TAP extra long landing
Only half a speed-brake
Firstly the terminology. Having calculated the exact same value of 450m independently before for my small Airbus, that is not the TDZ as the word is understood. Nominal distance-to-touchdown for sure, why not say 350-550 m is a 'valid touchdown range' where the landing performance figures are not invalidated. That is to say, the inherent margins from the calculation will cover ~100 m loss. (if the attempt was legally justified to begin with, unlike MK1602).
TDZ is commonly understood as either
a) 900 m or 1/3 of the runway whichever comes shorter (various ALAR toolkits)
b) the first part that is painted with TDZ zone markings.
now, A) above is an utterly useless concept that is a repeated pain to unlearn on all the performance and landing safety courses we would attend, design, teach or audit.
but B) has good merit. Since there are rules (ugly exceptions such as Burbank 9 notwithstanding), if the touchdown is not happening before the markings end the pilots can read that and need to understand beyond those all of the performance margins could be long eaten up. Thus pushing or allowing one's self to complete the landing becomes a stunt, similar to flying on 4 red PAPIs. One cannot evaluate any more how bad it is and there is no protection or recognition pattern to judge if it is becoming suicidal. Not that there are many tools left once REVs get deployed anyhow-
Real men don't touch beyond the painted zone, no matter the runway length. It is a display of professionalism, resolve and upholding of standards expected from the PIC authority.
While you may have retired successfully and I still have only 15 yrs to go, there are bright colleagues starting their careers as we type. They will need to do better than both of us when 4th stripe arrives.
Happily retired but there was a time that some airlines had a fuel policy devised by some - sitting at a desk or climbing the greasy pole.
I remember having to explain my fuel load.
Said —- thought that even if Porto Santo parking was full.
Just land & stay on the Runway. i.e No excuse for taking Canary diversion fuel.
Hopefully that type of pressure is long gone.
I remember having to explain my fuel load.
Said —- thought that even if Porto Santo parking was full.
Just land & stay on the Runway. i.e No excuse for taking Canary diversion fuel.
Hopefully that type of pressure is long gone.
Absolutely !
If the alternate of PXO Porto Santo's parking ramp could already be full, and/or the weather there is also marginal, then one is looking at going to LPA or TFS - 250nm south.
Or, you have to go back north to Faro or Lisbon.
Flight planning for Madeira was/is crucial, with all 'areas' covered in the scenario.
As for Video posted on here of the TAP A321neo long flare and landing long,
perhaps one may muse that as the TAP Crew are 'locals', they maybe of the mindset as they have a 'local' confidence, they know/think they can do it.
(We could also call that complacency of course)
I am not excusing this landing at all for those opinions, but we do know that many accidents in the past (Including the TAP 727 at Madeira in 1977) was the cause in/or in part.
FD, Re your point B),
This assumes that an 'acceptable' point of touchdown wrt the markings will provide sufficient runway remaining in which to stop.
Whilst in most normal operations the remaining distance is sufficient, the operation is still based on an assumption which might not hold in all circumstances because of the uncertainty about the remaining ground roll distance - depends where you touchdown. i.e you can land within a generalised zone (TDZ markings), but still be wrong.
Furthermore, 'inherent margins' are generally unknown, with wide variations according to conditions, accuracy of reporting, how the landing is flown - slightly high, slightly fast - most of the margin already used.
LDA constant; LDR variable.
We are slaves of our perception
This assumes that an 'acceptable' point of touchdown wrt the markings will provide sufficient runway remaining in which to stop.
Whilst in most normal operations the remaining distance is sufficient, the operation is still based on an assumption which might not hold in all circumstances because of the uncertainty about the remaining ground roll distance - depends where you touchdown. i.e you can land within a generalised zone (TDZ markings), but still be wrong.
Furthermore, 'inherent margins' are generally unknown, with wide variations according to conditions, accuracy of reporting, how the landing is flown - slightly high, slightly fast - most of the margin already used.
LDA constant; LDR variable.
We are slaves of our perception
We are slaves of our perception
Rog, et al, for thought, debate.
Because we can see the flare - video, it is labeled after the fact as … (derogatory), yet this event apparently resulted in a 'safe' operation.
Safe - minimising the risk of harm, i.e. stop before the runway end using normal, predefined procedures, regulations.
What if another video was taken of a 'good' flare and touchdown, but unseen, late application of lift dump, reverse, brakes, resulted in the same outcome, the same stopping distance, the same margin of safety ?
We label only that which we see; a limitation of outcome-based safety management and hindsight.
Because we can see the flare - video, it is labeled after the fact as … (derogatory), yet this event apparently resulted in a 'safe' operation.
Safe - minimising the risk of harm, i.e. stop before the runway end using normal, predefined procedures, regulations.
What if another video was taken of a 'good' flare and touchdown, but unseen, late application of lift dump, reverse, brakes, resulted in the same outcome, the same stopping distance, the same margin of safety ?
We label only that which we see; a limitation of outcome-based safety management and hindsight.
Many posts mention fixed distances as positional references, but landing performance involves so many variables it cannot be considered static.
The position where the wheels touch the ground will vary with each landing.
The distance required to stop varies with situational conditions; reported conditions may not be accurate.
Landing overruns still feature high in safety statistics; is the industry missing something.
LCY was mentioned an example of fixed distance markings (and lights); are these still in use after runway lengthening (by a small amount).
Current operator comment ?
The position where the wheels touch the ground will vary with each landing.
The distance required to stop varies with situational conditions; reported conditions may not be accurate.
Landing overruns still feature high in safety statistics; is the industry missing something.
LCY was mentioned an example of fixed distance markings (and lights); are these still in use after runway lengthening (by a small amount).
Current operator comment ?
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I wish They design alarm which starts timing at crossing the threshold and rings a bell at 10seconds. The pilot just applies reverse or TOGA. No third option.
Generally the problem is initial flare. At correct flare altitude of 20 or 30 feet at ROD of 700 to 800ft the flare should cut the ROD by half which is to be judged looking outside. After that even if nothing is done acceptable landing results. Even overweight landing limit is 360ft/mt.
Generally the problem is initial flare. At correct flare altitude of 20 or 30 feet at ROD of 700 to 800ft the flare should cut the ROD by half which is to be judged looking outside. After that even if nothing is done acceptable landing results. Even overweight landing limit is 360ft/mt.
Last edited by vilas; 22nd Jul 2023 at 11:59.
The Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) is made up of two sub-functions: runway overrun warning (ROW) and runway overrun protection (ROP). The ROW function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to perform a Go-Around whereas the ROP function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to apply available deceleration means.
ROPS was certified for:
Airbus A380 in 2009
Airbus A320 Family in 2013
Airbus A350 in 2014
Airbus A330 in 2015
I am not sure if this a 'standard fit' piece of kit, or an optional extra.
Runway Overrun Prevention System
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Airbus DO have such a system --- Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS)
The Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) is made up of two sub-functions: runway overrun warning (ROW) and runway overrun protection (ROP). The ROW function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to perform a Go-Around whereas the ROP function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to apply available deceleration means.
ROPS was certified for:
Airbus A380 in 2009
Airbus A320 Family in 2013
Airbus A350 in 2014
Airbus A330 in 2015
I am not sure if this a 'standard fit' piece of kit, or an optional extra.
Runway Overrun Prevention System
The Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) is made up of two sub-functions: runway overrun warning (ROW) and runway overrun protection (ROP). The ROW function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to perform a Go-Around whereas the ROP function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to apply available deceleration means.
ROPS was certified for:
Airbus A380 in 2009
Airbus A320 Family in 2013
Airbus A350 in 2014
Airbus A330 in 2015
I am not sure if this a 'standard fit' piece of kit, or an optional extra.
Runway Overrun Prevention System
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Airbus DO have such a system --- Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS)
The Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) is made up of two sub-functions: runway overrun warning (ROW) and runway overrun protection (ROP). The ROW function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to perform a Go-Around whereas the ROP function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to apply available deceleration means.
ROPS was certified for:
Airbus A380 in 2009
Airbus A320 Family in 2013
Airbus A350 in 2014
Airbus A330 in 2015
I am not sure if this a 'standard fit' piece of kit, or an optional extra.
Runway Overrun Prevention System
The Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) is made up of two sub-functions: runway overrun warning (ROW) and runway overrun protection (ROP). The ROW function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to perform a Go-Around whereas the ROP function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to apply available deceleration means.
ROPS was certified for:
Airbus A380 in 2009
Airbus A320 Family in 2013
Airbus A350 in 2014
Airbus A330 in 2015
I am not sure if this a 'standard fit' piece of kit, or an optional extra.
Runway Overrun Prevention System
...B
Last edited by 1southernman; 22nd Jul 2023 at 12:40.
Flew the 320/319 for 9 yrs and don't remember ROP, etc. or any training for it...But then again my adult kids wore name tags for me growing up so...Anyway I don't think more bells, etc. in this type of incident would help...Training and FOQA would and I can see this type of event as a great recurrent scenario...B
I gather the 2016 EK 777-300 crash-land at DXB also had a ''long land'' call out feature enabled and IIRC was heard on the CVR. Still did not save the plane.
If memory serves it caused the decision to go around which was then poorly executed causing the crash. Had they ignored the call the landing would have been completed without incident.
However I heard that if one is ignoring the ''call out'' this was against/verboten of the EK FCOM/SOPs, and thus would have meant up in the Office with the CP, with no tea, and def no biccies.
I guess this one was possibly neither + the P45's ?
The alerting system in the EK accident differed significantly from ROPS, so too the procedures.
ROPS is predominantly predictive system which alerts the crew to possible limiting conditions for landing before touchdown; an amber level alert.
After touchdown it provides instructions for the crew to mitigate a potential overrun if the conditions are not as expected; a red level warning.
ROPS has knowledge of the runway length and some met conditions, aircraft config and selected autobrake level.
The runway condition is as entered by the crew, thus some uncertainty.
https://flightsafety.org/wp-content/...ogan-Jones.pdf
The EK system was purely advisory and based on a distance beyond the runway threshold, not proportional to the actual runway length. Also the operator mandated a GA with any alert (amber level).
Thus the system had a different meaning than normal on the very long runway (EK).
The SOP was less relevant for safe operation with potential for confusion and ambiguity, which might have contributed to the final outcome. Also the aircraft did not indicate to the crew the change of system state, mode of operation for GA at low altitude.
The EK system might have been of value at Funchal; an audio alert - a fixed distance marker, but not at all like the benefit the ROPS provides.
ROPS is predominantly predictive system which alerts the crew to possible limiting conditions for landing before touchdown; an amber level alert.
After touchdown it provides instructions for the crew to mitigate a potential overrun if the conditions are not as expected; a red level warning.
ROPS has knowledge of the runway length and some met conditions, aircraft config and selected autobrake level.
The runway condition is as entered by the crew, thus some uncertainty.
https://flightsafety.org/wp-content/...ogan-Jones.pdf
The EK system was purely advisory and based on a distance beyond the runway threshold, not proportional to the actual runway length. Also the operator mandated a GA with any alert (amber level).
Thus the system had a different meaning than normal on the very long runway (EK).
The SOP was less relevant for safe operation with potential for confusion and ambiguity, which might have contributed to the final outcome. Also the aircraft did not indicate to the crew the change of system state, mode of operation for GA at low altitude.
The EK system might have been of value at Funchal; an audio alert - a fixed distance marker, but not at all like the benefit the ROPS provides.
I rarely post, choosing to respect the decisions made by the individuals involved because none of us speculators are at the controls at the time these events happen.
However…. when I watched the video it appeared to me that the PF was looking to grease it on. Then, as the distance markers flashed by, my opinion changed to the wind must have kicked in and things were going south quick. Nevertheless, unless there were extenuating circumstances that we don’t know about, a GA should have been called for.
However…. when I watched the video it appeared to me that the PF was looking to grease it on. Then, as the distance markers flashed by, my opinion changed to the wind must have kicked in and things were going south quick. Nevertheless, unless there were extenuating circumstances that we don’t know about, a GA should have been called for.
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Pulling off a greaser is a real thrill. Sadly!
I take the old saying "any landing you walk away from is a good landing" as a warning against the quest for greasers: the important thing is that your landings be predictable and repeatable. The attempt to do better than that is a distraction.
My friends here shall kindly refrain from inquiring into my success at resisting that distraction, thankyouverymuch.
I take the old saying "any landing you walk away from is a good landing" as a warning against the quest for greasers: the important thing is that your landings be predictable and repeatable. The attempt to do better than that is a distraction.
My friends here shall kindly refrain from inquiring into my success at resisting that distraction, thankyouverymuch.
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Originally Posted by Vilas
Or rather had ROPs not been installed the crew would've landed with an innocuous overrun
Ah thanks, so I recall, yes.
However I heard that if one is ignoring the ''call out'' this was against/verboten of the EK FCOM/SOPs, and thus would have meant up in the Office with the CP, with no tea, and def no biccies.
I guess this one was possibly neither + the P45's ?
However I heard that if one is ignoring the ''call out'' this was against/verboten of the EK FCOM/SOPs, and thus would have meant up in the Office with the CP, with no tea, and def no biccies.
I guess this one was possibly neither + the P45's ?