Let´s give a thought to the poor Station Engineer who probably sat down in Row 4 and considered that maybe just maybe, things would end in absolute disaster and he could do nothing but sit there.

I shudder to think!

Like that post Centaurus
I am all for the modern CRM as I fly early generation jets under trying conditions at times and we need to work together, but never forget who signs all the paperwork, and who receives the phone calls from the boss!

Regarding this incident
I am always surprised that these sort of things happen as frequently as they do in large major airlines with so much available to them in the way of training resources etc.

Yet us flicking around in an early generation jet are perceived by many in the recognised major airlines to be unsafe operators.
We have to check and double check all the time due to the "sophistication" of our old bus!
yambat

Well the airline accountants will be overjoyed to hear that. Think of all the money they will save on those pesky little CRM courses.

Have you checked the accident statistics since CRM was introduced.

Centaurus;

You have a badly twisted view of CRM.

CRM doesn't "empower" anyone.

CRM does not challenge the authority and command responsibility of the captain. CRM is not a "manners" course for captains nor a licence to take over for F/O's. CRM does not disrespect the law which assigns responsibility for the flight solely to the captain. CRM is the requirement to speak up if one sees something unfolding that raises the risk to the flight, period.

CRM does not require that the F/O take over in immanent danger.

Such an action belongs elsewhere in training and responsibility, differing, obviously, with cultural differences. (One wonders, for example, what would have happened to the F/O on the Airblue A321 if he had taken over from the captain and successfuly cleared the hills...fired?, reprimanded? Anyone?)

The requirement to speak up and not remain silent while risk heightens is formalized so that a risk is identified, assessed, a response formulated and then actioned.

Such a process (a mini-intervention) can take hours or seconds..."Captain, should we be at this altitude?"..."Captain, the flight plan shows us burning into our alternate fuel"... , etc.

Those statements don't challenge authority, they bring information to the surface so the crew is aware of risk and can deal with it, even if it is only to dismiss the threat as it is being handled correctly.

The final decision is always the captain's. The FD is not a democracy.

In CRM, no F/O "takes over" the airplane and runs it unless the captain allows it, but that's not CRM; - like viewing statements about risk to the flight as "challenges to one's authority", permitting anyone to take over the FD is a far more serious operational and personal problem and well beyond CRM issues.

Because the "discourse" is about one's "authority" and not the "operational safety" of the flight, those that resist the notion of CRM and dismiss it as so much new-age psychobabble, are generally those who need it the most.

PJ2

Role/Roll reversal.

The F4 used to (still does - any still flying?) have a rudder shaker to remind you to roll the aircraft with rudder to prevent roll reversal at low speed. Perhaps airliners should have a rudder shaker to warn you are not taking off at the right intersection!



But seriously, a wrong intersection / runway incursion warning system should be a priority for the next life saving aviation gadget. It's not rocket science - the infrastructure is alreadt there. It's just software.

PJ2 - brilliant post! That's exactly how it is meant to be!

So the tower controller REALISED but failed to pass it on that the aircraft was at the incorrect point.....:confused:

Well said, Sir.

It would be well for First Officers to actually realise just whom is in charge of the airplane...and for those slightly challanged, a hint....it ain't them.

Sorry for perpetuating the thread creep but I believe the real problem is perceived authority by the first officers.

It is kind of sad that yet another thread has degenerated into a weenie waving contest into the percieved dimunition of an airline captains authority.

There is a lesson here. The FO had over 6000 hrs and the Captain over 12,000 hrs, in other words senior guys with lots of experience flying long haul on the airlines biggest equipment. The FO was probably senior enough to hold a narrow body short haul Command if he wanted it. Frankly I think it is rather silly to imply htat this individual was not up to the task of taxing the aircraft, lining up and then doing the takeoff, it is not rocket science. The reason why many airlines do not allow this is because they are too cheap to pay for a tiller on the right side. This was not a case of a 250 hr new hire screwing up.

IN any case it IMO has no bearing on the central question, they had only two taxways to choose from yet chose the wrong one........why.

Yes there was a bunch of related factors (poor markings/signage, a missed opportunity by ATC to alert the crew) but ultimately the crew (that means both Captain and FO !) had completely lost airport situational awareness.

Personally I think the take away is the ease one can fall into complacency on the "easy" tasks. I look back at the screwups in my career and and many are similar to this incident...falling into the trap that "this is straight forward so I got it and I can start thinking about the next step".

BTW my company SOP is that the "ready" call includes the taxiway where the aircraft is holding short, something that we did not use to do untill the new Director of Flight ops insisted this procedure be adopted.

He was very wise...we have the same in our company.
Also, we have another....intersection takeoff are not allowed, except in the case of part of the runway being closed.
Perhaps BA should adopt a similar policy?

411,

Loved the "copilot is a copilot period" comment. You must be a treat to fly with.

Some day, a lowly copilot may save your bacon, heaven forbid you make a mistake.

From what I've read 411A is far too good to make mistakes :)

You might be surprised, 412SP...several F/O's request just that.
;)

411A, you old dinosaur, I always find your posts, shall we say, interesting, reminiscent of Captain O P Jones of Imperial Airways:
"Pass me the silver tongs, Mr Hoskins, I wish to retract the flap."
Margaret Thatcher was correct in stating:
"Consensus is a lack of leadership."
However, when I attained my first command, my boss told me that a large part of my job was to help train my co-pilot to become a captain, and that was 40 years ago, long before anyone could spell CRM!

411A, my dear sir, whilst I realise that a lot of your comments are tongue in cheek, why not come clean and tell us how you educate your F/Os to become competent future captains?

I would suggest that is fine in an ideal world, but it is not a really practical proposition. The important thing is to have in place the procedures and checks to try to ensure that the holes in the cheese don't line up. Clearly in this case all the holes bar one (the aircraft was light) lined up. That is clearly regretable and the procedures will have been modified as a result.

You can bet your shirt that those pilots will never make that mistake again!

To suggest that you should use full length of 31L at JFK, as an example, rather than KK intersection, is frankly ludicrous, but undoubtedly that is what 411A would do.

Taxing an aircraft is easy. Knowing where to go is the difficult part. What must be understood is that taxing an aircraft is a two man job, it makes no difference who is taxing the aircraft at all. Your primary role as PNF/PM on the ground is to monitor the track of the aircraft, as it is in the air. As PM you should be telling the PF when to turn and what holding points should we expecting to see. With PF looking at his chart as well this is a good error check. Having your head down doing control checks or before take off checks while letting the PF blindly taxi on his own, before establishing that both of you are happy with the intended route, would seem to me to be poor airmanship.

Hmmm, I do fly a Cessna Citation with RAAS. Apart from other things, if I`d try to takeoff from a runway less (rather TODA) than 4000 ft it yells at me ("short runway"). 777 hasn´t got that thingy?
Next, we have the Jepp plate on the MFD with a little airplane on it showing our position. 777 hasn´t got that?

I disagree with your wording above, although the principles are correct in part!

As PM and/or PF, you should be 'asking' open questions as to what you expect to see/where you think you are, rather than 'telling' someone what to do. It is the 'telling' that results in confirmation bias which is what you want to avoid. What you want is independent confirmation of a shared mental model, imho.

How about a TomTom with an airfield database?
"At the next junction, keep right" ....... "Recalculating" ...... "At the next junction, turn around"
Add in the John Cleese voice with witticisms and you're in for a fun time.:ok:

"Well, Nigel, this is going to be an interesting take-off, don't you think?"
Nothing threatening there!

Airclues - thank you, a misread on my part.
A simple "yes" I would have understood - but I read this reply as only describing the "underway" state in which I had absolutely no interest. The addition of "then" or "but" would have made it crystal.

His dudeness,

In response to your two questions, the answer is no to both of them.

Quote below from the Wikipedia page on the Tenerife disaster.

Captain van Zanten interrupted the co-pilot's readback with the comment "We're going". As noted in the NOVA documentary, Meurs chose not to embarrass his superior a second time by stating that they still did not have the proper clearance to take off.

411A, are you honestly saying that you'd prefer this situation to manifest itself again? I make no apology for banging on about CRM as quite simply, it saves lives. It's not about 'co-pilots' getting above themselves, it's about doing what is right and putting our egos in check when we make mistakes (and don't bull**** me for a second that you've never dropped a clanger!). Fortunately I fly with a bunch of great people who do just that and correct my daily mistakes in a cheerful manner. Demonstrating to me exactly the type of captain I want to be when I grow up :rolleyes:

'It would be well for First Officers to actually realise just whom is in charge of the airplane...and for those slightly challanged, a hint....it ain't them.'

It certainly isn't and I've every respect for the position. But nor does your signing of the tech log confer on you any right to ignore inquiries and assistance from the competent professionals with whom you work. You have no right to potentially cause an accident just to sate your seemingly fragile ego.

It's all very simple.
When they have achieved their Command rating but not eligable for Command just yet, and it's their turn to fly (PF) I put 'em in the LHS, and have them make all the decisions.
And yes, I'm a TRI/TRE....and am allowed to complete the above.
In this way they get the picture, early on, make no mistake.
OK with you, sir?:E

Ground operations are a high risk environment.
 

The most challenging aspect of my job is getting to the airport and then running the gantlet necessary to position myself in left front seat. The next most difficult part is getting the jet off the gate and to the assigned & appropriate runway. Then there is the task of getting the jet off the runway and to the gate. If I am going to get into trouble it is probably going to happen when conducting those ground operations. Does that parallel anybody else’s experience? For me, under most circumstances, ground operations are the most hazard packed and threatening phase of my job.


I was surprised when I read some of the preceding comments that seem to relegate taxiing the jet as a non-event.


At our airline the Captain’s job is the same whether or not they are the pilot flying or not; FOs don’t taxi or park the jet.

We are flying in a virtual world
 

Since JAR OPS was introduced an ATPL became a Micy Mouse kind of exercise.
Pilots no longer have a feeling with the aircrafts performance.

Basically one needs to nominate a take off alternate for every departure. This includes to have a look at the runway lenght of the departure airway in case of a return.

In this case it would have forced the crew to have a close look at the performance and the runway lenght.

But we are living in a world were numbers spitted out by a computer are no longer cross-checked with common sence and basic knowledge of performance.

If I am right BA had to teach their crews how to interpreted a weather radar display after a B 777 flew into a TS at high level, BA had to teach their crews how to use the fuel system on a B 747 after the LAX-LHR incident ..... what's next?

By the way .... can any BA genius explain to me how you recognise a slower than normal acceleration on take off ???

Yup, so very true.

Back to basics...and individual responsibility.

Sorry, if accidens/incidents are to be minimised, nothing else will do.

411A,

being an FO, I must admit that whilst I accept that the Captain is ultimately responsible I still feel it is my duty to speak up whenever I feel something is not right. It has nothing to do with me thinking the Captain is a bad pilot, I make mistakes as does everyone. What is important is how you deal with the mistakes.
Your arrogance is incredible. For you, a person on a rumour network, to try and advise BA on changing it's policy is not only arrogant but in my opinion stupid. It's safety record is outstanding as are it's crews.

As an irrelivant FO I am eternally gratefull I will never have to fly with you and one day when I hopefully gain my command I will never treat my FO's with such disrespect.

So, with your given system of the FO never taxiing the aircraft, what then happens when they gain their command? They have to taxi an aircraft in often unfamiliar airports and what's more - the person next to them is LESS experienced. Well done!

Then, at that time, these First Officers receive Command Training.
Simples.:rolleyes:

Well, if one actually reads the AAIB report (suggest you do so:rolleyes:) it would appear that the concerned BA crew was not exactly paying attention to details.:eek:

OMG, what an absolute surprise.:}

An interesting thread with a bit of thread drift but nevertheless looking at the issues from percieved different corners.

I wonder had this been Ryanair would we be already on page 25 with claims of poor skills, charging for toilets, crew paying to fly etc ad nauseum, thankfully we have not degenerated into that.

Humans make mistakes, some big, some small and in 99.99% of cases thankfully involving air crew nobody notices and hopefully somebody learns a little bit. Computers are great until you unplug them.

On a crew with this level of experience its a "oh ****" moment that puts all future career prospects on hold while everybody digs the life out of it.

Ultimately there is a responsibility by the airport operator to get it right as the tiny slip up almost has a catastrophic ending.

As a poster has said its the easy ones that you get caught with.

It will sadly not be the last incident like this on an airport, next time I hope for same outcome as the BA one.

Whatever else they did they still got it in the air and underpants can be changed.

If 411 had said:
"A Captain is a Captain period."
Would that seem "overbearing" or "correct"? :hmm:

I have to agree with 411 here (and that isn't usual). A company pays for a pilot to fly an aircraft. They expect that pilot to get the aircraft from "A" to "B". If it is a complex aircraft, they hire a junior pilot as "load relief" - but the pilot hired to get the aircraft from "A" to "B" is the same guy.

Speak up - fine.

Understand that is the limit of your role, unless you are convinced your (and the passenger's) lives are in danger. In the vast majority of cases, the Captain knows the situation, has seen it many times before, and hasn't the time (at THAT time) to explain it - after all, they are the only pilot the company is paying to be responsible for the flight.

Yes - there are occasional guys who have slipped through the system, have made Captain and are still prepared to risk the aircraft to push a bad approach. The FO's job is to report them, before they become a risk - not to struggle for control on a single approach.

The problem with "complete role reversal", ie taxi, take-off etc etc is that the FO thinks that they know the entire job. You don't know the job until you look to the left, and see nothing but your reflection looking back at you.

I must admit to not reading the whole report but looking at the chart the airport seems quite simple from the point of view of layout, taxi routes etc.

Therein lies the trap methinks. If you're taxiing around a "complex" airport then you're much more likely to carry out a thorough briefing and also be monitoring carefully where you are. Of course this should apply wherever you are.

@fdr: when the hell did that happen?

you mean by 30 as in three zero tons???? has anyone investigated this?

Best regards
AN2 Driver

As an ex BA pilot I agree with the 'What if this had been RyanAir?' comments.

I think it is great bedtime reading for everyone. It is such a simple example of the Swiss cheese analogy and I have to say, I thought 'There but for the grace etc.'

I have certainly been in a position where I should have spoken up but didn't. I have also spoken up and been wrong.
We are not paid to protect our fragile little egos. We are paid not to crash. So speak up; be wrong; it's only your ego; not a fireball.

Just in from pub - hope the foregoing makes sense and isn't too hectoring.

Actually yes 777 has RAAS. Both Boeing and Honeywell have had the ability to deliver RAAS in the 777 since late 2009 (after this incident) and I believe United is operating with it now. The Boeing version will callout "On Runway, x,xxx Remaining" if the aircraft aligns with less than an operator specified distance remaining, and as the aircraft exceeds 40 knots will then yell "Caution Short Runway, Short Runway".

You seem to be confusing "role reversal" with how we conduct operations in BA, specifically, the monitored approach. It works fine (I appreciate a lot of other airlines don't use it) and at least gives you both something of interest to do in the flight.

Your attitude is appalling, which is, no doubt why you reside in a desert, and work in one, flying a heap of junk, that most people retired years ago. I pity any FO that has to fly with you.

Back to the original thread... and how do we help prevent this from happening in the future.

I think we are long overdue for a display of taxi charts and current aircraft position on an MFD while taxying the airplane. Maybe even program the taxi route so it highlights the route to follow.

It is my understanding that many corporate jets have this great tool. Airliners are overdue....

Hmmm...One wonders what other nonsense BA has come up with...?:rolleyes:
From the report on this very serious incident, it certainly seems that BA pilots are so busy congratulating each other on a job well done:eek::eek:while at the same time a few of 'em are unable to determine just where on the airport they truly are...:{:{

Some comments and some questions: First, the trainee controller does not seem like the brightest bulb on the Xmas tree. A simple reply like "You are at Bravo, not Alpha" would have been good. Second, as someone has already pointed out, the mistaken identity of the intersections was almost a weekly event, yet the supervisor left the trainee controller without supervision, and the airport authorities had not done anything in terms of signage to stop these repeated errors.

Now for my questions: What percentage of professional air carrier pilots would have backtracked Rwy 07 for a full length departure? An extra 400m is, well, an extra 400m! Also, was the crew's decision to use flaps 20 made early in the process, or was that selection made after the captain commented that the runway looked short? How much benefit was derived by powering up while braked? If this had not been done, how much extra runway might have been needed before the mains left the ground?