Yup, and few companies adhere to the 'BA way'.
For a very good reason...it is nonsense.:E

411A
 

Have you tried it over a reasonable period of time?

If as I suspect you have not then you too are guilty of giving us the benefit of your inexperience.

Pilots are great at resisting change but before it is too late you too could open your mind to new ideas rather than relying on the mantra than "it has always been done that way so it must be right".

Yes I suppose being a big fish in a very small pond, a la 411a might lead one to believe they have become the crucible of all things aviation.



:D

It would make a great GOUGE Question.
 

HOW WOULD YOU IDENTIFY ALPHA?

I just looked at a taxi diagram, Bravo has the tower and fire station across the way.

flightwatch

An excellent factual post and from many years experience too. Your comment about pilot's naturally resisting change is so true. I was once on a QF 747-400 and visited the flight deck being curious as I was on the same aircraft with BA at the time.

BA jumbos have a shared bunk with a door and two bunks one above the other. QF have (or had) a single first class seat at the back of the FD behind a curtain and a second first class seat behind a curtain at the back of the upper deck where BA have a large wardrobe for passenger coats, etc.

On noise issues alone I thought the setup was inferior to ours. I mentioned this interesting arrangement and the SFO on the FD replied in that wonderful Australian style that 'the company want to give us a double bunk area behind a door but we're fighting it'!

Similarly, so much of the criticism of BA SOPs is from those not having ever experienced them. I have experienced both. I prefer BA SOPs. With reference to command conversions I gained my command on the B757 after 10 years on the B747 so a type AND command conversion. I completed that conversion in 24 sectors including a two sector final check.

In my 12 years as an FO in BA there were two basic types of captain - those who made all the decisions and paid scant regard to the guy in the RHS (who may well have had a command elsewhere and would not necessarily be wet behind the ears) and those who had sufficient confidence in themselves to actually allow FOs to make decisions and allow them to learn and develop. It is never in question who has the final say nor that the captain will override anything he/she is not happy with.

In the incident which is the subject of this thread it is plain there were a number of contributing factors. Anybody in commercial aviation will know of many, many seemingly inexplicable events which could so easily have been tragedies were it not for an element of luck.

Having flown close to 900 hrs for several years on the B777 it may well be that fatigue played a part but that cannot be proven. Complacency may also feature and that is something which all of us fight very hard to avoid. Hands up anybody who has never frightened themselves having lapsed from one's usual high standards, breathed a sigh of relief and learnt from the experience.

Given that BA has an open and 'no blame' safety reporting culture with the exception of actions deemed negligent. It is indicative of how seriously the company view the incident given the captain lost his command, something which rarely happens. In most cases retraining and supervision is the norm.

Those posters claiming BA should insist on minimum signage, etc at airports they operate to have clearly never ventured far from the civilised world.

Thank you M. Mouse.

Interesting, isn’t it, how our self appointed expert never replies when challenged?

I too prefer BA SOPs however for the next few months until anno domini catches up with me I can only use my discretion to allow the co-pilot to make as many decisions and carry out my duties to the permitted limit which sadly doesn’t extend to letting him taxy the aircraft. I fail to see in the incident above how whoever was taxying was relevant; the fact is that both pilots mis-identified the intersection.

I seem to remember that a seat change in BA was accomplished in around 12 sectors, with my present mob it is many more.

Dont worry about 411a, he is suffering from the desert heat and probably still pulling cactus spines out of his ar.. , which has fuddled his brain!

I have to know....does 411A own a goldfish?

So in this case the F/O was taxying the a/c leaving the captain to moniter the taxi route. In other words the captain had more capacity to spot the mistake. This incident has absolutely nothing to do with who was controlling the a/c. Be honest, you just don't like the idea of some young upstart touching "your" thrust levers!

BA and many others have been following these procedures for a long time. They are safe and they work. If it bruises your ego then on behalf of BA and many other airlines, I can only apologise :hmm:

The pilot not taxiing often has more to do than simply monitor the taxi route & check the charts. In our outfit he/she does the take-off review & the before take-off checklist.

The take-off review involves a run around the cockpit calling a number of settings & and visually checking them. If you don't want to break the flow & miss something, you will have your head inside the cockpit for a while while you are doing this, followed by selecting the before take-off checklist. I'm not saying that it is right, it is just what my outfit expects us to do.

The taxi in this case was quite short & it is possible that the captain had his head inside at the critical moment that the aircraft was turned onto 'B'. Not the best time to be 'heads down', but you could be forgiven for thinking that it was a simple taxi route & not prone to error. Particularly if you hadn't been there before.

So it is not necessarily the case that the captain had more capacity to spot the error. He may in fact have had less!

I bet the engineer will take the jump seat for the rest of his career!

Indeed so, Oakape, however I doubt our self-appointed BA experts would want to admit this, as it would damage their 'we know best' image.:rolleyes:
And, then we come to intersection takeoffs....this one in particular.
Was it such a waste of time to taxi to the end of the runway?
And, one can't use the excuse of a narrow runway either, as there are turning pads available.
The safer alternative is clearly to begin the takeoff from the end of the runway, yet our happless BA pilots chose otherwise.
Only three words needed to describe these two...careless and reckless.

Is M.Mouse correct? Do BA still have a 'no blame culture'? Are they really that backward? Forward thinking organisations through that concept out at least a decade ago.

A Safety Case for each destination would have prevented what could have been a major disaster as it would have highlighted the airport's shortcomings. The lack of teeth of CAA's ASSI organisation is also rather concerning.

Not really, in this day and age, and on modern jets. A take off from the full length would have used a higher derate, and consequently the aircraft would need more runway, than from an intersection where a higher power setting would be used, and consequently less runway needed. A point often overlooked by the "runway behind you" brigade.

Regardless of your views on whether the captain should taxy the aircraft or not, I am at a loss to see what difference it would have made in this incident. I mean, he was on the flight deck, right? So he didn't do the take off brief, but presumably he listened to it?

Apart from 411a, who clearly came forth from his mother's womb, wearing 4 stripes, and a set of pilot's wings, we all have to start somewhere. IMHO, but only having known BA SOPs, the more you can get the FO to act as captain the better. We are all qualified P1 on the aircraft, and it will make the transition to captaincy that bit more straightforward when the time comes. In addition, many folk are vastly experienced in the RHS, either from a military background, or having held commands in other airlines.

Care to expand on that rather interesting statement?

411A thank you so much for the laugh of the week when you refer to BA pilots as 'self-appointed BA experts '.

Kettle to pot, are you receiving over.

Not necessarily used a 'higher' derate, Slickster...the pilots can select any derate they so desire, within limitations, or....none at all.
Unless of course, perhaps for BA, who would not necessarily have common sense.
So, I gather that with your statement, re intersection takeoffs, you were quite OK and in agreement with the concerned pilots actions?
The shorter the runway the better, perhaps?:rolleyes:

BA are already directly responsible for one 777 accident, one wonders if they are aiming for some kind of record, with their (collectively) strange ideas?

411A
 

You can choose not to derate, but in the long-term you are setting yourself and your mates up for a higher incidence of engine failures. You really ought not to cane the poor engines just for the sake of an anachronistic view of your 'rights' as captain.

By the way, I get the impression 411A once failed the BA selection procedure (or am I being unkind?) :O

AD

To BarbiesBoyfriend and 411A:

Regarding the whole issue of F/O's shouldn't be allowed to taxi, and there only having a tiller on Captains side, what is the procedure if the Captain became incapacitated during flight?

With only one tiller, I presume the F/O would fly the aircraft from right hand seat, land, stop it on runway, apply brakes and await tug? And with that (as I only fly small turbo prop aircraft, we have no tillers), is the tiller not required to control the steering as the aircraft slows down on the runway?

Looking forward to some clarification...

Utter rubbish.

You are forgetting many variables, such as aircraft weight etc.

Our company has worked out a standard derate (in this case it is the maximum 61 degrees) for use at domestic weights at domestic airports. So on one runway for the same derate we can use full length and a variety of intersections.

(ah the power of a 767!)


As for this quote....hmmm...sometimes its more the "runway ahead" of you when you do a high speed RTO.........

411A has an obsession with the British, and all things BA. He hates both. At every opportunity he posts here, and I assume, anywhere else he can, and posts the same obsessive diatribe over and over again.

By virtue of the internet he attains a large audience, and that seems to sustain him and his ego.

His main mode of operation is to say the same thing over and over again in the vain hope that what he says will become the truth. His views belong in a bygone age. The world and aviation have long since moved on from his archaic views and beliefs. Thank God.

At the end of the day he is an old man, with old ideas, flying an old aeroplane, in a tiny operation in a tiny backwater.

M. Mouse: Extensive research in the oil industry has shown that a just culture trumps a no-blame culture as reckless and irressponsible behaviour deserves blame and retrubution (errors don't).
411: 'BA responsbile for one 777 accident' - applying a blame culture there?

Not at all. But the intersection they planned to take off from, was perfectly OK - they had the performance for it. Unfortunately, they took off from the wrong intersection. I'm not saying the shorter the runway the better, but I operate in a commercial environment, and if it saves me 10 minutes, fuel, and means I make my slot I'll use an intersection, if I have the figures for it. Presumably, you've never used an intersection departure, and no doubt, by the same token, fill your crate to the brim with gas everywhere you go regardless of how much fuel is required?

Well, on the 2 Boeings I've flown, we use CARD, via the ACARS to get our performance. You input all the variables, and it spits out your take off performance. All things being equal, you will get a better derate when using the longer runway, therefore, lower power setting, longer take off roll. You obviously get a better derate, the lighter you are, but I fail to see the relevance of this, as the aircraft is the same weight wherever you take off from. Either it can be done, or not.

I take your point, but again, for an intersection departure, you may often have a different (lower) V1, thus meaning you have just as much runway to stop in as you would have full length, with a higher V1, and the slower take of roll.

So I beg to differ - I am not talking utter rubbish.

Shell Management: M.Mouse wrote:

My bold. Isn't that the same as a just culture? I think you may be getting into semantics.

Yup, that is precisely correct, and what is expected, by many (most) airlines.

Nope, not unkind, not British (thanks for small favors), therefore never applied.

...is slightly more important.

What surprises me the most is those at BA here (both retired and 'current'), whom are trying (with very limited success) to justify the actions of these two bozos, under discussion.
It is quite clear from the AAIB report, that the UKCAA thinks otherwise.

I was quite willing to present this as a learning experience, thereby saving these guys their positions.
However, having read a few 'odd' comments from former and retired BA pilots, I have changed my mind.

Rather than change this into a 'learning experience' for BA, these bozos deserve to be sacked (or severely demoted), forthwith.

Wonder if they were?

BA, perhaps trying to tie AirFrance in the hull loss ratings?
It can't be long before this happens, with BA 'obtuse' flight ops procedures:rolleyes:

This very serious incident has exposed BA for what they truly are...an airline whose aircraft are crewed by pilots whom have few (perhaps outdated) ideas of what they are correctly doing.
Oh, how the mighty have fallen.:eek:
How very sad.

Question:

Did anyone die? No

Did we all learn from the mistake? Yes

Are they "bozos"? There but for the grace of your non existent God........

By 411A Did sim training for several ex BA pilots, most are OK but rather long winded self absorbed individuals. Yada, yada,yada .......

fdr....Bollocks! KAL did sack the national captain but the foreign squealer was done in by his own arrogance. When it was time for his contract renewal, flight administration did contact him asking about his interest in continuing. However his arrogance knew no bounds; to quote, " there're much better opportunities out there; we'll see about it ". Well flight administration thought it was better to be done with him!

His identity was divulged by a fellow expat, the hamburger!

Coming back to the incident, he made no attempt to reach the crew ( when he was augment captain sitting in the forward cabin within reach of the cockpit or interphone ). He let the incident happened so that he can be " one up ". My fellow pilots know him as a self aggrandizing individual with a lot of heroic schemes and anecdotes which we have to bear with on long flights with him.

Oh yes, par for the course.:rolleyes:
It never changes, I suspect.
Endemic for the breed.:yuk:

411A, note the following...
 

Coincidence or maybe not, but I've twice been lined up by assertive FO's at the wrong intersection and I've not picked it up due to the confident nature in which they have assured me that the performance calculations have permitted it. The first time it happened I was distracted during taxi by a cabin issue, and as we lined up (FO's tiller) I queried as to whether my colleague had rechecked the perf data for the intersection we were using, as it wasn't the one we'd briefed for and he assured me he had. Once airborne, owing to the fact that the piano keys had come up a lot sooner than I'd expected, I got the book out and found that we didn't have any figures for that intersection, even though other companies were using it...(confirmation bias??)., and the second time, the FO was polite enough to admit to me and to the TWR, he'd got the wrong intersection and we backtracked to the one we'd briefed for. (BA franchise operation/geriatric early jets)

Now, both these lads were ex Air Force, and both went on to BA (back in the 90s) and I'm wondering if the psychometric profiles that each of these employers used then had sufficient bias on airmanship to truly support a leg and leg about P1 / P1(S) operation, as even though whilst I was the Captain in each case, I attributed too much credibility to their advocacy and their decision making due to the confident nature of the pre take off brief and the "captaincy" being demonstrated. In effect I was a left hand seat co pilot. They didn't seem to understand the role of the captain as the final arbiter of the decision making process and to my shame I didn't challenge them in the interests of good CRM as I didn't want to come across as "old school".

Having therefore been there, done that, got the T shirt, I commiserate with the crew and blame the management.

Yup, I would agree.

ANY airline management that would allow a co-pilot to presume that they are in charge of anything, is daft in the extreme.
BA is a perfect example of the odd man out, IE: daft ideas in progress.

British Airways...complete and utter malfeasance, of the highest order, with the crew under discussion.

I am sorry. I would reply but being of limited intellect I haven't a clue what you are on about.

As usual, the best contribution to this thread has come from PJ2, thank you sir for your eminently sensible and logical contributions on this and many other threads over the years.

Risk assessment is mandatory in most organisations that operate a Safety Management System nowadays whenever a new or changed procedure is introduced. Runway incursions are a fact of life, especially at busy airports so any procedure that helps to mitigate the risk should be identified. This can range from what my mob does - a simple reiteration of the taxy routing and a turn by turn commentary from the PF (who always taxies the a/c 411) on where he is going before he makes the turn, to relatively cheap RAAS from Honeywell et al which is available at very little cost.

This loss of SA by the BA crew could be due to any number of reasons - all of them human and all of them traps lying in wait for the rest of us - no matter that 411 appears to be immune to these! Identifying threats and preventing them turning into mistakes is at the very heart of Threat and Error Management. We are all humans and WILL make mistakes, nothing is surer. Being aware of the potential threats and enunciating them as a team - such as the FSF ALAR Risk Assessment Checklist for approach and landing is just one way of doing this. There are many others, all of them useful. What should not be acceptable in the modern world is the concept of nobody being prepared to speak up whenever he's not happy with something. Unfortunately is continues to happen due to experience and cultural reasons, especially in those parts of the world where authority is almost sacrosanct. Perhaps a factor in the A321 accident at Islamabad?

Our Ops Manual allows us to accept intersection departures but I will never intentionally leave runway behind me and I teach my student F/Os and Captains my reasons for this. While the RTOW figures may state that we have the performance for an intersection takeoff, how would you feel if, having performed one of these, something went wrong in the RTO case and you ended up with just the nosewheel in the grass? You're now facing a serious incident enquiry instead of a simple RTO had you used the full length! It may be a cliche but runway behind you is still of those three most useless things in aviation and that hasn't changed since the Wright Brothers.

The division of responsibilities on the flight deck will always be a source of argument among pilots. BA operates a particular type of monitored system that works perfectly well for them. In another existence, I used these procedures and they work very well and are particularly useful during an approach to minimums. There are many other SOPs that work equally well for their operators and I wouldn't have the arrogance to presume that my particular set is better than anyone else's. What is important is that the crew sticks exactly to whatever procedures they have in their company as they give a certain level of certainty to each pilot that he knows what to expect from the other. In this sense, there are probably no bad SOPs - just that some may be better thought out than others.

For 411: you are perfectly entitled to your view on the role of the F/O. However, I firmly believe that giving the F/O as musch authority as possible from the very beginning is the best way to go in the long run. Our 250hr F/Os start the engines, handle all comms with the ground engineer and taxy, takeoff and fly the aircraft from A to B perfectly safely. They do not have the arrogance to believe that they are in charge of the a/c but we give them the licence to make as many of the decisions as possible and if I'm not happy with a course of action I will (gently) query why he/she thinks he/she would do it his/her way and try to educate them on what I believe they may have missed. For 411's benefit, in the past 15 years my F/O has picked up my mistakes more often that I have picked up his! It is a two-man operation with the Captain as leader of the team but with input required and expected from the F/O - even if it happens to be wrong. It is how the Capt handles this kind of situation that will ultimately determine the lesson that the F/O learns from it. mY sincere thanks to all those Captains who over the years gently educated me to get to where I am today.

I would agree with your comments, and would also agree that the 'captaincy' being demonstrated by these referenced First Officers was poor, in the extreme....IE: they sound very confident, yet often demonstrate poor attitude and proper decision atributes (beak well above ground effect, syndrome).

Nothing wrong with 'old school' in my considered opinion, with appropriate modifications to satisfy the PC set, today.

I would agree.

411a, your immaturity is truly quite scary.

If I didn't think you were a 17 year old wind-up merchant sitting there in your undies flicking endlessly between pprune and PPorn hoping to god your mum don't walk in I might actually take offence at your drivel.

One things for sure with the regularity of your posts you seem to have very little else to do with your day.

I'm surprised that 411a allows mere co-pilots to actually fly the aircraft at all, if taxying is beyond them and dangerous. It beggars belief that such attitudes still exist in management and trainers. We can argue all day as to the role reversal and BA, but to suggest that a commercial pilot is incapable of safely taxying an aircraft is just plain stupid.

In the Olde Days of Yore, when BEA were introducing their monitored approach technique, to the amazement of all the rest of the Worlds' Airline Pilots, a Pan Am ( Ahhhh ! ) Captain approached us in the Idlewild Customs Hall under the impression that BOAC and BEA were one and the same ( 15 years later they were ) and told us that Pan Am had always used a monitored approach !

Oh! Really ? Yes, he said - I fly, he monitors.

I had left BA before the procedure had spread to the 747 fleet, so cannot comment, but I had no problem with the concept that one pilot handled the hardware start to finish, and the other carried out the co-pilot duties, didn't matter which seat was handling the hardware, but as Captain I made the decisions for actions that weren't obvious, or routine. Seemed to work, but then we had a Flight Engineer to do all the real work !

I agree with you Juan, as per my last post on the matter.
411a says in one breath a F/O is capable, inteligent, qualified to fly the aircraft, even if said genius as 411a become incapcitated or God forbid, die and get the aircraft not only from A to B but actually get the aircraft on the ground, where in his second breath the F/O suddenly becomes so incompetent, unqualified, uninteligent and incapable of moving same aircraft from one slab of concrete to another.
The F/O is clearly capable to handle throttles to make the aircraft go forward/faster, but is incapable to handle the tiller to control the aircraft on the ground
The bloke is a joke beyond anything resembling credible.
AFOS

Given this weeks "management" quotes, starting to wonder if 411A is acutally MOL...

Ryanair boss says air stewardesses should be allowed to land planes in an emergency - Telegraph

"... long winded self absorbed individuals..." (Post # 146 ).
Sums up 411A very well

A quite reasonable alternative, on many occasions.:E