A350 pilot startled by windshear alarm
Thanks Stilton for your bringing up the "soft go-around." Some years ago I was riding on Lufthansa from Frankfurt to Cairo. Weather CAVU. While on approach at about 1500 feet, suddenly the nose pitched up and TOGA came on abruptly. Scared the **** out of me and many of my fellow passengers. What happened? The runway was fouled by a slow-departing aircraft. Clearly a gentle application and gentle pulling up the nose was the appropriate thing to do. No point in upsetting the fare-paying passengers. Nufsaid.
I enjoy the arrogance of all the pilots here who never make mistakes and were born with 10,000 hours of hand flying skills. The "Children of the Magenta" line has been trotted out since 1997 when Cpt Vanderburgh first posited it. That was 24 years ago fellas. The 20 year old cadets back then are now the 44 year old line training captains. The 30 year old senior first officers/new captains are 54 year old management pilots. The 40 year old training captains became 64 year old heads of fleets/chiefs of some department or other and they had the power to direct and control training for 24 YEARS! You need more time to redirect training? How much more time? 50 years?
And to push the blame onto the new pilots of today/Children of the Magenta in 2021 is hypocrisy in it's truest form. You were Children of the Magenta and you created and trained and reinforced everything for decades. Please tell me how a 21 year old cadet is supposed to develop hand flying skills etc with a training department and FDM that specifically prohibits it? Who's fault is that? The 21 yold kid eager to learn? Or all these older 'experts' who are just magic?
Wakeup and see where the real issue is; we might just get a nice swansong before automation replaces us all 100%
And to push the blame onto the new pilots of today/Children of the Magenta in 2021 is hypocrisy in it's truest form. You were Children of the Magenta and you created and trained and reinforced everything for decades. Please tell me how a 21 year old cadet is supposed to develop hand flying skills etc with a training department and FDM that specifically prohibits it? Who's fault is that? The 21 yold kid eager to learn? Or all these older 'experts' who are just magic?
Wakeup and see where the real issue is; we might just get a nice swansong before automation replaces us all 100%
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For an English translation of the original French report on this event, go to the very first post of this thread, to the AvHerald link. On the third paragraph where it says "final report" it is a link to an English translation courtesy of the BEA.
There was a time in which I used to go around 8 times a week to this airport. From the Metars on AvHerald, it looks like the typical frontal weather moving from west to east. The TCUs pass over Paris and continue on their easterly movement, and start to "party" 10 or 15 miles east of Paris due to the excitation of passing over the town. This is the area where the approach is done to Orly, and often one has to endure some turbulence and ask to avoid the worst of it. Often it is clear skies to the west of the airport, but to the east, on the approach path, it looks ugly. For sure some turbulence was likely at the time, but I doubt that they had a Microburst on top of them, or ahead of them.
It seems that now the machine decides and orders a Go-around when its inbuilt parameters are reached, instead of just advising of possible Windsheer ahead. "GO AROUND, WINDSHEER AHEAD"
There was a time in which I used to go around 8 times a week to this airport. From the Metars on AvHerald, it looks like the typical frontal weather moving from west to east. The TCUs pass over Paris and continue on their easterly movement, and start to "party" 10 or 15 miles east of Paris due to the excitation of passing over the town. This is the area where the approach is done to Orly, and often one has to endure some turbulence and ask to avoid the worst of it. Often it is clear skies to the west of the airport, but to the east, on the approach path, it looks ugly. For sure some turbulence was likely at the time, but I doubt that they had a Microburst on top of them, or ahead of them.
It seems that now the machine decides and orders a Go-around when its inbuilt parameters are reached, instead of just advising of possible Windsheer ahead. "GO AROUND, WINDSHEER AHEAD"
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Even with Airbus without the function it’s very simple. Just go back to climb detent after setting the thrust levers to TOGA. Makes life much easier. Well in that incident even with soft go around function it did not help much but I guess if they have used TOGA only it would have been much worst.
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BoeingDriver99
Where I come from 30 years ago you wouldn’t get near a domestic airline without 3000 hours and lots of twin time.
Because the recruiters knew that the entry level jet was two-pilot.
Thats the point.
Where I come from 30 years ago you wouldn’t get near a domestic airline without 3000 hours and lots of twin time.
Because the recruiters knew that the entry level jet was two-pilot.
Thats the point.
Roj approved
I’m sure it is, the 767 was the last aircraft I flew
My point is, this GA function was a big step forward from the aircraft I flew before, the MD80 which went to full power with GA selection and it took a lot of ‘restraining’ !
I’m sure it is, the 767 was the last aircraft I flew
My point is, this GA function was a big step forward from the aircraft I flew before, the MD80 which went to full power with GA selection and it took a lot of ‘restraining’ !
G’day pineteam,
Ahh, the old “TOGA TAP”, it works well when executed correctly.
One of the local operators in AUS have a checkered history with it. Jetstar A320 Go Around Melbourne
From watching the BEA video, and reading this from Airbus, https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/intro...ound-function/
the “SOFT GA” is a variation on that, Levers to TOGA -> FLEX/MCT to get the Soft Go Around.
Unfortunately the most important part was forgotten, FLY the aircraft, they did everything but control the pitch.
Roughly 1 minute without any side stick inputs to arrest the rate of climb, but the Gear came up, Flaps were retracted, Thrust levers moved and the FCU was fiddled with.
The added distraction of the Traffic probably contributed to the second mishandling event, but eventually, the Captain got it under control.
It is a good reminder to establish who is “In Control” and what the aircraft is doing, IE: KNOW THE FMA.
A second push on the TOGA switch gives you full noise, SOFT -> FULL, so it’s the opposite to the Airbus FULL-> SOFT.
From memory, if W/S, GPWS or a GA, just push the TOGA button AND push the Thrust Levers to Full Thrust. Maybe the Boeing guys can confirm?
Ahh, the old “TOGA TAP”, it works well when executed correctly.
One of the local operators in AUS have a checkered history with it. Jetstar A320 Go Around Melbourne
From watching the BEA video, and reading this from Airbus, https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/intro...ound-function/
the “SOFT GA” is a variation on that, Levers to TOGA -> FLEX/MCT to get the Soft Go Around.
Unfortunately the most important part was forgotten, FLY the aircraft, they did everything but control the pitch.
Roughly 1 minute without any side stick inputs to arrest the rate of climb, but the Gear came up, Flaps were retracted, Thrust levers moved and the FCU was fiddled with.
The added distraction of the Traffic probably contributed to the second mishandling event, but eventually, the Captain got it under control.
It is a good reminder to establish who is “In Control” and what the aircraft is doing, IE: KNOW THE FMA.
From memory, if W/S, GPWS or a GA, just push the TOGA button AND push the Thrust Levers to Full Thrust. Maybe the Boeing guys can confirm?
Last edited by Roj approved; 19th Jul 2021 at 07:13.
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Jet Star incident was due to company's incorrectly revised procedure about missed approach. Perhaps somebody forgetting to raise gear in a GA in the past, Jetstar relegated FMA check after gear was selected up. In this Melbourne go around the pilot inadvertently pushed thrust levers short of TOGA or full forward position. The aircraft remained in approach phase. The PF didn't check FMA as per the revised procedure but waited for positive climb call from PM to order gear up. The PM waited for the positive climb which didn't happen because FDs were in approach phase and taking them down. Vis was below CAT1 minimum, at 35ft. PF ignored the FDs and pulled up the aircraft. After this incident Jetstar reverted back to the correct Airbus procedure of first TOGA, then confirm GA phase by checking the FMA only then everything else. There were two other airlines involved in similar incidents. Actually even with full TOGA power there's no need to play with thrust levers preemptively. What needs to be remembered is the moment SRS changes to OP CLB it signals acceleration and eyes must shift to the speed tape and order immediate flap retraction. That creates sufficient space for other activities like thrust reduction and next flap reduction.
vilas
In the event of a GPWS terrain warning, the procedure is to disengage the autopilot and auto throttle and "aggressively apply maximum thrust" while pitching up. The TOGA switches are irrelevant in that situation.
In the event of a GPWS terrain warning, the procedure is to disengage the autopilot and auto throttle and "aggressively apply maximum thrust" while pitching up. The TOGA switches are irrelevant in that situation.
iceman50
Yes I am deadly serious. This was taught to me by a very experienced senior Captain. Flying is a team effort and you both need to be on the same page. If one pilot can detect a problem approaching - for example you as PF are touching the end stops on the side-stick while flying a turbulent approach, then it makes very good sense to tell PM you might need to go-around, and get them primed so they are ready. Why wouldn't you ? Talk to me Goose.
If the other pilot is a few hundred hour newbie, it makes even more sense, otherwise you might be doing an OPI (one pilot inoperative), go-around, and potentially forgetting the gear and the speed brake in the process.
Yes I am deadly serious. This was taught to me by a very experienced senior Captain. Flying is a team effort and you both need to be on the same page. If one pilot can detect a problem approaching - for example you as PF are touching the end stops on the side-stick while flying a turbulent approach, then it makes very good sense to tell PM you might need to go-around, and get them primed so they are ready. Why wouldn't you ? Talk to me Goose.
If the other pilot is a few hundred hour newbie, it makes even more sense, otherwise you might be doing an OPI (one pilot inoperative), go-around, and potentially forgetting the gear and the speed brake in the process.
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All engines operating high energy go arounds are statistically speaking one of the most screwed-up manoeuvres within our Industry. There are tons of very well written articles and safety briefings reporting events and incidents over the past years involving mismanaged go arounds and the bottom line is to brief and rehearse the actions during the approach briefing highlighting the important threats. And this is another thing: threats briefings. Pilots tend to look for threats all over the place because it must be included in the briefing, it is in the SOPs so we must talk about some threats. Excellent, that is very true, but we must talk about real threats, stuff that is beneficial to us. During line checks or sim checks I occasionally see pilots talking about threats such as "Atc, terrain, weather, complex taxi routing... anything else?" How effective is this? Zero, but hey you've considered many important aspects so you can put the checkmark on the threats part of the approach briefing. Threats must be very specific and as pilots we must have a few very clear key points for the approach (same as for departure btw) that stick to our brain to prevent getting caught in the action.
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Uplinker
I think it’s quite a sensible thing to do. My last company would have us each walk through our RTO actions in sequence at the start of each pairing (or maybe it was each day). Whatever it was, I thought it was a great idea, even if it did make the briefing a bit longer.
I think it’s quite a sensible thing to do. My last company would have us each walk through our RTO actions in sequence at the start of each pairing (or maybe it was each day). Whatever it was, I thought it was a great idea, even if it did make the briefing a bit longer.
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Coming back to A350 pilot's startle case, today exactly 32 years ago United flight 232 with catastrophic failure of tail mounted engine, the flight controls became disfunctional. It was a fit case for Capt Haynes and crew to get a heart attack but they kept their wits about and worked out a procedure to use thrust to pitch up and down and asymmetric thrust for bank. They created history by controlled crash landing and saving 184 lives out of 296. And here a false windshear warning knocked the crew out of their wit and for some time nobody knew what was happening. Are some more humans than the others? I remember hypnosis shows in which the hypnotist says ,"Sleep" and the person flops into unconsciousness. If this is going to happen in the air then it's a terrible human factor. In that case pilots would need to be checked for hypersensitivity to stress, startle or whatever you may call it.
Last edited by vilas; 19th Jul 2021 at 14:22.
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Uplinker
You conveniently modified my post in your reply to "pre briefing a memory item".
In your first post you stated "Ready for windshear memory drill?.........Windshear TOGA". My question was if you had a windshear warning were you seriously going to say "Ready for windshear memory drill?.........Windshear TOGA". Rather than act calling "Windshear TOGA", I was not questioning the prebriefing of any actions that might be required on an approach, all good airmanship. But the way you wrote your comment was you would waffle before acting losing possible valuable seconds and altitude in a real windshear event.
You conveniently modified my post in your reply to "pre briefing a memory item".
In your first post you stated "Ready for windshear memory drill?.........Windshear TOGA". My question was if you had a windshear warning were you seriously going to say "Ready for windshear memory drill?.........Windshear TOGA". Rather than act calling "Windshear TOGA", I was not questioning the prebriefing of any actions that might be required on an approach, all good airmanship. But the way you wrote your comment was you would waffle before acting losing possible valuable seconds and altitude in a real windshear event.
It would help if posters referred to the report (https://www.bea.aero/fileadmin/user_...20-0065.en.pdf) so that questions can be posed based on a common document.
PF surprised - this was in relation to ‘the day’s meteorological conditions, the predictive windshear warning’ (page 9).
The PM initiated the GA; the checklist had a note (before the memory items !), that after risk assessment a predictive (Red) warning could be disregarded !
The ‘captain-PM who called out “Go-Around”, the copilot-PF had replied, “Go-Around flaps” and the captain retracted one notch of flaps’; the soft GA mode was used, which with config change suggested a normal GA - missed approach procedure (page 10).
The narrative suggests that the crew were ‘behind the aircraft’ after GA selection(PF thought the AP was engaged), and due to the lower than standard altitude limit, coincident with a procedural turn.
The Capt took control after the Alt Bust, aiming to regain the cleared altitude. There was conflicting traffic above, ATC requested a turn. Further ATC calls added urgency about the traffic, and then cleared the aircraft for further climb; potential for high task workload, with distracting aircraft alerts, and ATC calls.
The report covers the scenario from each crew members viewpoint.
Pre briefing specific drills (based on hindsight), #97 could bias crews to select incorrect procedures - this event only required a missed approach or even none at all.
PF surprised - this was in relation to ‘the day’s meteorological conditions, the predictive windshear warning’ (page 9).
The PM initiated the GA; the checklist had a note (before the memory items !), that after risk assessment a predictive (Red) warning could be disregarded !
The ‘captain-PM who called out “Go-Around”, the copilot-PF had replied, “Go-Around flaps” and the captain retracted one notch of flaps’; the soft GA mode was used, which with config change suggested a normal GA - missed approach procedure (page 10).
The narrative suggests that the crew were ‘behind the aircraft’ after GA selection(PF thought the AP was engaged), and due to the lower than standard altitude limit, coincident with a procedural turn.
The Capt took control after the Alt Bust, aiming to regain the cleared altitude. There was conflicting traffic above, ATC requested a turn. Further ATC calls added urgency about the traffic, and then cleared the aircraft for further climb; potential for high task workload, with distracting aircraft alerts, and ATC calls.
The report covers the scenario from each crew members viewpoint.
Pre briefing specific drills (based on hindsight), #97 could bias crews to select incorrect procedures - this event only required a missed approach or even none at all.
Interspersed with the usual playing of the man rather than the ball, there are some interesting views being expressed here. My own view is that this is a training issue and I agree that the sim should be used more for training than testing.
However, I don't think you can point the finger quite so directly at the regulator here:
(post #29). We have been in a race to the bottom for some years and this is down to the operators who demand the cheapest possible TR or differences training for their pilots. The manufacturers respond to pressure from the customers and design a training system that will just meet the standard and must then convince the certifying regulator that it does, and adjusts it if not. The regulator then 'accepts' (rather than approves) the manufacturer's evidence that the training is up to the mark.
This is all about commercial pressure and the bottom line for the shareholder. Until the operators all accept that training needs to be taken seriously (as some do already) we will end up with a system where crews are 'just good enough'. Until they are not...
However, I don't think you can point the finger quite so directly at the regulator here:
...the regulator that want the pilot be trained at minimum level
This is all about commercial pressure and the bottom line for the shareholder. Until the operators all accept that training needs to be taken seriously (as some do already) we will end up with a system where crews are 'just good enough'. Until they are not...