probably stop up to a reasonable speed, say 80kts, on receipt of a call on the basis that they would not have called unless it was important. Better safe than sorry? Even more so if your company has a system for indicating an 'emergency' such as 3 or 4 chimes.

Hardly surprising that you prefer it...the policy makes far more sense.
Sadly, BA appears, in many ways, to apply sideways thinking with many of their policies.
Having said this, as I have personally flown with several BA secconded crew at other airlines, found them to be quite good operators.
Just as good, in fact, as secconded QF crew, some years ago.

BA.
FD crew, OK.
Management policies...suspect.:suspect:

Thanks for the information.

Cheers, D.L.

I think this scenario has been discussed before. There are two major problems: the time factor and ignorance.

TIME FACTOR:

1. Summon CC and hope they respond quickly.

2. Convince CC that you're qualified to make an observation regarding the safety of the a/c.

3. Hope that CC has enough time left to convey message to FD.

IGNORANCE:

I recall sitting just behind the wing on an FK-100 not so long after the Republic DC-9 crash in DTW and noting 0 flap as we lined up - ignorant of the fact that this was standard for the type. There was no time to say or do anything so I clenched my buttocks and figured that since we were light we'd get away with it! I remained ignorant for many years as on my subsequent flights on the type I was always ahead of the wing. When I learned of my ignorance I thought back to that day and was grateful that I hadn't rushed up front with my I/D to warn the crew (pre 911 days - so it was possible)!

AFOS
 

I believe this has happened to one Far Eastern airline when P1 was incapacitated.

After a successful autoland by the F/O, he had to stop on the runway as he had NEVER been taught/allowed to taxi the beast.

Company policy allowed the F/O to control the aircraft from after lineup until about 40 knots on the landing roll. [B747 with a tiller on each side]

An ideal place for 411A perhaps?

The flaws in 411 argument seem to be many but there are 2 points I would like to make.
Firstly having flown types with tillers on only one side and also with tillers on both sides I would far prefer to have tillers on both sides. Handing over control while trying to exit the runway expediciously at busy international airports is not the most sensible thing to do, although I do not know of any incidents caused by this it can only increase the risk, and was something I was very wary of.
Secondly I am sure if 411 had an incident in the air he would expect his FO to fly the aircraft while he managed the situation (unless he is such an aviation god that he can do everything). What is the difference with this scenario and having the FO taxi the aircraft while the Captain manages the pre departure procedures? Absolutely nothing as far as I can see.

Whilst I know we are meant to play the ball not the man, 411 does seem to display a particular dislike to BA procedures and I cannot understand why. Maybe he could enlighten us with some background information.

Yup, if I flew the B747.
Clearly the referenced airline had their policies straight.

Now, what should become of the BA 777 crew in question.
I would suggest...two months off without pay, followed by a PC (in the sim) and two line checks, then return to normal duties.

CRM?
Yup, have these two personally address the next few CRM classes that BA has, and 'explain themselves'.
IE: a learning experience, for all...without having any metal bent with the original incident.

Also, look carefully at the idea of...
1. Having the First Officer taxi the airplane (a bad idea, in my opinion),
and...
2. Make damn sure this does not happen again.
3. For all pilots...to be sure of the airfield layout, and, have the company (BA) survey the airports that they serve, to be sure that signage is up to snuff. IF signage is found defective, find out why.

And, for the UKCAA, have a very close look (review) of BA flight deck policies, to be sure that they are reasonable.
Reasonable defined as...the Captain always has control of the tiller for taxi...without question.
First Officers, when they advance to Command, will have an ample opportunity to taxi the airplane, during Command training.

HP Bleed,
Agreed.


I cannot see how a Captain can fail to monitor an FO taxiing although it obviously happened here. Before TO checklists are not long on a 777. If unable to monitor at a simple airfield I would be unhappy as a pax at a more complicated one. I do however remember flying with Captains where I was far happier monitoring them than letting them monitor me due to their variable performance.

411A,
"You might be surprised, 412SP...several F/O's request just that."
Maybe they prefer to not learn to make decisions and feel safer monitoring you!!:p

Excuse my ignorance (cockpit technology is passing me by) -

For less than $150 I can buy a talking GPS that will direct my automobile - within a few metres - to a desired destination.

Are you telling me the FD/FMS can't direct me to the correct intersection for TO?

This was posted on airliners.net by someone who is a BA 777 flight crew member and I re-post it here for several reasons. First, it explains to me why the crew would opt for an intersection takeoff rather than backtrack for a full length departure. Second, this post raises the issue about the issue of BA crews being able to freely report safety issues without fear of punishment. And that clearly did not happen here as the Captain was demoted.

Here is the post from airliners.net:

."OK, before we get too carried away here:

The aircraft actually had sufficient runway without the use of full power as long as both engines kept running. The real problem would have been a loss of thrust before V1 which may have led to runway excursion whilst trying to

Neither pilot had been to St.Kitts before. The runway and taxiway signage was vitually non-existent at the time.

At many of the Caribbean Airports that we operate to, a full length departure means a backtrack (or Back-taxi if your American). Whils't that is not a big deal for a shorthaul/narrowbody aircraft, it is a big deal for a 777 which cannot turn 180deg in a standard rwy width (45m). There are turning circles at the end of most rwys, but a 180deg turn in a 777 is a convoluted affair (BA/Boeing SOPs) with a 15deg offset required, a full stop, hard tiller over and then turn into turning circle using outboard thrust. Apart from being slow and inconvenient, it tends to wear the rear tyres quite badly, especially if the rear wheel steering is U/S.

As a result, the crew elected to take the longest intersection departure (I would have made the same decision). Unfortunately, they misidentified the correct position and started the T/O roll from the shorter intersection.

We carry a station engineer from Antigua on this trip. As all of our 777s are ETOPS a/c, we are obliged to do an ETOPS transit check on all departures. A ground engineer is carried on all Caribbean shuttle flights to do this, leaving the flight crew to concentrate on their duties. In this case, as he had been there several times before, the engineer realised the error and tried to gain access to the flight deck (I think I would have done the same). Unfortunately, the Cabin Manager failed to understand the nature of the problem and concentrated on keeping the flight deck area sterile to avoid distractions!

Because the flight crew were expecting an intersection departure, they were expecting runway behind them, but failed to realise the lack of runway in front of them! ATC also failed to notify them, even though they were aware of the intersection point!

It was only after they were airborne that the crew realised their mistake. They were, of course, mortified! They fully confessed their transgression to BA management. A full investigation (with AAIB) was instigated. Despite the BA safety philosophy being a 'no blame' culture, the Captain was demoted and faces a long time before he can look at command again and both he and the F/O faced re-training in the simulator. This is highly controversial amongst the pilot force of BA, for many reasons.

I know both pilots and they are both competent and nice guys. I went to St.Kitts myself subsequently and personally found it difficult to comprehend how this had happened, but it did. All of us are very aware that this was an embarrassing and potentially fatal incident. We were lucky that we didn't have an accident, but we have to put it behind us, learn from the mistakes and put procedures in place to help prevent a repitition.

As part of the review following this incident, BA has decided to fit a runway alerting system to it's aircraft and our latest 777, a 300ER has just gone into service with this RAAS (Runway Alerting & Awareness System) fitted.

So, I hope that this answers many questions about the incident and that you might see it more from our perspective. For those who wonder about BA's operating standards, I can say personally that I think this was embarrassing and that we were lucky, but I think that all airlines have occasions where things go wrong, many of them we don't hear about! In our case, I think that BA and it's pilots have responded by learning from it and I beleive that our safety standards have improved even further as a result.

Incidentally, BA do not put undue pressure on us to achieve quick turnarounds. We obviously take pride in an on schedule operation, but I don't believe it was a factor in this incident."

Isn't the answer to this as simple as having signs on all runways every ? 100 m ? showing the distance to the end of the runway. I am sure that I saw this at IAD.

The crew would then compare the distance from their position to the end of the runway with what they expected.

Is this a naive "too simple" solution?

Just SLF please don't flame me.........

From 1.10.2 of the report:

Though most are not directly involved I actually know one of the C/C who was on this flight. I am also aware that the engineer involved is fairly well known to most of the C/C that make these flights.

I operated the BEA/BA “monitored approach” system with more-or-less total handover of PF/PNF duties for 30+ years and well remembered the howls of protest from the BOAC contingent when the system – in slightly modified form – was adopted for the introduction of the 747-400. Happily they were professional enough, despite many saying they hated it, to adopt it and it is, I assume still in use today, 22 years later.

For the past (nearly) 10 years I have flown with a company on the same equipment who use the basic Boeing “one man and his dog” system, whereby, in theory there is no change over of duties apart from whose hand is on the control column and where the F/O theoretically has little say in the operational decisions on the day.

Somebody asked a few posts ago what it is like for F/Os from the latter background what it is like when it comes to command upgrade. Difficult, appears to be the answer from those I have asked. In BA command upgrade failures were rare as compared with my present operator where although not common they are a significantly higher percentage than at BA particularly as in BA they often comprised of a seat/type change as opposed to the current outfit who only have one type. Also the duration of the course is about three times as long.

I well remember debriefing a converting F/O on the 744 after we zig-zagged off down the taxiway on his first sector on the aircraft why it had happened. “Well”, he said, “I have been on the 737-200 since I joined BA without a rhs tiller and the last aircraft I taxied was a PA-28 through the rudder pedals”.

This shows clearly the folly of an inflexible system which does not allow at least some hand over of responsibilities during line operation. I am not referring to the monitored approach which is a whole different argument and which has been done to death before and caused much disagreement between the two camps, mostly from those who have not had the benefit of actually trying both systems and who spout forth with the benefit of their inexperience. I am referring to allowing the co-pilot to make the fuel decision, calculate the take-off performance (rather than just checking it), do the walkaround and the myriad other tasks that the Boeing sop says is done by the Captain. On my side I try to use a certain amount of discretion in normal operation and I like to load the FMS merely to stay current with the whole operation (at my age I don’t want to be transferred to the 70+ thread and become an incompetent “gummer”!)

I understand that Boeing have just one sop for all types and realize that they do this as they sell aircraft to many airlines where it fits perfectly, I believe in the USA you don’t even have to hold a P1 rating to sit in the rhs in many cases. However in a well trained first world company it does not sit well to have a person in the lhs who makes all the decisions to the detriment of his colleague. In fact it goes against many of the principles of CRM to do so and there are few in my present company who do not include the F/O in their deliberations.

That font of all knowledge 411A condescendingly states that he has flown with BA/QF crews who were “quite good operators”. Well, in my opinion a “quite good Captain” should be competent and confident enough to supervise the co-pilot taxying. In fact even the TriStar was flown by BEA/BA for many years using the hand-over technique.

Having said all this in each company it is their train set and we all have to play with it as the ops manual states.